2001-10-03 17:10:38 +04:00
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/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
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2008-03-23 00:29:41 +03:00
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// $Id: ctrl_xfer16.cc,v 1.54 2008-03-22 21:29:39 sshwarts Exp $
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2001-10-03 17:10:38 +04:00
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/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
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//
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2001-04-10 06:20:02 +04:00
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// Copyright (C) 2001 MandrakeSoft S.A.
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2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
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//
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// MandrakeSoft S.A.
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// 43, rue d'Aboukir
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// 75002 Paris - France
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// http://www.linux-mandrake.com/
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// http://www.mandrakesoft.com/
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//
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// This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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// modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
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// License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
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// version 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
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//
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// This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
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// Lesser General Public License for more details.
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//
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// You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
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// License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
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// Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
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2007-11-17 21:08:46 +03:00
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/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
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2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
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2001-05-24 22:46:34 +04:00
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#define NEED_CPU_REG_SHORTCUTS 1
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2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
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#include "bochs.h"
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2006-03-07 01:03:16 +03:00
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#include "cpu.h"
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merge in BRANCH-io-cleanup.
To see the commit logs for this use either cvsweb or
cvs update -r BRANCH-io-cleanup and then 'cvs log' the various files.
In general this provides a generic interface for logging.
logfunctions:: is a class that is inherited by some classes, and also
. allocated as a standalone global called 'genlog'. All logging uses
. one of the ::info(), ::error(), ::ldebug(), ::panic() methods of this
. class through 'BX_INFO(), BX_ERROR(), BX_DEBUG(), BX_PANIC()' macros
. respectively.
.
. An example usage:
. BX_INFO(("Hello, World!\n"));
iofunctions:: is a class that is allocated once by default, and assigned
as the iofunction of each logfunctions instance. It is this class that
maintains the file descriptor and other output related code, at this
point using vfprintf(). At some future point, someone may choose to
write a gui 'console' for bochs to which messages would be redirected
simply by assigning a different iofunction class to the various logfunctions
objects.
More cleanup is coming, but this works for now. If you want to see alot
of debugging output, in main.cc, change onoff[LOGLEV_DEBUG]=0 to =1.
Comments, bugs, flames, to me: todd@fries.net
2001-05-15 18:49:57 +04:00
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#define LOG_THIS BX_CPU_THIS_PTR
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2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
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2007-11-24 17:22:34 +03:00
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// Make code more tidy with a few macros.
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#if BX_SUPPORT_X86_64==0
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#define RSP ESP
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#endif
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2008-03-23 00:29:41 +03:00
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void BX_CPP_AttrRegparmN(1) BX_CPU_C::RETnear16_Iw(bxInstruction_c *i)
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2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
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{
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#if BX_DEBUGGER
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BX_CPU_THIS_PTR show_flag |= Flag_ret;
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#endif
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2007-11-24 17:22:34 +03:00
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BX_CPU_THIS_PTR speculative_rsp = 1;
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BX_CPU_THIS_PTR prev_rsp = RSP;
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2007-12-20 21:29:42 +03:00
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Bit16u return_IP = pop_16();
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2004-11-02 20:31:14 +03:00
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2007-12-30 23:16:35 +03:00
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if (return_IP > BX_CPU_THIS_PTR sregs[BX_SEG_REG_CS].cache.u.segment.limit_scaled)
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2004-11-02 21:05:19 +03:00
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{
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BX_ERROR(("retnear_iw: IP > limit"));
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exception(BX_GP_EXCEPTION, 0, 0);
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2004-11-02 19:10:02 +03:00
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}
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2004-11-02 20:31:14 +03:00
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2004-11-02 21:05:19 +03:00
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EIP = return_IP;
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2005-02-17 00:27:21 +03:00
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Bit16u imm16 = i->Iw();
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2004-11-02 20:31:14 +03:00
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|
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|
I integrated my hacks to get Linux/x86-64 booting. To keep
these from interfering from a normal compile here's what I did.
In config.h.in (which will generate config.h after a configure),
I added a #define called KPL64Hacks:
#define KPL64Hacks
*After* running configure, you must set this by hand. It will
default to off, so you won't get my hacks in a normal compile.
This will go away soon. There is also a macro just after that
called BailBigRSP(). You don't need to enabled that, but you
can. In many of the instructions which seemed like they could
be hit by the fetchdecode64() process, but which also touched
EIP/ESP, I inserted a macro. Usually this macro expands to nothing.
If you like, you can enabled it, and it will panic if it finds
the upper bits of RIP/RSP set. This helped me find bugs.
Also, I cleaned up the emulation in ctrl_xfer{8,16,32}.cc.
There were some really old legacy code snippets which directly
accessed operands on the stack with access_linear. Lots of
ugly code instead of just pop_32() etc. Cleaning those up,
minimized the number of instructions which directly manipulate
the stack pointer, which should help in refining 64-bit support.
2002-09-24 04:44:56 +04:00
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if (BX_CPU_THIS_PTR sregs[BX_SEG_REG_SS].cache.u.segment.d_b) /* 32bit stack */
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2005-02-17 00:27:21 +03:00
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ESP += imm16;
|
I integrated my hacks to get Linux/x86-64 booting. To keep
these from interfering from a normal compile here's what I did.
In config.h.in (which will generate config.h after a configure),
I added a #define called KPL64Hacks:
#define KPL64Hacks
*After* running configure, you must set this by hand. It will
default to off, so you won't get my hacks in a normal compile.
This will go away soon. There is also a macro just after that
called BailBigRSP(). You don't need to enabled that, but you
can. In many of the instructions which seemed like they could
be hit by the fetchdecode64() process, but which also touched
EIP/ESP, I inserted a macro. Usually this macro expands to nothing.
If you like, you can enabled it, and it will panic if it finds
the upper bits of RIP/RSP set. This helped me find bugs.
Also, I cleaned up the emulation in ctrl_xfer{8,16,32}.cc.
There were some really old legacy code snippets which directly
accessed operands on the stack with access_linear. Lots of
ugly code instead of just pop_32() etc. Cleaning those up,
minimized the number of instructions which directly manipulate
the stack pointer, which should help in refining 64-bit support.
2002-09-24 04:44:56 +04:00
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else
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2007-11-24 17:22:34 +03:00
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SP += imm16;
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BX_CPU_THIS_PTR speculative_rsp = 0;
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2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
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2003-02-13 18:04:11 +03:00
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BX_INSTR_UCNEAR_BRANCH(BX_CPU_ID, BX_INSTR_IS_RET, EIP);
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2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
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}
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2008-03-23 00:29:41 +03:00
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void BX_CPP_AttrRegparmN(1) BX_CPU_C::RETnear16(bxInstruction_c *i)
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2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
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{
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#if BX_DEBUGGER
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BX_CPU_THIS_PTR show_flag |= Flag_ret;
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#endif
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2007-11-24 17:22:34 +03:00
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BX_CPU_THIS_PTR speculative_rsp = 1;
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BX_CPU_THIS_PTR prev_rsp = RSP;
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2007-12-20 21:29:42 +03:00
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Bit16u return_IP = pop_16();
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2004-11-02 21:05:19 +03:00
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2007-12-30 23:16:35 +03:00
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if (return_IP > BX_CPU_THIS_PTR sregs[BX_SEG_REG_CS].cache.u.segment.limit_scaled)
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2004-11-02 21:05:19 +03:00
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{
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BX_ERROR(("retnear: IP > limit"));
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exception(BX_GP_EXCEPTION, 0, 0);
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2004-11-02 19:10:02 +03:00
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}
|
2004-11-02 21:05:19 +03:00
|
|
|
|
I integrated my hacks to get Linux/x86-64 booting. To keep
these from interfering from a normal compile here's what I did.
In config.h.in (which will generate config.h after a configure),
I added a #define called KPL64Hacks:
#define KPL64Hacks
*After* running configure, you must set this by hand. It will
default to off, so you won't get my hacks in a normal compile.
This will go away soon. There is also a macro just after that
called BailBigRSP(). You don't need to enabled that, but you
can. In many of the instructions which seemed like they could
be hit by the fetchdecode64() process, but which also touched
EIP/ESP, I inserted a macro. Usually this macro expands to nothing.
If you like, you can enabled it, and it will panic if it finds
the upper bits of RIP/RSP set. This helped me find bugs.
Also, I cleaned up the emulation in ctrl_xfer{8,16,32}.cc.
There were some really old legacy code snippets which directly
accessed operands on the stack with access_linear. Lots of
ugly code instead of just pop_32() etc. Cleaning those up,
minimized the number of instructions which directly manipulate
the stack pointer, which should help in refining 64-bit support.
2002-09-24 04:44:56 +04:00
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EIP = return_IP;
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2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
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2007-11-24 17:22:34 +03:00
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BX_CPU_THIS_PTR speculative_rsp = 0;
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2003-02-13 18:04:11 +03:00
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BX_INSTR_UCNEAR_BRANCH(BX_CPU_ID, BX_INSTR_IS_RET, EIP);
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2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
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}
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2008-03-23 00:29:41 +03:00
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void BX_CPP_AttrRegparmN(1) BX_CPU_C::RETfar16_Iw(bxInstruction_c *i)
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2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
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{
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Bit16s imm16;
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Bit16u ip, cs_raw;
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|
|
|
|
I integrated my hacks to get Linux/x86-64 booting. To keep
these from interfering from a normal compile here's what I did.
In config.h.in (which will generate config.h after a configure),
I added a #define called KPL64Hacks:
#define KPL64Hacks
*After* running configure, you must set this by hand. It will
default to off, so you won't get my hacks in a normal compile.
This will go away soon. There is also a macro just after that
called BailBigRSP(). You don't need to enabled that, but you
can. In many of the instructions which seemed like they could
be hit by the fetchdecode64() process, but which also touched
EIP/ESP, I inserted a macro. Usually this macro expands to nothing.
If you like, you can enabled it, and it will panic if it finds
the upper bits of RIP/RSP set. This helped me find bugs.
Also, I cleaned up the emulation in ctrl_xfer{8,16,32}.cc.
There were some really old legacy code snippets which directly
accessed operands on the stack with access_linear. Lots of
ugly code instead of just pop_32() etc. Cleaning those up,
minimized the number of instructions which directly manipulate
the stack pointer, which should help in refining 64-bit support.
2002-09-24 04:44:56 +04:00
|
|
|
invalidate_prefetch_q();
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|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
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#if BX_DEBUGGER
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BX_CPU_THIS_PTR show_flag |= Flag_ret;
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#endif
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2002-09-18 02:50:53 +04:00
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imm16 = i->Iw();
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2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
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|
2007-11-24 17:22:34 +03:00
|
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BX_CPU_THIS_PTR speculative_rsp = 1;
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BX_CPU_THIS_PTR prev_rsp = RSP;
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|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
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|
if (protected_mode()) {
|
2005-03-20 21:01:01 +03:00
|
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BX_CPU_THIS_PTR return_protected(i, imm16);
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
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|
goto done;
|
2005-02-17 00:27:21 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2007-12-20 21:29:42 +03:00
|
|
|
ip = pop_16();
|
|
|
|
cs_raw = pop_16();
|
2005-02-17 00:27:21 +03:00
|
|
|
|
I integrated my hacks to get Linux/x86-64 booting. To keep
these from interfering from a normal compile here's what I did.
In config.h.in (which will generate config.h after a configure),
I added a #define called KPL64Hacks:
#define KPL64Hacks
*After* running configure, you must set this by hand. It will
default to off, so you won't get my hacks in a normal compile.
This will go away soon. There is also a macro just after that
called BailBigRSP(). You don't need to enabled that, but you
can. In many of the instructions which seemed like they could
be hit by the fetchdecode64() process, but which also touched
EIP/ESP, I inserted a macro. Usually this macro expands to nothing.
If you like, you can enabled it, and it will panic if it finds
the upper bits of RIP/RSP set. This helped me find bugs.
Also, I cleaned up the emulation in ctrl_xfer{8,16,32}.cc.
There were some really old legacy code snippets which directly
accessed operands on the stack with access_linear. Lots of
ugly code instead of just pop_32() etc. Cleaning those up,
minimized the number of instructions which directly manipulate
the stack pointer, which should help in refining 64-bit support.
2002-09-24 04:44:56 +04:00
|
|
|
load_seg_reg(&BX_CPU_THIS_PTR sregs[BX_SEG_REG_CS], cs_raw);
|
2007-10-19 01:27:56 +04:00
|
|
|
EIP = (Bit32u) ip;
|
2005-02-17 00:27:21 +03:00
|
|
|
|
I integrated my hacks to get Linux/x86-64 booting. To keep
these from interfering from a normal compile here's what I did.
In config.h.in (which will generate config.h after a configure),
I added a #define called KPL64Hacks:
#define KPL64Hacks
*After* running configure, you must set this by hand. It will
default to off, so you won't get my hacks in a normal compile.
This will go away soon. There is also a macro just after that
called BailBigRSP(). You don't need to enabled that, but you
can. In many of the instructions which seemed like they could
be hit by the fetchdecode64() process, but which also touched
EIP/ESP, I inserted a macro. Usually this macro expands to nothing.
If you like, you can enabled it, and it will panic if it finds
the upper bits of RIP/RSP set. This helped me find bugs.
Also, I cleaned up the emulation in ctrl_xfer{8,16,32}.cc.
There were some really old legacy code snippets which directly
accessed operands on the stack with access_linear. Lots of
ugly code instead of just pop_32() etc. Cleaning those up,
minimized the number of instructions which directly manipulate
the stack pointer, which should help in refining 64-bit support.
2002-09-24 04:44:56 +04:00
|
|
|
if (BX_CPU_THIS_PTR sregs[BX_SEG_REG_SS].cache.u.segment.d_b)
|
|
|
|
ESP += imm16;
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|
else
|
2007-11-24 17:22:34 +03:00
|
|
|
SP += imm16;
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
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|
2005-03-20 21:01:01 +03:00
|
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done:
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2007-11-24 17:22:34 +03:00
|
|
|
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BX_CPU_THIS_PTR speculative_rsp = 0;
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|
|
|
|
2003-02-13 18:04:11 +03:00
|
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BX_INSTR_FAR_BRANCH(BX_CPU_ID, BX_INSTR_IS_RET,
|
2002-09-13 04:15:23 +04:00
|
|
|
BX_CPU_THIS_PTR sregs[BX_SEG_REG_CS].selector.value, EIP);
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-03-23 00:29:41 +03:00
|
|
|
void BX_CPP_AttrRegparmN(1) BX_CPU_C::RETfar16(bxInstruction_c *i)
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
Bit16u ip, cs_raw;
|
|
|
|
|
I integrated my hacks to get Linux/x86-64 booting. To keep
these from interfering from a normal compile here's what I did.
In config.h.in (which will generate config.h after a configure),
I added a #define called KPL64Hacks:
#define KPL64Hacks
*After* running configure, you must set this by hand. It will
default to off, so you won't get my hacks in a normal compile.
This will go away soon. There is also a macro just after that
called BailBigRSP(). You don't need to enabled that, but you
can. In many of the instructions which seemed like they could
be hit by the fetchdecode64() process, but which also touched
EIP/ESP, I inserted a macro. Usually this macro expands to nothing.
If you like, you can enabled it, and it will panic if it finds
the upper bits of RIP/RSP set. This helped me find bugs.
Also, I cleaned up the emulation in ctrl_xfer{8,16,32}.cc.
There were some really old legacy code snippets which directly
accessed operands on the stack with access_linear. Lots of
ugly code instead of just pop_32() etc. Cleaning those up,
minimized the number of instructions which directly manipulate
the stack pointer, which should help in refining 64-bit support.
2002-09-24 04:44:56 +04:00
|
|
|
invalidate_prefetch_q();
|
|
|
|
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
#if BX_DEBUGGER
|
|
|
|
BX_CPU_THIS_PTR show_flag |= Flag_ret;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2007-11-24 17:22:34 +03:00
|
|
|
BX_CPU_THIS_PTR speculative_rsp = 1;
|
|
|
|
BX_CPU_THIS_PTR prev_rsp = RSP;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (protected_mode()) {
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
BX_CPU_THIS_PTR return_protected(i, 0);
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2005-02-17 00:27:21 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2007-12-20 21:29:42 +03:00
|
|
|
ip = pop_16();
|
|
|
|
cs_raw = pop_16();
|
2007-10-19 01:27:56 +04:00
|
|
|
|
I integrated my hacks to get Linux/x86-64 booting. To keep
these from interfering from a normal compile here's what I did.
In config.h.in (which will generate config.h after a configure),
I added a #define called KPL64Hacks:
#define KPL64Hacks
*After* running configure, you must set this by hand. It will
default to off, so you won't get my hacks in a normal compile.
This will go away soon. There is also a macro just after that
called BailBigRSP(). You don't need to enabled that, but you
can. In many of the instructions which seemed like they could
be hit by the fetchdecode64() process, but which also touched
EIP/ESP, I inserted a macro. Usually this macro expands to nothing.
If you like, you can enabled it, and it will panic if it finds
the upper bits of RIP/RSP set. This helped me find bugs.
Also, I cleaned up the emulation in ctrl_xfer{8,16,32}.cc.
There were some really old legacy code snippets which directly
accessed operands on the stack with access_linear. Lots of
ugly code instead of just pop_32() etc. Cleaning those up,
minimized the number of instructions which directly manipulate
the stack pointer, which should help in refining 64-bit support.
2002-09-24 04:44:56 +04:00
|
|
|
load_seg_reg(&BX_CPU_THIS_PTR sregs[BX_SEG_REG_CS], cs_raw);
|
2007-10-19 01:27:56 +04:00
|
|
|
EIP = (Bit32u) ip;
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
2007-11-24 17:22:34 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BX_CPU_THIS_PTR speculative_rsp = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2003-02-13 18:04:11 +03:00
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_FAR_BRANCH(BX_CPU_ID, BX_INSTR_IS_RET,
|
2002-09-13 04:15:23 +04:00
|
|
|
BX_CPU_THIS_PTR sregs[BX_SEG_REG_CS].selector.value, EIP);
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-03-23 00:29:41 +03:00
|
|
|
void BX_CPP_AttrRegparmN(1) BX_CPU_C::CALL_Jw(bxInstruction_c *i)
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
Bit32u new_EIP;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if BX_DEBUGGER
|
|
|
|
BX_CPU_THIS_PTR show_flag |= Flag_call;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2002-09-18 02:50:53 +04:00
|
|
|
new_EIP = EIP + (Bit32s) i->Id();
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
new_EIP &= 0x0000ffff;
|
2004-11-02 21:05:19 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (new_EIP > BX_CPU_THIS_PTR sregs[BX_SEG_REG_CS].cache.u.segment.limit_scaled)
|
2004-11-02 19:10:02 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
2007-10-22 21:41:41 +04:00
|
|
|
BX_ERROR(("CALL_Jw: new_IP > BX_CPU_THIS_PTR sregs[BX_SEG_REG_CS].limit"));
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
exception(BX_GP_EXCEPTION, 0, 0);
|
2004-11-02 19:10:02 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* push 16 bit EA of next instruction */
|
|
|
|
push_16(IP);
|
2002-09-13 04:15:23 +04:00
|
|
|
EIP = new_EIP;
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2003-02-13 18:04:11 +03:00
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_UCNEAR_BRANCH(BX_CPU_ID, BX_INSTR_IS_CALL, EIP);
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-03-23 00:29:41 +03:00
|
|
|
void BX_CPP_AttrRegparmN(1) BX_CPU_C::CALL16_Ap(bxInstruction_c *i)
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
Bit16u cs_raw;
|
|
|
|
Bit16u disp16;
|
|
|
|
|
I integrated my hacks to get Linux/x86-64 booting. To keep
these from interfering from a normal compile here's what I did.
In config.h.in (which will generate config.h after a configure),
I added a #define called KPL64Hacks:
#define KPL64Hacks
*After* running configure, you must set this by hand. It will
default to off, so you won't get my hacks in a normal compile.
This will go away soon. There is also a macro just after that
called BailBigRSP(). You don't need to enabled that, but you
can. In many of the instructions which seemed like they could
be hit by the fetchdecode64() process, but which also touched
EIP/ESP, I inserted a macro. Usually this macro expands to nothing.
If you like, you can enabled it, and it will panic if it finds
the upper bits of RIP/RSP set. This helped me find bugs.
Also, I cleaned up the emulation in ctrl_xfer{8,16,32}.cc.
There were some really old legacy code snippets which directly
accessed operands on the stack with access_linear. Lots of
ugly code instead of just pop_32() etc. Cleaning those up,
minimized the number of instructions which directly manipulate
the stack pointer, which should help in refining 64-bit support.
2002-09-24 04:44:56 +04:00
|
|
|
invalidate_prefetch_q();
|
|
|
|
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
#if BX_DEBUGGER
|
|
|
|
BX_CPU_THIS_PTR show_flag |= Flag_call;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2002-09-18 02:50:53 +04:00
|
|
|
disp16 = i->Iw();
|
|
|
|
cs_raw = i->Iw2();
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2007-11-24 17:22:34 +03:00
|
|
|
BX_CPU_THIS_PTR speculative_rsp = 1;
|
|
|
|
BX_CPU_THIS_PTR prev_rsp = RSP;
|
|
|
|
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
if (protected_mode()) {
|
|
|
|
BX_CPU_THIS_PTR call_protected(i, cs_raw, disp16);
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2005-03-12 19:40:14 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
I integrated my hacks to get Linux/x86-64 booting. To keep
these from interfering from a normal compile here's what I did.
In config.h.in (which will generate config.h after a configure),
I added a #define called KPL64Hacks:
#define KPL64Hacks
*After* running configure, you must set this by hand. It will
default to off, so you won't get my hacks in a normal compile.
This will go away soon. There is also a macro just after that
called BailBigRSP(). You don't need to enabled that, but you
can. In many of the instructions which seemed like they could
be hit by the fetchdecode64() process, but which also touched
EIP/ESP, I inserted a macro. Usually this macro expands to nothing.
If you like, you can enabled it, and it will panic if it finds
the upper bits of RIP/RSP set. This helped me find bugs.
Also, I cleaned up the emulation in ctrl_xfer{8,16,32}.cc.
There were some really old legacy code snippets which directly
accessed operands on the stack with access_linear. Lots of
ugly code instead of just pop_32() etc. Cleaning those up,
minimized the number of instructions which directly manipulate
the stack pointer, which should help in refining 64-bit support.
2002-09-24 04:44:56 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
push_16(BX_CPU_THIS_PTR sregs[BX_SEG_REG_CS].selector.value);
|
2002-09-13 04:15:23 +04:00
|
|
|
push_16((Bit16u) EIP);
|
2007-10-19 01:27:56 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
load_seg_reg(&BX_CPU_THIS_PTR sregs[BX_SEG_REG_CS], cs_raw);
|
2007-10-19 01:27:56 +04:00
|
|
|
EIP = (Bit32u) disp16;
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
2007-11-24 17:22:34 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BX_CPU_THIS_PTR speculative_rsp = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2003-02-13 18:04:11 +03:00
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_FAR_BRANCH(BX_CPU_ID, BX_INSTR_IS_CALL,
|
2002-09-13 04:15:23 +04:00
|
|
|
BX_CPU_THIS_PTR sregs[BX_SEG_REG_CS].selector.value, EIP);
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-03-23 00:29:41 +03:00
|
|
|
void BX_CPP_AttrRegparmN(1) BX_CPU_C::CALL_EwM(bxInstruction_c *i)
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-01-12 19:40:38 +03:00
|
|
|
BX_CPU_CALL_METHODR(i->ResolveModrm, (i));
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if BX_DEBUGGER
|
|
|
|
BX_CPU_THIS_PTR show_flag |= Flag_call;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2008-01-12 19:40:38 +03:00
|
|
|
Bit16u op1_16 = read_virtual_word(i->seg(), RMAddr(i));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (op1_16 > BX_CPU_THIS_PTR sregs[BX_SEG_REG_CS].cache.u.segment.limit_scaled)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
BX_ERROR(("CALL_Ew: IP out of CS limits!"));
|
|
|
|
exception(BX_GP_EXCEPTION, 0, 0);
|
2005-03-12 19:40:14 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-12 19:40:38 +03:00
|
|
|
push_16(IP);
|
|
|
|
EIP = op1_16;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_UCNEAR_BRANCH(BX_CPU_ID, BX_INSTR_IS_CALL, EIP);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-03-23 00:29:41 +03:00
|
|
|
void BX_CPP_AttrRegparmN(1) BX_CPU_C::CALL_EwR(bxInstruction_c *i)
|
2008-01-12 19:40:38 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
Bit16u op1_16 = BX_READ_16BIT_REG(i->rm());
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if BX_DEBUGGER
|
|
|
|
BX_CPU_THIS_PTR show_flag |= Flag_call;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-02 21:05:19 +03:00
|
|
|
if (op1_16 > BX_CPU_THIS_PTR sregs[BX_SEG_REG_CS].cache.u.segment.limit_scaled)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2004-11-21 02:26:32 +03:00
|
|
|
BX_ERROR(("CALL_Ew: IP out of CS limits!"));
|
2004-11-02 21:05:19 +03:00
|
|
|
exception(BX_GP_EXCEPTION, 0, 0);
|
2004-11-02 19:10:02 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
|
I integrated my hacks to get Linux/x86-64 booting. To keep
these from interfering from a normal compile here's what I did.
In config.h.in (which will generate config.h after a configure),
I added a #define called KPL64Hacks:
#define KPL64Hacks
*After* running configure, you must set this by hand. It will
default to off, so you won't get my hacks in a normal compile.
This will go away soon. There is also a macro just after that
called BailBigRSP(). You don't need to enabled that, but you
can. In many of the instructions which seemed like they could
be hit by the fetchdecode64() process, but which also touched
EIP/ESP, I inserted a macro. Usually this macro expands to nothing.
If you like, you can enabled it, and it will panic if it finds
the upper bits of RIP/RSP set. This helped me find bugs.
Also, I cleaned up the emulation in ctrl_xfer{8,16,32}.cc.
There were some really old legacy code snippets which directly
accessed operands on the stack with access_linear. Lots of
ugly code instead of just pop_32() etc. Cleaning those up,
minimized the number of instructions which directly manipulate
the stack pointer, which should help in refining 64-bit support.
2002-09-24 04:44:56 +04:00
|
|
|
push_16(IP);
|
|
|
|
EIP = op1_16;
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2003-02-13 18:04:11 +03:00
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_UCNEAR_BRANCH(BX_CPU_ID, BX_INSTR_IS_CALL, EIP);
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-03-23 00:29:41 +03:00
|
|
|
void BX_CPP_AttrRegparmN(1) BX_CPU_C::CALL16_Ep(bxInstruction_c *i)
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
Bit16u cs_raw;
|
|
|
|
Bit16u op1_16;
|
|
|
|
|
I integrated my hacks to get Linux/x86-64 booting. To keep
these from interfering from a normal compile here's what I did.
In config.h.in (which will generate config.h after a configure),
I added a #define called KPL64Hacks:
#define KPL64Hacks
*After* running configure, you must set this by hand. It will
default to off, so you won't get my hacks in a normal compile.
This will go away soon. There is also a macro just after that
called BailBigRSP(). You don't need to enabled that, but you
can. In many of the instructions which seemed like they could
be hit by the fetchdecode64() process, but which also touched
EIP/ESP, I inserted a macro. Usually this macro expands to nothing.
If you like, you can enabled it, and it will panic if it finds
the upper bits of RIP/RSP set. This helped me find bugs.
Also, I cleaned up the emulation in ctrl_xfer{8,16,32}.cc.
There were some really old legacy code snippets which directly
accessed operands on the stack with access_linear. Lots of
ugly code instead of just pop_32() etc. Cleaning those up,
minimized the number of instructions which directly manipulate
the stack pointer, which should help in refining 64-bit support.
2002-09-24 04:44:56 +04:00
|
|
|
invalidate_prefetch_q();
|
|
|
|
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
#if BX_DEBUGGER
|
|
|
|
BX_CPU_THIS_PTR show_flag |= Flag_call;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2008-01-10 22:37:56 +03:00
|
|
|
BX_CPU_CALL_METHODR(i->ResolveModrm, (i));
|
|
|
|
|
2007-12-20 23:58:38 +03:00
|
|
|
op1_16 = read_virtual_word(i->seg(), RMAddr(i));
|
|
|
|
cs_raw = read_virtual_word(i->seg(), RMAddr(i)+2);
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2007-11-24 17:22:34 +03:00
|
|
|
BX_CPU_THIS_PTR speculative_rsp = 1;
|
|
|
|
BX_CPU_THIS_PTR prev_rsp = RSP;
|
|
|
|
|
2007-10-19 01:27:56 +04:00
|
|
|
if (protected_mode()) {
|
I integrated my hacks to get Linux/x86-64 booting. To keep
these from interfering from a normal compile here's what I did.
In config.h.in (which will generate config.h after a configure),
I added a #define called KPL64Hacks:
#define KPL64Hacks
*After* running configure, you must set this by hand. It will
default to off, so you won't get my hacks in a normal compile.
This will go away soon. There is also a macro just after that
called BailBigRSP(). You don't need to enabled that, but you
can. In many of the instructions which seemed like they could
be hit by the fetchdecode64() process, but which also touched
EIP/ESP, I inserted a macro. Usually this macro expands to nothing.
If you like, you can enabled it, and it will panic if it finds
the upper bits of RIP/RSP set. This helped me find bugs.
Also, I cleaned up the emulation in ctrl_xfer{8,16,32}.cc.
There were some really old legacy code snippets which directly
accessed operands on the stack with access_linear. Lots of
ugly code instead of just pop_32() etc. Cleaning those up,
minimized the number of instructions which directly manipulate
the stack pointer, which should help in refining 64-bit support.
2002-09-24 04:44:56 +04:00
|
|
|
BX_CPU_THIS_PTR call_protected(i, cs_raw, op1_16);
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2005-03-12 19:40:14 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
|
I integrated my hacks to get Linux/x86-64 booting. To keep
these from interfering from a normal compile here's what I did.
In config.h.in (which will generate config.h after a configure),
I added a #define called KPL64Hacks:
#define KPL64Hacks
*After* running configure, you must set this by hand. It will
default to off, so you won't get my hacks in a normal compile.
This will go away soon. There is also a macro just after that
called BailBigRSP(). You don't need to enabled that, but you
can. In many of the instructions which seemed like they could
be hit by the fetchdecode64() process, but which also touched
EIP/ESP, I inserted a macro. Usually this macro expands to nothing.
If you like, you can enabled it, and it will panic if it finds
the upper bits of RIP/RSP set. This helped me find bugs.
Also, I cleaned up the emulation in ctrl_xfer{8,16,32}.cc.
There were some really old legacy code snippets which directly
accessed operands on the stack with access_linear. Lots of
ugly code instead of just pop_32() etc. Cleaning those up,
minimized the number of instructions which directly manipulate
the stack pointer, which should help in refining 64-bit support.
2002-09-24 04:44:56 +04:00
|
|
|
push_16(BX_CPU_THIS_PTR sregs[BX_SEG_REG_CS].selector.value);
|
|
|
|
push_16(IP);
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
|
I integrated my hacks to get Linux/x86-64 booting. To keep
these from interfering from a normal compile here's what I did.
In config.h.in (which will generate config.h after a configure),
I added a #define called KPL64Hacks:
#define KPL64Hacks
*After* running configure, you must set this by hand. It will
default to off, so you won't get my hacks in a normal compile.
This will go away soon. There is also a macro just after that
called BailBigRSP(). You don't need to enabled that, but you
can. In many of the instructions which seemed like they could
be hit by the fetchdecode64() process, but which also touched
EIP/ESP, I inserted a macro. Usually this macro expands to nothing.
If you like, you can enabled it, and it will panic if it finds
the upper bits of RIP/RSP set. This helped me find bugs.
Also, I cleaned up the emulation in ctrl_xfer{8,16,32}.cc.
There were some really old legacy code snippets which directly
accessed operands on the stack with access_linear. Lots of
ugly code instead of just pop_32() etc. Cleaning those up,
minimized the number of instructions which directly manipulate
the stack pointer, which should help in refining 64-bit support.
2002-09-24 04:44:56 +04:00
|
|
|
load_seg_reg(&BX_CPU_THIS_PTR sregs[BX_SEG_REG_CS], cs_raw);
|
2007-10-19 01:27:56 +04:00
|
|
|
EIP = op1_16;
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
2007-11-24 17:22:34 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BX_CPU_THIS_PTR speculative_rsp = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2003-02-13 18:04:11 +03:00
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_FAR_BRANCH(BX_CPU_ID, BX_INSTR_IS_CALL,
|
2002-09-13 04:15:23 +04:00
|
|
|
BX_CPU_THIS_PTR sregs[BX_SEG_REG_CS].selector.value, EIP);
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-03-23 00:29:41 +03:00
|
|
|
void BX_CPP_AttrRegparmN(1) BX_CPU_C::JMP_Jw(bxInstruction_c *i)
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2004-11-02 20:31:14 +03:00
|
|
|
Bit32u new_EIP = EIP + (Bit32s) i->Id();
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
new_EIP &= 0x0000ffff;
|
2008-01-12 19:40:38 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (new_EIP > BX_CPU_THIS_PTR sregs[BX_SEG_REG_CS].cache.u.segment.limit_scaled)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
BX_ERROR(("JMP_Jw: offset outside of CS limits"));
|
|
|
|
exception(BX_GP_EXCEPTION, 0, 0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EIP = new_EIP;
|
|
|
|
|
2003-02-13 18:04:11 +03:00
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_UCNEAR_BRANCH(BX_CPU_ID, BX_INSTR_IS_JMP, new_EIP);
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-03-23 00:29:41 +03:00
|
|
|
void BX_CPP_AttrRegparmN(1) BX_CPU_C::JO_Jw(bxInstruction_c *i)
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
if (get_OF()) {
|
|
|
|
Bit32u new_EIP = EIP + (Bit32s) i->Id();
|
|
|
|
new_EIP &= 0x0000ffff;
|
|
|
|
branch_near32(new_EIP);
|
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_CNEAR_BRANCH_TAKEN(BX_CPU_ID, new_EIP);
|
2007-12-17 00:21:29 +03:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-12-17 00:21:29 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_CNEAR_BRANCH_NOT_TAKEN(BX_CPU_ID);
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-03-23 00:29:41 +03:00
|
|
|
void BX_CPP_AttrRegparmN(1) BX_CPU_C::JNO_Jw(bxInstruction_c *i)
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (! get_OF()) {
|
|
|
|
Bit32u new_EIP = EIP + (Bit32s) i->Id();
|
|
|
|
new_EIP &= 0x0000ffff;
|
|
|
|
branch_near32(new_EIP);
|
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_CNEAR_BRANCH_TAKEN(BX_CPU_ID, new_EIP);
|
2007-12-17 00:21:29 +03:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-12-17 00:21:29 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_CNEAR_BRANCH_NOT_TAKEN(BX_CPU_ID);
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-03-23 00:29:41 +03:00
|
|
|
void BX_CPP_AttrRegparmN(1) BX_CPU_C::JB_Jw(bxInstruction_c *i)
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (get_CF()) {
|
|
|
|
Bit32u new_EIP = EIP + (Bit32s) i->Id();
|
|
|
|
new_EIP &= 0x0000ffff;
|
|
|
|
branch_near32(new_EIP);
|
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_CNEAR_BRANCH_TAKEN(BX_CPU_ID, new_EIP);
|
2007-12-17 00:21:29 +03:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-12-17 00:21:29 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_CNEAR_BRANCH_NOT_TAKEN(BX_CPU_ID);
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-03-23 00:29:41 +03:00
|
|
|
void BX_CPP_AttrRegparmN(1) BX_CPU_C::JNB_Jw(bxInstruction_c *i)
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (! get_CF()) {
|
2004-10-20 00:05:07 +04:00
|
|
|
Bit32u new_EIP = EIP + (Bit32s) i->Id();
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
new_EIP &= 0x0000ffff;
|
2004-11-02 20:31:14 +03:00
|
|
|
branch_near32(new_EIP);
|
2003-02-13 18:04:11 +03:00
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_CNEAR_BRANCH_TAKEN(BX_CPU_ID, new_EIP);
|
2007-12-17 00:21:29 +03:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2004-11-02 20:31:14 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-12-17 00:21:29 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_CNEAR_BRANCH_NOT_TAKEN(BX_CPU_ID);
|
2002-09-22 05:52:21 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-03-23 00:29:41 +03:00
|
|
|
void BX_CPP_AttrRegparmN(1) BX_CPU_C::JZ_Jw(bxInstruction_c *i)
|
2002-09-22 05:52:21 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (get_ZF()) {
|
2004-10-20 00:05:07 +04:00
|
|
|
Bit32u new_EIP = EIP + (Bit32s) i->Id();
|
2002-09-22 05:52:21 +04:00
|
|
|
new_EIP &= 0x0000ffff;
|
2004-11-02 20:31:14 +03:00
|
|
|
branch_near32(new_EIP);
|
2003-02-13 18:04:11 +03:00
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_CNEAR_BRANCH_TAKEN(BX_CPU_ID, new_EIP);
|
2007-12-17 00:21:29 +03:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2004-11-02 19:10:02 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-12-17 00:21:29 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_CNEAR_BRANCH_NOT_TAKEN(BX_CPU_ID);
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-03-23 00:29:41 +03:00
|
|
|
void BX_CPP_AttrRegparmN(1) BX_CPU_C::JNZ_Jw(bxInstruction_c *i)
|
2002-09-22 05:52:21 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
if (! get_ZF()) {
|
|
|
|
Bit32u new_EIP = EIP + (Bit32s) i->Id();
|
|
|
|
new_EIP &= 0x0000ffff;
|
|
|
|
branch_near32(new_EIP);
|
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_CNEAR_BRANCH_TAKEN(BX_CPU_ID, new_EIP);
|
2007-12-17 00:21:29 +03:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-12-17 00:21:29 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_CNEAR_BRANCH_NOT_TAKEN(BX_CPU_ID);
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-03-23 00:29:41 +03:00
|
|
|
void BX_CPP_AttrRegparmN(1) BX_CPU_C::JBE_Jw(bxInstruction_c *i)
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (get_CF() || get_ZF()) {
|
|
|
|
Bit32u new_EIP = EIP + (Bit32s) i->Id();
|
|
|
|
new_EIP &= 0x0000ffff;
|
|
|
|
branch_near32(new_EIP);
|
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_CNEAR_BRANCH_TAKEN(BX_CPU_ID, new_EIP);
|
2007-12-17 00:21:29 +03:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-12-17 00:21:29 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_CNEAR_BRANCH_NOT_TAKEN(BX_CPU_ID);
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-03-23 00:29:41 +03:00
|
|
|
void BX_CPP_AttrRegparmN(1) BX_CPU_C::JNBE_Jw(bxInstruction_c *i)
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (! (get_CF() || get_ZF())) {
|
|
|
|
Bit32u new_EIP = EIP + (Bit32s) i->Id();
|
|
|
|
new_EIP &= 0x0000ffff;
|
|
|
|
branch_near32(new_EIP);
|
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_CNEAR_BRANCH_TAKEN(BX_CPU_ID, new_EIP);
|
2007-12-17 00:21:29 +03:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-12-17 00:21:29 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_CNEAR_BRANCH_NOT_TAKEN(BX_CPU_ID);
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-03-23 00:29:41 +03:00
|
|
|
void BX_CPP_AttrRegparmN(1) BX_CPU_C::JS_Jw(bxInstruction_c *i)
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (get_SF()) {
|
|
|
|
Bit32u new_EIP = EIP + (Bit32s) i->Id();
|
|
|
|
new_EIP &= 0x0000ffff;
|
|
|
|
branch_near32(new_EIP);
|
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_CNEAR_BRANCH_TAKEN(BX_CPU_ID, new_EIP);
|
2007-12-17 00:21:29 +03:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-12-17 00:21:29 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_CNEAR_BRANCH_NOT_TAKEN(BX_CPU_ID);
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-03-23 00:29:41 +03:00
|
|
|
void BX_CPP_AttrRegparmN(1) BX_CPU_C::JNS_Jw(bxInstruction_c *i)
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (! get_SF()) {
|
|
|
|
Bit32u new_EIP = EIP + (Bit32s) i->Id();
|
|
|
|
new_EIP &= 0x0000ffff;
|
|
|
|
branch_near32(new_EIP);
|
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_CNEAR_BRANCH_TAKEN(BX_CPU_ID, new_EIP);
|
2007-12-17 00:21:29 +03:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-12-17 00:21:29 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_CNEAR_BRANCH_NOT_TAKEN(BX_CPU_ID);
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-03-23 00:29:41 +03:00
|
|
|
void BX_CPP_AttrRegparmN(1) BX_CPU_C::JP_Jw(bxInstruction_c *i)
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (get_PF()) {
|
|
|
|
Bit32u new_EIP = EIP + (Bit32s) i->Id();
|
|
|
|
new_EIP &= 0x0000ffff;
|
|
|
|
branch_near32(new_EIP);
|
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_CNEAR_BRANCH_TAKEN(BX_CPU_ID, new_EIP);
|
2007-12-17 00:21:29 +03:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-12-17 00:21:29 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_CNEAR_BRANCH_NOT_TAKEN(BX_CPU_ID);
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-03-23 00:29:41 +03:00
|
|
|
void BX_CPP_AttrRegparmN(1) BX_CPU_C::JNP_Jw(bxInstruction_c *i)
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (! get_PF()) {
|
|
|
|
Bit32u new_EIP = EIP + (Bit32s) i->Id();
|
|
|
|
new_EIP &= 0x0000ffff;
|
|
|
|
branch_near32(new_EIP);
|
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_CNEAR_BRANCH_TAKEN(BX_CPU_ID, new_EIP);
|
2007-12-17 00:21:29 +03:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-12-17 00:21:29 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_CNEAR_BRANCH_NOT_TAKEN(BX_CPU_ID);
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-03-23 00:29:41 +03:00
|
|
|
void BX_CPP_AttrRegparmN(1) BX_CPU_C::JL_Jw(bxInstruction_c *i)
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (getB_SF() != getB_OF()) {
|
|
|
|
Bit32u new_EIP = EIP + (Bit32s) i->Id();
|
|
|
|
new_EIP &= 0x0000ffff;
|
|
|
|
branch_near32(new_EIP);
|
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_CNEAR_BRANCH_TAKEN(BX_CPU_ID, new_EIP);
|
2007-12-17 00:21:29 +03:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-12-17 00:21:29 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_CNEAR_BRANCH_NOT_TAKEN(BX_CPU_ID);
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-03-23 00:29:41 +03:00
|
|
|
void BX_CPP_AttrRegparmN(1) BX_CPU_C::JNL_Jw(bxInstruction_c *i)
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (getB_SF() == getB_OF()) {
|
|
|
|
Bit32u new_EIP = EIP + (Bit32s) i->Id();
|
|
|
|
new_EIP &= 0x0000ffff;
|
|
|
|
branch_near32(new_EIP);
|
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_CNEAR_BRANCH_TAKEN(BX_CPU_ID, new_EIP);
|
2007-12-17 00:21:29 +03:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-12-17 00:21:29 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_CNEAR_BRANCH_NOT_TAKEN(BX_CPU_ID);
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-03-23 00:29:41 +03:00
|
|
|
void BX_CPP_AttrRegparmN(1) BX_CPU_C::JLE_Jw(bxInstruction_c *i)
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (get_ZF() || (getB_SF() != getB_OF())) {
|
|
|
|
Bit32u new_EIP = EIP + (Bit32s) i->Id();
|
|
|
|
new_EIP &= 0x0000ffff;
|
|
|
|
branch_near32(new_EIP);
|
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_CNEAR_BRANCH_TAKEN(BX_CPU_ID, new_EIP);
|
2007-12-17 00:21:29 +03:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-12-17 00:21:29 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_CNEAR_BRANCH_NOT_TAKEN(BX_CPU_ID);
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-03-23 00:29:41 +03:00
|
|
|
void BX_CPP_AttrRegparmN(1) BX_CPU_C::JNLE_Jw(bxInstruction_c *i)
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (! get_ZF() && (getB_SF() == getB_OF())) {
|
2004-10-20 00:05:07 +04:00
|
|
|
Bit32u new_EIP = EIP + (Bit32s) i->Id();
|
2002-09-22 05:52:21 +04:00
|
|
|
new_EIP &= 0x0000ffff;
|
2004-11-02 20:31:14 +03:00
|
|
|
branch_near32(new_EIP);
|
2003-02-13 18:04:11 +03:00
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_CNEAR_BRANCH_TAKEN(BX_CPU_ID, new_EIP);
|
2007-12-17 00:21:29 +03:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2004-11-02 19:10:02 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-12-17 00:21:29 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_CNEAR_BRANCH_NOT_TAKEN(BX_CPU_ID);
|
2002-09-22 05:52:21 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2008-03-23 00:29:41 +03:00
|
|
|
void BX_CPP_AttrRegparmN(1) BX_CPU_C::JMP_EwM(bxInstruction_c *i)
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-01-10 22:37:56 +03:00
|
|
|
BX_CPU_CALL_METHODR(i->ResolveModrm, (i));
|
|
|
|
|
2007-12-20 23:58:38 +03:00
|
|
|
Bit16u new_IP = read_virtual_word(i->seg(), RMAddr(i));
|
2007-12-15 02:15:52 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-12 19:40:38 +03:00
|
|
|
if (new_IP > BX_CPU_THIS_PTR sregs[BX_SEG_REG_CS].cache.u.segment.limit_scaled)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
BX_ERROR(("JMP_Ew: offset outside of CS limits"));
|
|
|
|
exception(BX_GP_EXCEPTION, 0, 0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EIP = new_IP;
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2007-12-15 02:15:52 +03:00
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_UCNEAR_BRANCH(BX_CPU_ID, BX_INSTR_IS_JMP, new_IP);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-03-23 00:29:41 +03:00
|
|
|
void BX_CPP_AttrRegparmN(1) BX_CPU_C::JMP_EwR(bxInstruction_c *i)
|
2007-12-15 02:15:52 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-01-12 19:40:38 +03:00
|
|
|
Bit16u new_IP = BX_READ_16BIT_REG(i->rm());
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (new_IP > BX_CPU_THIS_PTR sregs[BX_SEG_REG_CS].cache.u.segment.limit_scaled)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
BX_ERROR(("JMP_Ew: offset outside of CS limits"));
|
|
|
|
exception(BX_GP_EXCEPTION, 0, 0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
EIP = new_IP;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_UCNEAR_BRANCH(BX_CPU_ID, BX_INSTR_IS_JMP, new_IP);
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-11-12 21:20:15 +03:00
|
|
|
/* Far indirect jump */
|
2008-03-23 00:29:41 +03:00
|
|
|
void BX_CPP_AttrRegparmN(1) BX_CPU_C::JMP16_Ep(bxInstruction_c *i)
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
Bit16u cs_raw;
|
|
|
|
Bit16u op1_16;
|
|
|
|
|
I integrated my hacks to get Linux/x86-64 booting. To keep
these from interfering from a normal compile here's what I did.
In config.h.in (which will generate config.h after a configure),
I added a #define called KPL64Hacks:
#define KPL64Hacks
*After* running configure, you must set this by hand. It will
default to off, so you won't get my hacks in a normal compile.
This will go away soon. There is also a macro just after that
called BailBigRSP(). You don't need to enabled that, but you
can. In many of the instructions which seemed like they could
be hit by the fetchdecode64() process, but which also touched
EIP/ESP, I inserted a macro. Usually this macro expands to nothing.
If you like, you can enabled it, and it will panic if it finds
the upper bits of RIP/RSP set. This helped me find bugs.
Also, I cleaned up the emulation in ctrl_xfer{8,16,32}.cc.
There were some really old legacy code snippets which directly
accessed operands on the stack with access_linear. Lots of
ugly code instead of just pop_32() etc. Cleaning those up,
minimized the number of instructions which directly manipulate
the stack pointer, which should help in refining 64-bit support.
2002-09-24 04:44:56 +04:00
|
|
|
invalidate_prefetch_q();
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-10 22:37:56 +03:00
|
|
|
BX_CPU_CALL_METHODR(i->ResolveModrm, (i));
|
|
|
|
|
2007-12-20 23:58:38 +03:00
|
|
|
op1_16 = read_virtual_word(i->seg(), RMAddr(i));
|
|
|
|
cs_raw = read_virtual_word(i->seg(), RMAddr(i)+2);
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2007-11-24 18:27:55 +03:00
|
|
|
// jump_protected doesn't affect RSP so it is RSP safe
|
2007-11-24 17:22:34 +03:00
|
|
|
if (protected_mode()) {
|
I integrated my hacks to get Linux/x86-64 booting. To keep
these from interfering from a normal compile here's what I did.
In config.h.in (which will generate config.h after a configure),
I added a #define called KPL64Hacks:
#define KPL64Hacks
*After* running configure, you must set this by hand. It will
default to off, so you won't get my hacks in a normal compile.
This will go away soon. There is also a macro just after that
called BailBigRSP(). You don't need to enabled that, but you
can. In many of the instructions which seemed like they could
be hit by the fetchdecode64() process, but which also touched
EIP/ESP, I inserted a macro. Usually this macro expands to nothing.
If you like, you can enabled it, and it will panic if it finds
the upper bits of RIP/RSP set. This helped me find bugs.
Also, I cleaned up the emulation in ctrl_xfer{8,16,32}.cc.
There were some really old legacy code snippets which directly
accessed operands on the stack with access_linear. Lots of
ugly code instead of just pop_32() etc. Cleaning those up,
minimized the number of instructions which directly manipulate
the stack pointer, which should help in refining 64-bit support.
2002-09-24 04:44:56 +04:00
|
|
|
BX_CPU_THIS_PTR jump_protected(i, cs_raw, op1_16);
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2005-03-12 19:40:14 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
|
I integrated my hacks to get Linux/x86-64 booting. To keep
these from interfering from a normal compile here's what I did.
In config.h.in (which will generate config.h after a configure),
I added a #define called KPL64Hacks:
#define KPL64Hacks
*After* running configure, you must set this by hand. It will
default to off, so you won't get my hacks in a normal compile.
This will go away soon. There is also a macro just after that
called BailBigRSP(). You don't need to enabled that, but you
can. In many of the instructions which seemed like they could
be hit by the fetchdecode64() process, but which also touched
EIP/ESP, I inserted a macro. Usually this macro expands to nothing.
If you like, you can enabled it, and it will panic if it finds
the upper bits of RIP/RSP set. This helped me find bugs.
Also, I cleaned up the emulation in ctrl_xfer{8,16,32}.cc.
There were some really old legacy code snippets which directly
accessed operands on the stack with access_linear. Lots of
ugly code instead of just pop_32() etc. Cleaning those up,
minimized the number of instructions which directly manipulate
the stack pointer, which should help in refining 64-bit support.
2002-09-24 04:44:56 +04:00
|
|
|
load_seg_reg(&BX_CPU_THIS_PTR sregs[BX_SEG_REG_CS], cs_raw);
|
2007-10-19 01:27:56 +04:00
|
|
|
EIP = op1_16;
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
2003-02-13 18:04:11 +03:00
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_FAR_BRANCH(BX_CPU_ID, BX_INSTR_IS_JMP,
|
2002-09-13 04:15:23 +04:00
|
|
|
BX_CPU_THIS_PTR sregs[BX_SEG_REG_CS].selector.value, EIP);
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-03-23 00:29:41 +03:00
|
|
|
void BX_CPP_AttrRegparmN(1) BX_CPU_C::IRET16(bxInstruction_c *i)
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
Bit16u ip, cs_raw, flags;
|
|
|
|
|
I integrated my hacks to get Linux/x86-64 booting. To keep
these from interfering from a normal compile here's what I did.
In config.h.in (which will generate config.h after a configure),
I added a #define called KPL64Hacks:
#define KPL64Hacks
*After* running configure, you must set this by hand. It will
default to off, so you won't get my hacks in a normal compile.
This will go away soon. There is also a macro just after that
called BailBigRSP(). You don't need to enabled that, but you
can. In many of the instructions which seemed like they could
be hit by the fetchdecode64() process, but which also touched
EIP/ESP, I inserted a macro. Usually this macro expands to nothing.
If you like, you can enabled it, and it will panic if it finds
the upper bits of RIP/RSP set. This helped me find bugs.
Also, I cleaned up the emulation in ctrl_xfer{8,16,32}.cc.
There were some really old legacy code snippets which directly
accessed operands on the stack with access_linear. Lots of
ugly code instead of just pop_32() etc. Cleaning those up,
minimized the number of instructions which directly manipulate
the stack pointer, which should help in refining 64-bit support.
2002-09-24 04:44:56 +04:00
|
|
|
invalidate_prefetch_q();
|
|
|
|
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
#if BX_DEBUGGER
|
|
|
|
BX_CPU_THIS_PTR show_flag |= Flag_iret;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2006-03-16 23:24:09 +03:00
|
|
|
BX_CPU_THIS_PTR nmi_disable = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2007-11-24 17:22:34 +03:00
|
|
|
BX_CPU_THIS_PTR speculative_rsp = 1;
|
|
|
|
BX_CPU_THIS_PTR prev_rsp = RSP;
|
|
|
|
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
if (v8086_mode()) {
|
|
|
|
// IOPL check in stack_return_from_v86()
|
2005-10-17 17:06:09 +04:00
|
|
|
iret16_stack_return_from_v86(i);
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2005-03-12 19:40:14 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2007-10-19 01:27:56 +04:00
|
|
|
if (protected_mode()) {
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
iret_protected(i);
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
2005-03-12 19:40:14 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2007-12-20 21:29:42 +03:00
|
|
|
ip = pop_16();
|
|
|
|
cs_raw = pop_16();
|
|
|
|
flags = pop_16();
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
load_seg_reg(&BX_CPU_THIS_PTR sregs[BX_SEG_REG_CS], cs_raw);
|
2002-09-13 04:15:23 +04:00
|
|
|
EIP = (Bit32u) ip;
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
write_flags(flags, /* change IOPL? */ 1, /* change IF? */ 1);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
2007-11-24 17:22:34 +03:00
|
|
|
BX_CPU_THIS_PTR speculative_rsp = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2003-02-13 18:04:11 +03:00
|
|
|
BX_INSTR_FAR_BRANCH(BX_CPU_ID, BX_INSTR_IS_IRET,
|
2002-09-13 04:15:23 +04:00
|
|
|
BX_CPU_THIS_PTR sregs[BX_SEG_REG_CS].selector.value, EIP);
|
2001-04-10 05:04:59 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|