We will move this code in the next commit. Clean it up
first to avoid checkpatch.pl errors.
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20200423073358.27155-5-philmd@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Make cpu_register() (renamed to arm_cpu_register()) available
from internals.h so we can register CPUs also from other files
in the future.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20200423073358.27155-3-philmd@redhat.com
Message-ID: <20190921150420.30743-2-thuth@redhat.com>
[PMD: Only take cpu_register() from Thomas's patch]
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Under KVM these registers are written by the hardware.
Restrict the writefn handlers to TCG to avoid when building
without TCG:
LINK aarch64-softmmu/qemu-system-aarch64
target/arm/helper.o: In function `do_ats_write':
target/arm/helper.c:3524: undefined reference to `raise_exception'
Suggested-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20200423073358.27155-2-philmd@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
These instructions are often used in glibc's string routines.
They were the final uses of the 32-bit at a time neon helpers.
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20200418162808.4680-1-richard.henderson@linaro.org
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Add the pvr-user2 property to control the user-defined
PVR1 User2 register.
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Luc Michel <luc.michel@greensocs.com>
Signed-off-by: Edgar E. Iglesias <edgar.iglesias@xilinx.com>
Add the pvr-user1 property to control the user-defined
PVR0 User1 field.
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Luc Michel <luc.michel@greensocs.com>
Signed-off-by: Edgar E. Iglesias <edgar.iglesias@xilinx.com>
Add the unaligned-exceptions property to control if the core
traps unaligned memory accesses.
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Luc Michel <luc.michel@greensocs.com>
Signed-off-by: Edgar E. Iglesias <edgar.iglesias@xilinx.com>
Add the div-zero-exception property to control if the core
traps divizions by zero.
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Luc Michel <luc.michel@greensocs.com>
Signed-off-by: Edgar E. Iglesias <edgar.iglesias@xilinx.com>
Add the ill-opcode-exception property to control if illegal
instructions will raise exceptions.
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Luc Michel <luc.michel@greensocs.com>
Signed-off-by: Edgar E. Iglesias <edgar.iglesias@xilinx.com>
Add the opcode-0x0-illegal CPU property to control if the core
should trap opcode zero as illegal.
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Luc Michel <luc.michel@greensocs.com>
Signed-off-by: Edgar E. Iglesias <edgar.iglesias@xilinx.com>
The sifive-e34 cpu type is the same as the sifive-e31 with the
single precision floating-point extension enabled.
Signed-off-by: Corey Wharton <coreyw7@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Bin Meng <bmeng.cn@gmail.com>
Message-id: 20200313193429.8035-3-coreyw7@fb.com
Message-Id: <20200313193429.8035-3-coreyw7@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
As-per RISC-V H-Extension v0.5 draft, the Stage2 SV32 page table has
12bits of VPN[1] and 10bits of VPN[0]. The additional 2bits in VPN[1]
is required to handle the 34bit intermediate physical address coming
from Stage1 SV32 page table. The 12bits of VPN[1] implies that Stage2
SV32 level-0 page table will be 16KB in size with total 4096 enteries
where each entry maps 4MB of memory (same as Stage1 SV32 page table).
The get_physical_address() function is broken for Stage2 SV32 level-0
page table because it incorrectly computes output physical address for
Stage2 SV32 level-0 page table entry.
The root cause of the issue is that get_physical_address() uses the
"widened" variable to compute level-0 physical address mapping which
changes level-0 mapping size (instead of 4MB). We should use the
"widened" variable only for computing index of Stage2 SV32 level-0
page table.
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <anup.patel@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Message-id: 20200330082724.120444-1-anup.patel@wdc.com
Message-Id: <20200330082724.120444-1-anup.patel@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Take the result of stage-1 and stage-2 page table walks and AND the two
protection flags together. This way we require both to set permissions
instead of just stage-2.
Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Message-id: 846f1e18f5922d818bc464ec32c144ef314ec724.1585262586.git.alistair.francis@wdc.com
Message-Id: <846f1e18f5922d818bc464ec32c144ef314ec724.1585262586.git.alistair.francis@wdc.com>
When doing the fist of a two stage lookup (Hypervisor extensions) don't
set the current protection flags from the second stage lookup of the
base address PTE.
Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Message-id: 931db85d6890ed4bc2b527fd1011197cd28299aa.1585262586.git.alistair.francis@wdc.com
Message-Id: <931db85d6890ed4bc2b527fd1011197cd28299aa.1585262586.git.alistair.francis@wdc.com>
The unpack facility is an indication that diagnose 308 subcodes 8-10
are available to the guest. That means, that the guest can put itself
into protected mode.
Once it is in protected mode, the hardware stops any attempt of VM
introspection by the hypervisor.
Some features are currently not supported in protected mode:
* vfio devices
* Migration
* Huge page backings
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200319131921.2367-17-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
For protected VMs status storing is not done by QEMU anymore.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200319131921.2367-15-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
For protected guests, we need to put the IO emulation results into the
SIDA, so SIE will write them into the guest at the next entry.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200319131921.2367-14-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
IO instruction data is routed through SIDAD for protected guests, so
adresses do not need to be checked, as this is kernel memory which is
always available.
Also the instruction data always starts at offset 0 of the SIDAD.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200319131921.2367-13-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
For protected guests the IPIB is written/read to/from the SIDA, so we
need those accesses to go through s390_cpu_pv_mem_read/write().
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200319131921.2367-12-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Handling of CPU reset and setting of the IPL psw from guest storage at
offset 0 is done by a Ultravisor call. Let's only fetch it if
necessary.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200319131921.2367-11-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
SCLP for a protected guest is done over the SIDAD, so we need to use
the s390_cpu_pv_mem_* functions to access the SIDAD instead of guest
memory when reading/writing SCBs.
To not confuse the sclp emulation, we set 0x4000 as the SCCB address,
since the function that injects the sclp external interrupt would
reject a zero sccb address.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Message-Id: <20200319131921.2367-10-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
For protected guests, we need to put the STSI emulation results into
the SIDA, so SIE will write them into the guest at the next entry.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200319131921.2367-9-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Protected guests save the instruction control blocks in the SIDA
instead of QEMU/KVM directly accessing the guest's memory.
Let's introduce new functions to access the SIDA.
The memops for doing so are available with KVM_CAP_S390_PROTECTED, so
let's check for that.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200319131921.2367-8-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Protected VMs no longer intercept with code 4 for an instruction
interception. Instead they have codes 104 and 108 for protected
instruction interception and protected instruction notification
respectively.
The 104 mirrors the 4 interception.
The 108 is a notification interception to let KVM and QEMU know that
something changed and we need to update tracking information or
perform specific tasks. It's currently taken for the following
instructions:
* spx (To inform about the changed prefix location)
* sclp (On incorrect SCCB values, so we can inject a IRQ)
* sigp (All but "stop and store status")
* diag308 (Subcodes 0/1)
Of these exits only sclp errors, state changing sigps and diag308 will
reach QEMU. QEMU will do its parts of the job, while the ultravisor
has done the instruction part of the job.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200319131921.2367-7-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
The unpack facility provides the means to setup a protected guest. A
protected guest cannot be introspected by the hypervisor or any
user/administrator of the machine it is running on.
Protected guests are encrypted at rest and need a special boot
mechanism via diag308 subcode 8 and 10.
Code 8 sets the PV specific IPLB which is retained separately from
those set via code 5.
Code 10 is used to unpack the VM into protected memory, verify its
integrity and start it.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Co-developed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> [Changes
to machine]
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200323083606.24520-1-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
[CH: fixed up KVM_PV_VM_ -> KVM_PV_]
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Fixes the following coccinelle warnings:
$ spatch --sp-file --verbose-parsing ... \
scripts/coccinelle/remove_local_err.cocci
...
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./target/ppc/translate_init.inc.c:5213
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./target/ppc/translate_init.inc.c:5261
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./target/microblaze/cpu.c:166
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./target/microblaze/cpu.c:167
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./target/microblaze/cpu.c:169
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./target/microblaze/cpu.c:170
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./target/microblaze/cpu.c:171
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./target/microblaze/cpu.c:172
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./target/microblaze/cpu.c:173
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./target/i386/cpu.c:5787
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./target/i386/cpu.c:5789
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./target/i386/cpu.c:5800
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./target/i386/cpu.c:5801
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./target/i386/cpu.c:5802
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./target/i386/cpu.c:5804
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./target/i386/cpu.c:5805
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./target/i386/cpu.c:5806
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./target/i386/cpu.c:6329
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./hw/sd/sdhci.c:1133
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./hw/scsi/scsi-disk.c:3081
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./hw/net/virtio-net.c:1529
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./hw/riscv/sifive_u.c:468
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./dump/dump.c:1895
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./block/vhdx.c:2209
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./block/vhdx.c:2215
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./block/vhdx.c:2221
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./block/vhdx.c:2222
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./block/replication.c:172
SUSPICIOUS: a \ character appears outside of a #define at ./block/replication.c:173
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Message-Id: <20200412223619.11284-2-f4bug@amsat.org>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Acked-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
They are part of the IPL process, so let's put them into the ipl
header.
Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200319131921.2367-2-frankja@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
In commit 41a4bf1feab098da4cd the added code to set the CNP
field in ID_MMFR4 for the AArch64 'max' CPU had a typo
where it used the wrong variable name, resulting in ID_MMFR4
fields AC2, XNX and LSM being wrong. Fix the typo.
Fixes: 41a4bf1feab098da4cd
Reported-by: Laurent Desnogues <laurent.desnogues@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Edgar E. Iglesias <edgar.iglesias@xilinx.com>
Reviewed-by: Laurent Desnogues <laurent.desnogues@gmail.com>
Message-id: 20200422124501.28015-1-peter.maydell@linaro.org
If mtmsr L=1 sets MSR[EE] while there is a maskable exception pending,
it does not cause an interrupt. This causes the test case to hang:
https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-ppc/2019-10/msg00826.html
More recently, Linux reduced the occurance of operations (e.g., rfi)
which stop translation and allow pending interrupts to be processed.
This started causing hangs in Linux boot in long-running kernel tests,
running with '-d int' shows the decrementer stops firing despite DEC
wrapping and MSR[EE]=1.
https://lists.ozlabs.org/pipermail/linuxppc-dev/2020-April/208301.html
The cause is the broken mtmsr L=1 behaviour, which is contrary to the
architecture. From Power ISA v3.0B, p.977, Move To Machine State Register,
Programming Note states:
If MSR[EE]=0 and an External, Decrementer, or Performance Monitor
exception is pending, executing an mtmsrd instruction that sets
MSR[EE] to 1 will cause the interrupt to occur before the next
instruction is executed, if no higher priority exception exists
Fix this by handling L=1 exactly the same way as L=0, modulo the MSR
bits altered.
The confusion arises from L=0 being "context synchronizing" whereas L=1
is "execution synchronizing", which is a weaker semantic. However this
is not a relaxation of the requirement that these exceptions cause
interrupts when MSR[EE]=1 (e.g., when mtmsr executes to completion as
TCG is doing here), rather it specifies how a pipelined processor can
have multiple instructions in flight where one may influence how another
behaves.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Reported-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@ozlabs.org>
Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20200414111131.465560-1-npiggin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org>
Tested-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Since we now use a GByteArray, we can not use stfl_p() directly.
Introduce the gdb_get_float32() helper to load a float32 register.
Fixes: a010bdbe719 ("extend GByteArray to read register helpers")
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20200414163853.12164-2-philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200414200631.12799-14-alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Introduce gdb_get_zeroes() to fill a GByteArray with zeroes.
Fixes: a010bdbe719 ("extend GByteArray to read register helpers")
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200414102427.7459-1-philmd@redhat.com>
[AJB: used slightly more gliby set_size approach]
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20200414200631.12799-13-alex.bennee@linaro.org>
We should only pass in gdb_get_reg16() with the GByteArray* object
itself, no need to shift. Without this patch, gdb remote attach will
crash QEMU:
(gdb) target remote :1234
Remote debugging using :1234
Remote communication error. Target disconnected.: Connection reset by peer.
$ qemu-system-x86_64 -m 1G -smp 4 ... -s
ERROR:qemu/gdbstub.c:1843:handle_read_all_regs: assertion failed: (len == gdbserver_state.mem_buf->len)
Bail out! ERROR:qemu/gdbstub.c:1843:handle_read_all_regs: assertion failed: (len == gdbserver_state.mem_buf->len)
Fixes: a010bdbe719 ("extend GByteArray to read register helpers")
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20200409164954.36902-3-peterx@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200414200631.12799-12-alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Since a010bdbe719 the gdbstub API takes a GByteArray*. Unfortunately
we forgot to update the gdb_get_reg*() calls. Do it now.
Fixes: a010bdbe719 ("extend GByteArray to read register helpers")
Reported-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Reviewed-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20200409172509.4078-1-philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200414200631.12799-11-alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Patch acb9f95a7c "i386: Fix GCC warning with snprintf when HAX
is enabled" replaced Windows device names with posix device
names. Revert this.
Fixes: acb9f95a7c "i386: Fix GCC warning with snprintf when HAX is enabled"
Signed-off-by: Volker Rümelin <vr_qemu@t-online.de>
Message-Id: <20200322210211.29603-1-vr_qemu@t-online.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Coverity reported a missing fall through comment, add it.
Fixes: e5918d7d7f0 ("target/rx: TCG translation")
Reported-by: Coverity (CID 1422222 MISSING_BREAK)
Suggested-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200403184419.28556-1-philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Rather than dynamically allocate, and risk failing to free
when we longjmp out of the translator, allocate the maximum
buffer size based on the maximum supported instruction length.
Suggested-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Dynamically allocating a new structure within the DisasContext can
potentially leak as we can longjmp out of the translation loop (see
test_phys_mem). The proper fix would be to use static allocation
within the DisasContext but as the Xtensa translator imports it's code
from elsewhere I leave that as an exercise for the maintainer.
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20200403191150.863-6-alex.bennee@linaro.org>
The KVM FWNMI capability should be enabled with the "ibm,nmi-register"
rtas call. Although MCEs from KVM will be delivered as architected
interrupts to the guest before "ibm,nmi-register" is called, KVM has
different behaviour depending on whether the guest has enabled FWNMI
(it attempts to do more recovery on behalf of a non-FWNMI guest).
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20200325142906.221248-2-npiggin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
An old comment in get_phys_addr_lpae() claims that the code does not
support the different format TCR for VTCR_EL2. This used to be true
but it is not true now (in particular the aa64_va_parameters() and
aa32_va_parameters() functions correctly handle the different
register format by checking whether the mmu_idx is Stage2).
Remove the out of date parts of the comment.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20200331143407.3186-1-peter.maydell@linaro.org
Our implementation of the PSTATE.PAN bit incorrectly cleared all
access permission bits for privileged access to memory which is
user-accessible. It should only affect the privileged read and write
permissions; execute permission is dealt with via XN/PXN instead.
Fixes: 81636b70c226dc27d7ebc8d
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20200330170651.20901-1-peter.maydell@linaro.org
While support for parsing ieee_half in the XML description was added
to gdb in 2019 (a6d0f249) there is no easy way for the gdbstub to know
if the gdb end will understand it. Disable it for now and allow older
gdbs to successfully connect to the default -cpu max SVE enabled
QEMUs.
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20200402143913.24005-1-alex.bennee@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
