AMD SEV will pin all guest memory, mark discarding of RAM broken. At the
time this is called, we cannot have anyone active that relies on discards
to work properly - let's still implement error handling.
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200626072248.78761-8-david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
SEVState is contained with SevGuestState. We've now fixed redundancies
and name conflicts, so there's no real point to the nested structure. Just
move all the fields of SEVState into SevGuestState.
This eliminates the SEVState structure, which as a bonus removes the
confusion with the SevState enum.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20200604064219.436242-10-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The user can explicitly specify a handle via the "handle" property wired
to SevGuestState::handle. That gets passed to the KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START
ioctl() which may update it, the final value being copied back to both
SevGuestState::handle and SEVState::handle.
AFAICT, nothing will be looking SEVState::handle before it and
SevGuestState::handle have been updated from the ioctl(). So, remove the
field and just use SevGuestState::handle directly.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20200604064219.436242-9-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
SEVState::policy is set from the final value of the policy field in the
parameter structure for the KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START ioctl(). But, AFAICT
that ioctl() won't ever change it from the original supplied value which
comes from SevGuestState::policy.
So, remove this field and just use SevGuestState::policy directly.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20200604064219.436242-8-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The SEVState structure has cbitpos and reduced_phys_bits fields which are
simply copied from the SevGuestState structure and never changed. Now that
SEVState is embedded in SevGuestState we can just access the original copy
directly.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20200604064219.436242-7-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The SEV code uses a pretty ugly global to access its internal state. Now
that SEVState is embedded in SevGuestState, we can avoid accessing it via
the global in some cases. In the remaining cases use a new global
referencing the containing SevGuestState which will simplify some future
transformations.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200604064219.436242-6-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Currently SevGuestState contains only configuration information. For
runtime state another non-QOM struct SEVState is allocated separately.
Simplify things by instead embedding the SEVState structure in
SevGuestState.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200604064219.436242-5-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
At the moment this is a purely passive object which is just a container for
information used elsewhere, hence the name. I'm going to change that
though, so as a preliminary rename it to SevGuestState.
That name risks confusion with both SEVState and SevState, but I'll be
working on that in following patches.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20200604064219.436242-4-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Neither QSevGuestInfo nor SEVState (not to be confused with SevState) is
used anywhere outside target/i386/sev.c, so they might as well live in
there rather than in a (somewhat) exposed header.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20200604064219.436242-3-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
This structure is nothing but an empty wrapper around the parent class,
which by QOM conventions means we don't need it at all.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20200604064219.436242-2-david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The only way object_property_add() can fail is when a property with
the same name already exists. Since our property names are all
hardcoded, failure is a programming error, and the appropriate way to
handle it is passing &error_abort.
Same for its variants, except for object_property_add_child(), which
additionally fails when the child already has a parent. Parentage is
also under program control, so this is a programming error, too.
We have a bit over 500 callers. Almost half of them pass
&error_abort, slightly fewer ignore errors, one test case handles
errors, and the remaining few callers pass them to their own callers.
The previous few commits demonstrated once again that ignoring
programming errors is a bad idea.
Of the few ones that pass on errors, several violate the Error API.
The Error ** argument must be NULL, &error_abort, &error_fatal, or a
pointer to a variable containing NULL. Passing an argument of the
latter kind twice without clearing it in between is wrong: if the
first call sets an error, it no longer points to NULL for the second
call. ich9_pm_add_properties(), sparc32_ledma_realize(),
sparc32_dma_realize(), xilinx_axidma_realize(), xilinx_enet_realize()
are wrong that way.
When the one appropriate choice of argument is &error_abort, letting
users pick the argument is a bad idea.
Drop parameter @errp and assert the preconditions instead.
There's one exception to "duplicate property name is a programming
error": the way object_property_add() implements the magic (and
undocumented) "automatic arrayification". Don't drop @errp there.
Instead, rename object_property_add() to object_property_try_add(),
and add the obvious wrapper object_property_add().
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200505152926.18877-15-armbru@redhat.com>
[Two semantic rebase conflicts resolved]
object_property_set_description() and
object_class_property_set_description() fail only when property @name
is not found.
There are 85 calls of object_property_set_description() and
object_class_property_set_description(). None of them can fail:
* 84 immediately follow the creation of the property.
* The one in spapr_rng_instance_init() refers to a property created in
spapr_rng_class_init(), from spapr_rng_properties[].
Every one of them still gets to decide what to pass for @errp.
51 calls pass &error_abort, 32 calls pass NULL, one receives the error
and propagates it to &error_abort, and one propagates it to
&error_fatal. I'm actually surprised none of them violates the Error
API.
What are we gaining by letting callers handle the "property not found"
error? Use when the property is not known to exist is simpler: you
don't have to guard the call with a check. We haven't found such a
use in 5+ years. Until we do, let's make life a bit simpler and drop
the @errp parameter.
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200505152926.18877-8-armbru@redhat.com>
[One semantic rebase conflict resolved]
Several objects implemented their own uint property getters and setters,
despite them being straightforward (without any checks/validations on
the values themselves) and identical across objects. This makes use of
an enhanced API for object_property_add_uintXX_ptr() which offers
default setters.
Some of these setters used to update the value even if the type visit
failed (eg. because the value being set overflowed over the given type).
The new setter introduces a check for these errors, not updating the
value if an error occurred. The error is propagated.
Signed-off-by: Felipe Franciosi <felipe@nutanix.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
sysemu/sysemu.h is a rather unfocused dumping ground for stuff related
to the system-emulator. Evidence:
* It's included widely: in my "build everything" tree, changing
sysemu/sysemu.h still triggers a recompile of some 1100 out of 6600
objects (not counting tests and objects that don't depend on
qemu/osdep.h, down from 5400 due to the previous two commits).
* It pulls in more than a dozen additional headers.
Split stuff related to run state management into its own header
sysemu/runstate.h.
Touching sysemu/sysemu.h now recompiles some 850 objects. qemu/uuid.h
also drops from 1100 to 850, and qapi/qapi-types-run-state.h from 4400
to 4200. Touching new sysemu/runstate.h recompiles some 500 objects.
Since I'm touching MAINTAINERS to add sysemu/runstate.h anyway, also
add qemu/main-loop.h.
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190812052359.30071-30-armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
[Unbreak OS-X build]
In these multiline messages, there were typos. Fix them -- add a missing
space and remove a superfluous apostrophe.
Inspired by Tom's patch.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Cc: qemu-trivial@nongnu.org
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <20190719104118.17735-1-jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The commit referenced below skipped pinning ram device memory when
ram blocks are added, we need to do the same when they're removed.
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Fixes: cedc0ad539 ("target/i386: sev: Do not pin the ram device memory region")
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <156320087103.2556.10983987500488190423.stgit@gimli.home>
Reviewed-by: Singh, Brijesh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The RAM device presents a memory region that should be handled
as an IO region and should not be pinned.
In the case of the vfio-pci, RAM device represents a MMIO BAR
and the memory region is not backed by pages hence
KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION fails to lock the memory range.
Fixes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1667249
Cc: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Message-Id: <20190204222322.26766-3-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Clean up includes so that osdep.h is included first and headers
which it implies are not included manually.
This commit was created with scripts/clean-includes, with the changes
to the following files manually reverted:
contrib/libvhost-user/libvhost-user-glib.h
contrib/libvhost-user/libvhost-user.c
contrib/libvhost-user/libvhost-user.h
linux-user/mips64/cpu_loop.c
linux-user/mips64/signal.c
linux-user/sparc64/cpu_loop.c
linux-user/sparc64/signal.c
linux-user/x86_64/cpu_loop.c
linux-user/x86_64/signal.c
target/s390x/gen-features.c
tests/migration/s390x/a-b-bios.c
tests/test-rcu-simpleq.c
tests/test-rcu-tailq.c
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20181204172535.2799-1-armbru@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Yuval Shaia <yuval.shaia@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Viktor Prutyanov <viktor.prutyanov@phystech.edu>
The string returned by object_property_get_str() is dynamically allocated.
Fixes: d8575c6c02
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Message-Id: <152231462116.69730.14119625999092384450.stgit@bahia.lan>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
The function can be used to get the current SEV capabilities.
The capabilities include platform diffie-hellman key (pdh) and certificate
chain. The key can be provided to the external entities which wants to
establish a trusted channel between SEV firmware and guest owner.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
SEV guest migration is not implemented yet.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
SEV launch flow requires us to issue LAUNCH_FINISH command before guest
is ready to run.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
During machine creation we encrypted the guest bios image, the
LAUNCH_MEASURE command can be used to retrieve the measurement of
the encrypted memory region. This measurement is a signature of
the memory contents that can be sent to the guest owner as an
attestation that the memory was encrypted correctly by the firmware.
VM management tools like libvirt can query the measurement using
query-sev-launch-measure QMP command.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command is used to encrypt a guest memory
region using the VM Encryption Key created using LAUNCH_START.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START command creates a new VM encryption key (VEK).
The encryption key created with the command will be used for encrypting
the bootstrap images (such as guest bios).
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When SEV is enabled, the hardware encryption engine uses a tweak such
that the two identical plaintext at different location will have a
different ciphertexts. So swapping or moving a ciphertexts of two guest
pages will not result in plaintexts being swapped. Hence relocating
a physical backing pages of the SEV guest will require some additional
steps in KVM driver. The KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_{UN,}REG_REGION ioctl can be
used to register/unregister the guest memory region which may contain the
encrypted data. KVM driver will internally handle the relocating physical
backing pages of registered memory regions.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When memory encryption is enabled, KVM_SEV_INIT command is used to
initialize the platform. The command loads the SEV related persistent
data from non-volatile storage and initializes the platform context.
This command should be first issued before invoking any other guest
commands provided by the SEV firmware.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Add a new memory encryption object 'sev-guest'. The object will be used
to create encrypted VMs on AMD EPYC CPU. The object provides the properties
to pass guest owner's public Diffie-hellman key, guest policy and session
information required to create the memory encryption context within the
SEV firmware.
e.g to launch SEV guest
# $QEMU \
-object sev-guest,id=sev0 \
-machine ....,memory-encryption=sev0
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
