Modify migrate_add_blocker and migrate_del_blocker to take an Error **
reason. This allows migration to own the Error object, so that if
an error occurs in migrate_add_blocker, migration code can free the Error
and clear the client handle, simplifying client code. It also simplifies
the migrate_del_blocker call site.
In addition, this is a pre-requisite for a proposed future patch that would
add a mode argument to migration requests to support live update, and
maintain a list of blockers for each mode. A blocker may apply to a single
mode or to multiple modes, and passing Error** will allow one Error object
to be registered for multiple modes.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Steve Sistare <steven.sistare@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Michael Galaxy <mgalaxy@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Galaxy <mgalaxy@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <1697634216-84215-1-git-send-email-steven.sistare@oracle.com>
The value of the reduced-phys-bits parameter is propogated to the CPUID
information exposed to the guest. Update the current validation check to
account for the size of the CPUID field (6-bits), ensuring the value is
in the range of 1 to 63.
Maintain backward compatibility, to an extent, by allowing a value greater
than 1 (so that the previously documented value of 5 still works), but not
allowing anything over 63.
Fixes: d8575c6c02 ("sev/i386: add command to initialize the memory encryption context")
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <cca5341a95ac73f904e6300f10b04f9c62e4e8ff.1664550870.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
This had been pulled in via qemu/plugin.h from hw/core/cpu.h,
but that will be removed.
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20230310195252.210956-5-richard.henderson@linaro.org>
[AJB: add various additional cases shown by CI]
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20230315174331.2959-15-alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilio Cota <cota@braap.org>
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20230207075115.1525-2-armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Konstantin Kostiuk <kkostiuk@redhat.com>
Add a new field 'cpu0-id' to the response of query-sev-capabilities QMP
command. The value of the field is the base64-encoded unique ID of CPU0
(socket 0), which can be used to retrieve the signed CEK of the CPU from
AMD's Key Distribution Service (KDS).
Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220228093014.882288-1-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Use address_space_map/unmap and check for errors.
Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
[Two lines wrapped for length - Daniel]
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
In sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes, the sizes of structs are known at
compile-time, so calculate needed padding at compile-time.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Commit cff03145ed ("sev/i386: Introduce sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes
for measured linux boot", 2021-09-30) introduced measured direct boot
with -kernel, using an OVMF-designated hashes table which QEMU fills.
However, no checks are performed on the validity of the hashes area
designated by OVMF. Specifically, if OVMF publishes the
SEV_HASH_TABLE_RV_GUID entry but it is filled with zeroes, this will
cause QEMU to write the hashes entries over the first page of the
guest's memory (GPA 0).
Add validity checks to the published area. If the hashes table area's
base address is zero, or its size is too small to fit the aligned hashes
table, display an error and stop the guest launch. In such case, the
following error will be displayed:
qemu-system-x86_64: SEV: guest firmware hashes table area is invalid (base=0x0 size=0x0)
Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Commit cff03145ed ("sev/i386: Introduce sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes
for measured linux boot", 2021-09-30) introduced measured direct boot
with -kernel, using an OVMF-designated hashes table which QEMU fills.
However, if OVMF doesn't designate such an area, QEMU would completely
abort the VM launch. This breaks launching with -kernel using older
OVMF images which don't publish the SEV_HASH_TABLE_RV_GUID.
Fix that so QEMU will only look for the hashes table if the sev-guest
kernel-hashes option is set to on. Otherwise, QEMU won't look for the
designated area in OVMF and won't fill that area.
To enable addition of kernel hashes, launch the guest with:
-object sev-guest,...,kernel-hashes=on
Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Introduce new boolean 'kernel-hashes' option on the sev-guest object.
It will be used to to decide whether to add the hashes of
kernel/initrd/cmdline to SEV guest memory when booting with -kernel.
The default value is 'off'.
Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
The struct kvm_sev_launch_measure has a constant and small size, and
therefore we can use a regular local variable for it instead of
allocating and freeing heap memory for it.
Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211011173026.2454294-3-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The struct kvm_sev_launch_start has a constant and small size, and
therefore we can use a regular local variable for it instead of
allocating and freeing heap memory for it.
Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211011173026.2454294-2-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
While being conditionally used for TARGET_I386 in hmp-commands-info.hx,
hmp_info_sev() is declared for all targets. Reduce its declaration
to target including "monitor/hmp-target.h". This is a minor cleanup.
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211007161716.453984-23-philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Move qmp_query_sev() & hmp_info_sev()() from monitor.c to sev.c
and make sev_get_info() static. We don't need the stub anymore,
remove it. Add a stub for hmp_info_sev().
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211007161716.453984-22-philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Move qmp_query_sev_launch_measure() from monitor.c to sev.c
and make sev_get_launch_measurement() static. We don't need the
stub anymore, remove it.
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211007161716.453984-21-philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Move qmp_query_sev_capabilities() from monitor.c to sev.c
and make sev_get_capabilities() static. We don't need the
stub anymore, remove it.
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211007161716.453984-20-philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Move qmp_sev_inject_launch_secret() from monitor.c to sev.c
and make sev_inject_launch_secret() static. We don't need the
stub anymore, remove it.
Previously with binaries built without SEV, management layer
was getting an empty response:
{ "execute": "sev-inject-launch-secret",
"arguments": { "packet-header": "mypkt", "secret": "mypass", "gpa": 4294959104 }
}
{
"return": {
}
}
Now the response is explicit, mentioning the feature is disabled:
{ "execute": "sev-inject-launch-secret",
"arguments": { "packet-header": "mypkt", "secret": "mypass", "gpa": 4294959104 }
}
{
"error": {
"class": "GenericError",
"desc": "this feature or command is not currently supported"
}
}
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211007161716.453984-19-philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Move qmp_query_sev_attestation_report() from monitor.c to sev.c
and make sev_get_attestation_report() static. We don't need the
stub anymore, remove it.
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211007161716.453984-18-philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
SEV is a x86 specific feature, and the "sev_i386.h" header
is already in target/i386/. Rename it as "sev.h" to simplify.
Patch created mechanically using:
$ git mv target/i386/sev_i386.h target/i386/sev.h
$ sed -i s/sev_i386.h/sev.h/ $(git grep -l sev_i386.h)
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211007161716.453984-15-philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Use g_autofree to remove a pair of g_free/goto.
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211007161716.453984-13-philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Removes a whole bunch of g_free's and a goto.
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Connor Kuehl <ckuehl@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Message-Id: <20210603113017.34922-1-dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211007161716.453984-12-philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Unused dead code makes review harder, so remove it.
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Connor Kuehl <ckuehl@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211007161716.453984-10-philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Multiple errors might be reported to the monitor,
better to prefix the SEV ones so we can distinct them.
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211007161716.453984-6-philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Add the sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes function to calculate the hashes of
the kernel/initrd/cmdline and fill a designated OVMF encrypted hash
table area. For this to work, OVMF must support an encrypted area to
place the data which is advertised via a special GUID in the OVMF reset
table.
The hashes of each of the files is calculated (or the string in the case
of the cmdline with trailing '\0' included). Each entry in the hashes
table is GUID identified and since they're passed through the
sev_encrypt_flash interface, the hashes will be accumulated by the AMD
PSP measurement (SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE).
Co-developed-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210930054915.13252-2-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
In sev_read_file_base64() we call g_file_get_contents(), which
allocates memory for the file contents. We then base64-decode the
contents (which allocates another buffer for the decoded data), but
forgot to free the memory for the original file data.
Use g_autofree to ensure that the file data is freed.
Fixes: Coverity CID 1459997
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210820165650.2839-1-peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
We did this with scripts/coccinelle/use-error_fatal.cocci before, in
commit 50beeb6809 and 007b06578a. This commit cleans up rarer
variations that don't seem worth matching with Coccinelle.
Cc: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Cc: Cornelia Huck <cornelia.huck@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Cc: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210720125408.387910-2-armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
The SEV userspace header[1] exports a couple of other error conditions that
aren't listed in QEMU's SEV implementation, so let's just round out the
list.
[1] linux-headers/linux/psp-sev.h
Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <ckuehl@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210430134830.254741-3-ckuehl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
This can help lower any margin for error when making future additions to
the list, especially if they're made out of order.
While doing so, make capitalization of ASID consistent with its usage in
the SEV firmware spec (Asid -> ASID).
Signed-off-by: Connor Kuehl <ckuehl@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210430134830.254741-2-ckuehl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
The SEV FW >= 0.23 added a new command that can be used to query the
attestation report containing the SHA-256 digest of the guest memory
and VMSA encrypted with the LAUNCH_UPDATE and sign it with the PEK.
Note, we already have a command (LAUNCH_MEASURE) that can be used to
query the SHA-256 digest of the guest memory encrypted through the
LAUNCH_UPDATE. The main difference between previous and this command
is that the report is signed with the PEK and unlike the LAUNCH_MEASURE
command the ATTESATION_REPORT command can be called while the guest
is running.
Add a QMP interface "query-sev-attestation-report" that can be used
to get the report encoded in base64.
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Connor Kuehl <ckuehl@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210429170728.24322-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Ram block notifiers are currently not aware of resizes. To properly
handle resizes during migration, we want to teach ram block notifiers about
resizeable ram.
Introduce the basic infrastructure but keep using max_size in the
existing notifiers. Supply the max_size when adding and removing ram
blocks. Also, notify on resizes.
Acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: haxm-team@intel.com
Cc: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Cc: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Cc: Wenchao Wang <wenchao.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Colin Xu <colin.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210429112708.12291-3-david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Stop including exec/address-spaces.h in files that don't need it.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210416171314.2074665-5-thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
The 'running' argument from VMChangeStateHandler does not require
other value than 0 / 1. Make it a plain boolean.
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Acked-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Message-Id: <20210111152020.1422021-3-philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Update the sev_es_enabled() function return value to be based on the SEV
policy that has been specified. SEV-ES is enabled if SEV is enabled and
the SEV-ES policy bit is set in the policy object.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <c69f81c6029f31fc4c52a9f35f1bd704362476a5.1611682609.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When SEV-ES is enabled, it is not possible modify the guests register
state after it has been initially created, encrypted and measured.
Normally, an INIT-SIPI-SIPI request is used to boot the AP. However, the
hypervisor cannot emulate this because it cannot update the AP register
state. For the very first boot by an AP, the reset vector CS segment
value and the EIP value must be programmed before the register has been
encrypted and measured. Search the guest firmware for the guest for a
specific GUID that tells Qemu the value of the reset vector to use.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <22db2bfb4d6551aed661a9ae95b4fdbef613ca21.1611682609.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
In prep for AP booting, require the use of in-kernel irqchip support. This
lessens the Qemu support burden required to boot APs.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <e9aec5941e613456f0757f5a73869cdc5deea105.1611682609.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Provide initial support for SEV-ES. This includes creating a function to
indicate the guest is an SEV-ES guest (which will return false until all
support is in place), performing the proper SEV initialization and
ensuring that the guest CPU state is measured as part of the launch.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <2e6386cbc1ddeaf701547dd5677adf5ddab2b6bd.1611682609.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
While we've abstracted some (potential) differences between mechanisms for
securing guest memory, the initialization is still specific to SEV. Given
that, move it into x86's kvm_arch_init() code, rather than the generic
kvm_init() code.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
The platform specific details of mechanisms for implementing
confidential guest support may require setup at various points during
initialization. Thus, it's not really feasible to have a single cgs
initialization hook, but instead each mechanism needs its own
initialization calls in arch or machine specific code.
However, to make it harder to have a bug where a mechanism isn't
properly initialized under some circumstances, we want to have a
common place, late in boot, where we verify that cgs has been
initialized if it was requested.
This patch introduces a ready flag to the ConfidentialGuestSupport
base type to accomplish this, which we verify in
qemu_machine_creation_done().
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
This allows failures to be reported richly and idiomatically.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Currently the "memory-encryption" property is only looked at once we
get to kvm_init(). Although protection of guest memory from the
hypervisor isn't something that could really ever work with TCG, it's
not conceptually tied to the KVM accelerator.
In addition, the way the string property is resolved to an object is
almost identical to how a QOM link property is handled.
So, create a new "confidential-guest-support" link property which sets
this QOM interface link directly in the machine. For compatibility we
keep the "memory-encryption" property, but now implemented in terms of
the new property.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
When AMD's SEV memory encryption is in use, flash memory banks (which are
initialed by pc_system_flash_map()) need to be encrypted with the guest's
key, so that the guest can read them.
That's abstracted via the kvm_memcrypt_encrypt_data() callback in the KVM
state.. except, that it doesn't really abstract much at all.
For starters, the only call site is in code specific to the 'pc'
family of machine types, so it's obviously specific to those and to
x86 to begin with. But it makes a bunch of further assumptions that
need not be true about an arbitrary confidential guest system based on
memory encryption, let alone one based on other mechanisms:
* it assumes that the flash memory is defined to be encrypted with the
guest key, rather than being shared with hypervisor
* it assumes that that hypervisor has some mechanism to encrypt data into
the guest, even though it can't decrypt it out, since that's the whole
point
* the interface assumes that this encrypt can be done in place, which
implies that the hypervisor can write into a confidential guests's
memory, even if what it writes isn't meaningful
So really, this "abstraction" is actually pretty specific to the way SEV
works. So, this patch removes it and instead has the PC flash
initialization code call into a SEV specific callback.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Several architectures have mechanisms which are designed to protect
guest memory from interference or eavesdropping by a compromised
hypervisor. AMD SEV does this with in-chip memory encryption and
Intel's TDX can do similar things. POWER's Protected Execution
Framework (PEF) accomplishes a similar goal using an ultravisor and
new memory protection features, instead of encryption.
To (partially) unify handling for these, this introduces a new
ConfidentialGuestSupport QOM base class. "Confidential" is kind of vague,
but "confidential computing" seems to be the buzzword about these schemes,
and "secure" or "protected" are often used in connection to unrelated
things (such as hypervisor-from-guest or guest-from-guest security).
The "support" in the name is significant because in at least some of the
cases it requires the guest to take specific actions in order to protect
itself from hypervisor eavesdropping.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
AMD SEV allows a guest owner to inject a secret blob
into the memory of a virtual machine. The secret is
encrypted with the SEV Transport Encryption Key and
integrity is guaranteed with the Transport Integrity
Key. Although QEMU facilitates the injection of the
launch secret, it cannot access the secret.
Signed-off-by: Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Message-Id: <20201027170303.47550-1-tobin@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Some typedefs and macros are defined after the type check macros.
This makes it difficult to automatically replace their
definitions with OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE.
Patch generated using:
$ ./scripts/codeconverter/converter.py -i \
--pattern=QOMStructTypedefSplit $(git grep -l '' -- '*.[ch]')
which will split "typdef struct { ... } TypedefName"
declarations.
Followed by:
$ ./scripts/codeconverter/converter.py -i --pattern=MoveSymbols \
$(git grep -l '' -- '*.[ch]')
which will:
- move the typedefs and #defines above the type check macros
- add missing #include "qom/object.h" lines if necessary
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200831210740.126168-9-ehabkost@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200831210740.126168-10-ehabkost@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20200831210740.126168-11-ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
In some cases, such as if the kvm-amd "sev" module parameter is set
to 0, SEV will be unavailable but query-sev-capabilities will still
return all the information. This tricks libvirt into erroneously
reporting that SEV is available. Check the actual usability of the
feature and return the appropriate error if QEMU cannot use KVM
or KVM cannot use SEV.
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The query-sev-capabilities was reporting errors through error_report;
change it to use Error** so that the cause of the failure is clearer.
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
