The unique sev_encrypt_flash() invocation (in pc_system_flash_map)
is protected by the "if (sev_enabled())" check, so is not
reacheable.
Replace the abort() call in sev_es_save_reset_vector() by
g_assert_not_reached() which meaning is clearer.
Reviewed-by: Connor Kuehl <ckuehl@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211007161716.453984-11-philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Unused dead code makes review harder, so remove it.
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Connor Kuehl <ckuehl@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211007161716.453984-10-philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Commit 00b8105324 ("target-i386: Remove assert_no_error usage")
forgot to add the "qapi/error.h" for &error_abort, add it now.
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Connor Kuehl <ckuehl@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211007161716.453984-8-philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
If the management layer tries to inject a secret, it gets an empty
response in case the guest doesn't have SEV enabled, or the binary
is built without SEV:
{ "execute": "sev-inject-launch-secret",
"arguments": { "packet-header": "mypkt", "secret": "mypass", "gpa": 4294959104 }
}
{
"return": {
}
}
Make it clearer by returning an error:
{ "execute": "sev-inject-launch-secret",
"arguments": { "packet-header": "mypkt", "secret": "mypass", "gpa": 4294959104 }
}
{
"error": {
"class": "GenericError",
"desc": "SEV not enabled for guest"
}
}
Note: we will remove the sev_inject_launch_secret() stub in few commits,
so we don't bother to add error_setg() there.
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Connor Kuehl <ckuehl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211007161716.453984-7-philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Multiple errors might be reported to the monitor,
better to prefix the SEV ones so we can distinct them.
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211007161716.453984-6-philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
SEV is x86-specific, no need to add its stub to other
architectures. Move the stub file to target/i386/kvm/.
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211007161716.453984-5-philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Introduce the i386_softmmu_kvm Meson source set to be able to
add features dependent on CONFIG_KVM.
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211007161716.453984-4-philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
We're about to move this out of tcg.h, so rename it
as we did when moving MemOp.
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Add the sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes function to calculate the hashes of
the kernel/initrd/cmdline and fill a designated OVMF encrypted hash
table area. For this to work, OVMF must support an encrypted area to
place the data which is advertised via a special GUID in the OVMF reset
table.
The hashes of each of the files is calculated (or the string in the case
of the cmdline with trailing '\0' included). Each entry in the hashes
table is GUID identified and since they're passed through the
sev_encrypt_flash interface, the hashes will be accumulated by the AMD
PSP measurement (SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE).
Co-developed-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210930054915.13252-2-dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
KVM implements some Hyper-V 2016 functions so providing WS2008R2 version
is somewhat incorrect. While generally guests shouldn't care about it
and always check feature bits, it is known that some tools in Windows
actually check version info.
For compatibility reasons make the change for 6.2 machine types only.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210902093530.345756-9-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Currently, we hardcode Hyper-V version id (CPUID 0x40000002) to
WS2008R2 and it is known that certain tools in Windows check this. It
seems useful to provide some flexibility by making it possible to change
this info at will. CPUID information is defined in TLFS as:
EAX: Build Number
EBX Bits 31-16: Major Version
Bits 15-0: Minor Version
ECX Service Pack
EDX Bits 31-24: Service Branch
Bits 23-0: Service Number
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210902093530.345756-8-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The enlightenment allows to use Hyper-V SynIC with hardware APICv/AVIC
enabled. Normally, Hyper-V SynIC disables these hardware features and
suggests the guest to use paravirtualized AutoEOI feature. Linux-4.15
gains support for conditional APICv/AVIC disablement, the feature
stays on until the guest tries to use AutoEOI feature with SynIC. With
'HV_DEPRECATING_AEOI_RECOMMENDED' bit exposed, modern enough Windows/
Hyper-V versions should follow the recommendation and not use the
(unwanted) feature.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210902093530.345756-7-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
In preparation to enabling Hyper-V + APICv/AVIC move
HV_APIC_ACCESS_RECOMMENDED setting out of kvm_hyperv_properties[]: the
'real' feature bit for the vAPIC features is HV_APIC_ACCESS_AVAILABLE,
HV_APIC_ACCESS_RECOMMENDED is a recommendation to use the feature which
we may not always want to give.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210902093530.345756-6-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
By default, KVM allows the guest to use all currently supported Hyper-V
enlightenments when Hyper-V CPUID interface was exposed, regardless of if
some features were not announced in guest visible CPUIDs. hv-enforce-cpuid
feature alters this behavior and only allows the guest to use exposed
Hyper-V enlightenments. The feature is supported by Linux >= 5.14 and is
not enabled by default in QEMU.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210902093530.345756-5-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
By default, KVM allows the guest to use all currently supported PV features
even when they were not announced in guest visible CPUIDs. Introduce a new
"kvm-pv-enforce-cpuid" flag to limit the supported feature set to the
exposed features. The feature is supported by Linux >= 5.10 and is not
enabled by default in QEMU.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210902093530.345756-4-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Provide a name field for all the memory listeners. It can be used to identify
which memory listener is which.
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210817013553.30584-2-peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
In sev_read_file_base64() we call g_file_get_contents(), which
allocates memory for the file contents. We then base64-decode the
contents (which allocates another buffer for the decoded data), but
forgot to free the memory for the original file data.
Use g_autofree to ensure that the file data is freed.
Fixes: Coverity CID 1459997
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210820165650.2839-1-peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Libvirt can use query-sgx-capabilities to get the host
sgx capabilities to decide how to allocate SGX EPC size to VM.
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210910102258.46648-3-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The QMP and HMP interfaces can be used by monitor or QMP tools to retrieve
the SGX information from VM side when SGX is enabled on Intel platform.
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210910102258.46648-2-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
SGX capabilities are enumerated through CPUID_0x12.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210719112136.57018-16-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The SGX sub-leafs are enumerated at CPUID 0x12. Indices 0 and 1 are
always present when SGX is supported, and enumerate SGX features and
capabilities. Indices >=2 are directly correlated with the platform's
EPC sections. Because the number of EPC sections is dynamic and user
defined, the number of SGX sub-leafs is "NULL" terminated.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210719112136.57018-15-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
If the guest want to fully use SGX, the guest needs to be able to
access provisioning key. Add a new KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE to KVM to
support provisioning key to KVM guests.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210719112136.57018-14-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Expose SGX to the guest if and only if KVM is enabled and supports
virtualization of SGX. While the majority of ENCLS can be emulated to
some degree, because SGX uses a hardware-based root of trust, the
attestation aspects of SGX cannot be emulated in software, i.e.
ultimately emulation will fail as software cannot generate a valid
quote/report. The complexity of partially emulating SGX in Qemu far
outweighs the value added, e.g. an SGX specific simulator for userspace
applications can emulate SGX for development and testing purposes.
Note, access to the PROVISIONKEY is not yet advertised to the guest as
KVM blocks access to the PROVISIONKEY by default and requires userspace
to provide additional credentials (via ioctl()) to expose PROVISIONKEY.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210719112136.57018-13-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
SGX adds multiple flags to FEATURE_CONTROL to enable SGX and Flexible
Launch Control.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210719112136.57018-12-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
On real hardware, on systems that supports SGX Launch Control, those
MSRs are initialized to digest of Intel's signing key; on systems that
don't support SGX Launch Control, those MSRs are not available but
hardware always uses digest of Intel's signing key in EINIT.
KVM advertises SGX LC via CPUID if and only if the MSRs are writable.
Unconditionally initialize those MSRs to digest of Intel's signing key
when CPU is realized and reset to reflect the fact. This avoids
potential bug in case kvm_arch_put_registers() is called before
kvm_arch_get_registers() is called, in which case guest's virtual
SGX_LEPUBKEYHASH MSRs will be set to 0, although KVM initializes those
to digest of Intel's signing key by default, since KVM allows those MSRs
to be updated by Qemu to support live migration.
Save/restore the SGX Launch Enclave Public Key Hash MSRs if SGX Launch
Control (LC) is exposed to the guest. Likewise, migrate the MSRs if they
are writable by the guest.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210719112136.57018-11-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CPUID leaf 12_1_EAX is an Intel-defined feature bits leaf enumerating
the platform's SGX capabilities that may be utilized by an enclave, e.g.
whether or not an enclave can gain access to the provision key.
Currently there are six capabilities:
- INIT: set when the enclave has has been initialized by EINIT. Cannot
be set by software, i.e. forced to zero in CPUID.
- DEBUG: permits a debugger to read/write into the enclave.
- MODE64BIT: the enclave runs in 64-bit mode
- PROVISIONKEY: grants has access to the provision key
- EINITTOKENKEY: grants access to the EINIT token key, i.e. the
enclave can generate EINIT tokens
- KSS: Key Separation and Sharing enabled for the enclave.
Note that the entirety of CPUID.0x12.0x1, i.e. all registers, enumerates
the allowed ATTRIBUTES (128 bits), but only bits 31:0 are directly
exposed to the user (via FEAT_12_1_EAX). Bits 63:32 are currently all
reserved and bits 127:64 correspond to the allowed XSAVE Feature Request
Mask, which is calculated based on other CPU features, e.g. XSAVE, MPX,
AVX, etc... and is not exposed to the user.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210719112136.57018-10-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CPUID leaf 12_0_EBX is an Intel-defined feature bits leaf enumerating
the platform's SGX extended capabilities. Currently there is a single
capabilitiy:
- EXINFO: record information about #PFs and #GPs in the enclave's SSA
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210719112136.57018-9-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CPUID leaf 12_0_EAX is an Intel-defined feature bits leaf enumerating
the CPU's SGX capabilities, e.g. supported SGX instruction sets.
Currently there are four enumerated capabilities:
- SGX1 instruction set, i.e. "base" SGX
- SGX2 instruction set for dynamic EPC management
- ENCLV instruction set for VMM oversubscription of EPC
- ENCLS-C instruction set for thread safe variants of ENCLS
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210719112136.57018-8-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Add CPUID defines for SGX and SGX Launch Control (LC), as well as
defines for their associated FEATURE_CONTROL MSR bits. Define the
Launch Enclave Public Key Hash MSRs (LE Hash MSRs), which exist
when SGX LC is present (in CPUID), and are writable when SGX LC is
enabled (in FEATURE_CONTROL).
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210719112136.57018-7-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
There is nothing target specific about this. The implementation
is host specific, but the declaration is 100% common.
Reviewed-By: Warner Losh <imp@bsdimp.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
With Apple Silicon available to the masses, it's a good time to add support
for driving its virtualization extensions from QEMU.
This patch adds all necessary architecture specific code to get basic VMs
working, including save/restore.
Known limitations:
- WFI handling is missing (follows in later patch)
- No watchpoint/breakpoint support
Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@csgraf.de>
Reviewed-by: Roman Bolshakov <r.bolshakov@yadro.com>
Reviewed-by: Sergio Lopez <slp@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20210916155404.86958-5-agraf@csgraf.de
[PMM: added missing #include]
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
We will need to install a migration helper for the ARM hvf backend.
Let's introduce an arch callback for the overall hvf init chain to
do so.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@csgraf.de>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20210916155404.86958-4-agraf@csgraf.de
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
cpu_get_pic_interrupt() is now unreachable from user-mode,
delete the unnecessary stubs.
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Reviewed-by: Warner Losh <imp@bsdimp.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210911165434.531552-25-f4bug@amsat.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Following the logic of commit 30493a030f ("i386: split seg_helper
into user-only and sysemu parts"), move x86_cpu_exec_interrupt()
under sysemu/seg_helper.c.
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Reviewed-By: Warner Losh <imp@bsdimp.com>
Message-Id: <20210911165434.531552-12-f4bug@amsat.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Restrict cpu_exec_interrupt() and its callees to sysemu.
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Reviewed-by: Warner Losh <imp@bsdimp.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210911165434.531552-11-f4bug@amsat.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
do_interrupt() is sysemu specific. However due to some X86
specific hack, it is also used in user-mode emulation, which
is why it couldn't be restricted to CONFIG_SOFTMMU (see the
comment around added in commit 7827168471: "cpu: tcg_ops:
move to tcg-cpu-ops.h, keep a pointer in CPUClass").
Keep the hack but rename the handler as fake_user_interrupt()
and restrict do_interrupt() to sysemu.
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Reviewed-by: Warner Losh <imp@bsdimp.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210911165434.531552-6-f4bug@amsat.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Merge two TARGET_X86_64 consecutive blocks.
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Reviewed-by: Warner Losh <imp@bsdimp.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210911165434.531552-4-f4bug@amsat.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Restrict some sysemu-only fpu_helper helpers (see commit
83a3d9c740: "i386: separate fpu_helper sysemu-only parts").
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Reviewed-by: Warner Losh <imp@bsdimp.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210911165434.531552-3-f4bug@amsat.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
[rth: Split out of a larger patch.]
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
A parameter max_size was added to the RAMBlockNotifier
ram_block_added function. Use the max_size for pre allocation
of hva space.
Signed-off-by: Reinoud Zandijk <Reinoud@NetBSD.org>
Message-Id: <20210718134650.1191-3-reinoud@NetBSD.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The feature allows the VMSAVE and VMLOAD instructions to execute in guest mode without
causing a VMEXIT. (APM2 15.33.1)
Signed-off-by: Lara Lazier <laramglazier@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Writes to cr8 affect v_tpr. This could set or unset an interrupt
request as the priority might have changed.
Signed-off-by: Lara Lazier <laramglazier@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The APM2 states that if V_IGN_TPR is nonzero, the current
virtual interrupt ignores the (virtual) TPR.
Signed-off-by: Lara Lazier <laramglazier@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
VGIF provides masking capability for when virtual interrupts
are taken. (APM2)
Signed-off-by: Lara Lazier <laramglazier@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Moved int_ctl into the CPUX86State structure. It removes some
unnecessary stores and loads, and prepares for tracking the vIRQ
state even when it is masked due to vGIF.
Signed-off-by: Lara Lazier <laramglazier@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
VGIF allows STGI and CLGI to execute in guest mode and control virtual
interrupts in guest mode.
When the VGIF feature is enabled then:
* executing STGI in the guest sets bit 9 of the VMCB offset 60h.
* executing CLGI in the guest clears bit 9 of the VMCB offset 60h.
Signed-off-by: Lara Lazier <laramglazier@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20210730070742.9674-1-laramglazier@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
APM2 requires that VMRUN and VMLOAD canonicalize (sign extend to 63
from 48/57) all base addresses in the segment registers that have been
respectively loaded.
Signed-off-by: Lara Lazier <laramglazier@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20210804113058.45186-1-laramglazier@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
