Some Windows versions crash at boot or fail to enable the VMBus device if
they don't see the expected set of Hyper-V features (enlightenments).
Since this provides poor user experience let's warn user if the VMBus
device is enabled without the recommended set of Hyper-V features.
The recommended set is the minimum set of Hyper-V features required to make
the VMBus device work properly in Windows Server versions 2016, 2019 and
2022.
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Maciej S. Szmigiero <maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com>
CPUID leaf 7 was grouped together with SGX leaf 0x12 by commit
b9edbadefb ("i386: Propagate SGX CPUID sub-leafs to KVM") by mistake.
SGX leaf 0x12 has its specific logic to check if subleaf (starting from 2)
is valid or not by checking the bit 0:3 of corresponding EAX is 1 or
not.
Leaf 7 follows the logic that EAX of subleaf 0 enumerates the maximum
valid subleaf.
Fixes: b9edbadefb ("i386: Propagate SGX CPUID sub-leafs to KVM")
Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240125024016.2521244-4-xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
No such constraint that subleaf index needs to be less than 64.
Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Reviewed-by:Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240125024016.2521244-3-xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Existing code misses a decrement of cpuid_i when skip leaf 0x1F.
There's a blank CPUID entry(with leaf, subleaf as 0, and all fields
stuffed 0s) left in the CPUID array.
It conflicts with correct CPUID leaf 0.
Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Reviewed-by:Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240125024016.2521244-2-xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The Big QEMU Lock (BQL) has many names and they are confusing. The
actual QemuMutex variable is called qemu_global_mutex but it's commonly
referred to as the BQL in discussions and some code comments. The
locking APIs, however, are called qemu_mutex_lock_iothread() and
qemu_mutex_unlock_iothread().
The "iothread" name is historic and comes from when the main thread was
split into into KVM vcpu threads and the "iothread" (now called the main
loop thread). I have contributed to the confusion myself by introducing
a separate --object iothread, a separate concept unrelated to the BQL.
The "iothread" name is no longer appropriate for the BQL. Rename the
locking APIs to:
- void bql_lock(void)
- void bql_unlock(void)
- bool bql_locked(void)
There are more APIs with "iothread" in their names. Subsequent patches
will rename them. There are also comments and documentation that will be
updated in later patches.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Acked-by: Fabiano Rosas <farosas@suse.de>
Acked-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Farman <farman@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Harsh Prateek Bora <harshpb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Hyman Huang <yong.huang@smartx.com>
Reviewed-by: Akihiko Odaki <akihiko.odaki@daynix.com>
Message-id: 20240102153529.486531-2-stefanha@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Commit 7191f24c7f ("accel/kvm/kvm-all: Handle register access errors")
added error checking for KVM_SET_SREGS/KVM_SET_SREGS2. In doing so, it
exposed a long-running bug in current KVM support for SEV-ES where the
kernel assumes that MSR_EFER_LMA will be set explicitly by the guest
kernel, in which case EFER write traps would result in KVM eventually
seeing MSR_EFER_LMA get set and recording it in such a way that it would
be subsequently visible when accessing it via KVM_GET_SREGS/etc.
However, guest kernels currently rely on MSR_EFER_LMA getting set
automatically when MSR_EFER_LME is set and paging is enabled via
CR0_PG_MASK. As a result, the EFER write traps don't actually expose the
MSR_EFER_LMA bit, even though it is set internally, and when QEMU
subsequently tries to pass this EFER value back to KVM via
KVM_SET_SREGS* it will fail various sanity checks and return -EINVAL,
which is now considered fatal due to the aforementioned QEMU commit.
This can be addressed by inferring the MSR_EFER_LMA bit being set when
paging is enabled and MSR_EFER_LME is set, and synthesizing it to ensure
the expected bits are all present in subsequent handling on the host
side.
Ultimately, this handling will be implemented in the host kernel, but to
avoid breaking QEMU's SEV-ES support when using older host kernels, the
same handling can be done in QEMU just after fetching the register
values via KVM_GET_SREGS*. Implement that here.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Akihiko Odaki <akihiko.odaki@daynix.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Cc: Lara Lazier <laramglazier@gmail.com>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Cc: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 7191f24c7f ("accel/kvm/kvm-all: Handle register access errors")
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <20231206155821.1194551-1-michael.roth@amd.com>
This will allow Linux guests (since v6.0) to use the per-vCPU upcall
vector delivered as MSI through the local APIC.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
This was introduced in KVM in Linux 2.6.33, we can require it
unconditionally. KVM_CLOCK_TSC_STABLE was only added in Linux 4.9,
for now do not require it (though it would allow the removal of some
pretty yucky code).
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
This was introduced in KVM in Linux 2.6.36, and could already be used at
the time to save/restore FPU data even on older processor. We can require
it unconditionally and stop using KVM_GET/SET_FPU.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
This was introduced in KVM in Linux 3.5, we can require it unconditionally
in kvm_irqchip_send_msi(). However, not all architectures have to implement
it so check it only in x86, the only architecture that ever had MSI injection
but not KVM_CAP_SIGNAL_MSI.
ARM uses it to detect the presence of the ITS emulation in the kernel,
introduced in Linux 4.8. Assume that it's there and possibly fail when
realizing the arm-its-kvm device.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Modify migrate_add_blocker and migrate_del_blocker to take an Error **
reason. This allows migration to own the Error object, so that if
an error occurs in migrate_add_blocker, migration code can free the Error
and clear the client handle, simplifying client code. It also simplifies
the migrate_del_blocker call site.
In addition, this is a pre-requisite for a proposed future patch that would
add a mode argument to migration requests to support live update, and
maintain a list of blockers for each mode. A blocker may apply to a single
mode or to multiple modes, and passing Error** will allow one Error object
to be registered for multiple modes.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Steve Sistare <steven.sistare@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Michael Galaxy <mgalaxy@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Galaxy <mgalaxy@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <1697634216-84215-1-git-send-email-steven.sistare@oracle.com>
When explicitly booting a multiple vcpus vm with "-cpu +ht", it gets
warning of
warning: host doesn't support requested feature: CPUID.01H:EDX.ht [bit 28]
Make CPUID_HT as supported unconditionally can resolve the warning.
However it introduces another issue that it also expose CPUID_HT to
guest when "-cpu host/max" with only 1 vcpu. To fix this, need mark
CPUID_HT as the no_autoenable_flags.
Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20231010060539.210258-1-xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
kvm_has_pit_state2() is only defined for x86 targets (in
target/i386/kvm/kvm.c). Its declaration is pointless on
all other targets. Have it return a boolean.
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Message-ID: <20230904124325.79040-13-philmd@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Changes the signature of the target-defined functions for
inserting/removing kvm hw breakpoints. The address and length arguments
are now of vaddr type, which both matches the type used internally in
accel/kvm/kvm-all.c and makes the api target-agnostic.
Signed-off-by: Anton Johansson <anjo@rev.ng>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20230807155706.9580-4-anjo@rev.ng>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
kvm_arch_get_default_type() returns the default KVM type. This hook is
particularly useful to derive a KVM type that is valid for "none"
machine model, which is used by libvirt to probe the availability of
KVM.
For MIPS, the existing mips_kvm_type() is reused. This function ensures
the availability of VZ which is mandatory to use KVM on the current
QEMU.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Akihiko Odaki <akihiko.odaki@daynix.com>
Message-id: 20230727073134.134102-2-akihiko.odaki@daynix.com
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
[PMM: added doc comment for new function]
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
MCDT_NO bit indicates HW contains the security fix and doesn't need to
be mitigated to avoid data-dependent behaviour for certain instructions.
It needs no hypervisor support. Treat it as supported regardless of what
KVM reports.
Signed-off-by: Tao Su <tao1.su@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20230706054949.66556-4-tao1.su@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Upstream commit ddf0fd9ae1 "hw/xen: Support HVM_PARAM_CALLBACK_TYPE_GSI callback"
added kvm_xen_maybe_deassert_callback usage to target/i386/kvm/kvm.c file without
conditional preprocessing check. This breaks any build not using CONFIG_XEN_EMU.
Protect call by conditional preprocessing to allow build without CONFIG_XEN_EMU.
Signed-off-by: Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Message-Id: <20230308130557.2420-1-mrezanin@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The default number of PIRQs is set to 256 to avoid issues with 32-bit MSI
devices. Allow it to be increased if the user desires.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
The way that Xen handles MSI PIRQs is kind of awful.
There is a special MSI message which targets a PIRQ. The vector in the
low bits of data must be zero. The low 8 bits of the PIRQ# are in the
destination ID field, the extended destination ID field is unused, and
instead the high bits of the PIRQ# are in the high 32 bits of the address.
Using the high bits of the address means that we can't intercept and
translate these messages in kvm_send_msi(), because they won't be caught
by the APIC — addresses like 0x1000fee46000 aren't in the APIC's range.
So we catch them in pci_msi_trigger() instead, and deliver the event
channel directly.
That isn't even the worst part. The worst part is that Xen snoops on
writes to devices' MSI vectors while they are *masked*. When a MSI
message is written which looks like it targets a PIRQ, it remembers
the device and vector for later.
When the guest makes a hypercall to bind that PIRQ# (snooped from a
marked MSI vector) to an event channel port, Xen *unmasks* that MSI
vector on the device. Xen guests using PIRQ delivery of MSI don't
ever actually unmask the MSI for themselves.
Now that this is working we can finally enable XENFEAT_hvm_pirqs and
let the guest use it all.
Tested with passthrough igb and emulated e1000e + AHCI.
CPU0 CPU1
0: 65 0 IO-APIC 2-edge timer
1: 0 14 xen-pirq 1-ioapic-edge i8042
4: 0 846 xen-pirq 4-ioapic-edge ttyS0
8: 1 0 xen-pirq 8-ioapic-edge rtc0
9: 0 0 xen-pirq 9-ioapic-level acpi
12: 257 0 xen-pirq 12-ioapic-edge i8042
24: 9600 0 xen-percpu -virq timer0
25: 2758 0 xen-percpu -ipi resched0
26: 0 0 xen-percpu -ipi callfunc0
27: 0 0 xen-percpu -virq debug0
28: 1526 0 xen-percpu -ipi callfuncsingle0
29: 0 0 xen-percpu -ipi spinlock0
30: 0 8608 xen-percpu -virq timer1
31: 0 874 xen-percpu -ipi resched1
32: 0 0 xen-percpu -ipi callfunc1
33: 0 0 xen-percpu -virq debug1
34: 0 1617 xen-percpu -ipi callfuncsingle1
35: 0 0 xen-percpu -ipi spinlock1
36: 8 0 xen-dyn -event xenbus
37: 0 6046 xen-pirq -msi ahci[0000:00:03.0]
38: 1 0 xen-pirq -msi-x ens4
39: 0 73 xen-pirq -msi-x ens4-rx-0
40: 14 0 xen-pirq -msi-x ens4-rx-1
41: 0 32 xen-pirq -msi-x ens4-tx-0
42: 47 0 xen-pirq -msi-x ens4-tx-1
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
The GSI callback (and later PCI_INTX) is a level triggered interrupt. It
is asserted when an event channel is delivered to vCPU0, and is supposed
to be cleared when the vcpu_info->evtchn_upcall_pending field for vCPU0
is cleared again.
Thankfully, Xen does *not* assert the GSI if the guest sets its own
evtchn_upcall_pending field; we only need to assert the GSI when we
have delivered an event for ourselves. So that's the easy part, kind of.
There's a slight complexity in that we need to hold the BQL before we
can call qemu_set_irq(), and we definitely can't do that while holding
our own port_lock (because we'll need to take that from the qemu-side
functions that the PV backend drivers will call). So if we end up
wanting to set the IRQ in a context where we *don't* already hold the
BQL, defer to a BH.
However, we *do* need to poll for the evtchn_upcall_pending flag being
cleared. In an ideal world we would poll that when the EOI happens on
the PIC/IOAPIC. That's how it works in the kernel with the VFIO eventfd
pairs — one is used to trigger the interrupt, and the other works in the
other direction to 'resample' on EOI, and trigger the first eventfd
again if the line is still active.
However, QEMU doesn't seem to do that. Even VFIO level interrupts seem
to be supported by temporarily unmapping the device's BARs from the
guest when an interrupt happens, then trapping *all* MMIO to the device
and sending the 'resample' event on *every* MMIO access until the IRQ
is cleared! Maybe in future we'll plumb the 'resample' concept through
QEMU's irq framework but for now we'll do what Xen itself does: just
check the flag on every vmexit if the upcall GSI is known to be
asserted.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Handle the hypercall to set a per vcpu info, and also wire up the default
vcpu_info in the shared_info page for the first 32 vCPUs.
To avoid deadlock within KVM a vCPU thread must set its *own* vcpu_info
rather than it being set from the context in which the hypercall is
invoked.
Add the vcpu_info (and default) GPA to the vmstate_x86_cpu for migration,
and restore it in kvm_arch_put_registers() appropriately.
Signed-off-by: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
This means handling the new exit reason for Xen but still
crashing on purpose. As we implement each of the hypercalls
we will then return the right return code.
Signed-off-by: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
[dwmw2: Add CPL to hypercall tracing, disallow hypercalls from CPL > 0]
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
There are (at least) three different vCPU ID number spaces. One is the
internal KVM vCPU index, based purely on which vCPU was chronologically
created in the kernel first. If userspace threads are all spawned and
create their KVM vCPUs in essentially random order, then the KVM indices
are basically random too.
The second number space is the APIC ID space, which is consistent and
useful for referencing vCPUs. MSIs will specify the target vCPU using
the APIC ID, for example, and the KVM Xen APIs also take an APIC ID
from userspace whenever a vCPU needs to be specified (as opposed to
just using the appropriate vCPU fd).
The third number space is not normally relevant to the kernel, and is
the ACPI/MADT/Xen CPU number which corresponds to cs->cpu_index. But
Xen timer hypercalls use it, and Xen timer hypercalls *really* want
to be accelerated in the kernel rather than handled in userspace, so
the kernel needs to be told.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Introduce support for emulating CPUID for Xen HVM guests. It doesn't make
sense to advertise the KVM leaves to a Xen guest, so do Xen unconditionally
when the xen-version machine property is set.
Signed-off-by: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
[dwmw2: Obtain xen_version from KVM property, make it automatic]
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
This just initializes the basic Xen support in KVM for now. Only permitted
on TYPE_PC_MACHINE because that's where the sysbus devices for Xen heap
overlay, event channel, grant tables and other stuff will exist. There's
no point having the basic hypercall support if nothing else works.
Provide sysemu/kvm_xen.h and a kvm_xen_get_caps() which will be used
later by support devices.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
These are just a flag that documents the performance characteristic of
an instruction; it needs no hypervisor support. So include them even
if KVM does not show them. In particular, FZRM/FSRS/FSRC have only
been added very recently, but they are available on Sapphire Rapids
processors.
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
We have two inclusion loops:
block/block.h
-> block/block-global-state.h
-> block/block-common.h
-> block/blockjob.h
-> block/block.h
block/block.h
-> block/block-io.h
-> block/block-common.h
-> block/blockjob.h
-> block/block.h
I believe these go back to Emanuele's reorganization of the block API,
merged a few months ago in commit d7e2fe4aac.
Fortunately, breaking them is merely a matter of deleting unnecessary
includes from headers, and adding them back in places where they are
now missing.
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20221221133551.3967339-2-armbru@redhat.com>
Commit 012d4c96e2 changed the visitor functions taking Error ** to
return bool instead of void, and the commits following it used the new
return value to simplify error checking. Since then a few more uses
in need of the same treatment crept in. Do that. All pretty
mechanical except for
* balloon_stats_get_all()
This is basically the same transformation commit 012d4c96e2 applied
to the virtual walk example in include/qapi/visitor.h.
* set_max_queue_size()
Additionally replace "goto end of function" by return.
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20221121085054.683122-10-armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Specify maximum possible APIC ID assigned for current VM session to KVM
prior to the creation of vCPUs. By this setting, KVM can set up VM-scoped
data structure indexed by the APIC ID, e.g. Posted-Interrupt Descriptor
pointer table to support Intel IPI virtualization, with the most optimal
memory footprint.
It can be achieved by calling KVM_ENABLE_CAP for KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPU_ID
capability once KVM has enabled it. Ignoring the return error if KVM
doesn't support this capability yet.
Signed-off-by: Zeng Guang <guang.zeng@intel.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220825025246.26618-1-guang.zeng@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
These memory allocation functions return void *, and casting to
another pointer type is useless clutter. Drop these casts.
If you really want another pointer type, consider g_new().
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Message-Id: <20220923120025.448759-3-armbru@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Resetting a guest that has Hyper-V VMBus support enabled triggers a QEMU
assertion failure:
hw/hyperv/hyperv.c:131: synic_reset: Assertion `QLIST_EMPTY(&synic->sint_routes)' failed.
This happens both on normal guest reboot or when using "system_reset" HMP
command.
The failing assertion was introduced by commit 64ddecc88b ("hyperv: SControl is optional to enable SynIc")
to catch dangling SINT routes on SynIC reset.
The root cause of this problem is that the SynIC itself is reset before
devices using SINT routes have chance to clean up these routes.
Since there seems to be no existing mechanism to force reset callbacks (or
methods) to be executed in specific order let's use a similar method that
is already used to reset another interrupt controller (APIC) after devices
have been reset - by invoking the SynIC reset from the machine reset
handler via a new x86_cpu_after_reset() function co-located with
the existing x86_cpu_reset() in target/i386/cpu.c.
Opportunistically move the APIC reset handler there, too.
Fixes: 64ddecc88b ("hyperv: SControl is optional to enable SynIc") # exposed the bug
Signed-off-by: Maciej S. Szmigiero <maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <cb57cee2e29b20d06f81dce054cbcea8b5d497e8.1664552976.git.maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The MSR_CORE_THREAD_COUNT MSR describes CPU package topology, such as number
of threads and cores for a given package. This is information that QEMU has
readily available and can provide through the new user space MSR deflection
interface.
This patch propagates the existing hvf logic from patch 027ac0cb51
("target/i386/hvf: add rdmsr 35H MSR_CORE_THREAD_COUNT") to KVM.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@csgraf.de>
Message-Id: <20221004225643.65036-4-agraf@csgraf.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
KVM has grown support to deflect arbitrary MSRs to user space since
Linux 5.10. For now we don't expect to make a lot of use of this
feature, so let's expose it the easiest way possible: With up to 16
individually maskable MSRs.
This patch adds a kvm_filter_msr() function that other code can call
to install a hook on KVM MSR reads or writes.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@csgraf.de>
Message-Id: <20221004225643.65036-3-agraf@csgraf.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
There are cases that malicious virtual machine can cause CPU stuck (due
to event windows don't open up), e.g., infinite loop in microcode when
nested #AC (CVE-2015-5307). No event window means no event (NMI, SMI and
IRQ) can be delivered. It leads the CPU to be unavailable to host or
other VMs. Notify VM exit is introduced to mitigate such kind of
attacks, which will generate a VM exit if no event window occurs in VM
non-root mode for a specified amount of time (notify window).
A new KVM capability KVM_CAP_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT is exposed to user space
so that the user can query the capability and set the expected notify
window when creating VMs. The format of the argument when enabling this
capability is as follows:
Bit 63:32 - notify window specified in qemu command
Bit 31:0 - some flags (e.g. KVM_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT_ENABLED is set to
enable the feature.)
Users can configure the feature by a new (x86 only) accel property:
qemu -accel kvm,notify-vmexit=run|internal-error|disable,notify-window=n
The default option of notify-vmexit is run, which will enable the
capability and do nothing if the exit happens. The internal-error option
raises a KVM internal error if it happens. The disable option does not
enable the capability. The default value of notify-window is 0. It is valid
only when notify-vmexit is not disabled. The valid range of notify-window
is non-negative. It is even safe to set it to zero since there's an
internal hardware threshold to be added to ensure no false positive.
Because a notify VM exit may happen with VM_CONTEXT_INVALID set in exit
qualification (no cases are anticipated that would set this bit), which
means VM context is corrupted. It would be reflected in the flags of
KVM_EXIT_NOTIFY exit. If KVM_NOTIFY_CONTEXT_INVALID bit is set, raise a KVM
internal error unconditionally.
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chenyi Qiang <chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220929072014.20705-5-chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Several hypervisor capabilities in KVM are target-specific. When exposed
to QEMU users as accelerator properties (i.e. -accel kvm,prop=value), they
should not be available for all targets.
Add a hook for targets to add their own properties to -accel kvm, for
now no such property is defined.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220929072014.20705-3-chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
For the direct triple faults, i.e. hardware detected and KVM morphed
to VM-Exit, KVM will never lose them. But for triple faults sythesized
by KVM, e.g. the RSM path, if KVM exits to userspace before the request
is serviced, userspace could migrate the VM and lose the triple fault.
A new flag KVM_VCPUEVENT_VALID_TRIPLE_FAULT is defined to signal that
the event.triple_fault_pending field contains a valid state if the
KVM_CAP_X86_TRIPLE_FAULT_EVENT capability is enabled.
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Chenyi Qiang <chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20220929072014.20705-2-chenyi.qiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
There is no need to guard g_free(P) with if (P): g_free(NULL) is safe.
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Message-Id: <20220923090428.93529-1-armbru@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
New KVM_CLOCK flags were added in the kernel.(c68dc1b577eabd5605c6c7c08f3e07ae18d30d5d)
```
+ #define KVM_CLOCK_VALID_FLAGS \
+ (KVM_CLOCK_TSC_STABLE | KVM_CLOCK_REALTIME | KVM_CLOCK_HOST_TSC)
case KVM_CAP_ADJUST_CLOCK:
- r = KVM_CLOCK_TSC_STABLE;
+ r = KVM_CLOCK_VALID_FLAGS;
```
kvm_has_adjust_clock_stable needs to handle additional flags,
so that s->clock_is_reliable can be true and kvmclock_current_nsec doesn't need to be called.
Signed-off-by: Ray Zhang <zhanglei002@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20220922100523.2362205-1-zhanglei002@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
kvm_put_sregs2() fails to reset 'locked' CR4/CR0 bits upon vCPU reset when
it is in VMX root operation. Do kvm_put_msr_feature_control() before
kvm_put_sregs2() to (possibly) kick vCPU out of VMX root operation. It also
seems logical to do kvm_put_msr_feature_control() before
kvm_put_nested_state() and not after it, especially when 'real' nested
state is set.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220818150113.479917-3-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Make sure env->nested_state is cleaned up when a vCPU is reset, it may
be stale after an incoming migration, kvm_arch_put_registers() may
end up failing or putting vCPU in a weird state.
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220818150113.479917-2-vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
