Introduce a privileged helper to access RAPL MSR.
The privileged helper tool, qemu-vmsr-helper, is designed to provide
virtual machines with the ability to read specific RAPL (Running Average
Power Limit) MSRs without requiring CAP_SYS_RAWIO privileges or relying
on external, out-of-tree patches.
The helper tool leverages Unix permissions and SO_PEERCRED socket
options to enforce access control, ensuring that only processes
explicitly requesting read access via readmsr() from a valid Thread ID
can access these MSRs.
The list of RAPL MSRs that are allowed to be read by the helper tool is
defined in rapl-msr-index.h. This list corresponds to the RAPL MSRs that
will be supported in the next commit titled "Add support for RAPL MSRs
in KVM/QEMU."
The tool is intentionally designed to run on the Linux x86 platform.
This initial implementation is tailored for Intel CPUs but can be
extended to support AMD CPUs in the future.
Signed-off-by: Anthony Harivel <aharivel@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240522153453.1230389-3-aharivel@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
This generalizes the rule to generate the skeleton and allows to add
another.
Signed-off-by: Akihiko Odaki <akihiko.odaki@daynix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
This saves branches and makes later BPF program changes easier.
Signed-off-by: Akihiko Odaki <akihiko.odaki@daynix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
The kernel interprets the returned value as an unsigned 32-bit so -1
will mean queue 4294967295, which is awkward. Return 0 instead.
Signed-off-by: Akihiko Odaki <akihiko.odaki@daynix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
calculate_rss_hash() was using hash value 0 to tell if it calculated
a hash, but the hash value may be 0 on a rare occasion. Have a
distinct bool value for correctness.
Fixes: f3fa412de2 ("ebpf: Added eBPF RSS program.")
Signed-off-by: Akihiko Odaki <akihiko.odaki@daynix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Updated section name, so libbpf should init/gues proper
program type without specifications during open/load.
Also, added map_flags with explicitly declared BPF_F_MMAPABLE.
Added check for BPF_F_MMAPABLE flag to meson script and
requirements to libbpf version.
Also changed fragmentation flag check - some TCP/UDP packets
may be considered fragmented if DF flag is set.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Melnychenko <andrew@daynix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
The current implementation fails to load on a system with
libbpf 1.0 and reports that legacy map definitions in 'maps'
section are not supported by libbpf v1.0+. This commit updates
the Makefile to add BTF (-g flag) and appropriately updates
the maps in rss.bpf.c and update the skeleton file in repo.
Signed-off-by: Shreesh Adiga <16567adigashreesh@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Remove all the virtiofsd build and docs infrastructure.
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20221219130205.687815-4-berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Tweak the semantic patch to drop redundant parenthesis around the
return expression.
Coccinelle drops a comment in hw/rdma/vmw/pvrdma_cmd.c; restored
manually.
Coccinelle messes up vmdk_co_create(), not sure why. Change dropped,
will be done manually in the next commit.
Line breaks in target/avr/cpu.h and hw/rdma/vmw/pvrdma_cmd.c tidied up
manually.
Whitespace in tools/virtiofsd/fuse_lowlevel.c tidied up manually.
checkpatch.pl complains "return of an errno should typically be -ve"
two times for hw/9pfs/9p-synth.c. Preexisting, the patch merely makes
it visible to checkpatch.pl.
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20221122134917.1217307-2-armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
The virtiofsd currently crashes on s390x. This is because of a
`sigreturn` system call. See audit log below:
type=SECCOMP msg=audit(1669382477.611:459): auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 ses=4294967295 subj=system_u:system_r:virtd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 pid=6649 comm="virtiofsd" exe="/usr/libexec/virtiofsd" sig=31 arch=80000016 syscall=119 compat=0 ip=0x3fff15f748a code=0x80000000AUID="unset" UID="root" GID="root" ARCH=s390x SYSCALL=sigreturn
Signed-off-by: Marc Hartmayer <mhartmay@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: German Maglione <gmaglione@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20221125143946.27717-1-mhartmay@linux.ibm.com>
The "%f" specifier in g_date_time_format() is only available in glib
2.65.2 or later. If combined with older glib, the function returns null
and the timestamp displayed as "(null)".
For backward compatibility, g_date_time_get_microsecond should be used
to retrieve subsecond.
In this patch the g_date_time_format() leaves subsecond field as "%06d"
and let next snprintf to format with g_date_time_get_microsecond.
Signed-off-by: Yusuke Okada <okada.yusuke@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20220818184618.2205172-1-yokada.996@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
We are having bunch of issues with killpriv_v2 enabled by default. First
of all it relies on clearing suid/sgid bits as needed by dropping
capability CAP_FSETID. This does not work for remote filesystems like
NFS (and possibly others).
Secondly, we are noticing other issues related to clearing of SGID
which leads to failures for xfstests generic/355 and generic/193.
Thirdly, there are other issues w.r.t caching of metadata (suid/sgid)
bits in fuse client with killpriv_v2 enabled. Guest can cache that
data for sometime even if cleared on server.
Second and Third issue are fixable. Just that it might take a little
while to get it fixed in kernel. First one will probably not see
any movement for a long time.
Given these issues, killpriv_v2 does not seem to be a good candidate
for enabling by default. We have already disabled it by default in
rust version of virtiofsd.
Hence this patch disabled killpriv_v2 by default. User can choose to
enable it by passing option "-o killpriv_v2".
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <YuPd0itNIAz4tQRt@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220707163720.1421716-5-berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Inspired by Julia Lawall's fixing of Linux
kernel comments, I looked at qemu, although I did it manually.
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Henrique Barboza <danielhb413@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Klaus Jensen <k.jensen@samsung.com>
Message-Id: <20220614104045.85728-2-dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Header guard symbols should match their file name to make guard
collisions less likely.
Cleaned up with scripts/clean-header-guards.pl, followed by some
renaming of new guard symbols picked by the script to better ones.
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220506134911.2856099-2-armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
[Change to generated file ebpf/rss.bpf.skeleton.h backed out]
When using Meson options rather than config-host.h, the "when" clauses
have to be changed to if statements (which is not necessarily great,
though at least it highlights which parts of the build are per-target
and which are not).
Do that before moving vhost logic to meson.build, though for now
the variables are just based on config-host.mak data.
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Simplify the function to only return the directory path. Callers are
adjusted to use the GLib function to build paths, g_build_filename().
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220420132624.2439741-39-marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
virtiofsd has introduced killpriv_v2/no_killpriv_v2 for a while. Add
description of it to docs/helper.
Signed-off-by: Liu Yiding <liuyd.fnst@fujitsu.com>
Message-Id: <20220421095151.2231099-1-liuyd.fnst@fujitsu.com>
[Small documentation fixes: s/as client supports/as the client supports/
and s/. /. /.
--Stefan]
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
In virtiofsd, we assume that the presence of the STATX_MNT_ID macro
implies existence of the statx.stx_mnt_id field. Unfortunately, that is
not necessarily the case: glibc has introduced the macro in its commit
88a2cf6c4bab6e94a65e9c0db8813709372e9180, but the statx.stx_mnt_id field
is still missing from its own headers.
Let meson.build actually chek for both STATX_MNT_ID and
statx.stx_mnt_id, and set CONFIG_STATX_MNT_ID if both are present.
Then, use this config macro in virtiofsd.
Closes: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/882
Signed-off-by: Hanna Reitz <hreitz@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220223092340.9043-1-hreitz@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Honor the expected behavior of syncfs() to synchronously flush all data
and metadata to disk on linux systems.
If virtiofsd is started with '-o announce_submounts', the client is
expected to send a FUSE_SYNCFS request for each individual submount.
In this case, we just create a new file descriptor on the submount
inode with lo_inode_open(), call syncfs() on it and close it. The
intermediary file is needed because O_PATH descriptors aren't
backed by an actual file and syncfs() would fail with EBADF.
If virtiofsd is started without '-o announce_submounts' or if the
client doesn't have the FUSE_CAP_SUBMOUNTS capability, the client
only sends a single FUSE_SYNCFS request for the root inode. The
server would thus need to track submounts internally and call
syncfs() on each of them. This will be implemented later.
Note that syncfs() might suffer from a time penalty if the submounts
are being hammered by some unrelated workload on the host. The only
solution to prevent that is to avoid shared mounts.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Message-Id: <20220215181529.164070-2-groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Provide an option "-o security_label/no_security_label" to enable/disable
security label functionality. By default these are turned off.
If enabled, server will indicate to client that it is capable of handling
one security label during file creation. Typically this is expected to
be a SELinux label. File server will set this label on the file. It will
try to set it atomically wherever possible. But its not possible in
all the cases.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220208204813.682906-11-vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
If guest and host policies can't work with each other, then guest security
context (selinux label) needs to be set into an xattr. Say remap guest
security.selinux xattr to trusted.virtiofs.security.selinux.
That means setting "fscreate" is not going to help as that's ony useful
for security.selinux xattr on host.
So we need another method which is atomic. Use O_TMPFILE to create new
file, set xattr and then linkat() to proper place.
But this works only for regular files. So dir, symlinks will continue
to be non-atomic.
Also if host filesystem does not support O_TMPFILE, we fallback to
non-atomic behavior.
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220208204813.682906-10-vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
This patch adds support for creating new file with security context
as sent by client. It basically takes three paths.
- If no security context enabled, then it continues to create files without
security context.
- If security context is enabled and but security.selinux has not been
remapped, then it uses /proc/thread-self/attr/fscreate knob to set
security context and then create the file. This will make sure that
newly created file gets the security context as set in "fscreate" and
this is atomic w.r.t file creation.
This is useful and host and guest SELinux policies don't conflict and
can work with each other. In that case, guest security.selinux xattr
is not remapped and it is passthrough as "security.selinux" xattr
on host.
- If security context is enabled but security.selinux xattr has been
remapped to something else, then it first creates the file and then
uses setxattr() to set the remapped xattr with the security context.
This is a non-atomic operation w.r.t file creation.
This mode will be most versatile and allow host and guest to have their
own separate SELinux xattrs and have their own separate SELinux policies.
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220208204813.682906-9-vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Soon we will be able to create and also set security context on the file
atomically using /proc/self/task/tid/attr/fscreate knob. If this knob
is available on the system, first set the knob with the desired context
and then create the file. It will be created with the context set in
fscreate. This works basically for SELinux and its per thread.
This patch just introduces the helper functions. Subsequent patches will
make use of these helpers.
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220208204813.682906-8-vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
dgilbert: Manually merged gettid syscall number fixup from Vivek
Move core file creation bits in a separate function. Soon this is going
to get more complex as file creation need to set security context also.
And there will be multiple modes of file creation in next patch.
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220208204813.682906-7-vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Add capability to enable and parse security context as sent by client
and put into fuse_req. Filesystems now can get security context from
request and set it on files during creation.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220208204813.682906-6-vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
->capable keeps track of what capabilities kernel supports and ->wants keep
track of what capabilities filesytem wants.
Right now these fields are 32bit in size. But now fuse has run out of
bits and capabilities can now have bit number which are higher than 31.
That means 32 bit fields are not suffcient anymore. Increase size to 64
bit so that we can add newer capabilities and still be able to use existing
code to check and set the capabilities.
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220208204813.682906-5-vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Add some code to parse extended "struct fuse_init_in". And use a local
variable "flag" to represent 64 bit flags. This will make it easier
to add more features without having to worry about two 32bit flags (->flags
and ->flags2) in "fuse_struct_in".
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220208204813.682906-4-vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
dgilbert: Fixed up long line
Kernel version 5.17 has increased the size of "struct fuse_init_in" struct.
Previously this struct was 16 bytes and now it has been extended to
64 bytes in size.
Once qemu headers are updated to latest, it will expect to receive 64 byte
size struct (for protocol version major 7 and minor > 6). But if guest is
booting older kernel (older than 5.17), then it still sends older
fuse_init_in of size 16 bytes. And do_init() fails. It is expecting
64 byte struct. And this results in mount of virtiofs failing.
Fix this by parsing 16 bytes only for now. Separate patches will be
posted which will parse rest of the bytes and enable new functionality.
Right now we don't support any of the new functionality, so we don't
lose anything by not parsing bytes beyond 16.
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220208204813.682906-2-vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
With the current implementation, blocking flock can lead to
deadlock. Thus, it's better to return EOPNOTSUPP if a user attempts
to perform a blocking flock request.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Hasler <sebastian.hasler@stuvus.uni-stuttgart.de>
Message-Id: <20220113153249.710216-1-sebastian.hasler@stuvus.uni-stuttgart.de>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
The method is now in 0.59, using it simplifies some conditionals.
There is a small change, which is to build virtfs-proxy-helper in a
tools-only build. This is done for consistency with other tools,
which are not culled by the absence of system emulator binaries.
.disable_auto_if() would also be useful to check for packages,
for example
-linux_io_uring = not_found
-if not get_option('linux_io_uring').auto() or have_block
- linux_io_uring = dependency('liburing', required: get_option('linux_io_uring'),
- method: 'pkg-config', kwargs: static_kwargs)
-endif
+linux_io_uring = dependency('liburing',
+ required: get_option('linux_io_uring').disable_auto_if(not have_block),
+ method: 'pkg-config', kwargs: static_kwargs)
This change however is much larger and I am not sure about the improved
readability, so I am not performing it right now.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The virtiofsd currently crashes when used with glibc 2.35.
That is due to the rseq system call being added to every thread
creation [1][2].
[1]: https://www.efficios.com/blog/2019/02/08/linux-restartable-sequences/
[2]: https://sourceware.org/pipermail/libc-alpha/2022-February/136040.html
This happens not at daemon start, but when a guest connects
/usr/lib/qemu/virtiofsd -f --socket-path=/tmp/testvfsd -o sandbox=chroot \
-o source=/var/guests/j-virtiofs --socket-group=kvm
virtio_session_mount: Waiting for vhost-user socket connection...
# start ok, now guest will connect
virtio_session_mount: Received vhost-user socket connection
virtio_loop: Entry
fv_queue_set_started: qidx=0 started=1
fv_queue_set_started: qidx=1 started=1
Bad system call (core dumped)
We have to put rseq on the seccomp allowlist to avoid that the daemon
is crashing in this case.
Reported-by: Michael Hudson-Doyle <michael.hudson@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Ehrhardt <christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20220209111456.3328420-1-christian.ehrhardt@canonical.com
[Moved rseq to its alphabetically ordered position in the seccomp
allowlist.
--Stefan]
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
At the start, drop membership of all supplementary groups. This is
not required.
If we have membership of "root" supplementary group and when we switch
uid/gid using setresuid/setsgid, we still retain membership of existing
supplemntary groups. And that can allow some operations which are not
normally allowed.
For example, if root in guest creates a dir as follows.
$ mkdir -m 03777 test_dir
This sets SGID on dir as well as allows unprivileged users to write into
this dir.
And now as unprivileged user open file as follows.
$ su test
$ fd = open("test_dir/priviledge_id", O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 02755);
This will create SGID set executable in test_dir/.
And that's a problem because now an unpriviliged user can execute it,
get egid=0 and get access to resources owned by "root" group. This is
privilege escalation.
Fixes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2044863
Fixes: CVE-2022-0358
Reported-by: JIETAO XIAO <shawtao1125@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <YfBGoriS38eBQrAb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
dgilbert: Fixed missing {}'s style nit
Make the '--socket-group=' option fail if the group name is unknown:
./tools/virtiofsd/virtiofsd .... --socket-group=zaphod
vhost socket: unable to find group 'zaphod'
Reported-by: Xiaoling Gao <xiagao@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20211014122554.34599-1-dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Use a helper to stop all the queues. Later in the patch series I am
planning to use this helper at one more place later in the patch series.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210930153037.1194279-6-vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
We have open coded logic to take locks and push element on virtqueue at
three places. Add a helper and use it everywhere. Code is easier to read and
less number of lines of code.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210930153037.1194279-5-vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
"struct virtio_fs_config" definition seems to be unused in fuse_virtio.c.
Remove it.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210930153037.1194279-4-vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Right now for xattr remapping, we support types of "prefix", "ok" or "bad".
Type "bad" returns -EPERM on setxattr and hides xattr in listxattr. For
getxattr, mapping code returns -EPERM but getxattr code converts it to -ENODATA.
I need a new semantics where if an xattr is unsupported, then
getxattr()/setxattr() return -ENOTSUP and listxattr() should hide the xattr.
This is needed to simulate that security.selinux is not supported by
virtiofs filesystem and in that case client falls back to some default
label specified by policy.
So add a new type "unsupported" which returns -ENOTSUP on getxattr() and
setxattr() and hides xattrs in listxattr().
For example, one can use following mapping rule to not support
security.selinux xattr and allow others.
"-o xattrmap=/unsupported/all/security.selinux/security.selinux//ok/all///"
Suggested-by: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <YUt9qbmgAfCFfg5t@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Two minor fixes; one for performance, the other seccomp
on s390x.
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=GMdE
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/dgilbert-gitlab/tags/pull-virtiofs-20210916' into staging
virtiofsd pull 2021-08-16
Two minor fixes; one for performance, the other seccomp
on s390x.
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
# gpg: Signature made Thu 16 Sep 2021 14:51:38 BST
# gpg: using RSA key 45F5C71B4A0CB7FB977A9FA90516331EBC5BFDE7
# gpg: Good signature from "Dr. David Alan Gilbert (RH2) <dgilbert@redhat.com>" [full]
# Primary key fingerprint: 45F5 C71B 4A0C B7FB 977A 9FA9 0516 331E BC5B FDE7
* remotes/dgilbert-gitlab/tags/pull-virtiofs-20210916:
virtiofsd: Reverse req_list before processing it
tools/virtiofsd: Add fstatfs64 syscall to the seccomp allowlist
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
With the thread pool disabled, we add the requests in the queue to a
GList, processing by iterating over there afterwards.
For adding them, we're using "g_list_prepend()", which is more
efficient but causes the requests to be processed in reverse order,
breaking the read-ahead and request-merging optimizations in the host
for sequential operations.
According to the documentation, if you need to process the request
in-order, using "g_list_prepend()" and then reversing the list with
"g_list_reverse()" is more efficient than using "g_list_append()", so
let's do it that way.
Testing on a spinning disk (to boost the increase of read-ahead and
request-merging) shows a 4x improvement on sequential write fio test:
Test:
fio --directory=/mnt/virtio-fs --filename=fio-file1 --runtime=20
--iodepth=16 --size=4G --direct=1 --blocksize=4K --ioengine libaio
--rw write --name seqwrite-libaio
Without "g_list_reverse()":
...
Jobs: 1 (f=1): [W(1)][100.0%][w=22.4MiB/s][w=5735 IOPS][eta 00m:00s]
seqwrite-libaio: (groupid=0, jobs=1): err= 0: pid=710: Tue Aug 24 12:58:16 2021
write: IOPS=5709, BW=22.3MiB/s (23.4MB/s)(446MiB/20002msec); 0 zone resets
...
With "g_list_reverse()":
...
Jobs: 1 (f=1): [W(1)][100.0%][w=84.0MiB/s][w=21.5k IOPS][eta 00m:00s]
seqwrite-libaio: (groupid=0, jobs=1): err= 0: pid=716: Tue Aug 24 13:00:15 2021
write: IOPS=21.3k, BW=83.1MiB/s (87.2MB/s)(1663MiB/20001msec); 0 zone resets
...
Signed-off-by: Sergio Lopez <slp@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210824131158.39970-1-slp@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
The virtiofsd currently crashes on s390x when doing something like
this in the guest:
mkdir -p /mnt/myfs
mount -t virtiofs myfs /mnt/myfs
touch /mnt/myfs/foo.txt
stat -f /mnt/myfs/foo.txt
The problem is that the fstatfs64 syscall is called in this case
from the virtiofsd. We have to put it on the seccomp allowlist to
avoid that the daemon gets killed in this case.
Buglink: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2001728
Suggested-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210914123214.181885-1-thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sergio Lopez <slp@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
