* Update kernel headers (Gerd, myself)
* SEV support (Brijesh)
I have not tested non-x86 compilation, but I reordered the SEV patches
so that all non-x86-specific changes go first to catch any possible
issues (which weren't there anyway :)).
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Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/bonzini/tags/for-upstream-sev' into staging
* Migrate MSR_SMI_COUNT (Liran)
* Update kernel headers (Gerd, myself)
* SEV support (Brijesh)
I have not tested non-x86 compilation, but I reordered the SEV patches
so that all non-x86-specific changes go first to catch any possible
issues (which weren't there anyway :)).
# gpg: Signature made Tue 13 Mar 2018 16:37:06 GMT
# gpg: using RSA key BFFBD25F78C7AE83
# gpg: Good signature from "Paolo Bonzini <bonzini@gnu.org>"
# gpg: aka "Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>"
# Primary key fingerprint: 46F5 9FBD 57D6 12E7 BFD4 E2F7 7E15 100C CD36 69B1
# Subkey fingerprint: F133 3857 4B66 2389 866C 7682 BFFB D25F 78C7 AE83
* remotes/bonzini/tags/for-upstream-sev: (22 commits)
sev/i386: add sev_get_capabilities()
sev/i386: qmp: add query-sev-capabilities command
sev/i386: qmp: add query-sev-launch-measure command
sev/i386: hmp: add 'info sev' command
cpu/i386: populate CPUID 0x8000_001F when SEV is active
sev/i386: add migration blocker
sev/i386: finalize the SEV guest launch flow
sev/i386: add support to LAUNCH_MEASURE command
target/i386: encrypt bios rom
sev/i386: add command to encrypt guest memory region
sev/i386: add command to create launch memory encryption context
sev/i386: register the guest memory range which may contain encrypted data
sev/i386: add command to initialize the memory encryption context
include: add psp-sev.h header file
sev/i386: qmp: add query-sev command
target/i386: add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) object
kvm: introduce memory encryption APIs
kvm: add memory encryption context
docs: add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV)
machine: add memory-encryption option
...
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
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Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/stsquad/tags/pull-travis-speedup-130318-1' into staging
Some updates to reduce timeouts in Travis
# gpg: Signature made Tue 13 Mar 2018 16:44:46 GMT
# gpg: using RSA key FBD0DB095A9E2A44
# gpg: Good signature from "Alex Bennée (Master Work Key) <alex.bennee@linaro.org>"
# Primary key fingerprint: 6685 AE99 E751 67BC AFC8 DF35 FBD0 DB09 5A9E 2A44
* remotes/stsquad/tags/pull-travis-speedup-130318-1:
.travis.yml: add --disable-user with the rest of the disables
.travis.yml: split default config into system and user
.travis.yml: drop setting default log output
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
The function can be used to get the current SEV capabilities.
The capabilities include platform diffie-hellman key (pdh) and certificate
chain. The key can be provided to the external entities which wants to
establish a trusted channel between SEV firmware and guest owner.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The command can be used by libvirt to query the SEV capabilities.
Cc: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The command can be used by libvirt to retrieve the measurement of SEV guest.
This measurement is a signature of the memory contents that was encrypted
through the LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA.
Cc: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The command can be used to show the SEV information when memory
encryption is enabled on AMD platform.
Cc: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Cc: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When SEV is enabled, CPUID 0x8000_001F should provide additional
information regarding the feature (such as which page table bit is used
to mark the pages as encrypted etc).
The details for memory encryption CPUID is available in AMD APM
(https://support.amd.com/TechDocs/24594.pdf) Section E.4.17
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
SEV guest migration is not implemented yet.
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
SEV launch flow requires us to issue LAUNCH_FINISH command before guest
is ready to run.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
During machine creation we encrypted the guest bios image, the
LAUNCH_MEASURE command can be used to retrieve the measurement of
the encrypted memory region. This measurement is a signature of
the memory contents that can be sent to the guest owner as an
attestation that the memory was encrypted correctly by the firmware.
VM management tools like libvirt can query the measurement using
query-sev-launch-measure QMP command.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
SEV requires that guest bios must be encrypted before booting the guest.
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command is used to encrypt a guest memory
region using the VM Encryption Key created using LAUNCH_START.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START command creates a new VM encryption key (VEK).
The encryption key created with the command will be used for encrypting
the bootstrap images (such as guest bios).
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When SEV is enabled, the hardware encryption engine uses a tweak such
that the two identical plaintext at different location will have a
different ciphertexts. So swapping or moving a ciphertexts of two guest
pages will not result in plaintexts being swapped. Hence relocating
a physical backing pages of the SEV guest will require some additional
steps in KVM driver. The KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_{UN,}REG_REGION ioctl can be
used to register/unregister the guest memory region which may contain the
encrypted data. KVM driver will internally handle the relocating physical
backing pages of registered memory regions.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When memory encryption is enabled, KVM_SEV_INIT command is used to
initialize the platform. The command loads the SEV related persistent
data from non-volatile storage and initializes the platform context.
This command should be first issued before invoking any other guest
commands provided by the SEV firmware.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
As all the disabled features only affect system emulation we might as
well disable user mode to save compile time.
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
As the build times have risen we keep timing out. Split the default
config into system and user builds.
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
The log backend is the default one, we don't need to explicitly set it.
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Using a local m68k floatx80_cosh()
[copied from previous:
Written by Andreas Grabher for Previous, NeXT Computer Emulator.]
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Message-Id: <20180312202728.23790-12-laurent@vivier.eu>
Using a local m68k floatx80_sinh()
[copied from previous:
Written by Andreas Grabher for Previous, NeXT Computer Emulator.]
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Message-Id: <20180312202728.23790-11-laurent@vivier.eu>
Using local m68k floatx80_tanh() and floatx80_etoxm1()
[copied from previous:
Written by Andreas Grabher for Previous, NeXT Computer Emulator.]
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Message-Id: <20180312202728.23790-10-laurent@vivier.eu>
Using a local m68k floatx80_atanh()
[copied from previous:
Written by Andreas Grabher for Previous, NeXT Computer Emulator.]
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Message-Id: <20180312202728.23790-9-laurent@vivier.eu>
Using a local m68k floatx80_acos()
[copied from previous:
Written by Andreas Grabher for Previous, NeXT Computer Emulator.]
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Message-Id: <20180312202728.23790-8-laurent@vivier.eu>
Using a local m68k floatx80_asin()
[copied from previous:
Written by Andreas Grabher for Previous, NeXT Computer Emulator.]
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Message-Id: <20180312202728.23790-7-laurent@vivier.eu>
Using a local m68k floatx80_atan()
[copied from previous:
Written by Andreas Grabher for Previous, NeXT Computer Emulator.]
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Message-Id: <20180312202728.23790-6-laurent@vivier.eu>
Using a local m68k floatx80_cos()
[copied from previous:
Written by Andreas Grabher for Previous, NeXT Computer Emulator.]
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Message-Id: <20180312202728.23790-4-laurent@vivier.eu>
Using a local m68k floatx80_sin()
[copied from previous:
Written by Andreas Grabher for Previous, NeXT Computer Emulator.]
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Message-Id: <20180312202728.23790-3-laurent@vivier.eu>
Using a local m68k floatx80_tan()
[copied from previous:
Written by Andreas Grabher for Previous, NeXT Computer Emulator.]
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
Message-Id: <20180312202728.23790-2-laurent@vivier.eu>
Consider passing a JSON based block driver to "qemu-img commit"
$ qemu-img commit 'json:{"driver":"qcow2","file":{"driver":"gluster",\
"volume":"gv0","path":"sn1.qcow2",
"server":[{"type":\
"tcp","host":"10.73.199.197","port":"24007"}]},}'
Currently it will commit the content and then report an incredibly
useless error message when trying to re-open the committed image:
qemu-img: invalid URI
Usage: file=gluster[+transport]://[host[:port]]volume/path[?socket=...][,file.debug=N][,file.logfile=/path/filename.log]
With this fix we get:
qemu-img: invalid URI json:{"server.0.host": "10.73.199.197",
"driver": "gluster", "path": "luks.qcow2", "server.0.type":
"tcp", "server.0.port": "24007", "volume": "gv0"}
Of course the root cause problem still exists, but now we know
what actually needs fixing.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20180206105204.14817-1-berrange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jeff Cody <jcody@redhat.com>
The header file provide the ioctl command and structure to communicate
with /dev/sev device.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
The QMP query command can used to retrieve the SEV information when
memory encryption is enabled on AMD platform.
Cc: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Cc: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Add a new memory encryption object 'sev-guest'. The object will be used
to create encrypted VMs on AMD EPYC CPU. The object provides the properties
to pass guest owner's public Diffie-hellman key, guest policy and session
information required to create the memory encryption context within the
SEV firmware.
e.g to launch SEV guest
# $QEMU \
-object sev-guest,id=sev0 \
-machine ....,memory-encryption=sev0
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Inorder to integerate the Secure Encryption Virtualization (SEV) support
add few high-level memory encryption APIs which can be used for encrypting
the guest memory region.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Split from a patch by Brijesh Singh (brijesh.singh@amd.com).
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Create a documentation entry to describe the AMD Secure Encrypted
Virtualization (SEV) feature.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When CPU supports memory encryption feature, the property can be used to
specify the encryption object to use when launching an encrypted guest.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Cc: Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel@redhat.com>
Cc: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
This MSR returns the number of #SMIs that occurred on
CPU since boot.
KVM commit 52797bf9a875 ("KVM: x86: Add emulation of MSR_SMI_COUNT")
introduced support for emulating this MSR.
This commit adds support for QEMU to save/load this
MSR for migration purposes.
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Note that VIRTIO_GPU_CAPSET_VIRGL2 was added manually so it has to be added
manually after re-running scripts/update-linux-headers.sh.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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=nCAn
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Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/stefanha/tags/tracing-pull-request' into staging
# gpg: Signature made Mon 12 Mar 2018 15:59:54 GMT
# gpg: using RSA key 9CA4ABB381AB73C8
# gpg: Good signature from "Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>"
# gpg: aka "Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@gmail.com>"
# Primary key fingerprint: 8695 A8BF D3F9 7CDA AC35 775A 9CA4 ABB3 81AB 73C8
* remotes/stefanha/tags/tracing-pull-request:
trace: only permit standard C types and fixed size integer types
trace: remove use of QEMU specific types from trace probes
trace: include filename when printing parser error messages
simpletrace: fix timestamp argument type
log-for-trace.h: Split out parts of log.h used by trace.h
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Now the script works with Python 3, so we can use the 'python'
binary provided by the system.
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20180312185503.5746-4-ehabkost@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
On Python 3, json.dumps() return a str object, which can't be
sent directly through a socket and must be encoded into a bytes
object. Use .encode('utf-8'), which will work on both Python 2
and Python 3.
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20180312185503.5746-3-ehabkost@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
items() is less efficient on Python 2.x, but makes the code work
on both Python 2 and Python 3.
Cc: Lukáš Doktor <ldoktor@redhat.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Cc: Cleber Rosa <crosa@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20180312185503.5746-2-ehabkost@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
We are not running the script on "make check" yet, and additional
bugs were introduced recently in the tree.
Whitelist the new crashes while we investigate, to allow us to
run device-crash-test on "make check" as soon as possible to
prevent new bugs.
Cc: Pavel Pisa <pisa@cmp.felk.cvut.cz>
Cc: John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20180309202827.12085-5-ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
