In practice, the common situation is that a file is first included,
defines its multiple-inclusion guard and is then skipped instead of
being included again.
The other way round is that the multiple-inclusion guard is defined when
the file is included first. In that case, the file is now regarded as
guarded as well.
Multiple-inclusion guards can be defined either as variables or as
targets. Rename the variable tests so they include the word 'variable'.
Add tests to cover special characters in guard names (both variable and
target), just in case ParseVarnameGuard gets removed someday.
Document the pitfalls associated with choosing a naming scheme for
guards that leads to name clashes, such as with .PARSEFILE without
.PARSEDIR.
I commonly use __${.PARSEDIR:tA}__ where a unique guard
is needed, __${.PARSEDIR}__ is also useful in many cases.
Combination of patch from rillig and mine
New allow_kdc_spoof overrides this to restore previous behaviour
which was vulnerable to KDC spoofing, because without a host or
service key, pam_krb5 can't distinguish the legitimate KDC from a
spoofed one.
This way, having pam_krb5 enabled isn't dangerous even if you create
an empty /etc/krb5.conf to use client SSO without any host services.
Perhaps this should use krb5_verify_init_creds(3) instead, and
thereby respect the rather obscurely named krb5.conf option
verify_ap_req_nofail like the Linux pam_krb5 does, but:
- verify_ap_req_nofail is default-off (i.e., vulnerable by default),
- changing verify_ap_req_nofail to default-on would probably affect
more things and therefore be riskier,
- allow_kdc_spoof is a much clearer way to spell the idea,
- this patch is a smaller semantic change and thus less risky, and
- a security change with compatibility issues shouldn't have a
workaround that might introduce potentially worse security issues
or more compatibility issues.
Perhaps this should use krb5_verify_user(3) with secure=1 instead,
for simplicity, but it's not clear how to do that without first
prompting for the password -- which we shouldn't do at all if we
later decide we won't be able to use it anyway -- and without
repeating a bunch of the logic here anyway to pick the service name.
References about verify_ap_req_nofail:
- mit-krb5 discussion about verify_ap_req_nofail:
https://mailman.mit.edu/pipermail/krbdev/2011-January/009778.html
- Oracle has the default-secure setting in their krb5 system:
https://docs.oracle.com/cd/E26505_01/html/E27224/setup-148.htmlhttps://docs.oracle.com/cd/E26505_01/html/816-5174/krb5.conf-4.html#REFMAN4krb5.conf-4https://docs.oracle.com/cd/E19253-01/816-4557/gihyu/
- Heimdal issue on verify_ap_req_nofail default:
https://github.com/heimdal/heimdal/issues/1129
These are not useful unless you also set up /etc/krb5.conf and a
keytab for the host from the Kerberos KDC. But having them enabled
by default means that creating /etc/krb5.conf just to enable use of
Kerberos for _client-side_ single sign-on creates usability issues.
As proposed on tech-security:
https://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-security/2023/06/16/msg001160.html
Not sure if there's any padding here, but it's a pretty big
structure, fairly likely, so let's be rather safe than sorry.
XXX pullup-8
XXX pullup-9
XXX pullup-10
Unclear if there are any paths to the copyout without initialization,
but let's play it safe to keep the auditing effort low.
XXX pullup-8
XXX pullup-9
XXX pullup-10
guard the .BEGIN: rule with:
.if !make(clean) && !make(cleandir) && !make(distclean) && !make(obj)
so that it doesn't trigger in cases where we don't expect the objdir
to exist already, or we don't want to be adding things while we're
cleaning them out.
Addresses PR misc/57441 from Taylor R Campbell. (Not yet hooked into
source sets, will be done separately.)
(Borrows heavily from the equivalent pflog.4 man page already in tree,
and so retains the original copyright attribution as well.)
it does build "ui.c" a large number of times into individual places.
in the libraries, they're force to local symbols, and in the binaries
it doesn't really matter.
This release includes both the Heimdal 7.7.1 Security Vulnerability
fixes and non-Security bug fixes/improvements.
Security Vulnerabilities:
- CVE-2022-42898 PAC parse integer overflows
- CVE-2022-3437 Overflows and non-constant time leaks in DES{,3} and arcfour
- CVE-2022-41916 Fix Unicode normalization read of 1 bytes past end of array
- CVE-2021-44758 A null pointer de-reference DoS in SPNEGO acceptors
- CVE-2021-3671 A null pointer de-reference when handling missing sname
in TGS-REQ
- CVE-2022-44640 Heimdal KDC: invalid free in ASN.1 codec
Note that CVE-2022-44640 is a severe vulnerability, possibly a 10.0
on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) v3, as we believe
it should be possible to get an RCE on a KDC, which means that
credentials can be compromised that can be used to impersonate
anyone in a realm or forest of realms.
Heimdal's ASN.1 compiler generates code that allows specially
crafted DER encodings of CHOICEs to invoke the wrong free function
on the decoded structure upon decode error. This is known to impact
the Heimdal KDC, leading to an invalid free() of an address partly
or wholly under the control of the attacker, in turn leading to a
potential remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability.
This error affects the DER codec for all extensible CHOICE types
used in Heimdal, though not all cases will be exploitable. We have
not completed a thorough analysis of all the Heimdal components
affected, thus the Kerberos client, the X.509 library, and other
parts, may be affected as well.
This bug has been in Heimdal's ASN.1 compiler since 2005, but it may
only affect Heimdal 1.6 and up. It was first reported by Douglas
Bagnall, though it had been found independently by the Heimdal
maintainers via fuzzing a few weeks earlier.
While no zero-day exploit is known, such an exploit will likely be
available soon after public disclosure.
- CVE-2019-14870: Validate client attributes in protocol-transition
- CVE-2019-14870: Apply forwardable policy in protocol-transition
- CVE-2019-14870: Always lookup impersonate client in DB
Other changes:
- Bugs found by UBSAN (including the incorrect encoding of unconstrained
INTEGER value -1).
- Errors found by the LLVM scan-build static analyzer.
- Errors found by the valgrind memory debugger.
- Work around GCC Bug 95189 (memcmp wrongly stripped like strcmp).
- Correct ASN.1 OID typo for SHA-384
- Fix a deadlock in in the MEMORY ccache type.
- TGS: strip forwardable and proxiable flags if the server is
disallowed.
- CVE-2019-14870: Validate client attributes in protocol-transition
- CVE-2019-14870: Apply forwardable policy in protocol-transition
- CVE-2019-14870: Always lookup impersonate client in DB
- Incremental HDB propagation improvements
Refactor send_diffs making it progressive
Handle partial writes on non-blocking sockets
Disable Nagle in iprop master and slave
Use async I/O
Don't send I_HAVE in response to AYT
Do not recover log in kadm5_get_principal()
Don't send diffs to slaves with not yet known version
Don't stutter in send_diffs
- Optional backwards-compatible anon-pkinit behavior
rin