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Nm -> Fn getnameinfo; grammar improvements; markup improvement;

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all from jmc@openbsd, thanks.
This commit is contained in:
wiz 2003-08-28 12:03:08 +00:00
parent 8fcc4625a4
commit a24c4806d6
1 changed files with 9 additions and 9 deletions
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18
lib/libc/net/getnameinfo.3
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
.\" $NetBSD: getnameinfo.3,v 1.28 2003/08/28 09:39:11 wiz Exp $
.\" $NetBSD: getnameinfo.3,v 1.29 2003/08/28 12:03:08 wiz Exp $
.\" $KAME: getnameinfo.3,v 1.27 2003/04/30 06:06:42 itojun Exp $
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 1983, 1987, 1991, 1993
@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ and documented in
The implementation first appeared in WIDE Hydrangea IPv6 protocol stack kit.
.\"
.Sh CAVEATS
.Nm
.Fn getnameinfo
returns both numeric and FQDN notation of the address specified in
.Fa sa .
There is no return value that indicates if the string returned in
@ -297,14 +297,14 @@ There is no return value that indicates if the string returned in
is a result of binary to numeric-text translation (like
.Xr inet_ntop 3 ) ,
or the result of DNS reverse lookup.
Therefore, malicious parties could set up PTR record like below:
Therefore, malicious parties could set up a PTR record like below:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
1.0.0.127.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 10.1.1.1
.Ed
.Pp
and trick the caller of
.Nm
to believe that
.Fn getnameinfo
into believing that
.Fa sa
is
.Li 10.1.1.1
@ -312,10 +312,10 @@ when it actually is
.Li 127.0.0.1 .
.Pp
To prevent such attacks, the use of
.Li NI_NAMEREQD
like below is recommended when you use the result of
.Nm
for access control purposes.
.Dv NI_NAMEREQD
is recommended when you use the result of
.Fn getnameinfo
for access control purposes:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
struct sockaddr *sa;
socklen_t salen;