96a46def58
Also rstfy the documentation for AMD SEV, and link it. The documentation for PEF had been merged into the pseries doc, fix the reference. Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Daniel Henrique Barboza <danielhb413@gmail.com> Message-Id: <20220204161251.241877-1-cohuck@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org>
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AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV)
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=========================================
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Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) is a feature found on AMD processors.
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SEV is an extension to the AMD-V architecture which supports running encrypted
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virtual machines (VMs) under the control of KVM. Encrypted VMs have their pages
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(code and data) secured such that only the guest itself has access to the
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unencrypted version. Each encrypted VM is associated with a unique encryption
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key; if its data is accessed by a different entity using a different key the
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encrypted guests data will be incorrectly decrypted, leading to unintelligible
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data.
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Key management for this feature is handled by a separate processor known as the
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AMD secure processor (AMD-SP), which is present in AMD SOCs. Firmware running
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inside the AMD-SP provides commands to support a common VM lifecycle. This
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includes commands for launching, snapshotting, migrating and debugging the
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encrypted guest. These SEV commands can be issued via KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP
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ioctls.
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Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State (SEV-ES) builds on the SEV
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support to additionally protect the guest register state. In order to allow a
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hypervisor to perform functions on behalf of a guest, there is architectural
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support for notifying a guest's operating system when certain types of VMEXITs
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are about to occur. This allows the guest to selectively share information with
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the hypervisor to satisfy the requested function.
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Launching
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---------
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Boot images (such as bios) must be encrypted before a guest can be booted. The
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``MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP`` ioctl provides commands to encrypt the images: ``LAUNCH_START``,
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``LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA``, ``LAUNCH_MEASURE`` and ``LAUNCH_FINISH``. These four commands
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together generate a fresh memory encryption key for the VM, encrypt the boot
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images and provide a measurement than can be used as an attestation of a
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successful launch.
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For a SEV-ES guest, the ``LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA`` command is also used to encrypt the
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guest register state, or VM save area (VMSA), for all of the guest vCPUs.
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``LAUNCH_START`` is called first to create a cryptographic launch context within
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the firmware. To create this context, guest owner must provide a guest policy,
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its public Diffie-Hellman key (PDH) and session parameters. These inputs
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should be treated as a binary blob and must be passed as-is to the SEV firmware.
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The guest policy is passed as plaintext. A hypervisor may choose to read it,
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but should not modify it (any modification of the policy bits will result
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in bad measurement). The guest policy is a 4-byte data structure containing
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several flags that restricts what can be done on a running SEV guest.
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See KM Spec section 3 and 6.2 for more details.
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The guest policy can be provided via the ``policy`` property::
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# ${QEMU} \
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sev-guest,id=sev0,policy=0x1...\
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Setting the "SEV-ES required" policy bit (bit 2) will launch the guest as a
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SEV-ES guest::
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# ${QEMU} \
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sev-guest,id=sev0,policy=0x5...\
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The guest owner provided DH certificate and session parameters will be used to
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establish a cryptographic session with the guest owner to negotiate keys used
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for the attestation.
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The DH certificate and session blob can be provided via the ``dh-cert-file`` and
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``session-file`` properties::
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# ${QEMU} \
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sev-guest,id=sev0,dh-cert-file=<file1>,session-file=<file2>
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``LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA`` encrypts the memory region using the cryptographic context
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created via the ``LAUNCH_START`` command. If required, this command can be called
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multiple times to encrypt different memory regions. The command also calculates
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the measurement of the memory contents as it encrypts.
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``LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA`` encrypts all the vCPU VMSAs for a SEV-ES guest using the
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cryptographic context created via the ``LAUNCH_START`` command. The command also
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calculates the measurement of the VMSAs as it encrypts them.
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``LAUNCH_MEASURE`` can be used to retrieve the measurement of encrypted memory and,
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for a SEV-ES guest, encrypted VMSAs. This measurement is a signature of the
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memory contents and, for a SEV-ES guest, the VMSA contents, that can be sent
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to the guest owner as an attestation that the memory and VMSAs were encrypted
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correctly by the firmware. The guest owner may wait to provide the guest
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confidential information until it can verify the attestation measurement.
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Since the guest owner knows the initial contents of the guest at boot, the
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attestation measurement can be verified by comparing it to what the guest owner
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expects.
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``LAUNCH_FINISH`` finalizes the guest launch and destroys the cryptographic
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context.
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See SEV KM API Spec ([SEVKM]_) 'Launching a guest' usage flow (Appendix A) for the
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complete flow chart.
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To launch a SEV guest::
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# ${QEMU} \
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-machine ...,confidential-guest-support=sev0 \
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-object sev-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=47,reduced-phys-bits=1
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To launch a SEV-ES guest::
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# ${QEMU} \
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-machine ...,confidential-guest-support=sev0 \
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-object sev-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=47,reduced-phys-bits=1,policy=0x5
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An SEV-ES guest has some restrictions as compared to a SEV guest. Because the
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guest register state is encrypted and cannot be updated by the VMM/hypervisor,
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a SEV-ES guest:
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- Does not support SMM - SMM support requires updating the guest register
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state.
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- Does not support reboot - a system reset requires updating the guest register
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state.
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- Requires in-kernel irqchip - the burden is placed on the hypervisor to
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manage booting APs.
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Debugging
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---------
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Since the memory contents of a SEV guest are encrypted, hypervisor access to
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the guest memory will return cipher text. If the guest policy allows debugging,
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then a hypervisor can use the DEBUG_DECRYPT and DEBUG_ENCRYPT commands to access
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the guest memory region for debug purposes. This is not supported in QEMU yet.
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Snapshot/Restore
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----------------
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TODO
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Live Migration
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---------------
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TODO
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References
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----------
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`AMD Memory Encryption whitepaper
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<https://developer.amd.com/wordpress/media/2013/12/AMD_Memory_Encryption_Whitepaper_v7-Public.pdf>`_
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.. [SEVKM] `Secure Encrypted Virtualization Key Management
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<http://developer.amd.com/wordpress/media/2017/11/55766_SEV-KM-API_Specification.pdf>`_
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KVM Forum slides:
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* `AMD’s Virtualization Memory Encryption (2016)
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<http://www.linux-kvm.org/images/7/74/02x08A-Thomas_Lendacky-AMDs_Virtualizatoin_Memory_Encryption_Technology.pdf>`_
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* `Extending Secure Encrypted Virtualization With SEV-ES (2018)
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<https://www.linux-kvm.org/images/9/94/Extending-Secure-Encrypted-Virtualization-with-SEV-ES-Thomas-Lendacky-AMD.pdf>`_
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`AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual:
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<http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/24593.pdf>`_
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* SME is section 7.10
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* SEV is section 15.34
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* SEV-ES is section 15.35
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