803b7718e6
Free the "id_auth" name for the binary version of the data. Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2365 lines
70 KiB
C
2365 lines
70 KiB
C
/*
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* QEMU SEV support
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*
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* Copyright Advanced Micro Devices 2016-2018
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*
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* Author:
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* Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
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*
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* This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or later.
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* See the COPYING file in the top-level directory.
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*
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*/
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#include "qemu/osdep.h"
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#include <linux/kvm.h>
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#include <linux/kvm_para.h>
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#include <linux/psp-sev.h>
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#include <sys/ioctl.h>
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#include "qapi/error.h"
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#include "qom/object_interfaces.h"
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#include "qemu/base64.h"
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#include "qemu/module.h"
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#include "qemu/uuid.h"
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#include "qemu/error-report.h"
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#include "crypto/hash.h"
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#include "sysemu/kvm.h"
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#include "kvm/kvm_i386.h"
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#include "sev.h"
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#include "sysemu/sysemu.h"
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#include "sysemu/runstate.h"
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#include "trace.h"
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#include "migration/blocker.h"
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#include "qom/object.h"
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#include "monitor/monitor.h"
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#include "monitor/hmp-target.h"
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#include "qapi/qapi-commands-misc-target.h"
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#include "confidential-guest.h"
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#include "hw/i386/pc.h"
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#include "exec/address-spaces.h"
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#include "qemu/queue.h"
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OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE(SevCommonState, SevCommonStateClass, SEV_COMMON)
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OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE(SevGuestState, SevCommonStateClass, SEV_GUEST)
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OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE(SevSnpGuestState, SevCommonStateClass, SEV_SNP_GUEST)
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/* hard code sha256 digest size */
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#define HASH_SIZE 32
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typedef struct QEMU_PACKED SevHashTableEntry {
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QemuUUID guid;
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uint16_t len;
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uint8_t hash[HASH_SIZE];
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} SevHashTableEntry;
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typedef struct QEMU_PACKED SevHashTable {
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QemuUUID guid;
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uint16_t len;
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SevHashTableEntry cmdline;
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SevHashTableEntry initrd;
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SevHashTableEntry kernel;
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} SevHashTable;
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/*
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* Data encrypted by sev_encrypt_flash() must be padded to a multiple of
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* 16 bytes.
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*/
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typedef struct QEMU_PACKED PaddedSevHashTable {
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SevHashTable ht;
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uint8_t padding[ROUND_UP(sizeof(SevHashTable), 16) - sizeof(SevHashTable)];
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} PaddedSevHashTable;
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QEMU_BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(PaddedSevHashTable) % 16 != 0);
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#define SEV_INFO_BLOCK_GUID "00f771de-1a7e-4fcb-890e-68c77e2fb44e"
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typedef struct __attribute__((__packed__)) SevInfoBlock {
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/* SEV-ES Reset Vector Address */
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uint32_t reset_addr;
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} SevInfoBlock;
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#define SEV_HASH_TABLE_RV_GUID "7255371f-3a3b-4b04-927b-1da6efa8d454"
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typedef struct QEMU_PACKED SevHashTableDescriptor {
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/* SEV hash table area guest address */
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uint32_t base;
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/* SEV hash table area size (in bytes) */
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uint32_t size;
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} SevHashTableDescriptor;
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struct SevCommonState {
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X86ConfidentialGuest parent_obj;
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int kvm_type;
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/* configuration parameters */
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char *sev_device;
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uint32_t cbitpos;
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uint32_t reduced_phys_bits;
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bool kernel_hashes;
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/* runtime state */
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uint8_t api_major;
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uint8_t api_minor;
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uint8_t build_id;
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int sev_fd;
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SevState state;
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uint32_t reset_cs;
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uint32_t reset_ip;
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bool reset_data_valid;
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};
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struct SevCommonStateClass {
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X86ConfidentialGuestClass parent_class;
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/* public */
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bool (*build_kernel_loader_hashes)(SevCommonState *sev_common,
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SevHashTableDescriptor *area,
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SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx,
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Error **errp);
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int (*launch_start)(SevCommonState *sev_common);
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void (*launch_finish)(SevCommonState *sev_common);
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int (*launch_update_data)(SevCommonState *sev_common, hwaddr gpa, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len);
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int (*kvm_init)(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp);
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};
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/**
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* SevGuestState:
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*
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* The SevGuestState object is used for creating and managing a SEV
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* guest.
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*
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* # $QEMU \
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* -object sev-guest,id=sev0 \
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* -machine ...,memory-encryption=sev0
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*/
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struct SevGuestState {
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SevCommonState parent_obj;
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gchar *measurement;
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/* configuration parameters */
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uint32_t handle;
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uint32_t policy;
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char *dh_cert_file;
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char *session_file;
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bool legacy_vm_type;
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};
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struct SevSnpGuestState {
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SevCommonState parent_obj;
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/* configuration parameters */
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char *guest_visible_workarounds;
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char *id_block_base64;
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uint8_t *id_block;
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char *id_auth_base64;
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char *host_data;
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struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start kvm_start_conf;
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struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish kvm_finish_conf;
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uint32_t kernel_hashes_offset;
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PaddedSevHashTable *kernel_hashes_data;
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};
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#define DEFAULT_GUEST_POLICY 0x1 /* disable debug */
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#define DEFAULT_SEV_DEVICE "/dev/sev"
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#define DEFAULT_SEV_SNP_POLICY 0x30000
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typedef struct SevLaunchUpdateData {
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QTAILQ_ENTRY(SevLaunchUpdateData) next;
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hwaddr gpa;
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void *hva;
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uint64_t len;
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int type;
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} SevLaunchUpdateData;
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static QTAILQ_HEAD(, SevLaunchUpdateData) launch_update;
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static Error *sev_mig_blocker;
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static const char *const sev_fw_errlist[] = {
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[SEV_RET_SUCCESS] = "",
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[SEV_RET_INVALID_PLATFORM_STATE] = "Platform state is invalid",
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[SEV_RET_INVALID_GUEST_STATE] = "Guest state is invalid",
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[SEV_RET_INAVLID_CONFIG] = "Platform configuration is invalid",
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[SEV_RET_INVALID_LEN] = "Buffer too small",
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[SEV_RET_ALREADY_OWNED] = "Platform is already owned",
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[SEV_RET_INVALID_CERTIFICATE] = "Certificate is invalid",
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[SEV_RET_POLICY_FAILURE] = "Policy is not allowed",
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[SEV_RET_INACTIVE] = "Guest is not active",
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[SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS] = "Invalid address",
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[SEV_RET_BAD_SIGNATURE] = "Bad signature",
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[SEV_RET_BAD_MEASUREMENT] = "Bad measurement",
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[SEV_RET_ASID_OWNED] = "ASID is already owned",
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[SEV_RET_INVALID_ASID] = "Invalid ASID",
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[SEV_RET_WBINVD_REQUIRED] = "WBINVD is required",
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[SEV_RET_DFFLUSH_REQUIRED] = "DF_FLUSH is required",
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[SEV_RET_INVALID_GUEST] = "Guest handle is invalid",
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[SEV_RET_INVALID_COMMAND] = "Invalid command",
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[SEV_RET_ACTIVE] = "Guest is active",
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[SEV_RET_HWSEV_RET_PLATFORM] = "Hardware error",
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[SEV_RET_HWSEV_RET_UNSAFE] = "Hardware unsafe",
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[SEV_RET_UNSUPPORTED] = "Feature not supported",
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[SEV_RET_INVALID_PARAM] = "Invalid parameter",
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[SEV_RET_RESOURCE_LIMIT] = "Required firmware resource depleted",
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[SEV_RET_SECURE_DATA_INVALID] = "Part-specific integrity check failure",
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};
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#define SEV_FW_MAX_ERROR ARRAY_SIZE(sev_fw_errlist)
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/* <linux/kvm.h> doesn't expose this, so re-use the max from kvm.c */
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#define KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES 100
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typedef struct KvmCpuidInfo {
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struct kvm_cpuid2 cpuid;
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struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 entries[KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES];
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} KvmCpuidInfo;
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#define SNP_CPUID_FUNCTION_MAXCOUNT 64
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#define SNP_CPUID_FUNCTION_UNKNOWN 0xFFFFFFFF
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typedef struct {
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uint32_t eax_in;
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uint32_t ecx_in;
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uint64_t xcr0_in;
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uint64_t xss_in;
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uint32_t eax;
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uint32_t ebx;
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uint32_t ecx;
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uint32_t edx;
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uint64_t reserved;
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} __attribute__((packed)) SnpCpuidFunc;
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typedef struct {
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uint32_t count;
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uint32_t reserved1;
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uint64_t reserved2;
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SnpCpuidFunc entries[SNP_CPUID_FUNCTION_MAXCOUNT];
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} __attribute__((packed)) SnpCpuidInfo;
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static int
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sev_ioctl(int fd, int cmd, void *data, int *error)
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{
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int r;
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struct kvm_sev_cmd input;
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memset(&input, 0x0, sizeof(input));
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input.id = cmd;
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input.sev_fd = fd;
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input.data = (uintptr_t)data;
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r = kvm_vm_ioctl(kvm_state, KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP, &input);
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if (error) {
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*error = input.error;
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}
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return r;
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}
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static int
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sev_platform_ioctl(int fd, int cmd, void *data, int *error)
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{
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int r;
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struct sev_issue_cmd arg;
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arg.cmd = cmd;
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arg.data = (unsigned long)data;
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r = ioctl(fd, SEV_ISSUE_CMD, &arg);
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if (error) {
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*error = arg.error;
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}
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return r;
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}
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static const char *
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fw_error_to_str(int code)
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{
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if (code < 0 || code >= SEV_FW_MAX_ERROR) {
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return "unknown error";
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}
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return sev_fw_errlist[code];
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}
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static bool
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sev_check_state(const SevCommonState *sev_common, SevState state)
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{
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assert(sev_common);
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return sev_common->state == state ? true : false;
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}
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static void
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sev_set_guest_state(SevCommonState *sev_common, SevState new_state)
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{
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assert(new_state < SEV_STATE__MAX);
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assert(sev_common);
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trace_kvm_sev_change_state(SevState_str(sev_common->state),
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SevState_str(new_state));
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sev_common->state = new_state;
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}
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static void
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sev_ram_block_added(RAMBlockNotifier *n, void *host, size_t size,
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size_t max_size)
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{
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int r;
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struct kvm_enc_region range;
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ram_addr_t offset;
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MemoryRegion *mr;
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/*
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* The RAM device presents a memory region that should be treated
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* as IO region and should not be pinned.
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*/
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mr = memory_region_from_host(host, &offset);
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if (mr && memory_region_is_ram_device(mr)) {
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return;
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}
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range.addr = (uintptr_t)host;
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range.size = max_size;
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trace_kvm_memcrypt_register_region(host, max_size);
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r = kvm_vm_ioctl(kvm_state, KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION, &range);
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if (r) {
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error_report("%s: failed to register region (%p+%#zx) error '%s'",
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__func__, host, max_size, strerror(errno));
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exit(1);
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}
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}
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static void
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sev_ram_block_removed(RAMBlockNotifier *n, void *host, size_t size,
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size_t max_size)
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{
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int r;
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struct kvm_enc_region range;
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ram_addr_t offset;
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MemoryRegion *mr;
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/*
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* The RAM device presents a memory region that should be treated
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* as IO region and should not have been pinned.
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*/
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mr = memory_region_from_host(host, &offset);
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if (mr && memory_region_is_ram_device(mr)) {
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return;
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}
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range.addr = (uintptr_t)host;
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range.size = max_size;
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trace_kvm_memcrypt_unregister_region(host, max_size);
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r = kvm_vm_ioctl(kvm_state, KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_UNREG_REGION, &range);
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if (r) {
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error_report("%s: failed to unregister region (%p+%#zx)",
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__func__, host, max_size);
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}
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}
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static struct RAMBlockNotifier sev_ram_notifier = {
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.ram_block_added = sev_ram_block_added,
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.ram_block_removed = sev_ram_block_removed,
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};
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bool
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sev_enabled(void)
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{
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ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs = MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs;
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return !!object_dynamic_cast(OBJECT(cgs), TYPE_SEV_COMMON);
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}
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bool
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sev_snp_enabled(void)
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{
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ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs = MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs;
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return !!object_dynamic_cast(OBJECT(cgs), TYPE_SEV_SNP_GUEST);
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}
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bool
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sev_es_enabled(void)
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{
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ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs = MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs;
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return sev_snp_enabled() ||
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(sev_enabled() && SEV_GUEST(cgs)->policy & SEV_POLICY_ES);
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}
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uint32_t
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sev_get_cbit_position(void)
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{
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SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs);
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return sev_common ? sev_common->cbitpos : 0;
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}
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uint32_t
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sev_get_reduced_phys_bits(void)
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{
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SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs);
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return sev_common ? sev_common->reduced_phys_bits : 0;
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}
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static SevInfo *sev_get_info(void)
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{
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SevInfo *info;
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SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs);
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info = g_new0(SevInfo, 1);
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info->enabled = sev_enabled();
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if (info->enabled) {
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info->api_major = sev_common->api_major;
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info->api_minor = sev_common->api_minor;
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info->build_id = sev_common->build_id;
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info->state = sev_common->state;
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if (sev_snp_enabled()) {
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info->sev_type = SEV_GUEST_TYPE_SEV_SNP;
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info->u.sev_snp.snp_policy =
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object_property_get_uint(OBJECT(sev_common), "policy", NULL);
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} else {
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info->sev_type = SEV_GUEST_TYPE_SEV;
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info->u.sev.handle = SEV_GUEST(sev_common)->handle;
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info->u.sev.policy =
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(uint32_t)object_property_get_uint(OBJECT(sev_common),
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"policy", NULL);
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}
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}
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return info;
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}
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SevInfo *qmp_query_sev(Error **errp)
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{
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SevInfo *info;
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info = sev_get_info();
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if (!info) {
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error_setg(errp, "SEV feature is not available");
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return NULL;
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}
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return info;
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}
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void hmp_info_sev(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
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{
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SevInfo *info = sev_get_info();
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if (!info || !info->enabled) {
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monitor_printf(mon, "SEV is not enabled\n");
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goto out;
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}
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monitor_printf(mon, "SEV type: %s\n", SevGuestType_str(info->sev_type));
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monitor_printf(mon, "state: %s\n", SevState_str(info->state));
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monitor_printf(mon, "build: %d\n", info->build_id);
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monitor_printf(mon, "api version: %d.%d\n", info->api_major,
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info->api_minor);
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if (sev_snp_enabled()) {
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monitor_printf(mon, "debug: %s\n",
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info->u.sev_snp.snp_policy & SEV_SNP_POLICY_DBG ? "on"
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: "off");
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monitor_printf(mon, "SMT allowed: %s\n",
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info->u.sev_snp.snp_policy & SEV_SNP_POLICY_SMT ? "on"
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: "off");
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} else {
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monitor_printf(mon, "handle: %d\n", info->u.sev.handle);
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monitor_printf(mon, "debug: %s\n",
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info->u.sev.policy & SEV_POLICY_NODBG ? "off" : "on");
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monitor_printf(mon, "key-sharing: %s\n",
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info->u.sev.policy & SEV_POLICY_NOKS ? "off" : "on");
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}
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out:
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qapi_free_SevInfo(info);
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}
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static int
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sev_get_pdh_info(int fd, guchar **pdh, size_t *pdh_len, guchar **cert_chain,
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size_t *cert_chain_len, Error **errp)
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{
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guchar *pdh_data = NULL;
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guchar *cert_chain_data = NULL;
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struct sev_user_data_pdh_cert_export export = {};
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int err, r;
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|
|
|
/* query the certificate length */
|
|
r = sev_platform_ioctl(fd, SEV_PDH_CERT_EXPORT, &export, &err);
|
|
if (r < 0) {
|
|
if (err != SEV_RET_INVALID_LEN) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "SEV: Failed to export PDH cert"
|
|
" ret=%d fw_err=%d (%s)",
|
|
r, err, fw_error_to_str(err));
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pdh_data = g_new(guchar, export.pdh_cert_len);
|
|
cert_chain_data = g_new(guchar, export.cert_chain_len);
|
|
export.pdh_cert_address = (unsigned long)pdh_data;
|
|
export.cert_chain_address = (unsigned long)cert_chain_data;
|
|
|
|
r = sev_platform_ioctl(fd, SEV_PDH_CERT_EXPORT, &export, &err);
|
|
if (r < 0) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "SEV: Failed to export PDH cert ret=%d fw_err=%d (%s)",
|
|
r, err, fw_error_to_str(err));
|
|
goto e_free;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*pdh = pdh_data;
|
|
*pdh_len = export.pdh_cert_len;
|
|
*cert_chain = cert_chain_data;
|
|
*cert_chain_len = export.cert_chain_len;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
e_free:
|
|
g_free(pdh_data);
|
|
g_free(cert_chain_data);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sev_get_cpu0_id(int fd, guchar **id, size_t *id_len, Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
guchar *id_data;
|
|
struct sev_user_data_get_id2 get_id2 = {};
|
|
int err, r;
|
|
|
|
/* query the ID length */
|
|
r = sev_platform_ioctl(fd, SEV_GET_ID2, &get_id2, &err);
|
|
if (r < 0 && err != SEV_RET_INVALID_LEN) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "SEV: Failed to get ID ret=%d fw_err=%d (%s)",
|
|
r, err, fw_error_to_str(err));
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
id_data = g_new(guchar, get_id2.length);
|
|
get_id2.address = (unsigned long)id_data;
|
|
|
|
r = sev_platform_ioctl(fd, SEV_GET_ID2, &get_id2, &err);
|
|
if (r < 0) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "SEV: Failed to get ID ret=%d fw_err=%d (%s)",
|
|
r, err, fw_error_to_str(err));
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*id = id_data;
|
|
*id_len = get_id2.length;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
g_free(id_data);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static SevCapability *sev_get_capabilities(Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
SevCapability *cap = NULL;
|
|
guchar *pdh_data = NULL;
|
|
guchar *cert_chain_data = NULL;
|
|
guchar *cpu0_id_data = NULL;
|
|
size_t pdh_len = 0, cert_chain_len = 0, cpu0_id_len = 0;
|
|
uint32_t ebx;
|
|
int fd;
|
|
SevCommonState *sev_common;
|
|
char *sev_device;
|
|
|
|
if (!kvm_enabled()) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "KVM not enabled");
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (kvm_vm_ioctl(kvm_state, KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP, NULL) < 0) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "SEV is not enabled in KVM");
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sev_common = SEV_COMMON(MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs);
|
|
if (!sev_common) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "SEV is not configured");
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sev_device = object_property_get_str(OBJECT(sev_common), "sev-device",
|
|
&error_abort);
|
|
fd = open(sev_device, O_RDWR);
|
|
if (fd < 0) {
|
|
error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "SEV: Failed to open %s",
|
|
DEFAULT_SEV_DEVICE);
|
|
g_free(sev_device);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
g_free(sev_device);
|
|
|
|
if (sev_get_pdh_info(fd, &pdh_data, &pdh_len,
|
|
&cert_chain_data, &cert_chain_len, errp)) {
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sev_get_cpu0_id(fd, &cpu0_id_data, &cpu0_id_len, errp)) {
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cap = g_new0(SevCapability, 1);
|
|
cap->pdh = g_base64_encode(pdh_data, pdh_len);
|
|
cap->cert_chain = g_base64_encode(cert_chain_data, cert_chain_len);
|
|
cap->cpu0_id = g_base64_encode(cpu0_id_data, cpu0_id_len);
|
|
|
|
host_cpuid(0x8000001F, 0, NULL, &ebx, NULL, NULL);
|
|
cap->cbitpos = ebx & 0x3f;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* When SEV feature is enabled, we loose one bit in guest physical
|
|
* addressing.
|
|
*/
|
|
cap->reduced_phys_bits = 1;
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
g_free(cpu0_id_data);
|
|
g_free(pdh_data);
|
|
g_free(cert_chain_data);
|
|
close(fd);
|
|
return cap;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SevCapability *qmp_query_sev_capabilities(Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
return sev_get_capabilities(errp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static OvmfSevMetadata *ovmf_sev_metadata_table;
|
|
|
|
#define OVMF_SEV_META_DATA_GUID "dc886566-984a-4798-A75e-5585a7bf67cc"
|
|
typedef struct __attribute__((__packed__)) OvmfSevMetadataOffset {
|
|
uint32_t offset;
|
|
} OvmfSevMetadataOffset;
|
|
|
|
OvmfSevMetadata *pc_system_get_ovmf_sev_metadata_ptr(void)
|
|
{
|
|
return ovmf_sev_metadata_table;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void pc_system_parse_sev_metadata(uint8_t *flash_ptr, size_t flash_size)
|
|
{
|
|
OvmfSevMetadata *metadata;
|
|
OvmfSevMetadataOffset *data;
|
|
|
|
if (!pc_system_ovmf_table_find(OVMF_SEV_META_DATA_GUID, (uint8_t **)&data,
|
|
NULL)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
metadata = (OvmfSevMetadata *)(flash_ptr + flash_size - data->offset);
|
|
if (memcmp(metadata->signature, "ASEV", 4) != 0 ||
|
|
metadata->len < sizeof(OvmfSevMetadata) ||
|
|
metadata->len > flash_size - data->offset) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ovmf_sev_metadata_table = g_memdup2(metadata, metadata->len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static SevAttestationReport *sev_get_attestation_report(const char *mnonce,
|
|
Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct kvm_sev_attestation_report input = {};
|
|
SevAttestationReport *report = NULL;
|
|
SevCommonState *sev_common;
|
|
g_autofree guchar *data = NULL;
|
|
g_autofree guchar *buf = NULL;
|
|
gsize len;
|
|
int err = 0, ret;
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_enabled()) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "SEV is not enabled");
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* lets decode the mnonce string */
|
|
buf = g_base64_decode(mnonce, &len);
|
|
if (!buf) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "SEV: failed to decode mnonce input");
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* verify the input mnonce length */
|
|
if (len != sizeof(input.mnonce)) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "SEV: mnonce must be %zu bytes (got %" G_GSIZE_FORMAT ")",
|
|
sizeof(input.mnonce), len);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sev_common = SEV_COMMON(MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs);
|
|
|
|
/* Query the report length */
|
|
ret = sev_ioctl(sev_common->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_GET_ATTESTATION_REPORT,
|
|
&input, &err);
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
if (err != SEV_RET_INVALID_LEN) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "SEV: Failed to query the attestation report"
|
|
" length ret=%d fw_err=%d (%s)",
|
|
ret, err, fw_error_to_str(err));
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
data = g_malloc(input.len);
|
|
input.uaddr = (unsigned long)data;
|
|
memcpy(input.mnonce, buf, sizeof(input.mnonce));
|
|
|
|
/* Query the report */
|
|
ret = sev_ioctl(sev_common->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_GET_ATTESTATION_REPORT,
|
|
&input, &err);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "SEV: Failed to get attestation report"
|
|
" ret=%d fw_err=%d (%s)", ret, err, fw_error_to_str(err));
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
report = g_new0(SevAttestationReport, 1);
|
|
report->data = g_base64_encode(data, input.len);
|
|
|
|
trace_kvm_sev_attestation_report(mnonce, report->data);
|
|
|
|
return report;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SevAttestationReport *qmp_query_sev_attestation_report(const char *mnonce,
|
|
Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
return sev_get_attestation_report(mnonce, errp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
sev_read_file_base64(const char *filename, guchar **data, gsize *len)
|
|
{
|
|
gsize sz;
|
|
g_autofree gchar *base64 = NULL;
|
|
GError *error = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!g_file_get_contents(filename, &base64, &sz, &error)) {
|
|
error_report("SEV: Failed to read '%s' (%s)", filename, error->message);
|
|
g_error_free(error);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*data = g_base64_decode(base64, len);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
sev_snp_launch_start(SevCommonState *sev_common)
|
|
{
|
|
int fw_error, rc;
|
|
SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(sev_common);
|
|
struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start *start = &sev_snp_guest->kvm_start_conf;
|
|
|
|
trace_kvm_sev_snp_launch_start(start->policy,
|
|
sev_snp_guest->guest_visible_workarounds);
|
|
|
|
if (!kvm_enable_hypercall(BIT_ULL(KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE))) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rc = sev_ioctl(sev_common->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START,
|
|
start, &fw_error);
|
|
if (rc < 0) {
|
|
error_report("%s: SNP_LAUNCH_START ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'",
|
|
__func__, rc, fw_error, fw_error_to_str(fw_error));
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
QTAILQ_INIT(&launch_update);
|
|
|
|
sev_set_guest_state(sev_common, SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
sev_launch_start(SevCommonState *sev_common)
|
|
{
|
|
gsize sz;
|
|
int ret = 1;
|
|
int fw_error, rc;
|
|
SevGuestState *sev_guest = SEV_GUEST(sev_common);
|
|
struct kvm_sev_launch_start start = {
|
|
.handle = sev_guest->handle, .policy = sev_guest->policy
|
|
};
|
|
guchar *session = NULL, *dh_cert = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (sev_guest->session_file) {
|
|
if (sev_read_file_base64(sev_guest->session_file, &session, &sz) < 0) {
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
start.session_uaddr = (unsigned long)session;
|
|
start.session_len = sz;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sev_guest->dh_cert_file) {
|
|
if (sev_read_file_base64(sev_guest->dh_cert_file, &dh_cert, &sz) < 0) {
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
start.dh_uaddr = (unsigned long)dh_cert;
|
|
start.dh_len = sz;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
trace_kvm_sev_launch_start(start.policy, session, dh_cert);
|
|
rc = sev_ioctl(sev_common->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START, &start, &fw_error);
|
|
if (rc < 0) {
|
|
error_report("%s: LAUNCH_START ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'",
|
|
__func__, ret, fw_error, fw_error_to_str(fw_error));
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sev_set_guest_state(sev_common, SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE);
|
|
sev_guest->handle = start.handle;
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
g_free(session);
|
|
g_free(dh_cert);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
sev_snp_cpuid_report_mismatches(SnpCpuidInfo *old,
|
|
SnpCpuidInfo *new)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
|
|
if (old->count != new->count) {
|
|
error_report("SEV-SNP: CPUID validation failed due to count mismatch,"
|
|
"provided: %d, expected: %d", old->count, new->count);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < old->count; i++) {
|
|
SnpCpuidFunc *old_func, *new_func;
|
|
|
|
old_func = &old->entries[i];
|
|
new_func = &new->entries[i];
|
|
|
|
if (memcmp(old_func, new_func, sizeof(SnpCpuidFunc))) {
|
|
error_report("SEV-SNP: CPUID validation failed for function 0x%x, index: 0x%x"
|
|
"provided: eax:0x%08x, ebx: 0x%08x, ecx: 0x%08x, edx: 0x%08x"
|
|
"expected: eax:0x%08x, ebx: 0x%08x, ecx: 0x%08x, edx: 0x%08x",
|
|
old_func->eax_in, old_func->ecx_in,
|
|
old_func->eax, old_func->ebx, old_func->ecx, old_func->edx,
|
|
new_func->eax, new_func->ebx, new_func->ecx, new_func->edx);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const char *
|
|
snp_page_type_to_str(int type)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (type) {
|
|
case KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL: return "Normal";
|
|
case KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO: return "Zero";
|
|
case KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_UNMEASURED: return "Unmeasured";
|
|
case KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_SECRETS: return "Secrets";
|
|
case KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_CPUID: return "Cpuid";
|
|
default: return "unknown";
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
sev_snp_launch_update(SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest,
|
|
SevLaunchUpdateData *data)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret, fw_error;
|
|
SnpCpuidInfo snp_cpuid_info;
|
|
struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_update update = {0};
|
|
|
|
if (!data->hva || !data->len) {
|
|
error_report("SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE called with invalid address"
|
|
"/ length: %p / %lx",
|
|
data->hva, data->len);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (data->type == KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_CPUID) {
|
|
/* Save a copy for comparison in case the LAUNCH_UPDATE fails */
|
|
memcpy(&snp_cpuid_info, data->hva, sizeof(snp_cpuid_info));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
update.uaddr = (__u64)(unsigned long)data->hva;
|
|
update.gfn_start = data->gpa >> TARGET_PAGE_BITS;
|
|
update.len = data->len;
|
|
update.type = data->type;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE requires that GPA ranges have the private
|
|
* memory attribute set in advance.
|
|
*/
|
|
ret = kvm_set_memory_attributes_private(data->gpa, data->len);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
error_report("SEV-SNP: failed to configure initial"
|
|
"private guest memory");
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while (update.len || ret == -EAGAIN) {
|
|
trace_kvm_sev_snp_launch_update(update.uaddr, update.gfn_start <<
|
|
TARGET_PAGE_BITS, update.len,
|
|
snp_page_type_to_str(update.type));
|
|
|
|
ret = sev_ioctl(SEV_COMMON(sev_snp_guest)->sev_fd,
|
|
KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE,
|
|
&update, &fw_error);
|
|
if (ret && ret != -EAGAIN) {
|
|
error_report("SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'",
|
|
ret, fw_error, fw_error_to_str(fw_error));
|
|
|
|
if (data->type == KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_CPUID) {
|
|
sev_snp_cpuid_report_mismatches(&snp_cpuid_info, data->hva);
|
|
error_report("SEV-SNP: failed update CPUID page");
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
if (!ret && update.gfn_start << TARGET_PAGE_BITS != data->gpa + data->len) {
|
|
error_report("SEV-SNP: expected update of GPA range %lx-%lx,"
|
|
"got GPA range %lx-%llx",
|
|
data->gpa, data->gpa + data->len, data->gpa,
|
|
update.gfn_start << TARGET_PAGE_BITS);
|
|
ret = -EIO;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
sev_launch_update_data(SevCommonState *sev_common, hwaddr gpa, uint8_t *addr, uint64_t len)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret, fw_error;
|
|
struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data update;
|
|
|
|
if (!addr || !len) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
update.uaddr = (uintptr_t)addr;
|
|
update.len = len;
|
|
trace_kvm_sev_launch_update_data(addr, len);
|
|
ret = sev_ioctl(sev_common->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA,
|
|
&update, &fw_error);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
error_report("%s: LAUNCH_UPDATE ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'",
|
|
__func__, ret, fw_error, fw_error_to_str(fw_error));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
sev_launch_update_vmsa(SevGuestState *sev_guest)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret, fw_error;
|
|
|
|
ret = sev_ioctl(SEV_COMMON(sev_guest)->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA,
|
|
NULL, &fw_error);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
error_report("%s: LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'",
|
|
__func__, ret, fw_error, fw_error_to_str(fw_error));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
sev_launch_get_measure(Notifier *notifier, void *unused)
|
|
{
|
|
SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs);
|
|
SevGuestState *sev_guest = SEV_GUEST(sev_common);
|
|
int ret, error;
|
|
g_autofree guchar *data = NULL;
|
|
struct kvm_sev_launch_measure measurement = {};
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_check_state(sev_common, SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE)) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sev_es_enabled()) {
|
|
/* measure all the VM save areas before getting launch_measure */
|
|
ret = sev_launch_update_vmsa(sev_guest);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
kvm_mark_guest_state_protected();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* query the measurement blob length */
|
|
ret = sev_ioctl(sev_common->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE,
|
|
&measurement, &error);
|
|
if (!measurement.len) {
|
|
error_report("%s: LAUNCH_MEASURE ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'",
|
|
__func__, ret, error, fw_error_to_str(errno));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
data = g_new0(guchar, measurement.len);
|
|
measurement.uaddr = (unsigned long)data;
|
|
|
|
/* get the measurement blob */
|
|
ret = sev_ioctl(sev_common->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE,
|
|
&measurement, &error);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
error_report("%s: LAUNCH_MEASURE ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'",
|
|
__func__, ret, error, fw_error_to_str(errno));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sev_set_guest_state(sev_common, SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_SECRET);
|
|
|
|
/* encode the measurement value and emit the event */
|
|
sev_guest->measurement = g_base64_encode(data, measurement.len);
|
|
trace_kvm_sev_launch_measurement(sev_guest->measurement);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static char *sev_get_launch_measurement(void)
|
|
{
|
|
ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs = MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs;
|
|
SevGuestState *sev_guest =
|
|
(SevGuestState *)object_dynamic_cast(OBJECT(cgs), TYPE_SEV_GUEST);
|
|
|
|
if (sev_guest &&
|
|
SEV_COMMON(sev_guest)->state >= SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_SECRET) {
|
|
return g_strdup(sev_guest->measurement);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SevLaunchMeasureInfo *qmp_query_sev_launch_measure(Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
char *data;
|
|
SevLaunchMeasureInfo *info;
|
|
|
|
data = sev_get_launch_measurement();
|
|
if (!data) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "SEV launch measurement is not available");
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
info = g_malloc0(sizeof(*info));
|
|
info->data = data;
|
|
|
|
return info;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static Notifier sev_machine_done_notify = {
|
|
.notify = sev_launch_get_measure,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
sev_launch_finish(SevCommonState *sev_common)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret, error;
|
|
|
|
trace_kvm_sev_launch_finish();
|
|
ret = sev_ioctl(sev_common->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH, 0,
|
|
&error);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
error_report("%s: LAUNCH_FINISH ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'",
|
|
__func__, ret, error, fw_error_to_str(error));
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sev_set_guest_state(sev_common, SEV_STATE_RUNNING);
|
|
|
|
/* add migration blocker */
|
|
error_setg(&sev_mig_blocker,
|
|
"SEV: Migration is not implemented");
|
|
migrate_add_blocker(&sev_mig_blocker, &error_fatal);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
snp_launch_update_data(uint64_t gpa, void *hva,
|
|
uint32_t len, int type)
|
|
{
|
|
SevLaunchUpdateData *data;
|
|
|
|
data = g_new0(SevLaunchUpdateData, 1);
|
|
data->gpa = gpa;
|
|
data->hva = hva;
|
|
data->len = len;
|
|
data->type = type;
|
|
|
|
QTAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&launch_update, data, next);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
sev_snp_launch_update_data(SevCommonState *sev_common, hwaddr gpa,
|
|
uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = snp_launch_update_data(gpa, ptr, len,
|
|
KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
sev_snp_cpuid_info_fill(SnpCpuidInfo *snp_cpuid_info,
|
|
const KvmCpuidInfo *kvm_cpuid_info)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
|
|
if (kvm_cpuid_info->cpuid.nent > SNP_CPUID_FUNCTION_MAXCOUNT) {
|
|
error_report("SEV-SNP: CPUID entry count (%d) exceeds max (%d)",
|
|
kvm_cpuid_info->cpuid.nent, SNP_CPUID_FUNCTION_MAXCOUNT);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memset(snp_cpuid_info, 0, sizeof(*snp_cpuid_info));
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < kvm_cpuid_info->cpuid.nent; i++) {
|
|
const struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *kvm_cpuid_entry;
|
|
SnpCpuidFunc *snp_cpuid_entry;
|
|
|
|
kvm_cpuid_entry = &kvm_cpuid_info->entries[i];
|
|
snp_cpuid_entry = &snp_cpuid_info->entries[i];
|
|
|
|
snp_cpuid_entry->eax_in = kvm_cpuid_entry->function;
|
|
if (kvm_cpuid_entry->flags == KVM_CPUID_FLAG_SIGNIFCANT_INDEX) {
|
|
snp_cpuid_entry->ecx_in = kvm_cpuid_entry->index;
|
|
}
|
|
snp_cpuid_entry->eax = kvm_cpuid_entry->eax;
|
|
snp_cpuid_entry->ebx = kvm_cpuid_entry->ebx;
|
|
snp_cpuid_entry->ecx = kvm_cpuid_entry->ecx;
|
|
snp_cpuid_entry->edx = kvm_cpuid_entry->edx;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Guest kernels will calculate EBX themselves using the 0xD
|
|
* subfunctions corresponding to the individual XSAVE areas, so only
|
|
* encode the base XSAVE size in the initial leaves, corresponding
|
|
* to the initial XCR0=1 state.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (snp_cpuid_entry->eax_in == 0xD &&
|
|
(snp_cpuid_entry->ecx_in == 0x0 || snp_cpuid_entry->ecx_in == 0x1)) {
|
|
snp_cpuid_entry->ebx = 0x240;
|
|
snp_cpuid_entry->xcr0_in = 1;
|
|
snp_cpuid_entry->xss_in = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
snp_cpuid_info->count = i;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
snp_launch_update_cpuid(uint32_t cpuid_addr, void *hva, uint32_t cpuid_len)
|
|
{
|
|
KvmCpuidInfo kvm_cpuid_info = {0};
|
|
SnpCpuidInfo snp_cpuid_info;
|
|
CPUState *cs = first_cpu;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
uint32_t i = 0;
|
|
|
|
assert(sizeof(snp_cpuid_info) <= cpuid_len);
|
|
|
|
/* get the cpuid list from KVM */
|
|
do {
|
|
kvm_cpuid_info.cpuid.nent = ++i;
|
|
ret = kvm_vcpu_ioctl(cs, KVM_GET_CPUID2, &kvm_cpuid_info);
|
|
} while (ret == -E2BIG);
|
|
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
error_report("SEV-SNP: unable to query CPUID values for CPU: '%s'",
|
|
strerror(-ret));
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = sev_snp_cpuid_info_fill(&snp_cpuid_info, &kvm_cpuid_info);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
error_report("SEV-SNP: failed to generate CPUID table information");
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(hva, &snp_cpuid_info, sizeof(snp_cpuid_info));
|
|
|
|
return snp_launch_update_data(cpuid_addr, hva, cpuid_len,
|
|
KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_CPUID);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
snp_launch_update_kernel_hashes(SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp, uint32_t addr,
|
|
void *hva, uint32_t len)
|
|
{
|
|
int type = KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO;
|
|
if (sev_snp->parent_obj.kernel_hashes) {
|
|
assert(sev_snp->kernel_hashes_data);
|
|
assert((sev_snp->kernel_hashes_offset +
|
|
sizeof(*sev_snp->kernel_hashes_data)) <= len);
|
|
memset(hva, 0, len);
|
|
memcpy(hva + sev_snp->kernel_hashes_offset, sev_snp->kernel_hashes_data,
|
|
sizeof(*sev_snp->kernel_hashes_data));
|
|
type = KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL;
|
|
}
|
|
return snp_launch_update_data(addr, hva, len, type);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
snp_metadata_desc_to_page_type(int desc_type)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (desc_type) {
|
|
/* Add the umeasured prevalidated pages as a zero page */
|
|
case SEV_DESC_TYPE_SNP_SEC_MEM: return KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO;
|
|
case SEV_DESC_TYPE_SNP_SECRETS: return KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_SECRETS;
|
|
case SEV_DESC_TYPE_CPUID: return KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_CPUID;
|
|
default:
|
|
return KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
snp_populate_metadata_pages(SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp,
|
|
OvmfSevMetadata *metadata)
|
|
{
|
|
OvmfSevMetadataDesc *desc;
|
|
int type, ret, i;
|
|
void *hva;
|
|
MemoryRegion *mr = NULL;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < metadata->num_desc; i++) {
|
|
desc = &metadata->descs[i];
|
|
|
|
type = snp_metadata_desc_to_page_type(desc->type);
|
|
|
|
hva = gpa2hva(&mr, desc->base, desc->len, NULL);
|
|
if (!hva) {
|
|
error_report("%s: Failed to get HVA for GPA 0x%x sz 0x%x",
|
|
__func__, desc->base, desc->len);
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (type == KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_CPUID) {
|
|
ret = snp_launch_update_cpuid(desc->base, hva, desc->len);
|
|
} else if (desc->type == SEV_DESC_TYPE_SNP_KERNEL_HASHES) {
|
|
ret = snp_launch_update_kernel_hashes(sev_snp, desc->base, hva,
|
|
desc->len);
|
|
} else {
|
|
ret = snp_launch_update_data(desc->base, hva, desc->len, type);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
error_report("%s: Failed to add metadata page gpa 0x%x+%x type %d",
|
|
__func__, desc->base, desc->len, desc->type);
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
sev_snp_launch_finish(SevCommonState *sev_common)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret, error;
|
|
Error *local_err = NULL;
|
|
OvmfSevMetadata *metadata;
|
|
SevLaunchUpdateData *data;
|
|
SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp = SEV_SNP_GUEST(sev_common);
|
|
struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish *finish = &sev_snp->kvm_finish_conf;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* To boot the SNP guest, the hypervisor is required to populate the CPUID
|
|
* and Secrets page before finalizing the launch flow. The location of
|
|
* the secrets and CPUID page is available through the OVMF metadata GUID.
|
|
*/
|
|
metadata = pc_system_get_ovmf_sev_metadata_ptr();
|
|
if (metadata == NULL) {
|
|
error_report("%s: Failed to locate SEV metadata header", __func__);
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Populate all the metadata pages */
|
|
snp_populate_metadata_pages(sev_snp, metadata);
|
|
|
|
QTAILQ_FOREACH(data, &launch_update, next) {
|
|
ret = sev_snp_launch_update(sev_snp, data);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
trace_kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish(sev_snp->id_block_base64, sev_snp->id_auth_base64,
|
|
sev_snp->host_data);
|
|
ret = sev_ioctl(sev_common->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH,
|
|
finish, &error);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
error_report("SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'",
|
|
ret, error, fw_error_to_str(error));
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
kvm_mark_guest_state_protected();
|
|
sev_set_guest_state(sev_common, SEV_STATE_RUNNING);
|
|
|
|
/* add migration blocker */
|
|
error_setg(&sev_mig_blocker,
|
|
"SEV-SNP: Migration is not implemented");
|
|
ret = migrate_add_blocker(&sev_mig_blocker, &local_err);
|
|
if (local_err) {
|
|
error_report_err(local_err);
|
|
error_free(sev_mig_blocker);
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
sev_vm_state_change(void *opaque, bool running, RunState state)
|
|
{
|
|
SevCommonState *sev_common = opaque;
|
|
SevCommonStateClass *klass = SEV_COMMON_GET_CLASS(opaque);
|
|
|
|
if (running) {
|
|
if (!sev_check_state(sev_common, SEV_STATE_RUNNING)) {
|
|
klass->launch_finish(sev_common);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sev_kvm_type(X86ConfidentialGuest *cg)
|
|
{
|
|
SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(cg);
|
|
SevGuestState *sev_guest = SEV_GUEST(sev_common);
|
|
int kvm_type;
|
|
|
|
if (sev_common->kvm_type != -1) {
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
kvm_type = (sev_guest->policy & SEV_POLICY_ES) ?
|
|
KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM : KVM_X86_SEV_VM;
|
|
if (kvm_is_vm_type_supported(kvm_type) && !sev_guest->legacy_vm_type) {
|
|
sev_common->kvm_type = kvm_type;
|
|
} else {
|
|
sev_common->kvm_type = KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
return sev_common->kvm_type;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sev_snp_kvm_type(X86ConfidentialGuest *cg)
|
|
{
|
|
return KVM_X86_SNP_VM;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sev_common_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
char *devname;
|
|
int ret, fw_error, cmd;
|
|
uint32_t ebx;
|
|
uint32_t host_cbitpos;
|
|
struct sev_user_data_status status = {};
|
|
SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(cgs);
|
|
SevCommonStateClass *klass = SEV_COMMON_GET_CLASS(cgs);
|
|
X86ConfidentialGuestClass *x86_klass =
|
|
X86_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_GET_CLASS(cgs);
|
|
|
|
sev_common->state = SEV_STATE_UNINIT;
|
|
|
|
host_cpuid(0x8000001F, 0, NULL, &ebx, NULL, NULL);
|
|
host_cbitpos = ebx & 0x3f;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The cbitpos value will be placed in bit positions 5:0 of the EBX
|
|
* register of CPUID 0x8000001F. No need to verify the range as the
|
|
* comparison against the host value accomplishes that.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (host_cbitpos != sev_common->cbitpos) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "%s: cbitpos check failed, host '%d' requested '%d'",
|
|
__func__, host_cbitpos, sev_common->cbitpos);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The reduced-phys-bits value will be placed in bit positions 11:6 of
|
|
* the EBX register of CPUID 0x8000001F, so verify the supplied value
|
|
* is in the range of 1 to 63.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (sev_common->reduced_phys_bits < 1 ||
|
|
sev_common->reduced_phys_bits > 63) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "%s: reduced_phys_bits check failed,"
|
|
" it should be in the range of 1 to 63, requested '%d'",
|
|
__func__, sev_common->reduced_phys_bits);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
devname = object_property_get_str(OBJECT(sev_common), "sev-device", NULL);
|
|
sev_common->sev_fd = open(devname, O_RDWR);
|
|
if (sev_common->sev_fd < 0) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "%s: Failed to open %s '%s'", __func__,
|
|
devname, strerror(errno));
|
|
g_free(devname);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
g_free(devname);
|
|
|
|
ret = sev_platform_ioctl(sev_common->sev_fd, SEV_PLATFORM_STATUS, &status,
|
|
&fw_error);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "%s: failed to get platform status ret=%d "
|
|
"fw_error='%d: %s'", __func__, ret, fw_error,
|
|
fw_error_to_str(fw_error));
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
sev_common->build_id = status.build;
|
|
sev_common->api_major = status.api_major;
|
|
sev_common->api_minor = status.api_minor;
|
|
|
|
if (sev_es_enabled()) {
|
|
if (!kvm_kernel_irqchip_allowed()) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "%s: SEV-ES guests require in-kernel irqchip"
|
|
"support", __func__);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sev_es_enabled() && !sev_snp_enabled()) {
|
|
if (!(status.flags & SEV_STATUS_FLAGS_CONFIG_ES)) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "%s: guest policy requires SEV-ES, but "
|
|
"host SEV-ES support unavailable",
|
|
__func__);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
trace_kvm_sev_init();
|
|
if (x86_klass->kvm_type(X86_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST(sev_common)) == KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM) {
|
|
cmd = sev_es_enabled() ? KVM_SEV_ES_INIT : KVM_SEV_INIT;
|
|
|
|
ret = sev_ioctl(sev_common->sev_fd, cmd, NULL, &fw_error);
|
|
} else {
|
|
struct kvm_sev_init args = { 0 };
|
|
|
|
ret = sev_ioctl(sev_common->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_INIT2, &args, &fw_error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "%s: failed to initialize ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'",
|
|
__func__, ret, fw_error, fw_error_to_str(fw_error));
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = klass->launch_start(sev_common);
|
|
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "%s: failed to create encryption context", __func__);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (klass->kvm_init && klass->kvm_init(cgs, errp)) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
qemu_add_vm_change_state_handler(sev_vm_state_change, sev_common);
|
|
|
|
cgs->ready = true;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* SEV/SEV-ES rely on pinned memory to back guest RAM so discarding
|
|
* isn't actually possible. With SNP, only guest_memfd pages are used
|
|
* for private guest memory, so discarding of shared memory is still
|
|
* possible..
|
|
*/
|
|
ret = ram_block_discard_disable(true);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "%s: cannot disable RAM discard", __func__);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* SEV uses these notifiers to register/pin pages prior to guest use,
|
|
* but SNP relies on guest_memfd for private pages, which has its
|
|
* own internal mechanisms for registering/pinning private memory.
|
|
*/
|
|
ram_block_notifier_add(&sev_ram_notifier);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The machine done notify event is used for SEV guests to get the
|
|
* measurement of the encrypted images. When SEV-SNP is enabled, the
|
|
* measurement is part of the guest attestation process where it can
|
|
* be collected without any reliance on the VMM. So skip registering
|
|
* the notifier for SNP in favor of using guest attestation instead.
|
|
*/
|
|
qemu_add_machine_init_done_notifier(&sev_machine_done_notify);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int sev_snp_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
MachineState *ms = MACHINE(qdev_get_machine());
|
|
X86MachineState *x86ms = X86_MACHINE(ms);
|
|
|
|
if (x86ms->smm == ON_OFF_AUTO_AUTO) {
|
|
x86ms->smm = ON_OFF_AUTO_OFF;
|
|
} else if (x86ms->smm == ON_OFF_AUTO_ON) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "SEV-SNP does not support SMM.");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
sev_encrypt_flash(hwaddr gpa, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len, Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs);
|
|
SevCommonStateClass *klass;
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_common) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
klass = SEV_COMMON_GET_CLASS(sev_common);
|
|
|
|
/* if SEV is in update state then encrypt the data else do nothing */
|
|
if (sev_check_state(sev_common, SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE)) {
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
ret = klass->launch_update_data(sev_common, gpa, ptr, len);
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "SEV: Failed to encrypt pflash rom");
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int sev_inject_launch_secret(const char *packet_hdr, const char *secret,
|
|
uint64_t gpa, Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
ERRP_GUARD();
|
|
struct kvm_sev_launch_secret input;
|
|
g_autofree guchar *data = NULL, *hdr = NULL;
|
|
int error, ret = 1;
|
|
void *hva;
|
|
gsize hdr_sz = 0, data_sz = 0;
|
|
MemoryRegion *mr = NULL;
|
|
SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs);
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_common) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "SEV not enabled for guest");
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* secret can be injected only in this state */
|
|
if (!sev_check_state(sev_common, SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_SECRET)) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "SEV: Not in correct state. (LSECRET) %x",
|
|
sev_common->state);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hdr = g_base64_decode(packet_hdr, &hdr_sz);
|
|
if (!hdr || !hdr_sz) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "SEV: Failed to decode sequence header");
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
data = g_base64_decode(secret, &data_sz);
|
|
if (!data || !data_sz) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "SEV: Failed to decode data");
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hva = gpa2hva(&mr, gpa, data_sz, errp);
|
|
if (!hva) {
|
|
error_prepend(errp, "SEV: Failed to calculate guest address: ");
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
input.hdr_uaddr = (uint64_t)(unsigned long)hdr;
|
|
input.hdr_len = hdr_sz;
|
|
|
|
input.trans_uaddr = (uint64_t)(unsigned long)data;
|
|
input.trans_len = data_sz;
|
|
|
|
input.guest_uaddr = (uint64_t)(unsigned long)hva;
|
|
input.guest_len = data_sz;
|
|
|
|
trace_kvm_sev_launch_secret(gpa, input.guest_uaddr,
|
|
input.trans_uaddr, input.trans_len);
|
|
|
|
ret = sev_ioctl(sev_common->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET,
|
|
&input, &error);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "SEV: failed to inject secret ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'",
|
|
ret, error, fw_error_to_str(error));
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#define SEV_SECRET_GUID "4c2eb361-7d9b-4cc3-8081-127c90d3d294"
|
|
struct sev_secret_area {
|
|
uint32_t base;
|
|
uint32_t size;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
void qmp_sev_inject_launch_secret(const char *packet_hdr,
|
|
const char *secret,
|
|
bool has_gpa, uint64_t gpa,
|
|
Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!sev_enabled()) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "SEV not enabled for guest");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!has_gpa) {
|
|
uint8_t *data;
|
|
struct sev_secret_area *area;
|
|
|
|
if (!pc_system_ovmf_table_find(SEV_SECRET_GUID, &data, NULL)) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "SEV: no secret area found in OVMF,"
|
|
" gpa must be specified.");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
area = (struct sev_secret_area *)data;
|
|
gpa = area->base;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sev_inject_launch_secret(packet_hdr, secret, gpa, errp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
sev_es_parse_reset_block(SevInfoBlock *info, uint32_t *addr)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!info->reset_addr) {
|
|
error_report("SEV-ES reset address is zero");
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*addr = info->reset_addr;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
sev_es_find_reset_vector(void *flash_ptr, uint64_t flash_size,
|
|
uint32_t *addr)
|
|
{
|
|
QemuUUID info_guid, *guid;
|
|
SevInfoBlock *info;
|
|
uint8_t *data;
|
|
uint16_t *len;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Initialize the address to zero. An address of zero with a successful
|
|
* return code indicates that SEV-ES is not active.
|
|
*/
|
|
*addr = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Extract the AP reset vector for SEV-ES guests by locating the SEV GUID.
|
|
* The SEV GUID is located on its own (original implementation) or within
|
|
* the Firmware GUID Table (new implementation), either of which are
|
|
* located 32 bytes from the end of the flash.
|
|
*
|
|
* Check the Firmware GUID Table first.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (pc_system_ovmf_table_find(SEV_INFO_BLOCK_GUID, &data, NULL)) {
|
|
return sev_es_parse_reset_block((SevInfoBlock *)data, addr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* SEV info block not found in the Firmware GUID Table (or there isn't
|
|
* a Firmware GUID Table), fall back to the original implementation.
|
|
*/
|
|
data = flash_ptr + flash_size - 0x20;
|
|
|
|
qemu_uuid_parse(SEV_INFO_BLOCK_GUID, &info_guid);
|
|
info_guid = qemu_uuid_bswap(info_guid); /* GUIDs are LE */
|
|
|
|
guid = (QemuUUID *)(data - sizeof(info_guid));
|
|
if (!qemu_uuid_is_equal(guid, &info_guid)) {
|
|
error_report("SEV information block/Firmware GUID Table block not found in pflash rom");
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
len = (uint16_t *)((uint8_t *)guid - sizeof(*len));
|
|
info = (SevInfoBlock *)(data - le16_to_cpu(*len));
|
|
|
|
return sev_es_parse_reset_block(info, addr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void sev_es_set_reset_vector(CPUState *cpu)
|
|
{
|
|
X86CPU *x86;
|
|
CPUX86State *env;
|
|
ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs = MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs;
|
|
SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(
|
|
object_dynamic_cast(OBJECT(cgs), TYPE_SEV_COMMON));
|
|
|
|
/* Only update if we have valid reset information */
|
|
if (!sev_common || !sev_common->reset_data_valid) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Do not update the BSP reset state */
|
|
if (cpu->cpu_index == 0) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
x86 = X86_CPU(cpu);
|
|
env = &x86->env;
|
|
|
|
cpu_x86_load_seg_cache(env, R_CS, 0xf000, sev_common->reset_cs, 0xffff,
|
|
DESC_P_MASK | DESC_S_MASK | DESC_CS_MASK |
|
|
DESC_R_MASK | DESC_A_MASK);
|
|
|
|
env->eip = sev_common->reset_ip;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int sev_es_save_reset_vector(void *flash_ptr, uint64_t flash_size)
|
|
{
|
|
CPUState *cpu;
|
|
uint32_t addr;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs);
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_es_enabled()) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
addr = 0;
|
|
ret = sev_es_find_reset_vector(flash_ptr, flash_size,
|
|
&addr);
|
|
if (ret) {
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (addr) {
|
|
sev_common->reset_cs = addr & 0xffff0000;
|
|
sev_common->reset_ip = addr & 0x0000ffff;
|
|
sev_common->reset_data_valid = true;
|
|
|
|
CPU_FOREACH(cpu) {
|
|
sev_es_set_reset_vector(cpu);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const QemuUUID sev_hash_table_header_guid = {
|
|
.data = UUID_LE(0x9438d606, 0x4f22, 0x4cc9, 0xb4, 0x79, 0xa7, 0x93,
|
|
0xd4, 0x11, 0xfd, 0x21)
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static const QemuUUID sev_kernel_entry_guid = {
|
|
.data = UUID_LE(0x4de79437, 0xabd2, 0x427f, 0xb8, 0x35, 0xd5, 0xb1,
|
|
0x72, 0xd2, 0x04, 0x5b)
|
|
};
|
|
static const QemuUUID sev_initrd_entry_guid = {
|
|
.data = UUID_LE(0x44baf731, 0x3a2f, 0x4bd7, 0x9a, 0xf1, 0x41, 0xe2,
|
|
0x91, 0x69, 0x78, 0x1d)
|
|
};
|
|
static const QemuUUID sev_cmdline_entry_guid = {
|
|
.data = UUID_LE(0x97d02dd8, 0xbd20, 0x4c94, 0xaa, 0x78, 0xe7, 0x71,
|
|
0x4d, 0x36, 0xab, 0x2a)
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static bool build_kernel_loader_hashes(PaddedSevHashTable *padded_ht,
|
|
SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx,
|
|
Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
SevHashTable *ht;
|
|
uint8_t cmdline_hash[HASH_SIZE];
|
|
uint8_t initrd_hash[HASH_SIZE];
|
|
uint8_t kernel_hash[HASH_SIZE];
|
|
uint8_t *hashp;
|
|
size_t hash_len = HASH_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Calculate hash of kernel command-line with the terminating null byte. If
|
|
* the user doesn't supply a command-line via -append, the 1-byte "\0" will
|
|
* be used.
|
|
*/
|
|
hashp = cmdline_hash;
|
|
if (qcrypto_hash_bytes(QCRYPTO_HASH_ALG_SHA256, ctx->cmdline_data,
|
|
ctx->cmdline_size, &hashp, &hash_len, errp) < 0) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
assert(hash_len == HASH_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Calculate hash of initrd. If the user doesn't supply an initrd via
|
|
* -initrd, an empty buffer will be used (ctx->initrd_size == 0).
|
|
*/
|
|
hashp = initrd_hash;
|
|
if (qcrypto_hash_bytes(QCRYPTO_HASH_ALG_SHA256, ctx->initrd_data,
|
|
ctx->initrd_size, &hashp, &hash_len, errp) < 0) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
assert(hash_len == HASH_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
/* Calculate hash of the kernel */
|
|
hashp = kernel_hash;
|
|
struct iovec iov[2] = {
|
|
{ .iov_base = ctx->setup_data, .iov_len = ctx->setup_size },
|
|
{ .iov_base = ctx->kernel_data, .iov_len = ctx->kernel_size }
|
|
};
|
|
if (qcrypto_hash_bytesv(QCRYPTO_HASH_ALG_SHA256, iov, ARRAY_SIZE(iov),
|
|
&hashp, &hash_len, errp) < 0) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
assert(hash_len == HASH_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
ht = &padded_ht->ht;
|
|
|
|
ht->guid = sev_hash_table_header_guid;
|
|
ht->len = sizeof(*ht);
|
|
|
|
ht->cmdline.guid = sev_cmdline_entry_guid;
|
|
ht->cmdline.len = sizeof(ht->cmdline);
|
|
memcpy(ht->cmdline.hash, cmdline_hash, sizeof(ht->cmdline.hash));
|
|
|
|
ht->initrd.guid = sev_initrd_entry_guid;
|
|
ht->initrd.len = sizeof(ht->initrd);
|
|
memcpy(ht->initrd.hash, initrd_hash, sizeof(ht->initrd.hash));
|
|
|
|
ht->kernel.guid = sev_kernel_entry_guid;
|
|
ht->kernel.len = sizeof(ht->kernel);
|
|
memcpy(ht->kernel.hash, kernel_hash, sizeof(ht->kernel.hash));
|
|
|
|
/* zero the excess data so the measurement can be reliably calculated */
|
|
memset(padded_ht->padding, 0, sizeof(padded_ht->padding));
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool sev_snp_build_kernel_loader_hashes(SevCommonState *sev_common,
|
|
SevHashTableDescriptor *area,
|
|
SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx,
|
|
Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* SNP: Populate the hashes table in an area that later in
|
|
* snp_launch_update_kernel_hashes() will be copied to the guest memory
|
|
* and encrypted.
|
|
*/
|
|
SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(sev_common);
|
|
sev_snp_guest->kernel_hashes_offset = area->base & ~TARGET_PAGE_MASK;
|
|
sev_snp_guest->kernel_hashes_data = g_new0(PaddedSevHashTable, 1);
|
|
return build_kernel_loader_hashes(sev_snp_guest->kernel_hashes_data, ctx, errp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool sev_build_kernel_loader_hashes(SevCommonState *sev_common,
|
|
SevHashTableDescriptor *area,
|
|
SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx,
|
|
Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
PaddedSevHashTable *padded_ht;
|
|
hwaddr mapped_len = sizeof(*padded_ht);
|
|
MemTxAttrs attrs = { 0 };
|
|
bool ret = true;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Populate the hashes table in the guest's memory at the OVMF-designated
|
|
* area for the SEV hashes table
|
|
*/
|
|
padded_ht = address_space_map(&address_space_memory, area->base,
|
|
&mapped_len, true, attrs);
|
|
if (!padded_ht || mapped_len != sizeof(*padded_ht)) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "SEV: cannot map hashes table guest memory area");
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (build_kernel_loader_hashes(padded_ht, ctx, errp)) {
|
|
if (sev_encrypt_flash(area->base, (uint8_t *)padded_ht,
|
|
sizeof(*padded_ht), errp) < 0) {
|
|
ret = false;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
ret = false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
address_space_unmap(&address_space_memory, padded_ht,
|
|
mapped_len, true, mapped_len);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Add the hashes of the linux kernel/initrd/cmdline to an encrypted guest page
|
|
* which is included in SEV's initial memory measurement.
|
|
*/
|
|
bool sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes(SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx, Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t *data;
|
|
SevHashTableDescriptor *area;
|
|
SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs);
|
|
SevCommonStateClass *klass = SEV_COMMON_GET_CLASS(sev_common);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Only add the kernel hashes if the sev-guest configuration explicitly
|
|
* stated kernel-hashes=on.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!sev_common->kernel_hashes) {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!pc_system_ovmf_table_find(SEV_HASH_TABLE_RV_GUID, &data, NULL)) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "SEV: kernel specified but guest firmware "
|
|
"has no hashes table GUID");
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
area = (SevHashTableDescriptor *)data;
|
|
if (!area->base || area->size < sizeof(PaddedSevHashTable)) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "SEV: guest firmware hashes table area is invalid "
|
|
"(base=0x%x size=0x%x)", area->base, area->size);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return klass->build_kernel_loader_hashes(sev_common, area, ctx, errp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static char *
|
|
sev_common_get_sev_device(Object *obj, Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
return g_strdup(SEV_COMMON(obj)->sev_device);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
sev_common_set_sev_device(Object *obj, const char *value, Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
SEV_COMMON(obj)->sev_device = g_strdup(value);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool sev_common_get_kernel_hashes(Object *obj, Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
return SEV_COMMON(obj)->kernel_hashes;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void sev_common_set_kernel_hashes(Object *obj, bool value, Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
SEV_COMMON(obj)->kernel_hashes = value;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
sev_common_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data)
|
|
{
|
|
ConfidentialGuestSupportClass *klass = CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_CLASS(oc);
|
|
|
|
klass->kvm_init = sev_common_kvm_init;
|
|
|
|
object_class_property_add_str(oc, "sev-device",
|
|
sev_common_get_sev_device,
|
|
sev_common_set_sev_device);
|
|
object_class_property_set_description(oc, "sev-device",
|
|
"SEV device to use");
|
|
object_class_property_add_bool(oc, "kernel-hashes",
|
|
sev_common_get_kernel_hashes,
|
|
sev_common_set_kernel_hashes);
|
|
object_class_property_set_description(oc, "kernel-hashes",
|
|
"add kernel hashes to guest firmware for measured Linux boot");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
sev_common_instance_init(Object *obj)
|
|
{
|
|
SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(obj);
|
|
|
|
sev_common->kvm_type = -1;
|
|
|
|
sev_common->sev_device = g_strdup(DEFAULT_SEV_DEVICE);
|
|
|
|
object_property_add_uint32_ptr(obj, "cbitpos", &sev_common->cbitpos,
|
|
OBJ_PROP_FLAG_READWRITE);
|
|
object_property_add_uint32_ptr(obj, "reduced-phys-bits",
|
|
&sev_common->reduced_phys_bits,
|
|
OBJ_PROP_FLAG_READWRITE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* sev guest info common to sev/sev-es/sev-snp */
|
|
static const TypeInfo sev_common_info = {
|
|
.parent = TYPE_X86_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST,
|
|
.name = TYPE_SEV_COMMON,
|
|
.instance_size = sizeof(SevCommonState),
|
|
.instance_init = sev_common_instance_init,
|
|
.class_size = sizeof(SevCommonStateClass),
|
|
.class_init = sev_common_class_init,
|
|
.abstract = true,
|
|
.interfaces = (InterfaceInfo[]) {
|
|
{ TYPE_USER_CREATABLE },
|
|
{ }
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static char *
|
|
sev_guest_get_dh_cert_file(Object *obj, Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
return g_strdup(SEV_GUEST(obj)->dh_cert_file);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
sev_guest_set_dh_cert_file(Object *obj, const char *value, Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
SEV_GUEST(obj)->dh_cert_file = g_strdup(value);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static char *
|
|
sev_guest_get_session_file(Object *obj, Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
SevGuestState *sev_guest = SEV_GUEST(obj);
|
|
|
|
return sev_guest->session_file ? g_strdup(sev_guest->session_file) : NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
sev_guest_set_session_file(Object *obj, const char *value, Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
SEV_GUEST(obj)->session_file = g_strdup(value);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool sev_guest_get_legacy_vm_type(Object *obj, Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
return SEV_GUEST(obj)->legacy_vm_type;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void sev_guest_set_legacy_vm_type(Object *obj, bool value, Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
SEV_GUEST(obj)->legacy_vm_type = value;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
sev_guest_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data)
|
|
{
|
|
SevCommonStateClass *klass = SEV_COMMON_CLASS(oc);
|
|
X86ConfidentialGuestClass *x86_klass = X86_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_CLASS(oc);
|
|
|
|
klass->build_kernel_loader_hashes = sev_build_kernel_loader_hashes;
|
|
klass->launch_start = sev_launch_start;
|
|
klass->launch_finish = sev_launch_finish;
|
|
klass->launch_update_data = sev_launch_update_data;
|
|
klass->kvm_init = sev_kvm_init;
|
|
x86_klass->kvm_type = sev_kvm_type;
|
|
|
|
object_class_property_add_str(oc, "dh-cert-file",
|
|
sev_guest_get_dh_cert_file,
|
|
sev_guest_set_dh_cert_file);
|
|
object_class_property_set_description(oc, "dh-cert-file",
|
|
"guest owners DH certificate (encoded with base64)");
|
|
object_class_property_add_str(oc, "session-file",
|
|
sev_guest_get_session_file,
|
|
sev_guest_set_session_file);
|
|
object_class_property_set_description(oc, "session-file",
|
|
"guest owners session parameters (encoded with base64)");
|
|
object_class_property_add_bool(oc, "legacy-vm-type",
|
|
sev_guest_get_legacy_vm_type,
|
|
sev_guest_set_legacy_vm_type);
|
|
object_class_property_set_description(oc, "legacy-vm-type",
|
|
"use legacy VM type to maintain measurement compatibility with older QEMU or kernel versions.");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
sev_guest_instance_init(Object *obj)
|
|
{
|
|
SevGuestState *sev_guest = SEV_GUEST(obj);
|
|
|
|
sev_guest->policy = DEFAULT_GUEST_POLICY;
|
|
object_property_add_uint32_ptr(obj, "handle", &sev_guest->handle,
|
|
OBJ_PROP_FLAG_READWRITE);
|
|
object_property_add_uint32_ptr(obj, "policy", &sev_guest->policy,
|
|
OBJ_PROP_FLAG_READWRITE);
|
|
object_apply_compat_props(obj);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* guest info specific sev/sev-es */
|
|
static const TypeInfo sev_guest_info = {
|
|
.parent = TYPE_SEV_COMMON,
|
|
.name = TYPE_SEV_GUEST,
|
|
.instance_size = sizeof(SevGuestState),
|
|
.instance_init = sev_guest_instance_init,
|
|
.class_init = sev_guest_class_init,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
sev_snp_guest_get_policy(Object *obj, Visitor *v, const char *name,
|
|
void *opaque, Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
visit_type_uint64(v, name,
|
|
(uint64_t *)&SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj)->kvm_start_conf.policy,
|
|
errp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
sev_snp_guest_set_policy(Object *obj, Visitor *v, const char *name,
|
|
void *opaque, Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
visit_type_uint64(v, name,
|
|
(uint64_t *)&SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj)->kvm_start_conf.policy,
|
|
errp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static char *
|
|
sev_snp_guest_get_guest_visible_workarounds(Object *obj, Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
return g_strdup(SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj)->guest_visible_workarounds);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
sev_snp_guest_set_guest_visible_workarounds(Object *obj, const char *value,
|
|
Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj);
|
|
struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start *start = &sev_snp_guest->kvm_start_conf;
|
|
g_autofree guchar *blob;
|
|
gsize len;
|
|
|
|
g_free(sev_snp_guest->guest_visible_workarounds);
|
|
|
|
/* store the base64 str so we don't need to re-encode in getter */
|
|
sev_snp_guest->guest_visible_workarounds = g_strdup(value);
|
|
|
|
blob = qbase64_decode(sev_snp_guest->guest_visible_workarounds,
|
|
-1, &len, errp);
|
|
if (!blob) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (len != sizeof(start->gosvw)) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "parameter length of %lu exceeds max of %lu",
|
|
len, sizeof(start->gosvw));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(start->gosvw, blob, len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static char *
|
|
sev_snp_guest_get_id_block(Object *obj, Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj);
|
|
|
|
return g_strdup(sev_snp_guest->id_block_base64);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
sev_snp_guest_set_id_block(Object *obj, const char *value, Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj);
|
|
struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish *finish = &sev_snp_guest->kvm_finish_conf;
|
|
gsize len;
|
|
|
|
finish->id_block_en = 0;
|
|
g_free(sev_snp_guest->id_block);
|
|
g_free(sev_snp_guest->id_block_base64);
|
|
|
|
/* store the base64 str so we don't need to re-encode in getter */
|
|
sev_snp_guest->id_block_base64 = g_strdup(value);
|
|
sev_snp_guest->id_block =
|
|
qbase64_decode(sev_snp_guest->id_block_base64, -1, &len, errp);
|
|
|
|
if (!sev_snp_guest->id_block) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (len != KVM_SEV_SNP_ID_BLOCK_SIZE) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "parameter length of %lu not equal to %u",
|
|
len, KVM_SEV_SNP_ID_BLOCK_SIZE);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
finish->id_block_en = 1;
|
|
finish->id_block_uaddr = (uintptr_t)sev_snp_guest->id_block;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static char *
|
|
sev_snp_guest_get_id_auth(Object *obj, Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj);
|
|
|
|
return g_strdup(sev_snp_guest->id_auth_base64);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
sev_snp_guest_set_id_auth(Object *obj, const char *value, Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj);
|
|
struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish *finish = &sev_snp_guest->kvm_finish_conf;
|
|
gsize len;
|
|
|
|
g_free(sev_snp_guest->id_auth_base64);
|
|
g_free((guchar *)finish->id_auth_uaddr);
|
|
|
|
/* store the base64 str so we don't need to re-encode in getter */
|
|
sev_snp_guest->id_auth_base64 = g_strdup(value);
|
|
|
|
finish->id_auth_uaddr =
|
|
(uint64_t)qbase64_decode(sev_snp_guest->id_auth_base64, -1, &len, errp);
|
|
|
|
if (!finish->id_auth_uaddr) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (len > KVM_SEV_SNP_ID_AUTH_SIZE) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "parameter length:ID_AUTH %lu exceeds max of %u",
|
|
len, KVM_SEV_SNP_ID_AUTH_SIZE);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool
|
|
sev_snp_guest_get_author_key_enabled(Object *obj, Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj);
|
|
|
|
return !!sev_snp_guest->kvm_finish_conf.auth_key_en;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
sev_snp_guest_set_author_key_enabled(Object *obj, bool value, Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj);
|
|
|
|
sev_snp_guest->kvm_finish_conf.auth_key_en = value;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool
|
|
sev_snp_guest_get_vcek_disabled(Object *obj, Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj);
|
|
|
|
return !!sev_snp_guest->kvm_finish_conf.vcek_disabled;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
sev_snp_guest_set_vcek_disabled(Object *obj, bool value, Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj);
|
|
|
|
sev_snp_guest->kvm_finish_conf.vcek_disabled = value;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static char *
|
|
sev_snp_guest_get_host_data(Object *obj, Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj);
|
|
|
|
return g_strdup(sev_snp_guest->host_data);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
sev_snp_guest_set_host_data(Object *obj, const char *value, Error **errp)
|
|
{
|
|
SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj);
|
|
struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish *finish = &sev_snp_guest->kvm_finish_conf;
|
|
g_autofree guchar *blob;
|
|
gsize len;
|
|
|
|
g_free(sev_snp_guest->host_data);
|
|
|
|
/* store the base64 str so we don't need to re-encode in getter */
|
|
sev_snp_guest->host_data = g_strdup(value);
|
|
|
|
blob = qbase64_decode(sev_snp_guest->host_data, -1, &len, errp);
|
|
|
|
if (!blob) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (len != sizeof(finish->host_data)) {
|
|
error_setg(errp, "parameter length of %lu not equal to %lu",
|
|
len, sizeof(finish->host_data));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(finish->host_data, blob, len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
sev_snp_guest_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data)
|
|
{
|
|
SevCommonStateClass *klass = SEV_COMMON_CLASS(oc);
|
|
X86ConfidentialGuestClass *x86_klass = X86_CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_CLASS(oc);
|
|
|
|
klass->build_kernel_loader_hashes = sev_snp_build_kernel_loader_hashes;
|
|
klass->launch_start = sev_snp_launch_start;
|
|
klass->launch_finish = sev_snp_launch_finish;
|
|
klass->launch_update_data = sev_snp_launch_update_data;
|
|
klass->kvm_init = sev_snp_kvm_init;
|
|
x86_klass->kvm_type = sev_snp_kvm_type;
|
|
|
|
object_class_property_add(oc, "policy", "uint64",
|
|
sev_snp_guest_get_policy,
|
|
sev_snp_guest_set_policy, NULL, NULL);
|
|
object_class_property_add_str(oc, "guest-visible-workarounds",
|
|
sev_snp_guest_get_guest_visible_workarounds,
|
|
sev_snp_guest_set_guest_visible_workarounds);
|
|
object_class_property_add_str(oc, "id-block",
|
|
sev_snp_guest_get_id_block,
|
|
sev_snp_guest_set_id_block);
|
|
object_class_property_add_str(oc, "id-auth",
|
|
sev_snp_guest_get_id_auth,
|
|
sev_snp_guest_set_id_auth);
|
|
object_class_property_add_bool(oc, "author-key-enabled",
|
|
sev_snp_guest_get_author_key_enabled,
|
|
sev_snp_guest_set_author_key_enabled);
|
|
object_class_property_add_bool(oc, "vcek-required",
|
|
sev_snp_guest_get_vcek_disabled,
|
|
sev_snp_guest_set_vcek_disabled);
|
|
object_class_property_add_str(oc, "host-data",
|
|
sev_snp_guest_get_host_data,
|
|
sev_snp_guest_set_host_data);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
sev_snp_guest_instance_init(Object *obj)
|
|
{
|
|
ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs = CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT(obj);
|
|
SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(obj);
|
|
|
|
cgs->require_guest_memfd = true;
|
|
|
|
/* default init/start/finish params for kvm */
|
|
sev_snp_guest->kvm_start_conf.policy = DEFAULT_SEV_SNP_POLICY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* guest info specific to sev-snp */
|
|
static const TypeInfo sev_snp_guest_info = {
|
|
.parent = TYPE_SEV_COMMON,
|
|
.name = TYPE_SEV_SNP_GUEST,
|
|
.instance_size = sizeof(SevSnpGuestState),
|
|
.class_init = sev_snp_guest_class_init,
|
|
.instance_init = sev_snp_guest_instance_init,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
sev_register_types(void)
|
|
{
|
|
type_register_static(&sev_common_info);
|
|
type_register_static(&sev_guest_info);
|
|
type_register_static(&sev_snp_guest_info);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type_init(sev_register_types);
|