f0d7c2054a
Move the computation from gen_swstep_exception into a helper. This fixes a bug when: - MDSCR_EL1.KDE == 1 to enable debug exceptions within EL_D itself - we singlestep an ERET from EL_D to some lower EL Previously we were computing 'same el' based on the EL which executed the ERET instruction, whereas it ought to be computed based on the EL to which ERET returned. This happens naturally with the new helper, which runs after EL has been changed. Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Message-id: 20220609202901.1177572-14-richard.henderson@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
532 lines
15 KiB
C
532 lines
15 KiB
C
/*
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* ARM debug helpers.
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*
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* This code is licensed under the GNU GPL v2 or later.
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*
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
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*/
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#include "qemu/osdep.h"
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#include "cpu.h"
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#include "internals.h"
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#include "exec/exec-all.h"
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#include "exec/helper-proto.h"
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/* See AArch64.GenerateDebugExceptionsFrom() in ARM ARM pseudocode */
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static bool aa64_generate_debug_exceptions(CPUARMState *env)
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{
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int cur_el = arm_current_el(env);
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int debug_el;
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if (cur_el == 3) {
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return false;
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}
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/* MDCR_EL3.SDD disables debug events from Secure state */
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if (arm_is_secure_below_el3(env)
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&& extract32(env->cp15.mdcr_el3, 16, 1)) {
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return false;
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}
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/*
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* Same EL to same EL debug exceptions need MDSCR_KDE enabled
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* while not masking the (D)ebug bit in DAIF.
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*/
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debug_el = arm_debug_target_el(env);
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if (cur_el == debug_el) {
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return extract32(env->cp15.mdscr_el1, 13, 1)
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&& !(env->daif & PSTATE_D);
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}
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/* Otherwise the debug target needs to be a higher EL */
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return debug_el > cur_el;
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}
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static bool aa32_generate_debug_exceptions(CPUARMState *env)
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{
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int el = arm_current_el(env);
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if (el == 0 && arm_el_is_aa64(env, 1)) {
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return aa64_generate_debug_exceptions(env);
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}
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if (arm_is_secure(env)) {
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int spd;
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if (el == 0 && (env->cp15.sder & 1)) {
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/*
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* SDER.SUIDEN means debug exceptions from Secure EL0
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* are always enabled. Otherwise they are controlled by
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* SDCR.SPD like those from other Secure ELs.
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*/
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return true;
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}
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spd = extract32(env->cp15.mdcr_el3, 14, 2);
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switch (spd) {
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case 1:
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/* SPD == 0b01 is reserved, but behaves as 0b00. */
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case 0:
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/*
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* For 0b00 we return true if external secure invasive debug
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* is enabled. On real hardware this is controlled by external
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* signals to the core. QEMU always permits debug, and behaves
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* as if DBGEN, SPIDEN, NIDEN and SPNIDEN are all tied high.
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*/
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return true;
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case 2:
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return false;
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case 3:
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return true;
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}
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}
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return el != 2;
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}
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/*
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* Return true if debugging exceptions are currently enabled.
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* This corresponds to what in ARM ARM pseudocode would be
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* if UsingAArch32() then
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* return AArch32.GenerateDebugExceptions()
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* else
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* return AArch64.GenerateDebugExceptions()
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* We choose to push the if() down into this function for clarity,
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* since the pseudocode has it at all callsites except for the one in
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* CheckSoftwareStep(), where it is elided because both branches would
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* always return the same value.
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*/
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bool arm_generate_debug_exceptions(CPUARMState *env)
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{
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if (is_a64(env)) {
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return aa64_generate_debug_exceptions(env);
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} else {
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return aa32_generate_debug_exceptions(env);
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}
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}
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/*
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* Is single-stepping active? (Note that the "is EL_D AArch64?" check
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* implicitly means this always returns false in pre-v8 CPUs.)
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*/
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bool arm_singlestep_active(CPUARMState *env)
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{
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return extract32(env->cp15.mdscr_el1, 0, 1)
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&& arm_el_is_aa64(env, arm_debug_target_el(env))
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&& arm_generate_debug_exceptions(env);
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}
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/* Return true if the linked breakpoint entry lbn passes its checks */
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static bool linked_bp_matches(ARMCPU *cpu, int lbn)
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{
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CPUARMState *env = &cpu->env;
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uint64_t bcr = env->cp15.dbgbcr[lbn];
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int brps = arm_num_brps(cpu);
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int ctx_cmps = arm_num_ctx_cmps(cpu);
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int bt;
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uint32_t contextidr;
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uint64_t hcr_el2;
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/*
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* Links to unimplemented or non-context aware breakpoints are
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* CONSTRAINED UNPREDICTABLE: either behave as if disabled, or
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* as if linked to an UNKNOWN context-aware breakpoint (in which
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* case DBGWCR<n>_EL1.LBN must indicate that breakpoint).
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* We choose the former.
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*/
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if (lbn >= brps || lbn < (brps - ctx_cmps)) {
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return false;
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}
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bcr = env->cp15.dbgbcr[lbn];
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if (extract64(bcr, 0, 1) == 0) {
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/* Linked breakpoint disabled : generate no events */
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return false;
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}
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bt = extract64(bcr, 20, 4);
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hcr_el2 = arm_hcr_el2_eff(env);
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switch (bt) {
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case 3: /* linked context ID match */
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switch (arm_current_el(env)) {
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default:
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/* Context matches never fire in AArch64 EL3 */
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return false;
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case 2:
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if (!(hcr_el2 & HCR_E2H)) {
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/* Context matches never fire in EL2 without E2H enabled. */
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return false;
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}
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contextidr = env->cp15.contextidr_el[2];
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break;
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case 1:
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contextidr = env->cp15.contextidr_el[1];
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break;
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case 0:
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if ((hcr_el2 & (HCR_E2H | HCR_TGE)) == (HCR_E2H | HCR_TGE)) {
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contextidr = env->cp15.contextidr_el[2];
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} else {
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contextidr = env->cp15.contextidr_el[1];
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}
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break;
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}
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break;
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case 7: /* linked contextidr_el1 match */
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contextidr = env->cp15.contextidr_el[1];
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break;
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case 13: /* linked contextidr_el2 match */
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contextidr = env->cp15.contextidr_el[2];
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break;
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case 9: /* linked VMID match (reserved if no EL2) */
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case 11: /* linked context ID and VMID match (reserved if no EL2) */
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case 15: /* linked full context ID match */
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default:
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/*
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* Links to Unlinked context breakpoints must generate no
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* events; we choose to do the same for reserved values too.
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*/
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return false;
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}
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/*
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* We match the whole register even if this is AArch32 using the
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* short descriptor format (in which case it holds both PROCID and ASID),
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* since we don't implement the optional v7 context ID masking.
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*/
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return contextidr == (uint32_t)env->cp15.dbgbvr[lbn];
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}
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static bool bp_wp_matches(ARMCPU *cpu, int n, bool is_wp)
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{
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CPUARMState *env = &cpu->env;
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uint64_t cr;
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int pac, hmc, ssc, wt, lbn;
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/*
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* Note that for watchpoints the check is against the CPU security
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* state, not the S/NS attribute on the offending data access.
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*/
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bool is_secure = arm_is_secure(env);
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int access_el = arm_current_el(env);
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if (is_wp) {
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CPUWatchpoint *wp = env->cpu_watchpoint[n];
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if (!wp || !(wp->flags & BP_WATCHPOINT_HIT)) {
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return false;
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}
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cr = env->cp15.dbgwcr[n];
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if (wp->hitattrs.user) {
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/*
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* The LDRT/STRT/LDT/STT "unprivileged access" instructions should
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* match watchpoints as if they were accesses done at EL0, even if
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* the CPU is at EL1 or higher.
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*/
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access_el = 0;
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}
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} else {
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uint64_t pc = is_a64(env) ? env->pc : env->regs[15];
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if (!env->cpu_breakpoint[n] || env->cpu_breakpoint[n]->pc != pc) {
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return false;
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}
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cr = env->cp15.dbgbcr[n];
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}
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/*
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* The WATCHPOINT_HIT flag guarantees us that the watchpoint is
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* enabled and that the address and access type match; for breakpoints
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* we know the address matched; check the remaining fields, including
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* linked breakpoints. We rely on WCR and BCR having the same layout
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* for the LBN, SSC, HMC, PAC/PMC and is-linked fields.
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* Note that some combinations of {PAC, HMC, SSC} are reserved and
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* must act either like some valid combination or as if the watchpoint
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* were disabled. We choose the former, and use this together with
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* the fact that EL3 must always be Secure and EL2 must always be
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* Non-Secure to simplify the code slightly compared to the full
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* table in the ARM ARM.
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*/
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pac = FIELD_EX64(cr, DBGWCR, PAC);
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hmc = FIELD_EX64(cr, DBGWCR, HMC);
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ssc = FIELD_EX64(cr, DBGWCR, SSC);
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switch (ssc) {
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case 0:
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break;
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case 1:
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case 3:
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if (is_secure) {
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return false;
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}
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break;
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case 2:
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if (!is_secure) {
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return false;
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}
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break;
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}
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switch (access_el) {
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case 3:
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case 2:
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if (!hmc) {
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return false;
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}
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break;
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case 1:
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if (extract32(pac, 0, 1) == 0) {
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return false;
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}
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break;
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case 0:
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if (extract32(pac, 1, 1) == 0) {
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return false;
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}
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break;
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default:
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g_assert_not_reached();
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}
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wt = FIELD_EX64(cr, DBGWCR, WT);
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lbn = FIELD_EX64(cr, DBGWCR, LBN);
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if (wt && !linked_bp_matches(cpu, lbn)) {
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return false;
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}
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return true;
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}
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static bool check_watchpoints(ARMCPU *cpu)
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{
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CPUARMState *env = &cpu->env;
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int n;
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/*
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* If watchpoints are disabled globally or we can't take debug
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* exceptions here then watchpoint firings are ignored.
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*/
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if (extract32(env->cp15.mdscr_el1, 15, 1) == 0
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|| !arm_generate_debug_exceptions(env)) {
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return false;
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}
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for (n = 0; n < ARRAY_SIZE(env->cpu_watchpoint); n++) {
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if (bp_wp_matches(cpu, n, true)) {
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return true;
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}
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}
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return false;
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}
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bool arm_debug_check_breakpoint(CPUState *cs)
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{
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ARMCPU *cpu = ARM_CPU(cs);
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CPUARMState *env = &cpu->env;
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target_ulong pc;
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int n;
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/*
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* If breakpoints are disabled globally or we can't take debug
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* exceptions here then breakpoint firings are ignored.
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*/
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if (extract32(env->cp15.mdscr_el1, 15, 1) == 0
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|| !arm_generate_debug_exceptions(env)) {
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return false;
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}
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/*
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* Single-step exceptions have priority over breakpoint exceptions.
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* If single-step state is active-pending, suppress the bp.
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*/
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if (arm_singlestep_active(env) && !(env->pstate & PSTATE_SS)) {
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return false;
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}
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/*
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* PC alignment faults have priority over breakpoint exceptions.
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*/
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pc = is_a64(env) ? env->pc : env->regs[15];
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if ((is_a64(env) || !env->thumb) && (pc & 3) != 0) {
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return false;
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}
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/*
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* Instruction aborts have priority over breakpoint exceptions.
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* TODO: We would need to look up the page for PC and verify that
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* it is present and executable.
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*/
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for (n = 0; n < ARRAY_SIZE(env->cpu_breakpoint); n++) {
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if (bp_wp_matches(cpu, n, false)) {
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return true;
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}
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}
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return false;
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}
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bool arm_debug_check_watchpoint(CPUState *cs, CPUWatchpoint *wp)
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{
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/*
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* Called by core code when a CPU watchpoint fires; need to check if this
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* is also an architectural watchpoint match.
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*/
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ARMCPU *cpu = ARM_CPU(cs);
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return check_watchpoints(cpu);
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}
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/*
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* Return the FSR value for a debug exception (watchpoint, hardware
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* breakpoint or BKPT insn) targeting the specified exception level.
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*/
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static uint32_t arm_debug_exception_fsr(CPUARMState *env)
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{
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ARMMMUFaultInfo fi = { .type = ARMFault_Debug };
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int target_el = arm_debug_target_el(env);
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bool using_lpae = false;
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if (target_el == 2 || arm_el_is_aa64(env, target_el)) {
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using_lpae = true;
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} else {
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if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_LPAE) &&
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(env->cp15.tcr_el[target_el].raw_tcr & TTBCR_EAE)) {
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using_lpae = true;
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}
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}
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if (using_lpae) {
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return arm_fi_to_lfsc(&fi);
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} else {
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return arm_fi_to_sfsc(&fi);
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}
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}
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void arm_debug_excp_handler(CPUState *cs)
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{
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/*
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* Called by core code when a watchpoint or breakpoint fires;
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* need to check which one and raise the appropriate exception.
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*/
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ARMCPU *cpu = ARM_CPU(cs);
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CPUARMState *env = &cpu->env;
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CPUWatchpoint *wp_hit = cs->watchpoint_hit;
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if (wp_hit) {
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if (wp_hit->flags & BP_CPU) {
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bool wnr = (wp_hit->flags & BP_WATCHPOINT_HIT_WRITE) != 0;
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bool same_el = arm_debug_target_el(env) == arm_current_el(env);
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cs->watchpoint_hit = NULL;
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env->exception.fsr = arm_debug_exception_fsr(env);
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env->exception.vaddress = wp_hit->hitaddr;
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raise_exception(env, EXCP_DATA_ABORT,
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syn_watchpoint(same_el, 0, wnr),
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arm_debug_target_el(env));
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}
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} else {
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uint64_t pc = is_a64(env) ? env->pc : env->regs[15];
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bool same_el = (arm_debug_target_el(env) == arm_current_el(env));
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/*
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* (1) GDB breakpoints should be handled first.
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* (2) Do not raise a CPU exception if no CPU breakpoint has fired,
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* since singlestep is also done by generating a debug internal
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* exception.
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*/
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if (cpu_breakpoint_test(cs, pc, BP_GDB)
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|| !cpu_breakpoint_test(cs, pc, BP_CPU)) {
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return;
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}
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env->exception.fsr = arm_debug_exception_fsr(env);
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/*
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* FAR is UNKNOWN: clear vaddress to avoid potentially exposing
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* values to the guest that it shouldn't be able to see at its
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* exception/security level.
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*/
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env->exception.vaddress = 0;
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raise_exception(env, EXCP_PREFETCH_ABORT,
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syn_breakpoint(same_el),
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arm_debug_target_el(env));
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}
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}
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/*
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* Raise an EXCP_BKPT with the specified syndrome register value,
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* targeting the correct exception level for debug exceptions.
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*/
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void HELPER(exception_bkpt_insn)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t syndrome)
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{
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int debug_el = arm_debug_target_el(env);
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int cur_el = arm_current_el(env);
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/* FSR will only be used if the debug target EL is AArch32. */
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env->exception.fsr = arm_debug_exception_fsr(env);
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/*
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* FAR is UNKNOWN: clear vaddress to avoid potentially exposing
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* values to the guest that it shouldn't be able to see at its
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* exception/security level.
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*/
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env->exception.vaddress = 0;
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/*
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* Other kinds of architectural debug exception are ignored if
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* they target an exception level below the current one (in QEMU
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* this is checked by arm_generate_debug_exceptions()). Breakpoint
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* instructions are special because they always generate an exception
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* to somewhere: if they can't go to the configured debug exception
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* level they are taken to the current exception level.
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*/
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if (debug_el < cur_el) {
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debug_el = cur_el;
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}
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raise_exception(env, EXCP_BKPT, syndrome, debug_el);
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}
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void HELPER(exception_swstep)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t syndrome)
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{
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int debug_el = arm_debug_target_el(env);
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int cur_el = arm_current_el(env);
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/*
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* If singlestep is targeting a lower EL than the current one, then
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* DisasContext.ss_active must be false and we can never get here.
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*/
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assert(debug_el >= cur_el);
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if (debug_el == cur_el) {
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syndrome |= 1 << ARM_EL_EC_SHIFT;
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}
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raise_exception(env, EXCP_UDEF, syndrome, debug_el);
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}
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#if !defined(CONFIG_USER_ONLY)
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vaddr arm_adjust_watchpoint_address(CPUState *cs, vaddr addr, int len)
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{
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ARMCPU *cpu = ARM_CPU(cs);
|
|
CPUARMState *env = &cpu->env;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* In BE32 system mode, target memory is stored byteswapped (on a
|
|
* little-endian host system), and by the time we reach here (via an
|
|
* opcode helper) the addresses of subword accesses have been adjusted
|
|
* to account for that, which means that watchpoints will not match.
|
|
* Undo the adjustment here.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (arm_sctlr_b(env)) {
|
|
if (len == 1) {
|
|
addr ^= 3;
|
|
} else if (len == 2) {
|
|
addr ^= 2;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return addr;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|