1daba4d1b2
For now this only covers hcalls relating to TPM communication since it's the only one particularly important from a QEMU perspective atm, but others can be added here where it makes sense. The full specification for all hcalls/ucalls will eventually be made available in the public/OpenPower version of the PAPR specification. Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Message-Id: <20190717205842.17827-2-mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
77 lines
3.4 KiB
Plaintext
77 lines
3.4 KiB
Plaintext
On PPC64 systems supporting Protected Execution Facility (PEF), system
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memory can be placed in a secured region where only an "ultravisor"
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running in firmware can provide to access it. pseries guests on such
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systems can communicate with the ultravisor (via ultracalls) to switch to a
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secure VM mode (SVM) where the guest's memory is relocated to this secured
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region, making its memory inaccessible to normal processes/guests running on
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the host.
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The various ultracalls/hypercalls relating to SVM mode are currently
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only documented internally, but are planned for direct inclusion into the
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public OpenPOWER version of the PAPR specification (LoPAPR/LoPAR). An internal
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ACR has been filed to reserve a hypercall number range specific to this
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use-case to avoid any future conflicts with the internally-maintained PAPR
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specification. This document summarizes some of these details as they relate
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to QEMU.
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== hypercalls needed by the ultravisor ==
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Switching to SVM mode involves a number of hcalls issued by the ultravisor
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to the hypervisor to orchestrate the movement of guest memory to secure
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memory and various other aspects SVM mode. Numbers are assigned for these
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hcalls within the reserved range 0xEF00-0xEF80. The below documents the
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hcalls relevant to QEMU.
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- H_TPM_COMM (0xef10)
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For TPM_COMM_OP_EXECUTE operation:
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Send a request to a TPM and receive a response, opening a new TPM session
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if one has not already been opened.
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For TPM_COMM_OP_CLOSE_SESSION operation:
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Close the existing TPM session, if any.
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Arguments:
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r3 : H_TPM_COMM (0xef10)
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r4 : TPM operation, one of:
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TPM_COMM_OP_EXECUTE (0x1)
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TPM_COMM_OP_CLOSE_SESSION (0x2)
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r5 : in_buffer, guest physical address of buffer containing the request
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- Caller may use the same address for both request and response
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r6 : in_size, size of the in buffer
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- Must be less than or equal to 4KB
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r7 : out_buffer, guest physical address of buffer to store the response
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- Caller may use the same address for both request and response
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r8 : out_size, size of the out buffer
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- Must be at least 4KB, as this is the maximum request/response size
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supported by most TPM implementations, including the TPM Resource
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Manager in the linux kernel.
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Return values:
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r3 : H_Success request processed successfully
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H_PARAMETER invalid TPM operation
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H_P2 in_buffer is invalid
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H_P3 in_size is invalid
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H_P4 out_buffer is invalid
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H_P5 out_size is invalid
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H_RESOURCE problem communicating with TPM
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H_FUNCTION TPM access is not currently allowed/configured
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r4 : For TPM_COMM_OP_EXECUTE, the size of the response will be stored here
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upon success.
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Use-case/notes:
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SVM filesystems are encrypted using a symmetric key. This key is then
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wrapped/encrypted using the public key of a trusted system which has the
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private key stored in the system's TPM. An Ultravisor will use this
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hcall to unwrap/unseal the symmetric key using the system's TPM device
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or a TPM Resource Manager associated with the device.
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The Ultravisor sets up a separate session key with the TPM in advance
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during host system boot. All sensitive in and out values will be
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encrypted using the session key. Though the hypervisor will see the 'in'
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and 'out' buffers in raw form, any sensitive contents will generally be
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encrypted using this session key.
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