Set magic cookie on initialization. Clear on cleanup. Sprinkle a bunch
of assert()s checking the cookie, to verify the pointer is valid.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20180507102254.12107-1-kraxel@redhat.com
When vnc_client_read() return value is -1
vs is not valid any more.
Fixes: d49b87f0d1
Reported-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Tested-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Message-id: 20180420084820.3873-1-kraxel@redhat.com
Secondary displays in multihead setups are allowed to have a NULL
DisplaySurface. Typically user interfaces handle this by hiding the
window which shows the display in question.
This isn't an option for vnc though because it simply hasn't a concept
of windows or outputs. So handle the situation by showing a placeholder
DisplaySurface instead. Also check in console_select whenever a surface
is preset in the first place before requesting an update.
This fixes a segfault which can be triggered by switching to an unused
display (via vtrl-alt-<nr>) in a multihead setup, for example using
-device virtio-vga,max_outputs=2.
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Tested-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Message-id: 20180308161803.6152-1-kraxel@redhat.com
Move qapi-schema.json to qapi/, so it's next to its modules, and all
files get generated to qapi/, not just the ones generated for modules.
Consistently name the generated files qapi-MODULE.EXT:
qmp-commands.[ch] become qapi-commands.[ch], qapi-event.[ch] become
qapi-events.[ch], and qmp-introspect.[ch] become qapi-introspect.[ch].
This gets rid of the temporary hacks in scripts/qapi/commands.py,
scripts/qapi/events.py, and scripts/qapi/common.py.
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20180211093607.27351-28-armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
[eblake: Fix trailing dot in tpm.c, undo temporary hack for OSX toolchain]
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
In my "build everything" tree, a change to the types in
qapi-schema.json triggers a recompile of about 4800 out of 5100
objects.
The previous commit split up qmp-commands.h, qmp-event.h, qmp-visit.h,
qapi-types.h. Each of these headers still includes all its shards.
Reduce compile time by including just the shards we actually need.
To illustrate the benefits: adding a type to qapi/migration.json now
recompiles some 2300 instead of 4800 objects. The next commit will
improve it further.
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20180211093607.27351-24-armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
[eblake: rebase to master]
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Pass the modifier state to the keymap lookup function. In case multiple
keysym -> keycode mappings exist look at the modifier state and prefer
the mapping where the modifier state matches.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20180222070513.8740-6-kraxel@redhat.com
The 'vs->as.freq' value is a signed integer, which is read from an
unsigned 32-bit int field on the wire. There is thus a risk of overflow
on 32-bit platforms. Move the frequency limit checking to be done at
time of read before casting to a signed integer.
Reported-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Message-id: 20180205114938.15784-4-berrange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
For very large framebuffers, it is theoretically possible for the result
of 'vs->throttle_output_offset * VNC_THROTTLE_OUTPUT_LIMIT_SCALE' to
exceed the size of a 32-bit int. For this to happen in practice, the
video RAM would have to be set to a large enough value, which is not
likely today. None the less we can be paranoid against future growth by
using division instead of multiplication when checking the limits.
Reported-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Message-id: 20180205114938.15784-2-berrange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
On one of our client's node, due to trying to read from closed ioc,
a segmentation fault occured. Corresponding backtrace:
0 object_get_class (obj=obj@entry=0x0)
1 qio_channel_readv_full (ioc=0x0, iov=0x7ffe55277180 ...
2 qio_channel_read (ioc=<optimized out> ...
3 vnc_client_read_buf (vs=vs@entry=0x55625f3c6000, ...
4 vnc_client_read_plain (vs=0x55625f3c6000)
5 vnc_client_read (vs=0x55625f3c6000)
6 vnc_client_io (ioc=<optimized out>, condition=G_IO_IN, ...
7 g_main_dispatch (context=0x556251568a50)
8 g_main_context_dispatch (context=context@entry=0x556251568a50)
9 glib_pollfds_poll ()
10 os_host_main_loop_wait (timeout=<optimized out>)
11 main_loop_wait (nonblocking=nonblocking@entry=0)
12 main_loop () at vl.c:1909
13 main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>, ...
Having analyzed the coredump, I understood that the reason is that
ioc_tag is reset on vnc_disconnect_start and ioc is cleaned
in vnc_disconnect_finish. Between these two events due to some
reasons the ioc_tag was set again and after vnc_disconnect_finish
the handler is running with freed ioc,
which led to the segmentation fault.
The patch checks vs->disconnecting in places where we call
qio_channel_add_watch and resets handler if disconnecting == TRUE
to prevent such an occurrence.
Signed-off-by: Klim Kireev <klim.kireev@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20180207094844.21402-1-klim.kireev@virtuozzo.com
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
vnc_listen_io() does not own the reference on the 'cioc' parameter is it
passed, so should not be unref'ing it.
Fixes: 13e1d0e71e
Reported-by: Bandan Das <bsd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20180215102602.10864-1-berrange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
qemu-common.h includes qemu/option.h, but most places that include the
former don't actually need the latter. Drop the include, and add it
to the places that actually need it.
While there, drop superfluous includes of both headers, and
separate #include from file comment with a blank line.
This cleanup makes the number of objects depending on qemu/option.h
drop from 4545 (out of 4743) to 284 in my "build everything" tree.
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20180201111846.21846-20-armbru@redhat.com>
[Semantic conflict with commit bdd6a90a9e in block/nvme.c resolved]
qapi/qmp/types.h is a convenience header to include a number of
qapi/qmp/ headers. Since we rarely need all of the headers
qapi/qmp/types.h includes, we bypass it most of the time. Most of the
places that use it don't need all the headers, either.
Include the necessary headers directly, and drop qapi/qmp/types.h.
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20180201111846.21846-9-armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20180201111846.21846-6-armbru@redhat.com>
This cleanup makes the number of objects depending on qapi/error.h
drop from 1910 (out of 4743) to 1612 in my "build everything" tree.
While there, separate #include from file comment with a blank line,
and drop a useless comment on why qemu/osdep.h is included first.
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20180201111846.21846-5-armbru@redhat.com>
[Semantic conflict with commit 34e304e975 resolved, OSX breakage fixed]
The VNC server already has the ability to listen on multiple sockets.
Converting it to use the QIONetListener APIs though, will reduce the
amount of code in the VNC server and improve the clarity of what is
left.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20180201164514.10330-1-berrange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Pixman returns a signed int for the image width/height, but the VNC
protocol only permits a unsigned int16. Effective framebuffer size
is determined by the guest, limited by the video RAM size, so the
dimensions are unlikely to exceed the range of an unsigned int16,
but this is not currently validated.
With the current use of 'int' for client width/height, the calculation
of offsets in vnc_update_throttle_offset() suffers from integer size
promotion and sign extension, causing coverity warnings
*** CID 1385147: Integer handling issues (SIGN_EXTENSION)
/ui/vnc.c: 979 in vnc_update_throttle_offset()
973 * than that the client would already suffering awful audio
974 * glitches, so dropping samples is no worse really).
975 */
976 static void vnc_update_throttle_offset(VncState *vs)
977 {
978 size_t offset =
>>> CID 1385147: Integer handling issues (SIGN_EXTENSION)
>>> Suspicious implicit sign extension:
"vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel" with type "unsigned char" (8 bits,
unsigned) is promoted in "vs->client_width * vs->client_height *
vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel" to type "int" (32 bits, signed), then
sign-extended to type "unsigned long" (64 bits, unsigned). If
"vs->client_width * vs->client_height * vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel"
is greater than 0x7FFFFFFF, the upper bits of the result will all be 1.
979 vs->client_width * vs->client_height * vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel;
Change client_width / client_height to be a size_t to avoid sign
extension and integer promotion. Then validate that dimensions are in
range wrt the RFB protocol u16 limits.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20180118155254.17053-1-berrange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
While the QIOChannel APIs for reading/writing data return ssize_t, with negative
value indicating an error, the VNC code passes this return value through the
vnc_client_io_error() method. This detects the error condition, disconnects the
client and returns 0 to indicate error. Thus all the VNC helper methods should
return size_t (unsigned), and misleading comments which refer to the possibility
of negative return values need fixing.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20171218191228.31018-14-berrange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
The VNC client throttling is quite subtle so will benefit from having trace
points available for live debugging.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20171218191228.31018-13-berrange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
The previous patches fix problems with throttling of forced framebuffer updates
and audio data capture that would cause the QEMU output buffer size to grow
without bound. Those fixes are graceful in that once the client catches up with
reading data from the server, everything continues operating normally.
There is some data which the server sends to the client that is impractical to
throttle. Specifically there are various pseudo framebuffer update encodings to
inform the client of things like desktop resizes, pointer changes, audio
playback start/stop, LED state and so on. These generally only involve sending
a very small amount of data to the client, but a malicious guest might be able
to do things that trigger these changes at a very high rate. Throttling them is
not practical as missed or delayed events would cause broken behaviour for the
client.
This patch thus takes a more forceful approach of setting an absolute upper
bound on the amount of data we permit to be present in the output buffer at
any time. The previous patch set a threshold for throttling the output buffer
by allowing an amount of data equivalent to one complete framebuffer update and
one seconds worth of audio data. On top of this it allowed for one further
forced framebuffer update to be queued.
To be conservative, we thus take that throttling threshold and multiply it by
5 to form an absolute upper bound. If this bound is hit during vnc_write() we
forceably disconnect the client, refusing to queue further data. This limit is
high enough that it should never be hit unless a malicious client is trying to
exploit the sever, or the network is completely saturated preventing any sending
of data on the socket.
This completes the fix for CVE-2017-15124 started in the previous patches.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20171218191228.31018-12-berrange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
The VNC server must throttle data sent to the client to prevent the 'output'
buffer size growing without bound, if the client stops reading data off the
socket (either maliciously or due to stalled/slow network connection).
The current throttling is very crude because it simply checks whether the
output buffer offset is zero. This check is disabled if the client has requested
a forced update, because we want to send these as soon as possible.
As a result, the VNC client can cause QEMU to allocate arbitrary amounts of RAM.
They can first start something in the guest that triggers lots of framebuffer
updates eg play a youtube video. Then repeatedly send full framebuffer update
requests, but never read data back from the server. This can easily make QEMU's
VNC server send buffer consume 100MB of RAM per second, until the OOM killer
starts reaping processes (hopefully the rogue QEMU process, but it might pick
others...).
To address this we make the throttling more intelligent, so we can throttle
full updates. When we get a forced update request, we keep track of exactly how
much data we put on the output buffer. We will not process a subsequent forced
update request until this data has been fully sent on the wire. We always allow
one forced update request to be in flight, regardless of what data is queued
for incremental updates or audio data. The slight complication is that we do
not initially know how much data an update will send, as this is done in the
background by the VNC job thread. So we must track the fact that the job thread
has an update pending, and not process any further updates until this job is
has been completed & put data on the output buffer.
This unbounded memory growth affects all VNC server configurations supported by
QEMU, with no workaround possible. The mitigating factor is that it can only be
triggered by a client that has authenticated with the VNC server, and who is
able to trigger a large quantity of framebuffer updates or audio samples from
the guest OS. Mostly they'll just succeed in getting the OOM killer to kill
their own QEMU process, but its possible other processes can get taken out as
collateral damage.
This is a more general variant of the similar unbounded memory usage flaw in
the websockets server, that was previously assigned CVE-2017-15268, and fixed
in 2.11 by:
commit a7b20a8efa
Author: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Mon Oct 9 14:43:42 2017 +0100
io: monitor encoutput buffer size from websocket GSource
This new general memory usage flaw has been assigned CVE-2017-15124, and is
partially fixed by this patch.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20171218191228.31018-11-berrange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
The VNC server must throttle data sent to the client to prevent the 'output'
buffer size growing without bound, if the client stops reading data off the
socket (either maliciously or due to stalled/slow network connection).
The current throttling is very crude because it simply checks whether the
output buffer offset is zero. This check must be disabled if audio capture is
enabled, because when streaming audio the output buffer offset will rarely be
zero due to queued audio data, and so this would starve framebuffer updates.
As a result, the VNC client can cause QEMU to allocate arbitrary amounts of RAM.
They can first start something in the guest that triggers lots of framebuffer
updates eg play a youtube video. Then enable audio capture, and simply never
read data back from the server. This can easily make QEMU's VNC server send
buffer consume 100MB of RAM per second, until the OOM killer starts reaping
processes (hopefully the rogue QEMU process, but it might pick others...).
To address this we make the throttling more intelligent, so we can throttle
when audio capture is active too. To determine how to throttle incremental
updates or audio data, we calculate a size threshold. Normally the threshold is
the approximate number of bytes associated with a single complete framebuffer
update. ie width * height * bytes per pixel. We'll send incremental updates
until we hit this threshold, at which point we'll stop sending updates until
data has been written to the wire, causing the output buffer offset to fall
back below the threshold.
If audio capture is enabled, we increase the size of the threshold to also
allow for upto 1 seconds worth of audio data samples. ie nchannels * bytes
per sample * frequency. This allows the output buffer to have a mixture of
incremental framebuffer updates and audio data queued, but once the threshold
is exceeded, audio data will be dropped and incremental updates will be
throttled.
This unbounded memory growth affects all VNC server configurations supported by
QEMU, with no workaround possible. The mitigating factor is that it can only be
triggered by a client that has authenticated with the VNC server, and who is
able to trigger a large quantity of framebuffer updates or audio samples from
the guest OS. Mostly they'll just succeed in getting the OOM killer to kill
their own QEMU process, but its possible other processes can get taken out as
collateral damage.
This is a more general variant of the similar unbounded memory usage flaw in
the websockets server, that was previously assigned CVE-2017-15268, and fixed
in 2.11 by:
commit a7b20a8efa
Author: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Mon Oct 9 14:43:42 2017 +0100
io: monitor encoutput buffer size from websocket GSource
This new general memory usage flaw has been assigned CVE-2017-15124, and is
partially fixed by this patch.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20171218191228.31018-10-berrange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
The logic for determining if it is possible to send an update to the client
will become more complicated shortly, so pull it out into a separate method
for easier extension later.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20171218191228.31018-9-berrange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
According to the RFB protocol, a client sends one or more framebuffer update
requests to the server. The server can reply with a single framebuffer update
response, that covers all previously received requests. Once the client has
read this update from the server, it may send further framebuffer update
requests to monitor future changes. The client is free to delay sending the
framebuffer update request if it needs to throttle the amount of data it is
reading from the server.
The QEMU VNC server, however, has never correctly handled the framebuffer
update requests. Once QEMU has received an update request, it will continue to
send client updates forever, even if the client hasn't asked for further
updates. This prevents the client from throttling back data it gets from the
server. This change fixes the flawed logic such that after a set of updates are
sent out, QEMU waits for a further update request before sending more data.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20171218191228.31018-8-berrange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Currently the VNC servers tracks whether a client has requested an incremental
or forced update with two boolean flags. There are only really 3 distinct
states to track, so create an enum to more accurately reflect permitted states.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20171218191228.31018-7-berrange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
The vnc_update_client() method checks the 'has_dirty' flag to see if there are
dirty regions that are pending to send to the client. Regardless of this flag,
if a forced update is requested, updates must be sent. For unknown reasons
though, the code also tries to sent updates if audio capture is enabled. This
makes no sense as audio capture state does not impact framebuffer contents, so
this check is removed.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20171218191228.31018-5-berrange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Now that previous dead / unreachable code has been removed, we can simplify
the indentation in the vnc_client_update method.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20171218191228.31018-4-berrange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
A previous commit:
commit 5a8be0f73d
Author: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Date: Wed Jul 13 12:21:20 2016 +0200
vnc: make sure we finish disconnect
Added a check for vs->disconnecting at the very start of the
vnc_update_client method. This means that the very next "if"
statement check for !vs->disconnecting always evaluates true,
and is thus redundant. This in turn means the vs->disconnecting
check at the very end of the method never evaluates true, and
is thus unreachable code.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20171218191228.31018-3-berrange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
There is only one caller of vnc_update_client and that always passes false
for the 'sync' parameter.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20171218191228.31018-2-berrange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Also set saved handle to zero when removing without adding a new watch.
Signed-off-by: Brandon Carpenter <brandon.carpenter@cypherpath.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Trace anything related to authentication in the VNC protocol
handshake
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20170921121528.23935-3-berrange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Trace anything which opens/closes/wraps a QIOChannel in the
VNC server.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20170921121528.23935-2-berrange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
I used the clang-tidy qemu-round check to generate the fix:
https://github.com/elmarco/clang-tools-extra
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
I used the clang-tidy qemu-round check to generate the fix:
https://github.com/elmarco/clang-tools-extra
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Extract the (correct) cleaning code as a new function vnc_free_addresses() then
use it to remove the memory leaks.
Reported-by: Clang Static Analyzer
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
The current VNC default keyboard delay is 1ms. With that we're constantly
typing faster than the guest receives keyboard events from an XHCI attached
USB HID device.
The default keyboard delay time in the input layer however is 10ms. I don't know
how that number came to be, but empirical tests on some OpenQA driven ARM
systems show that 10ms really is a reasonable default number for the delay.
This patch moves the VNC delay also to 10ms. That way our default is much
safer (good!) and also consistent with the input layer default (also good!).
Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-id: 1499863425-103133-1-git-send-email-agraf@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Looks like #include "hw/qdev.h" is not needed here, so remove it.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Message-id: 1497894617-12143-1-git-send-email-thuth@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
ctpopl() has a better implementation than hweight_long() and ui/vnc.c
being the last user of hweight_long(), we can simply remove it.
Signed-off-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Message-id: 1489415605-13105-1-git-send-email-clg@kaod.org
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
This patch refactors ui/input.c to support absolute axis
minimum values other than 0. All dependent calls to qemu_input_queue_abs
have been updated to explicitly supply 0 as the axis minimum value.
Signed-off-by: Philippe Voinov <philippevoinov@gmail.com>
Message-id: 20170505133952.29885-1-philippevoinov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
SocketAddressLegacy is a simple union, and simple unions are awkward:
they have their variant members wrapped in a "data" object on the
wire, and require additional indirections in C. SocketAddress is the
equivalent flat union. Convert all users of SocketAddressLegacy to
SocketAddress, except for existing external interfaces.
See also commit fce5d53..9445673 and 85a82e8..c5f1ae3.
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <1493192202-3184-7-git-send-email-armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
[Minor editing accident fixed, commit message and a comment tweaked]
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
The next commit will rename SocketAddressFlat to SocketAddress, and
the commit after that will replace most uses of SocketAddressLegacy by
SocketAddress, replacing most of this commit's renames right back.
Note that checkpatch emits a few "line over 80 characters" warnings.
The long lines are all temporary; the SocketAddressLegacy replacement
will shorten them again.
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <1493192202-3184-5-git-send-email-armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
We have quite a few switches over SocketAddressKind. Some have case
labels for all enumeration values, others rely on a default label.
Some abort when the value isn't a valid SocketAddressKind, others
report an error then.
Unify as follows. Always provide case labels for all enumeration
values, to clarify intent. Abort when the value isn't a valid
SocketAddressKind, because the program state is messed up then.
Improve a few error messages while there.
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Message-id: 1490895797-29094-4-git-send-email-armbru@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Certain features make sense only with certain address families. For
instance, passing file descriptors requires AF_UNIX. Testing
SocketAddress's saddr->type == SOCKET_ADDRESS_KIND_UNIX is obvious,
but problematic: it can't recognize AF_UNIX when type ==
SOCKET_ADDRESS_KIND_FD.
Mark such tests of saddr->type TODO. We may want to check the address
family with getsockname() there.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-id: 1490895797-29094-2-git-send-email-armbru@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
vnc server in reverse mode (qemu -vnc localhost:$nr,reverse) interprets
$nr as display number (i.e. with 5900 offset) in recent qemu versions.
Historical and documented behavior is interpreting $nr as port number
though. So we should bring code and documentation in line.
Given that default listening port for viewers is 5500 the 5900 offset is
pretty inconvinient, because it is simply impossible to connect to port
5500. So, lets fix the code not the docs.
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-id: 1489480018-11443-1-git-send-email-kraxel@redhat.com
There is a special code path (dpy_gfx_copy) to allow graphic emulation
notify user interface code about bitblit operations carryed out by
guests. It is supported by cirrus and vnc server. The intended purpose
is to optimize display scrolls and just send over the scroll op instead
of a full display update.
This is rarely used these days though because modern guests simply don't
use the cirrus blitter any more. Any linux guest using the cirrus drm
driver doesn't. Any windows guest newer than winxp doesn't ship with a
cirrus driver any more and thus uses the cirrus as simple framebuffer.
So this code tends to bitrot and bugs can go unnoticed for a long time.
See for example commit "3e10c3e vnc: fix qemu crash because of SIGSEGV"
which fixes a bug lingering in the code for almost a year, added by
commit "c7628bf vnc: only alloc server surface with clients connected".
Also the vnc server will throttle the frame rate in case it figures the
network can't keep up (send buffers are full). This doesn't work with
dpy_gfx_copy, for any copy operation sent to the vnc client we have to
send all outstanding updates beforehand, otherwise the vnc client might
run the client side blit on outdated data and thereby corrupt the
display. So this dpy_gfx_copy "optimization" might even make things
worse on slow network links.
Lets kill it once for all.
Oh, and one more reason: Turns out (after writing the patch) we have a
security bug in that code path ...
Fixes: CVE-2016-9603
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Message-id: 1489494419-14340-1-git-send-email-kraxel@redhat.com
This change allows the listen address and websocket address
options for -vnc to be repeated. This causes the VNC server
to listen on multiple addresses. e.g.
$ $QEMU -vnc vnc=localhost:1,vnc=unix:/tmp/vnc,\
websocket=127.0.0.1:8080,websocket=[::]:8081
results in listening on
127.0.0.1:5901, 127.0.0.1:8080, ::1:5901, :::8081 & /tmp/vnc
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-id: 20170203120649.15637-9-berrange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
