Commit Graph

5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Paolo Bonzini
43b6d7ee1f meson: use have_vhost_* variables to pick sources
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-05-07 07:46:58 +02:00
Paolo Bonzini
7544060ef3 meson, configure: move libgio test to meson
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2022-04-28 08:52:22 +02:00
Sean Christopherson
c6c0232000 hostmem: Add hostmem-epc as a backend for SGX EPC
EPC (Enclave Page Cahe) is a specialized type of memory used by Intel
SGX (Software Guard Extensions).  The SDM desribes EPC as:

    The Enclave Page Cache (EPC) is the secure storage used to store
    enclave pages when they are a part of an executing enclave. For an
    EPC page, hardware performs additional access control checks to
    restrict access to the page. After the current page access checks
    and translations are performed, the hardware checks that the EPC
    page is accessible to the program currently executing. Generally an
    EPC page is only accessed by the owner of the executing enclave or
    an instruction which is setting up an EPC page.

Because of its unique requirements, Linux manages EPC separately from
normal memory.  Similar to memfd, the device /dev/sgx_vepc can be
opened to obtain a file descriptor which can in turn be used to mmap()
EPC memory.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210719112136.57018-3-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2021-09-30 14:50:19 +02:00
David Gibson
f91f9f254b confidential guest support: Introduce new confidential guest support class
Several architectures have mechanisms which are designed to protect
guest memory from interference or eavesdropping by a compromised
hypervisor.  AMD SEV does this with in-chip memory encryption and
Intel's TDX can do similar things.  POWER's Protected Execution
Framework (PEF) accomplishes a similar goal using an ultravisor and
new memory protection features, instead of encryption.

To (partially) unify handling for these, this introduces a new
ConfidentialGuestSupport QOM base class.  "Confidential" is kind of vague,
but "confidential computing" seems to be the buzzword about these schemes,
and "secure" or "protected" are often used in connection to unrelated
things (such as hypervisor-from-guest or guest-from-guest security).

The "support" in the name is significant because in at least some of the
cases it requires the guest to take specific actions in order to protect
itself from hypervisor eavesdropping.

Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
2021-02-08 16:57:37 +11:00
Marc-André Lureau
ab3180515c meson: convert backends directory to Meson
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2020-08-21 06:30:23 -04:00