Commit Graph

1400 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Kevin Wolf
8885eadedd qcow2: Put cache reference in error case
When qcow2_get_cluster_offset() sees a zero cluster in a version 2
image, it (rightfully) returns an error. But in doing so it shouldn't
leak an L2 table cache reference.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
2014-04-04 17:10:08 +02:00
Kevin Wolf
4c2e5f8f46 qcow2: Flush metadata during read-only reopen
If lazy refcounts are enabled for a backing file, committing to this
backing file may leave it in a dirty state even if the commit succeeds.
The reason is that the bdrv_flush() call in bdrv_commit() doesn't flush
refcount updates with lazy refcounts enabled, and qcow2_reopen_prepare()
doesn't take care to flush metadata.

In order to fix this, this patch also fixes qcow2_mark_clean(), which
contains another ineffective bdrv_flush() call beause lazy refcounts are
disabled only afterwards. All existing callers of qcow2_mark_clean()
either don't modify refcounts or already flush manually, so that this
fixes only a latent, but not yet actually triggerable bug.

Another instance of the same problem is live snapshots. Again, a real
corruption is prevented by an explicit flush for non-read-only images in
external_snapshot_prepare(), but images using lazy refcounts stay dirty.

Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-04 14:12:26 +02:00
Fam Zheng
cbee81f6de iscsi: Don't set error if already set in iscsi_do_inquiry
This eliminates the possible assertion failure in error_setg().

Signed-off-by: Fam Zheng <famz@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
2014-04-04 14:11:34 +02:00
Peter Maydell
784a5592c9 Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/bonzini/scsi-next' into staging
* remotes/bonzini/scsi-next:
  iscsi: always query max WRITE SAME length
  iscsi: ignore flushes on scsi-generic devices
  iscsi: recognize "invalid field" ASCQ from WRITE SAME command
  scsi-bus: remove bogus assertion

Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
2014-04-03 12:24:35 +01:00
Paolo Bonzini
c97ca29db0 iscsi: always query max WRITE SAME length
Max WRITE SAME length is also used when the UNMAP bit is zero, so it
should be queried even if LBPWS=0.  Same for the optimal transfer
length.

However, the write_zeroes_alignment only matters for UNMAP=1 so we
still restrict it to LBPWS=1.

Reviewed-by: Peter Lieven <pl@kamp.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2014-04-03 13:10:53 +02:00
Paolo Bonzini
b2f9c08a4f iscsi: ignore flushes on scsi-generic devices
Non-block SCSI devices do not support flushing, but we may still send
them requests via bdrv_flush_all.  Just ignore them.

Reviewed-by: Peter Lieven <pl@kamp.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2014-04-03 13:10:45 +02:00
Paolo Bonzini
27898a5daa iscsi: recognize "invalid field" ASCQ from WRITE SAME command
Some targets may return "invalid field" as the ASCQ from WRITE SAME
if they support the command only without the UNMAP field.  Recognize
that, and return ENOTSUP just like for "invalid operation code".

Reviewed-by: Peter Lieven <pl@kamp.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2014-04-03 13:10:32 +02:00
Stefan Hajnoczi
c792707f54 qcow2: link all L2 meta updates in preallocate()
preallocate() only links the first QCowL2Meta's data clusters into the
L2 table and ignores any chained QCowL2Metas in the linked list.

Chains of QCowL2Meta structs are built up when contiguous clusters span
L2 tables.  Each QCowL2Meta describes one L2 table update.  This is a
rare case in preallocate() but can happen.

This patch fixes preallocate() by iterating over the whole list of
QCowL2Metas.  Compare with the qcow2_co_writev() function's
implementation, which is similar but also also handles request
dependencies.  preallocate() only performs one allocation at a time so
there can be no dependencies.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 15:22:35 +02:00
Kevin Wolf
9302e863aa parallels: Sanity check for s->tracks (CVE-2014-0142)
This avoids a possible division by zero.

Convert s->tracks to unsigned as well because it feels better than
surviving just because the results of calculations with s->tracks are
converted to unsigned anyway.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 15:22:35 +02:00
Kevin Wolf
afbcc40bee parallels: Fix catalog size integer overflow (CVE-2014-0143)
The first test case would cause a huge memory allocation, leading to a
qemu abort; the second one to a too small malloc() for the catalog
(smaller than s->catalog_size), which causes a read-only out-of-bounds
array access and on big endian hosts an endianess conversion for an
undefined memory area.

The sample image used here is not an original Parallels image. It was
created using an hexeditor on the basis of the struct that qemu uses.
Good enough for trying to crash the driver, but not for ensuring
compatibility.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 15:22:35 +02:00
Kevin Wolf
5dae6e30c5 qcow2: Limit snapshot table size
Even with a limit of 64k snapshots, each snapshot could have a filename
and an ID with up to 64k, which would still lead to pretty large
allocations, which could potentially lead to qemu aborting. Limit the
total size of the snapshot table to an average of 1k per entry when
the limit of 64k snapshots is fully used. This should be plenty for any
reasonable user.

This also fixes potential integer overflows of s->snapshot_size.

Suggested-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 15:22:35 +02:00
Kevin Wolf
6a83f8b5be qcow2: Check maximum L1 size in qcow2_snapshot_load_tmp() (CVE-2014-0143)
This avoids an unbounded allocation.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 15:22:35 +02:00
Kevin Wolf
c05e4667be qcow2: Fix L1 allocation size in qcow2_snapshot_load_tmp() (CVE-2014-0145)
For the L1 table to loaded for an internal snapshot, the code allocated
only enough memory to hold the currently active L1 table. If the
snapshot's L1 table is actually larger than the current one, this leads
to a buffer overflow.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 15:22:35 +02:00
Kevin Wolf
11b128f406 qcow2: Fix NULL dereference in qcow2_open() error path (CVE-2014-0146)
The qcow2 code assumes that s->snapshots is non-NULL if s->nb_snapshots
!= 0. By having the initialisation of both fields separated in
qcow2_open(), any error occuring in between would cause the error path
to dereference NULL in qcow2_free_snapshots() if the image had any
snapshots.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 15:22:35 +02:00
Kevin Wolf
6b7d4c5558 qcow2: Fix copy_sectors() with VM state
bs->total_sectors is not the highest possible sector number that could
be involved in a copy on write operation: VM state is after the end of
the virtual disk. This resulted in wrong values for the number of
sectors to be copied (n).

The code that checks for the end of the image isn't required any more
because the code hasn't been calling the block layer's bdrv_read() for a
long time; instead, it directly calls qcow2_readv(), which doesn't error
out on VM state sector numbers.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 15:22:35 +02:00
Stefan Hajnoczi
f0dce23475 dmg: prevent chunk buffer overflow (CVE-2014-0145)
Both compressed and uncompressed I/O is buffered.  dmg_open() calculates
the maximum buffer size needed from the metadata in the image file.

There is currently a buffer overflow since ->lengths[] is accounted
against the maximum compressed buffer size but actually uses the
uncompressed buffer:

  switch (s->types[chunk]) {
  case 1: /* copy */
      ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, s->offsets[chunk],
                       s->uncompressed_chunk, s->lengths[chunk]);

We must account against the maximum uncompressed buffer size for type=1
chunks.

This patch fixes the maximum buffer size calculation to take into
account the chunk type.  It is critical that we update the correct
maximum since there are two buffers ->compressed_chunk and
->uncompressed_chunk.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 15:22:35 +02:00
Stefan Hajnoczi
686d7148ec dmg: use uint64_t consistently for sectors and lengths
The DMG metadata is stored as uint64_t, so use the same type for
sector_num.  int was a particularly poor choice since it is only 32-bit
and would truncate large values.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 15:22:35 +02:00
Stefan Hajnoczi
c165f77580 dmg: sanitize chunk length and sectorcount (CVE-2014-0145)
Chunk length and sectorcount are used for decompression buffers as well
as the bdrv_pread() count argument.  Ensure that they have reasonable
values so neither memory allocation nor conversion from uint64_t to int
will cause problems.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 15:22:35 +02:00
Stefan Hajnoczi
eb71803b04 dmg: use appropriate types when reading chunks
Use the right types instead of signed int:

  size_t new_size;

  This is a byte count for g_realloc() that is calculated from uint32_t
  and size_t values.

  uint32_t chunk_count;

  Use the same type as s->n_chunks, which is used together with
  chunk_count.

This patch is a cleanup and does not fix bugs.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 15:22:35 +02:00
Stefan Hajnoczi
b404bf8542 dmg: drop broken bdrv_pread() loop
It is not necessary to check errno for EINTR and the block layer does
not produce short reads.  Therefore we can drop the loop that attempts
to read a compressed chunk.

The loop is buggy because it incorrectly adds the transferred bytes
twice:

  do {
      ret = bdrv_pread(...);
      i += ret;
  } while (ret >= 0 && ret + i < s->lengths[chunk]);

Luckily we can drop the loop completely and perform a single
bdrv_pread().

Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 15:22:35 +02:00
Stefan Hajnoczi
73ed27ec28 dmg: prevent out-of-bounds array access on terminator
When a terminator is reached the base for offsets and sectors is stored.
The following records that are processed will use this base value.

If the first record we encounter is a terminator, then calculating the
base values would result in out-of-bounds array accesses.  Don't do
that.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 15:22:35 +02:00
Stefan Hajnoczi
2c1885adcf dmg: coding style and indentation cleanup
Clean up the mix of tabs and spaces, as well as the coding style
violations in block/dmg.c.  There are no semantic changes since this
patch simply reformats the code.

This patch is necessary before we can make meaningful changes to this
file, due to the inconsistent formatting and confusing indentation.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 15:22:35 +02:00
Kevin Wolf
cab60de930 qcow2: Fix new L1 table size check (CVE-2014-0143)
The size in bytes is assigned to an int later, so check that instead of
the number of entries.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 15:22:35 +02:00
Kevin Wolf
0abe740f1d qcow2: Protect against some integer overflows in bdrv_check
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 15:22:35 +02:00
Kevin Wolf
bb572aefbd qcow2: Fix types in qcow2_alloc_clusters and alloc_clusters_noref
In order to avoid integer overflows.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 15:22:34 +02:00
Kevin Wolf
2b5d5953ee qcow2: Check new refcount table size on growth
If the size becomes larger than what qcow2_open() would accept, fail the
growing operation.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 15:22:34 +02:00
Kevin Wolf
db8a31d11d qcow2: Avoid integer overflow in get_refcount (CVE-2014-0143)
This ensures that the checks catch all invalid cluster indexes
instead of returning the refcount of a wrong cluster.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 15:22:34 +02:00
Kevin Wolf
b106ad9185 qcow2: Don't rely on free_cluster_index in alloc_refcount_block() (CVE-2014-0147)
free_cluster_index is only correct if update_refcount() was called from
an allocation function, and even there it's brittle because it's used to
protect unfinished allocations which still have a refcount of 0 - if it
moves in the wrong place, the unfinished allocation can be corrupted.

So not using it any more seems to be a good idea. Instead, use the
first requested cluster to do the calculations. Return -EAGAIN if
unfinished allocations could become invalid and let the caller restart
its search for some free clusters.

The context of creating a snapsnot is one situation where
update_refcount() is called outside of a cluster allocation. For this
case, the change fixes a buffer overflow if a cluster is referenced in
an L2 table that cannot be represented by an existing refcount block.
(new_table[refcount_table_index] was out of bounds)

[Bump the qemu-iotests 026 refblock_alloc.write leak count from 10 to
11.
--Stefan]

Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 15:21:03 +02:00
Kevin Wolf
6d33e8e7dc qcow2: Fix backing file name length check
len could become negative and would pass the check then. Nothing bad
happened because bdrv_pread() happens to return an error for negative
length values, but make variables for sizes unsigned anyway.

This patch also changes the behaviour to error out on invalid lengths
instead of silently truncating it to 1023.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 14:19:09 +02:00
Kevin Wolf
2d51c32c4b qcow2: Validate active L1 table offset and size (CVE-2014-0144)
This avoids an unbounded allocation.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 14:19:09 +02:00
Kevin Wolf
ce48f2f441 qcow2: Validate snapshot table offset/size (CVE-2014-0144)
This avoid unbounded memory allocation and fixes a potential buffer
overflow on 32 bit hosts.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 14:19:09 +02:00
Kevin Wolf
8c7de28305 qcow2: Validate refcount table offset
The end of the refcount table must not exceed INT64_MAX so that integer
overflows are avoided.

Also check for misaligned refcount table. Such images are invalid and
probably the result of data corruption. Error out to avoid further
corruption.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 14:19:09 +02:00
Kevin Wolf
5dab2faddc qcow2: Check refcount table size (CVE-2014-0144)
Limit the in-memory reference count table size to 8 MB, it's enough in
practice. This fixes an unbounded allocation as well as a buffer
overflow in qcow2_refcount_init().

Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 14:19:09 +02:00
Kevin Wolf
a1b3955c94 qcow2: Check backing_file_offset (CVE-2014-0144)
Header, header extension and the backing file name must all be stored in
the first cluster. Setting the backing file to a much higher value
allowed header extensions to become much bigger than we want them to be
(unbounded allocation).

Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 14:19:09 +02:00
Kevin Wolf
24342f2cae qcow2: Check header_length (CVE-2014-0144)
This fixes an unbounded allocation for s->unknown_header_fields.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 14:19:09 +02:00
Fam Zheng
6d4b9e55fc curl: check data size before memcpy to local buffer. (CVE-2014-0144)
curl_read_cb is callback function for libcurl when data arrives. The
data size passed in here is not guaranteed to be within the range of
request we submitted, so we may overflow the guest IO buffer. Check the
real size we have before memcpy to buffer to avoid overflow.

Signed-off-by: Fam Zheng <famz@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 14:19:09 +02:00
Jeff Cody
1d7678dec4 vhdx: Bounds checking for block_size and logical_sector_size (CVE-2014-0148)
Other variables (e.g. sectors_per_block) are calculated using these
variables, and if not range-checked illegal values could be obtained
causing infinite loops and other potential issues when calculating
BAT entries.

The 1.00 VHDX spec requires BlockSize to be min 1MB, max 256MB.
LogicalSectorSize is required to be either 512 or 4096 bytes.

Reported-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Cody <jcody@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 14:19:09 +02:00
Jeff Cody
63fa06dc97 vdi: add bounds checks for blocks_in_image and disk_size header fields (CVE-2014-0144)
The maximum blocks_in_image is 0xffffffff / 4, which also limits the
maximum disk_size for a VDI image to 1024TB.  Note that this is the maximum
size that QEMU will currently support with this driver, not necessarily the
maximum size allowed by the image format.

This also fixes an incorrect error message, a bug introduced by commit
5b7aa9b56d (Reported by Stefan Weil)

Signed-off-by: Jeff Cody <jcody@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 14:06:31 +02:00
Kevin Wolf
5e71dfad76 vpc: Validate block size (CVE-2014-0142)
This fixes some cases of division by zero crashes.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 13:59:47 +02:00
Jeff Cody
97f1c45c6f vpc/vhd: add bounds check for max_table_entries and block_size (CVE-2014-0144)
This adds checks to make sure that max_table_entries and block_size
are in sane ranges.  Memory is allocated based on max_table_entries,
and block_size is used to calculate indices into that allocated
memory, so if these values are incorrect that can lead to potential
unbounded memory allocation, or invalid memory accesses.

Also, the allocation of the pagetable is changed from g_malloc0()
to qemu_blockalign().

Signed-off-by: Jeff Cody <jcody@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 13:59:47 +02:00
Kevin Wolf
a9ba36a45d bochs: Fix bitmap offset calculation
32 bit truncation could let us access the wrong offset in the image.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 13:59:47 +02:00
Kevin Wolf
8e53abbc20 bochs: Check extent_size header field (CVE-2014-0142)
This fixes two possible division by zero crashes: In bochs_open() and in
seek_to_sector().

Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 13:59:47 +02:00
Kevin Wolf
e3737b820b bochs: Check catalog_size header field (CVE-2014-0143)
It should neither become negative nor allow unbounded memory
allocations. This fixes aborts in g_malloc() and an s->catalog_bitmap
buffer overflow on big endian hosts.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 13:59:47 +02:00
Kevin Wolf
246f65838d bochs: Use unsigned variables for offsets and sizes (CVE-2014-0147)
Gets us rid of integer overflows resulting in negative sizes which
aren't correctly checked.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 13:59:47 +02:00
Kevin Wolf
3dd8a6763b bochs: Unify header structs and make them QEMU_PACKED
This is an on-disk structure, so offsets must be accurate.

Before this patch, sizeof(bochs) != sizeof(header_v1), which makes the
memcpy() between both invalid. We're lucky enough that the destination
buffer happened to be the larger one, and the memcpy size to be taken
from the smaller one, so we didn't get a buffer overflow in practice.

This patch unifies the both structures, eliminating the need to do a
memcpy in the first place. The common fields are extracted to the top
level of the struct and the actually differing part gets a union of the
two versions.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 13:59:47 +02:00
Stefan Hajnoczi
42d43d35d9 block/cloop: fix offsets[] size off-by-one
cloop stores the number of compressed blocks in the n_blocks header
field.  The file actually contains n_blocks + 1 offsets, where the extra
offset is the end-of-file offset.

The following line in cloop_read_block() results in an out-of-bounds
offsets[] access:

    uint32_t bytes = s->offsets[block_num + 1] - s->offsets[block_num];

This patch allocates and loads the extra offset so that
cloop_read_block() works correctly when the last block is accessed.

Notice that we must free s->offsets[] unconditionally now since there is
always an end-of-file offset.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 13:59:47 +02:00
Stefan Hajnoczi
f56b9bc3ae block/cloop: refuse images with bogus offsets (CVE-2014-0144)
The offsets[] array allows efficient seeking and tells us the maximum
compressed data size.  If the offsets are bogus the maximum compressed
data size will be unrealistic.

This could cause g_malloc() to abort and bogus offsets mean the image is
broken anyway.  Therefore we should refuse such images.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 13:59:47 +02:00
Stefan Hajnoczi
7b103b36d6 block/cloop: refuse images with huge offsets arrays (CVE-2014-0144)
Limit offsets_size to 512 MB so that:

1. g_malloc() does not abort due to an unreasonable size argument.

2. offsets_size does not overflow the bdrv_pread() int size argument.

This limit imposes a maximum image size of 16 TB at 256 KB block size.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 13:59:47 +02:00
Stefan Hajnoczi
509a41bab5 block/cloop: prevent offsets_size integer overflow (CVE-2014-0143)
The following integer overflow in offsets_size can lead to out-of-bounds
memory stores when n_blocks has a huge value:

    uint32_t n_blocks, offsets_size;
    [...]
    ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, 128 + 4, &s->n_blocks, 4);
    [...]
    s->n_blocks = be32_to_cpu(s->n_blocks);

    /* read offsets */
    offsets_size = s->n_blocks * sizeof(uint64_t);
    s->offsets = g_malloc(offsets_size);

    [...]

    for(i=0;i<s->n_blocks;i++) {
        s->offsets[i] = be64_to_cpu(s->offsets[i]);

offsets_size can be smaller than n_blocks due to integer overflow.
Therefore s->offsets[] is too small when the for loop byteswaps offsets.

This patch refuses to open files if offsets_size would overflow.

Note that changing the type of offsets_size is not a fix since 32-bit
hosts still only have 32-bit size_t.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 13:59:47 +02:00
Stefan Hajnoczi
d65f97a82c block/cloop: validate block_size header field (CVE-2014-0144)
Avoid unbounded s->uncompressed_block memory allocation by checking that
the block_size header field has a reasonable value.  Also enforce the
assumption that the value is a non-zero multiple of 512.

These constraints conform to cloop 2.639's code so we accept existing
image files.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2014-04-01 13:59:47 +02:00