Our gitlab-CI just showed a failed test_ppc_mac99 since it was apparently
killed some few seconds before the test finished. Allow it some more
time to complete.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Wainer dos Santos Moschetta <wainersm@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Dovgalyuk <pavel.dovgalyuk@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210127065222.48650-1-thuth@redhat.com>
At least some s390 cpu models support "Protected Virtualization" (PV),
a mechanism to protect guests from eavesdropping by a compromised
hypervisor.
This is similar in function to other mechanisms like AMD's SEV and
POWER's PEF, which are controlled by the "confidential-guest-support"
machine option. s390 is a slightly special case, because we already
supported PV, simply by using a CPU model with the required feature
(S390_FEAT_UNPACK).
To integrate this with the option used by other platforms, we
implement the following compromise:
- When the confidential-guest-support option is set, s390 will
recognize it, verify that the CPU can support PV (failing if not)
and set virtio default options necessary for encrypted or protected
guests, as on other platforms. i.e. if confidential-guest-support
is set, we will either create a guest capable of entering PV mode,
or fail outright.
- If confidential-guest-support is not set, guests might still be
able to enter PV mode, if the CPU has the right model. This may be
a little surprising, but shouldn't actually be harmful.
To start a guest supporting Protected Virtualization using the new
option use the command line arguments:
-object s390-pv-guest,id=pv0 -machine confidential-guest-support=pv0
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Tested-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
The default behaviour for virtio devices is not to use the platforms normal
DMA paths, but instead to use the fact that it's running in a hypervisor
to directly access guest memory. That doesn't work if the guest's memory
is protected from hypervisor access, such as with AMD's SEV or POWER's PEF.
So, if a confidential guest mechanism is enabled, then apply the
iommu_platform=on option so it will go through normal DMA mechanisms.
Those will presumably have some way of marking memory as shared with
the hypervisor or hardware so that DMA will work.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
We haven't yet implemented the fairly involved handshaking that will be
needed to migrate PEF protected guests. For now, just use a migration
blocker so we get a meaningful error if someone attempts this (this is the
same approach used by AMD SEV).
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Some upcoming POWER machines have a system called PEF (Protected
Execution Facility) which uses a small ultravisor to allow guests to
run in a way that they can't be eavesdropped by the hypervisor. The
effect is roughly similar to AMD SEV, although the mechanisms are
quite different.
Most of the work of this is done between the guest, KVM and the
ultravisor, with little need for involvement by qemu. However qemu
does need to tell KVM to allow secure VMs.
Because the availability of secure mode is a guest visible difference
which depends on having the right hardware and firmware, we don't
enable this by default. In order to run a secure guest you need to
create a "pef-guest" object and set the confidential-guest-support
property to point to it.
Note that this just *allows* secure guests, the architecture of PEF is
such that the guest still needs to talk to the ultravisor to enter
secure mode. Qemu has no direct way of knowing if the guest is in
secure mode, and certainly can't know until well after machine
creation time.
To start a PEF-capable guest, use the command line options:
-object pef-guest,id=pef0 -machine confidential-guest-support=pef0
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Now that we've implemented a generic machine option for configuring various
confidential guest support mechanisms:
1. Update docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt to reference this rather than
the earlier SEV specific option
2. Add a docs/confidential-guest-support.txt to cover the generalities of
the confidential guest support scheme
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
While we've abstracted some (potential) differences between mechanisms for
securing guest memory, the initialization is still specific to SEV. Given
that, move it into x86's kvm_arch_init() code, rather than the generic
kvm_init() code.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
The platform specific details of mechanisms for implementing
confidential guest support may require setup at various points during
initialization. Thus, it's not really feasible to have a single cgs
initialization hook, but instead each mechanism needs its own
initialization calls in arch or machine specific code.
However, to make it harder to have a bug where a mechanism isn't
properly initialized under some circumstances, we want to have a
common place, late in boot, where we verify that cgs has been
initialized if it was requested.
This patch introduces a ready flag to the ConfidentialGuestSupport
base type to accomplish this, which we verify in
qemu_machine_creation_done().
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
This allows failures to be reported richly and idiomatically.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Currently the "memory-encryption" property is only looked at once we
get to kvm_init(). Although protection of guest memory from the
hypervisor isn't something that could really ever work with TCG, it's
not conceptually tied to the KVM accelerator.
In addition, the way the string property is resolved to an object is
almost identical to how a QOM link property is handled.
So, create a new "confidential-guest-support" link property which sets
this QOM interface link directly in the machine. For compatibility we
keep the "memory-encryption" property, but now implemented in terms of
the new property.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
When the "memory-encryption" property is set, we also disable KSM
merging for the guest, since it won't accomplish anything.
We want that, but doing it in the property set function itself is
thereoretically incorrect, in the unlikely event of some configuration
environment that set the property then cleared it again before
constructing the guest.
More importantly, it makes some other cleanups we want more difficult.
So, instead move this logic to machine_run_board_init() conditional on
the final value of the property.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
When AMD's SEV memory encryption is in use, flash memory banks (which are
initialed by pc_system_flash_map()) need to be encrypted with the guest's
key, so that the guest can read them.
That's abstracted via the kvm_memcrypt_encrypt_data() callback in the KVM
state.. except, that it doesn't really abstract much at all.
For starters, the only call site is in code specific to the 'pc'
family of machine types, so it's obviously specific to those and to
x86 to begin with. But it makes a bunch of further assumptions that
need not be true about an arbitrary confidential guest system based on
memory encryption, let alone one based on other mechanisms:
* it assumes that the flash memory is defined to be encrypted with the
guest key, rather than being shared with hypervisor
* it assumes that that hypervisor has some mechanism to encrypt data into
the guest, even though it can't decrypt it out, since that's the whole
point
* the interface assumes that this encrypt can be done in place, which
implies that the hypervisor can write into a confidential guests's
memory, even if what it writes isn't meaningful
So really, this "abstraction" is actually pretty specific to the way SEV
works. So, this patch removes it and instead has the PC flash
initialization code call into a SEV specific callback.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Several architectures have mechanisms which are designed to protect
guest memory from interference or eavesdropping by a compromised
hypervisor. AMD SEV does this with in-chip memory encryption and
Intel's TDX can do similar things. POWER's Protected Execution
Framework (PEF) accomplishes a similar goal using an ultravisor and
new memory protection features, instead of encryption.
To (partially) unify handling for these, this introduces a new
ConfidentialGuestSupport QOM base class. "Confidential" is kind of vague,
but "confidential computing" seems to be the buzzword about these schemes,
and "secure" or "protected" are often used in connection to unrelated
things (such as hypervisor-from-guest or guest-from-guest security).
The "support" in the name is significant because in at least some of the
cases it requires the guest to take specific actions in order to protect
itself from hypervisor eavesdropping.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Global properties have an @optional field, which allows to apply a given
property to a given type even if one of its subclasses doesn't support
it. This is especially used in the compat code when dealing with the
"disable-modern" and "disable-legacy" properties and the "virtio-pci"
type.
Allow object_register_sugar_prop() to set this field as well.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Message-Id: <159738953558.377274.16617742952571083440.stgit@bahia.lan>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Rewrite the existing VMSTATE_FIFO8 macro to use VMSTATE_FIFO8_TEST as per the
standard pattern in include/migration/vmstate.h.
Signed-off-by: Mark Cave-Ayland <mark.cave-ayland@ilande.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210128221728.14887-3-mark.cave-ayland@ilande.co.uk>
Developer errors are better represented with assert() rather than abort(). Also
improve the strictness of the checks by using range checks within the assert()
rather than converting the existing equality checks to inequality checks.
Signed-off-by: Mark Cave-Ayland <mark.cave-ayland@ilande.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Fontana <cfontana@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210121102518.20112-1-mark.cave-ayland@ilande.co.uk>
add a new optional interface to CPUClass, which allows accelerators
to extend the CPUClass with additional accelerator-specific
initializations.
This will allow to separate the target cpu code that is specific
to each accelerator, and register it automatically with object
hierarchy lookup depending on accelerator code availability,
as part of the accel_init_interfaces() initialization step.
Signed-off-by: Claudio Fontana <cfontana@suse.de>
Message-Id: <20210204163931.7358-19-cfontana@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
This will allow us to centralize the registration of
the cpus.c module accelerator operations (in accel/accel-softmmu.c),
and trigger it automatically using object hierarchy lookup from the
new accel_init_interfaces() initialization step, depending just on
which accelerators are available in the code.
Rename all tcg-cpus.c, kvm-cpus.c, etc to tcg-accel-ops.c,
kvm-accel-ops.c, etc, matching the object type names.
Signed-off-by: Claudio Fontana <cfontana@suse.de>
Message-Id: <20210204163931.7358-18-cfontana@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
we cannot in principle make the TCG Operations field definitions
conditional on CONFIG_TCG in code that is included by both common_ss
and specific_ss modules.
Therefore, what we can do safely to restrict the TCG fields to TCG-only
builds, is to move all tcg cpu operations into a separate header file,
which is only included by TCG, target-specific code.
This leaves just a NULL pointer in the cpu.h for the non-TCG builds.
This also tidies up the code in all targets a bit, having all TCG cpu
operations neatly contained by a dedicated data struct.
Signed-off-by: Claudio Fontana <cfontana@suse.de>
Message-Id: <20210204163931.7358-16-cfontana@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
commit 568496c0c0 ("cpu: Add callback to check architectural") and
commit 3826121d92 ("target-arm: Implement checking of fired")
introduced an ARM-specific hack for cpu_check_watchpoint.
Make debug_check_watchpoint optional, and move it to tcg_ops.
Signed-off-by: Claudio Fontana <cfontana@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210204163931.7358-15-cfontana@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
commit 4061200059 ("arm: Correctly handle watchpoints for BE32 CPUs")
introduced this ARM-specific, TCG-specific hack to adjust the address,
before checking it with cpu_check_watchpoint.
Make adjust_watchpoint_address optional and move it to tcg_ops.
Signed-off-by: Claudio Fontana <cfontana@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210204163931.7358-14-cfontana@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
make it consistently SOFTMMU-only.
Signed-off-by: Claudio Fontana <cfontana@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
[claudio: make the field presence in cpu.h unconditional, removing the ifdefs]
Message-Id: <20210204163931.7358-12-cfontana@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Claudio Fontana <cfontana@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
[claudio: wrap target code around CONFIG_TCG and !CONFIG_USER_ONLY]
avoiding its use in headers used by common_ss code (should be poisoned).
Note: need to be careful with the use of CONFIG_USER_ONLY,
Message-Id: <20210204163931.7358-11-cfontana@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
cc->do_interrupt is in theory a TCG callback used in accel/tcg only,
to prepare the emulated architecture to take an interrupt as defined
in the hardware specifications,
but in reality the _do_interrupt style of functions in targets are
also occasionally reused by KVM to prepare the architecture state in a
similar way where userspace code has identified that it needs to
deliver an exception to the guest.
In the case of ARM, that includes:
1) the vcpu thread got a SIGBUS indicating a memory error,
and we need to deliver a Synchronous External Abort to the guest to
let it know about the error.
2) the kernel told us about a debug exception (breakpoint, watchpoint)
but it is not for one of QEMU's own gdbstub breakpoints/watchpoints
so it must be a breakpoint the guest itself has set up, therefore
we need to deliver it to the guest.
So in order to reuse code, the same arm_do_interrupt function is used.
This is all fine, but we need to avoid calling it using the callback
registered in CPUClass, since that one is now TCG-only.
Fortunately this is easily solved by replacing calls to
CPUClass::do_interrupt() with explicit calls to arm_do_interrupt().
Signed-off-by: Claudio Fontana <cfontana@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210204163931.7358-9-cfontana@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
move away TCG-only code, make it compile only on TCG.
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
[claudio: moved the prototypes from hw/core/cpu.h to exec/cpu-all.h]
Signed-off-by: Claudio Fontana <cfontana@suse.de>
Message-Id: <20210204163931.7358-4-cfontana@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
for now only TCG is allowed as an accelerator for riscv,
so remove the CONFIG_TCG use.
Signed-off-by: Claudio Fontana <cfontana@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210204163931.7358-3-cfontana@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
The TCG-specific CPU methods will be moved to a separate struct,
to make it easier to move accel-specific code outside generic CPU
code in the future. Start by moving tcg_initialize().
The new CPUClass.tcg_opts field may eventually become a pointer,
but keep it an embedded struct for now, to make code conversion
easier.
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
[claudio: move TCGCpuOperations inside include/hw/core/cpu.h]
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210204163931.7358-2-cfontana@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Restrict all operands to registers. All constants will be forced
into registers by the middle-end. Removing the difference in how
immediate integers were encoded will allow more code to be shared
between 32-bit and 64-bit operations.
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
This was removed from tcg_target_reg_alloc_order and
tcg_target_call_iarg_regs on the assumption that it
was the stack. This was incorrectly copied from i386.
For tci, the stack is R15.
By adding R4 back to tcg_target_call_iarg_regs, adjust the other
entries so that 6 (or 12) entries are still present in the array,
and adjust the numbers in the interpreter.
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
As noted in several comments, 8 regs is not enough for 32-bit
to perform calls, as currently implemented. Shortly, we will
rearrange the encoding which will make 32 regs impossible.
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Trivially implemented like other arithmetic.
Tested via check-tcg and the ppc64 target.
Tested-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
We do not simultaneously support div and div2 -- it's one
or the other. TCI is already using div, so remove div2.
Tested-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Three TODO instances are never happen cases.
Other uses of tcg_abort are also indicating unreachable cases.
Tested-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Weil <sw@weilnetz.de>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
The existing check was incomplete:
(1) Only applied to two of the 7 stores, and not to the loads at all.
(2) Only checked the upper, but not the lower bound of the stack.
Doing this at compile time means that we don't need to do it
at runtime as well.
Tested-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Eliminating a TODO for ld16s_i64.
Tested-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Eliminating a TODO for ld16u_i32.
Tested-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
