x-remote-machine object sets up various subsystems of the remote
device process. Instantiate PCI host bridge object and initialize RAM, IO &
PCI memory regions.
Signed-off-by: John G Johnson <john.g.johnson@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jagannathan Raman <jag.raman@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Elena Ufimtseva <elena.ufimtseva@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Message-id: c537f38d17f90453ca610c6b70cf3480274e0ba1.1611938319.git.jag.raman@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
PCI host bridge is setup for the remote device process. It is
implemented using remote-pcihost object. It is an extension of the PCI
host bridge setup by QEMU.
Remote-pcihost configures a PCI bus which could be used by the remote
PCI device to latch on to.
Signed-off-by: Jagannathan Raman <jag.raman@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: John G Johnson <john.g.johnson@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Elena Ufimtseva <elena.ufimtseva@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Message-id: 0871ba857abb2eafacde07e7fe66a3f12415bfb2.1611938319.git.jag.raman@oracle.com
[Added PCI_EXPRESS condition in hw/remote/Kconfig since remote-pcihost
needs PCIe. This solves "make check" failure on s390x. Fix suggested by
Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com> and Thomas Huth
<thuth@redhat.com>.
--Stefan]
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Allow RAM MemoryRegion to be created from an offset in a file, instead
of allocating at offset of 0 by default. This is needed to synchronize
RAM between QEMU & remote process.
Signed-off-by: Jagannathan Raman <jag.raman@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: John G Johnson <john.g.johnson@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Elena Ufimtseva <elena.ufimtseva@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Message-id: 609996697ad8617e3b01df38accc5c208c24d74e.1611938319.git.jag.raman@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
With the new CMB logic in place, bump the implemented specification
version to v1.4 by default.
This requires adding the setting the CNTRLTYPE field and modifying the
VWC field since 0x00 is no longer a valid value for bits 2:1.
Reviewed-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Klaus Jensen <k.jensen@samsung.com>
Implement v1.4 logic for configuring the Controller Memory Buffer. By
default, the v1.4 scheme will be used (CMB must be explicitly enabled by
the host), so drivers that only support v1.3 will not be able to use the
CMB anymore.
To retain the v1.3 behavior, set the boolean 'legacy-cmb' nvme device
parameter.
Reviewed-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Minwoo Im <minwoo.im.dev@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Padmakar Kalghatgi <p.kalghatgi@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Klaus Jensen <k.jensen@samsung.com>
Use the correct field names.
Reviewed-by: Minwoo Im <minwoo.im.dev@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Klaus Jensen <k.jensen@samsung.com>
This patch sets CMBS bit in controller capabilities register when user
configures NVMe driver with CMB support, so capabilites are correctly
reported to guest OS.
Signed-off-by: Andrzej Jakowski <andrzej.jakowski@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsky@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Minwoo Im <minwoo.im.dev@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Klaus Jensen <k.jensen@samsung.com>
During smart critical warning injection by setting property from QMP
command, also try to trigger asynchronous event.
Suggested by Keith, if a event has already been raised, there is no
need to enqueue the duplicate event any more.
Signed-off-by: zhenwei pi <pizhenwei@bytedance.com>
[k.jensen: fix typo in commit message]
Signed-off-by: Klaus Jensen <k.jensen@samsung.com>
There is a very low probability that hitting physical NVMe disk
hardware critical warning case, it's hard to write & test a monitor
agent service.
For debugging purposes, add a new 'smart_critical_warning' property
to emulate this situation.
The orignal version of this change is implemented by adding a fixed
property which could be initialized by QEMU command line. Suggested
by Philippe & Klaus, rework like current version.
Test with this patch:
1, change smart_critical_warning property for a running VM:
#virsh qemu-monitor-command nvme-upstream '{ "execute": "qom-set",
"arguments": { "path": "/machine/peripheral-anon/device[0]",
"property": "smart_critical_warning", "value":16 } }'
2, run smartctl in guest
#smartctl -H -l error /dev/nvme0n1
=== START OF SMART DATA SECTION ===
SMART overall-health self-assessment test result: FAILED!
- volatile memory backup device has failed
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: zhenwei pi <pizhenwei@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Klaus Jensen <k.jensen@samsung.com>
According to NVM Express v1.4, Section 5.14.1.2 ("SMART / Health
Information"), introduce bit 5 for "Persistent Memory Region has become
read-only or unreliable".
Signed-off-by: zhenwei pi <pizhenwei@bytedance.com>
[k.jensen: minor brush ups in commit message]
Signed-off-by: Klaus Jensen <k.jensen@samsung.com>
Align with existing style and use a typedef for header-file enums.
Signed-off-by: Klaus Jensen <k.jensen@samsung.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Fomichev <dmitry.fomichev@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Fomichev <dmitry.fomichev@wdc.com>
Define values and structures that are needed to support Zoned
Namespace Command Set (NVMe TP 4053).
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Fomichev <dmitry.fomichev@wdc.com>
Acked-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Klaus Jensen <k.jensen@samsung.com>
Many CNS commands have "allocated" command variants. These include
a namespace as long as it is allocated, that is a namespace is
included regardless if it is active (attached) or not.
While these commands are optional (they are mandatory for controllers
supporting the namespace attachment command), our QEMU implementation
is more complete by actually providing support for these CNS values.
However, since our QEMU model currently does not support the namespace
attachment command, these new allocated CNS commands will return the
same result as the active CNS command variants.
The reason for not hooking up this command completely is because the
NVMe specification requires the namespace management command to be
supported if the namespace attachment command is supported.
Signed-off-by: Niklas Cassel <niklas.cassel@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Fomichev <dmitry.fomichev@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Klaus Jensen <k.jensen@samsung.com>
Define the structures and constants required to implement
Namespace Types support.
Namespace Types introduce a new command set, "I/O Command Sets",
that allows the host to retrieve the command sets associated with
a namespace. Introduce support for the command set and enable
detection for the NVM Command Set.
The new workflows for identify commands rely heavily on zero-filled
identify structs. E.g., certain CNS commands are defined to return
a zero-filled identify struct when an inactive namespace NSID
is supplied.
Add a helper function in order to avoid code duplication when
reporting zero-filled identify structures.
Signed-off-by: Niklas Cassel <niklas.cassel@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Fomichev <dmitry.fomichev@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Klaus Jensen <k.jensen@samsung.com>
This log page becomes necessary to implement to allow checking for
Zone Append command support in Zoned Namespace Command Set.
This commit adds the code to report this log page for NVM Command
Set only. The parts that are specific to zoned operation will be
added later in the series.
All incoming admin and i/o commands are now only processed if their
corresponding support bits are set in this log. This provides an
easy way to control what commands to support and what not to
depending on set CC.CSS.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Fomichev <dmitry.fomichev@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Niklas Cassel <Niklas.Cassel@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Klaus Jensen <k.jensen@samsung.com>
v2
Dropped vmstate: Fix memory leak in vmstate_handle_alloc
Broke on Power
Added migration: only check page size match if RAM postcopy is enabled
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Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/dgilbert/tags/pull-migration-20210208a' into staging
Migration pull 2021-02-08
v2
Dropped vmstate: Fix memory leak in vmstate_handle_alloc
Broke on Power
Added migration: only check page size match if RAM postcopy is enabled
# gpg: Signature made Mon 08 Feb 2021 11:28:14 GMT
# gpg: using RSA key 45F5C71B4A0CB7FB977A9FA90516331EBC5BFDE7
# gpg: Good signature from "Dr. David Alan Gilbert (RH2) <dgilbert@redhat.com>" [full]
# Primary key fingerprint: 45F5 C71B 4A0C B7FB 977A 9FA9 0516 331E BC5B FDE7
* remotes/dgilbert/tags/pull-migration-20210208a: (27 commits)
migration: only check page size match if RAM postcopy is enabled
migration: introduce snapshot-{save, load, delete} QMP commands
iotests: fix loading of common.config from tests/ subdir
iotests: add support for capturing and matching QMP events
migration: introduce a delete_snapshot wrapper
migration: wire up support for snapshot device selection
migration: control whether snapshots are ovewritten
block: rename and alter bdrv_all_find_snapshot semantics
block: allow specifying name of block device for vmstate storage
block: add ability to specify list of blockdevs during snapshot
migration: stop returning errno from load_snapshot()
migration: Make save_snapshot() return bool, not 0/-1
block: push error reporting into bdrv_all_*_snapshot functions
migration: Display the migration blockers
migration: Add blocker information
migration: Fix a few absurdly defective error messages
migration: Fix cache_init()'s "Failed to allocate" error messages
migration: Clean up signed vs. unsigned XBZRLE cache-size
migration: Fix migrate-set-parameters argument validation
migration: introduce 'userfaultfd-wrlat.py' script
...
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
This adds the NPWG, NPWA, NPDG, NPDA and NOWS family of fields to the
shared nvme.h header for use by later patches.
Signed-off-by: Klaus Jensen <k.jensen@samsung.com>
Cc: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Cc: Fam Zheng <fam@euphon.net>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Minwoo Im <minwoo.im.dev@gmail.com>
Add support for reporting the Deallocated or Unwritten Logical Block
Error (DULBE).
Rely on the block status flags reported by the block layer and consider
any block with the BDRV_BLOCK_ZERO flag to be deallocated.
Multiple factors affect when a Write Zeroes command result in
deallocation of blocks.
* the underlying file system block size
* the blockdev format
* the 'discard' and 'logical_block_size' parameters
format | discard | wz (512B) wz (4KiB) wz (64KiB)
-----------------------------------------------------
qcow2 ignore n n y
qcow2 unmap n n y
raw ignore n y y
raw unmap n y y
So, this works best with an image in raw format and 4KiB LBAs, since
holes can then be punched on a per-block basis (this assumes a file
system with a 4kb block size, YMMV). A qcow2 image, uses a cluster size
of 64KiB by default and blocks will only be marked deallocated if a full
cluster is zeroed or discarded. However, this *is* consistent with the
spec since Write Zeroes "should" deallocate the block if the Deallocate
attribute is set and "may" deallocate if the Deallocate attribute is not
set. Thus, we always try to deallocate (the BDRV_REQ_MAY_UNMAP flag is
always set).
Signed-off-by: Klaus Jensen <k.jensen@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Add 'initialized' field and use it to avoid touching event notifiers which are
either not initialized or if their initialization failed.
This is somewhat a hack, but it seems the less intrusive way to make
virtio code deal with event notifiers that failed initialization.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20201217150040.906961-4-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
We passed an is_write flag to the fuzz_dma_read_cb function to
differentiate between the mapped DMA regions that need to be populated
with fuzzed data, and those that don't. We simply passed through the
address_space_map is_write parameter. The goal was to cut down on
unnecessarily populating mapped DMA regions, when they are not read
from.
Unfortunately, nothing precludes code from reading from regions mapped
with is_write=true. For example, see:
https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2021-01/msg04729.html
This patch removes the is_write parameter to fuzz_dma_read_cb. As a
result, we will fill all mapped DMA regions with fuzzed data, ignoring
the specified transfer direction.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Message-Id: <20210120060255.558535-1-alxndr@bu.edu>
Make snapshot deletion consistent with the snapshot save
and load commands by using a wrapper around the blockdev
layer. The main difference is that we get upfront validation
of the passed in device list (if any).
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210204124834.774401-10-berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Modify load_snapshot/save_snapshot to accept the device list and vmstate
node name parameters previously added to the block layer.
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210204124834.774401-9-berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
The traditional HMP "savevm" command will overwrite an existing snapshot
if it already exists with the requested name. This new flag allows this
to be controlled allowing for safer behaviour with a future QMP command.
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210204124834.774401-8-berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Currently bdrv_all_find_snapshot() will return 0 if it finds
a snapshot, -1 if an error occurs, or if it fails to find a
snapshot. New callers to be added want to distinguish between
the error scenario and failing to find a snapshot.
Rename it to bdrv_all_has_snapshot and make it return -1 on
error, 0 if no snapshot is found and 1 if snapshot is found.
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210204124834.774401-7-berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Currently the vmstate will be stored in the first block device that
supports snapshots. Historically this would have usually been the
root device, but with UEFI it might be the variable store. There
needs to be a way to override the choice of block device to store
the state in.
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210204124834.774401-6-berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
When running snapshot operations, there are various rules for which
blockdevs are included/excluded. While this provides reasonable default
behaviour, there are scenarios that are not well handled by the default
logic. Some of the conditions do not have a single correct answer.
Thus there needs to be a way for the mgmt app to provide an explicit
list of blockdevs to perform snapshots across. This can be achieved
by passing a list of node names that should be used.
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210204124834.774401-5-berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
None of the callers care about the errno value since there is a full
Error object populated. This gives consistency with save_snapshot()
which already just returns a boolean value.
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
[PMD: Return false/true instead of -1/0, document function]
Acked-by: Pavel Dovgalyuk <pavel.dovgalyuk@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210204124834.774401-4-berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Just for consistency, following the example documented since
commit e3fe3988d7 ("error: Document Error API usage rules"),
return a boolean value indicating an error is set or not.
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Dovgalyuk <pavel.dovgalyuk@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210204124834.774401-3-berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
The bdrv_all_*_snapshot functions return a BlockDriverState pointer
for the invalid backend, which the callers then use to report an
error message. In some cases multiple callers are reporting the
same error message, but with slightly different text. In the future
there will be more error scenarios for some of these methods, which
will benefit from fine grained error message reporting. So it is
helpful to push error reporting down a level.
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
[PMD: Initialize variables]
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210204124834.774401-2-berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
In this particular implementation the same single migration
thread is responsible for both normal linear dirty page
migration and procesing UFFD page fault events.
Processing write faults includes reading UFFD file descriptor,
finding respective RAM block and saving faulting page to
the migration stream. After page has been saved, write protection
can be removed. Since asynchronous version of qemu_put_buffer()
is expected to be used to save pages, we also have to flush
migraion stream prior to un-protecting saved memory range.
Write protection is being removed for any previously protected
memory chunk that has hit the migration stream. That's valid
for pages from linear page scan along with write fault pages.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Gruzdev <andrey.gruzdev@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210129101407.103458-4-andrey.gruzdev@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
fixup pagefault.address cast for 32bit
Glue code to the userfaultfd kernel implementation.
Querying feature support, createing file descriptor, feature control,
memory region registration, IOCTLs on registered registered regions.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Gruzdev <andrey.gruzdev@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210129101407.103458-3-andrey.gruzdev@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Fixed up range.start casting for 32bit
A number of hardware platforms are implementing mechanisms whereby the
hypervisor does not have unfettered access to guest memory, in order
to mitigate the security impact of a compromised hypervisor.
AMD's SEV implements this with in-cpu memory encryption, and Intel has
its own memory encryption mechanism. POWER has an upcoming mechanism
to accomplish this in a different way, using a new memory protection
level plus a small trusted ultravisor. s390 also has a protected
execution environment.
The current code (committed or draft) for these features has each
platform's version configured entirely differently. That doesn't seem
ideal for users, or particularly for management layers.
AMD SEV introduces a notionally generic machine option
"machine-encryption", but it doesn't actually cover any cases other
than SEV.
This series is a proposal to at least partially unify configuration
for these mechanisms, by renaming and generalizing AMD's
"memory-encryption" property. It is replaced by a
"confidential-guest-support" property pointing to a platform specific
object which configures and manages the specific details.
Note to Ram Pai: the documentation I've included for PEF is very
minimal. If you could send a patch expanding on that, it would be
very helpful.
Changes since v8:
* Rebase
* Fixed some cosmetic typos
Changes since v7:
* Tweaked and clarified meaning of the 'ready' flag
* Polished the interface to the PEF internals
* Shifted initialization for s390 PV later (I hope I've finally got
this after apply_cpu_model() where it needs to be)
Changes since v6:
* Moved to using OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE and OBJECT_DEFINE_TYPE macros
* Assorted minor fixes
Changes since v5:
* Renamed from "securable guest memory" to "confidential guest
support"
* Simpler reworking of x86 boot time flash encryption
* Added a bunch of documentation
* Fixed some compile errors on POWER
Changes since v4:
* Renamed from "host trust limitation" to "securable guest memory",
which I think is marginally more descriptive
* Re-organized initialization, because the previous model called at
kvm_init didn't work for s390
* Assorted fixes to the s390 implementation; rudimentary testing
(gitlab CI) only
Changes since v3:
* Rebased
* Added first cut at handling of s390 protected virtualization
Changes since RFCv2:
* Rebased
* Removed preliminary SEV cleanups (they've been merged)
* Changed name to "host trust limitation"
* Added migration blocker to the PEF code (based on SEV's version)
Changes since RFCv1:
* Rebased
* Fixed some errors pointed out by Dave Gilbert
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Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/dg-gitlab/tags/cgs-pull-request' into staging
Generalize memory encryption models
A number of hardware platforms are implementing mechanisms whereby the
hypervisor does not have unfettered access to guest memory, in order
to mitigate the security impact of a compromised hypervisor.
AMD's SEV implements this with in-cpu memory encryption, and Intel has
its own memory encryption mechanism. POWER has an upcoming mechanism
to accomplish this in a different way, using a new memory protection
level plus a small trusted ultravisor. s390 also has a protected
execution environment.
The current code (committed or draft) for these features has each
platform's version configured entirely differently. That doesn't seem
ideal for users, or particularly for management layers.
AMD SEV introduces a notionally generic machine option
"machine-encryption", but it doesn't actually cover any cases other
than SEV.
This series is a proposal to at least partially unify configuration
for these mechanisms, by renaming and generalizing AMD's
"memory-encryption" property. It is replaced by a
"confidential-guest-support" property pointing to a platform specific
object which configures and manages the specific details.
Note to Ram Pai: the documentation I've included for PEF is very
minimal. If you could send a patch expanding on that, it would be
very helpful.
Changes since v8:
* Rebase
* Fixed some cosmetic typos
Changes since v7:
* Tweaked and clarified meaning of the 'ready' flag
* Polished the interface to the PEF internals
* Shifted initialization for s390 PV later (I hope I've finally got
this after apply_cpu_model() where it needs to be)
Changes since v6:
* Moved to using OBJECT_DECLARE_TYPE and OBJECT_DEFINE_TYPE macros
* Assorted minor fixes
Changes since v5:
* Renamed from "securable guest memory" to "confidential guest
support"
* Simpler reworking of x86 boot time flash encryption
* Added a bunch of documentation
* Fixed some compile errors on POWER
Changes since v4:
* Renamed from "host trust limitation" to "securable guest memory",
which I think is marginally more descriptive
* Re-organized initialization, because the previous model called at
kvm_init didn't work for s390
* Assorted fixes to the s390 implementation; rudimentary testing
(gitlab CI) only
Changes since v3:
* Rebased
* Added first cut at handling of s390 protected virtualization
Changes since RFCv2:
* Rebased
* Removed preliminary SEV cleanups (they've been merged)
* Changed name to "host trust limitation"
* Added migration blocker to the PEF code (based on SEV's version)
Changes since RFCv1:
* Rebased
* Fixed some errors pointed out by Dave Gilbert
# gpg: Signature made Mon 08 Feb 2021 06:07:27 GMT
# gpg: using RSA key 75F46586AE61A66CC44E87DC6C38CACA20D9B392
# gpg: Good signature from "David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>" [full]
# gpg: aka "David Gibson (Red Hat) <dgibson@redhat.com>" [full]
# gpg: aka "David Gibson (ozlabs.org) <dgibson@ozlabs.org>" [full]
# gpg: aka "David Gibson (kernel.org) <dwg@kernel.org>" [unknown]
# Primary key fingerprint: 75F4 6586 AE61 A66C C44E 87DC 6C38 CACA 20D9 B392
* remotes/dg-gitlab/tags/cgs-pull-request:
s390: Recognize confidential-guest-support option
confidential guest support: Alter virtio default properties for protected guests
spapr: PEF: prevent migration
spapr: Add PEF based confidential guest support
confidential guest support: Update documentation
confidential guest support: Move SEV initialization into arch specific code
confidential guest support: Introduce cgs "ready" flag
sev: Add Error ** to sev_kvm_init()
confidential guest support: Rework the "memory-encryption" property
confidential guest support: Move side effect out of machine_set_memory_encryption()
sev: Remove false abstraction of flash encryption
confidential guest support: Introduce new confidential guest support class
qom: Allow optional sugar props
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
At least some s390 cpu models support "Protected Virtualization" (PV),
a mechanism to protect guests from eavesdropping by a compromised
hypervisor.
This is similar in function to other mechanisms like AMD's SEV and
POWER's PEF, which are controlled by the "confidential-guest-support"
machine option. s390 is a slightly special case, because we already
supported PV, simply by using a CPU model with the required feature
(S390_FEAT_UNPACK).
To integrate this with the option used by other platforms, we
implement the following compromise:
- When the confidential-guest-support option is set, s390 will
recognize it, verify that the CPU can support PV (failing if not)
and set virtio default options necessary for encrypted or protected
guests, as on other platforms. i.e. if confidential-guest-support
is set, we will either create a guest capable of entering PV mode,
or fail outright.
- If confidential-guest-support is not set, guests might still be
able to enter PV mode, if the CPU has the right model. This may be
a little surprising, but shouldn't actually be harmful.
To start a guest supporting Protected Virtualization using the new
option use the command line arguments:
-object s390-pv-guest,id=pv0 -machine confidential-guest-support=pv0
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Tested-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Some upcoming POWER machines have a system called PEF (Protected
Execution Facility) which uses a small ultravisor to allow guests to
run in a way that they can't be eavesdropped by the hypervisor. The
effect is roughly similar to AMD SEV, although the mechanisms are
quite different.
Most of the work of this is done between the guest, KVM and the
ultravisor, with little need for involvement by qemu. However qemu
does need to tell KVM to allow secure VMs.
Because the availability of secure mode is a guest visible difference
which depends on having the right hardware and firmware, we don't
enable this by default. In order to run a secure guest you need to
create a "pef-guest" object and set the confidential-guest-support
property to point to it.
Note that this just *allows* secure guests, the architecture of PEF is
such that the guest still needs to talk to the ultravisor to enter
secure mode. Qemu has no direct way of knowing if the guest is in
secure mode, and certainly can't know until well after machine
creation time.
To start a PEF-capable guest, use the command line options:
-object pef-guest,id=pef0 -machine confidential-guest-support=pef0
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
The platform specific details of mechanisms for implementing
confidential guest support may require setup at various points during
initialization. Thus, it's not really feasible to have a single cgs
initialization hook, but instead each mechanism needs its own
initialization calls in arch or machine specific code.
However, to make it harder to have a bug where a mechanism isn't
properly initialized under some circumstances, we want to have a
common place, late in boot, where we verify that cgs has been
initialized if it was requested.
This patch introduces a ready flag to the ConfidentialGuestSupport
base type to accomplish this, which we verify in
qemu_machine_creation_done().
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
This allows failures to be reported richly and idiomatically.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Currently the "memory-encryption" property is only looked at once we
get to kvm_init(). Although protection of guest memory from the
hypervisor isn't something that could really ever work with TCG, it's
not conceptually tied to the KVM accelerator.
In addition, the way the string property is resolved to an object is
almost identical to how a QOM link property is handled.
So, create a new "confidential-guest-support" link property which sets
this QOM interface link directly in the machine. For compatibility we
keep the "memory-encryption" property, but now implemented in terms of
the new property.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
When AMD's SEV memory encryption is in use, flash memory banks (which are
initialed by pc_system_flash_map()) need to be encrypted with the guest's
key, so that the guest can read them.
That's abstracted via the kvm_memcrypt_encrypt_data() callback in the KVM
state.. except, that it doesn't really abstract much at all.
For starters, the only call site is in code specific to the 'pc'
family of machine types, so it's obviously specific to those and to
x86 to begin with. But it makes a bunch of further assumptions that
need not be true about an arbitrary confidential guest system based on
memory encryption, let alone one based on other mechanisms:
* it assumes that the flash memory is defined to be encrypted with the
guest key, rather than being shared with hypervisor
* it assumes that that hypervisor has some mechanism to encrypt data into
the guest, even though it can't decrypt it out, since that's the whole
point
* the interface assumes that this encrypt can be done in place, which
implies that the hypervisor can write into a confidential guests's
memory, even if what it writes isn't meaningful
So really, this "abstraction" is actually pretty specific to the way SEV
works. So, this patch removes it and instead has the PC flash
initialization code call into a SEV specific callback.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Several architectures have mechanisms which are designed to protect
guest memory from interference or eavesdropping by a compromised
hypervisor. AMD SEV does this with in-chip memory encryption and
Intel's TDX can do similar things. POWER's Protected Execution
Framework (PEF) accomplishes a similar goal using an ultravisor and
new memory protection features, instead of encryption.
To (partially) unify handling for these, this introduces a new
ConfidentialGuestSupport QOM base class. "Confidential" is kind of vague,
but "confidential computing" seems to be the buzzword about these schemes,
and "secure" or "protected" are often used in connection to unrelated
things (such as hypervisor-from-guest or guest-from-guest security).
The "support" in the name is significant because in at least some of the
cases it requires the guest to take specific actions in order to protect
itself from hypervisor eavesdropping.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Global properties have an @optional field, which allows to apply a given
property to a given type even if one of its subclasses doesn't support
it. This is especially used in the compat code when dealing with the
"disable-modern" and "disable-legacy" properties and the "virtio-pci"
type.
Allow object_register_sugar_prop() to set this field as well.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Message-Id: <159738953558.377274.16617742952571083440.stgit@bahia.lan>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Rewrite the existing VMSTATE_FIFO8 macro to use VMSTATE_FIFO8_TEST as per the
standard pattern in include/migration/vmstate.h.
Signed-off-by: Mark Cave-Ayland <mark.cave-ayland@ilande.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210128221728.14887-3-mark.cave-ayland@ilande.co.uk>
add a new optional interface to CPUClass, which allows accelerators
to extend the CPUClass with additional accelerator-specific
initializations.
This will allow to separate the target cpu code that is specific
to each accelerator, and register it automatically with object
hierarchy lookup depending on accelerator code availability,
as part of the accel_init_interfaces() initialization step.
Signed-off-by: Claudio Fontana <cfontana@suse.de>
Message-Id: <20210204163931.7358-19-cfontana@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
This will allow us to centralize the registration of
the cpus.c module accelerator operations (in accel/accel-softmmu.c),
and trigger it automatically using object hierarchy lookup from the
new accel_init_interfaces() initialization step, depending just on
which accelerators are available in the code.
Rename all tcg-cpus.c, kvm-cpus.c, etc to tcg-accel-ops.c,
kvm-accel-ops.c, etc, matching the object type names.
Signed-off-by: Claudio Fontana <cfontana@suse.de>
Message-Id: <20210204163931.7358-18-cfontana@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
we cannot in principle make the TCG Operations field definitions
conditional on CONFIG_TCG in code that is included by both common_ss
and specific_ss modules.
Therefore, what we can do safely to restrict the TCG fields to TCG-only
builds, is to move all tcg cpu operations into a separate header file,
which is only included by TCG, target-specific code.
This leaves just a NULL pointer in the cpu.h for the non-TCG builds.
This also tidies up the code in all targets a bit, having all TCG cpu
operations neatly contained by a dedicated data struct.
Signed-off-by: Claudio Fontana <cfontana@suse.de>
Message-Id: <20210204163931.7358-16-cfontana@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
commit 568496c0c0 ("cpu: Add callback to check architectural") and
commit 3826121d92 ("target-arm: Implement checking of fired")
introduced an ARM-specific hack for cpu_check_watchpoint.
Make debug_check_watchpoint optional, and move it to tcg_ops.
Signed-off-by: Claudio Fontana <cfontana@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210204163931.7358-15-cfontana@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
commit 4061200059 ("arm: Correctly handle watchpoints for BE32 CPUs")
introduced this ARM-specific, TCG-specific hack to adjust the address,
before checking it with cpu_check_watchpoint.
Make adjust_watchpoint_address optional and move it to tcg_ops.
Signed-off-by: Claudio Fontana <cfontana@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20210204163931.7358-14-cfontana@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
make it consistently SOFTMMU-only.
Signed-off-by: Claudio Fontana <cfontana@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
[claudio: make the field presence in cpu.h unconditional, removing the ifdefs]
Message-Id: <20210204163931.7358-12-cfontana@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
