Commit Graph

17 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Markus Armbruster
54d31236b9 sysemu: Split sysemu/runstate.h off sysemu/sysemu.h
sysemu/sysemu.h is a rather unfocused dumping ground for stuff related
to the system-emulator.  Evidence:

* It's included widely: in my "build everything" tree, changing
  sysemu/sysemu.h still triggers a recompile of some 1100 out of 6600
  objects (not counting tests and objects that don't depend on
  qemu/osdep.h, down from 5400 due to the previous two commits).

* It pulls in more than a dozen additional headers.

Split stuff related to run state management into its own header
sysemu/runstate.h.

Touching sysemu/sysemu.h now recompiles some 850 objects.  qemu/uuid.h
also drops from 1100 to 850, and qapi/qapi-types-run-state.h from 4400
to 4200.  Touching new sysemu/runstate.h recompiles some 500 objects.

Since I'm touching MAINTAINERS to add sysemu/runstate.h anyway, also
add qemu/main-loop.h.

Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190812052359.30071-30-armbru@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
[Unbreak OS-X build]
2019-08-16 13:37:36 +02:00
Jiri Slaby
d4b976c0a8 target/i386: sev: fix failed message typos
In these multiline messages, there were typos. Fix them -- add a missing
space and remove a superfluous apostrophe.

Inspired by Tom's patch.

Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Cc: qemu-trivial@nongnu.org
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <20190719104118.17735-1-jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-07-19 23:45:28 +02:00
Alex Williamson
56e2ec9488 target/i386: sev: Do not unpin ram device memory region
The commit referenced below skipped pinning ram device memory when
ram blocks are added, we need to do the same when they're removed.

Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Fixes: cedc0ad539 ("target/i386: sev: Do not pin the ram device memory region")
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <156320087103.2556.10983987500488190423.stgit@gimli.home>
Reviewed-by: Singh, Brijesh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-07-15 20:58:37 +02:00
Markus Armbruster
0b8fa32f55 Include qemu/module.h where needed, drop it from qemu-common.h
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190523143508.25387-4-armbru@redhat.com>
[Rebased with conflicts resolved automatically, except for
hw/usb/dev-hub.c hw/misc/exynos4210_rng.c hw/misc/bcm2835_rng.c
hw/misc/aspeed_scu.c hw/display/virtio-vga.c hw/arm/stm32f205_soc.c;
ui/cocoa.m fixed up]
2019-06-12 13:18:33 +02:00
Singh, Brijesh
cedc0ad539 target/i386: sev: Do not pin the ram device memory region
The RAM device presents a memory region that should be handled
as an IO region and should not be pinned.

In the case of the vfio-pci, RAM device represents a MMIO BAR
and the memory region is not backed by pages hence
KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION fails to lock the memory range.

Fixes: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1667249
Cc: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Message-Id: <20190204222322.26766-3-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2019-03-18 09:39:57 +01:00
Markus Armbruster
b7d89466dd Clean up includes
Clean up includes so that osdep.h is included first and headers
which it implies are not included manually.

This commit was created with scripts/clean-includes, with the changes
to the following files manually reverted:

    contrib/libvhost-user/libvhost-user-glib.h
    contrib/libvhost-user/libvhost-user.c
    contrib/libvhost-user/libvhost-user.h
    linux-user/mips64/cpu_loop.c
    linux-user/mips64/signal.c
    linux-user/sparc64/cpu_loop.c
    linux-user/sparc64/signal.c
    linux-user/x86_64/cpu_loop.c
    linux-user/x86_64/signal.c
    target/s390x/gen-features.c
    tests/migration/s390x/a-b-bios.c
    tests/test-rcu-simpleq.c
    tests/test-rcu-tailq.c

Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20181204172535.2799-1-armbru@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Yuval Shaia <yuval.shaia@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Viktor Prutyanov <viktor.prutyanov@phystech.edu>
2018-12-20 10:29:08 +01:00
Paolo Bonzini
bf3175b499 target/i386: sev: fix memory leaks
Reported by Coverity.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2018-05-09 00:13:39 +02:00
Greg Kurz
5d7bc72a43 sev/i386: fix memory leak in sev_guest_init()
The string returned by object_property_get_str() is dynamically allocated.

Fixes: d8575c6c02
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Message-Id: <152231462116.69730.14119625999092384450.stgit@bahia.lan>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
2018-04-02 23:05:26 -03:00
Brijesh Singh
9f75079498 sev/i386: add sev_get_capabilities()
The function can be used to get the current SEV capabilities.
The capabilities include platform diffie-hellman key (pdh) and certificate
chain. The key can be provided to the external entities which wants to
establish a trusted channel between SEV firmware and guest owner.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2018-03-13 17:36:06 +01:00
Brijesh Singh
8fa4466d77 sev/i386: add migration blocker
SEV guest migration is not implemented yet.

Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2018-03-13 17:36:05 +01:00
Brijesh Singh
5dd0df7e74 sev/i386: finalize the SEV guest launch flow
SEV launch flow requires us to issue LAUNCH_FINISH command before guest
is ready to run.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2018-03-13 17:36:05 +01:00
Brijesh Singh
c6c89c976d sev/i386: add support to LAUNCH_MEASURE command
During machine creation we encrypted the guest bios image, the
LAUNCH_MEASURE command can be used to retrieve the measurement of
the encrypted memory region. This measurement is a signature of
the memory contents that can be sent to the guest owner as an
attestation that the memory was encrypted correctly by the firmware.
VM management tools like libvirt can query the measurement using
query-sev-launch-measure QMP command.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2018-03-13 17:36:05 +01:00
Brijesh Singh
b738d6300d sev/i386: add command to encrypt guest memory region
The KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command is used to encrypt a guest memory
region using the VM Encryption Key created using LAUNCH_START.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2018-03-13 17:36:00 +01:00
Brijesh Singh
620fd55c24 sev/i386: add command to create launch memory encryption context
The KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START command creates a new VM encryption key (VEK).
The encryption key created with the command will be used for encrypting
the bootstrap images (such as guest bios).

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2018-03-13 17:35:59 +01:00
Brijesh Singh
2b308e4431 sev/i386: register the guest memory range which may contain encrypted data
When SEV is enabled, the hardware encryption engine uses a tweak such
that the two identical plaintext at different location will have a
different ciphertexts. So swapping or moving a ciphertexts of two guest
pages will not result in plaintexts being swapped. Hence relocating
a physical backing pages of the SEV guest will require some additional
steps in KVM driver. The KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_{UN,}REG_REGION ioctl can be
used to register/unregister the guest memory region which may contain the
encrypted data. KVM driver will internally handle the relocating physical
backing pages of registered memory regions.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2018-03-13 17:35:41 +01:00
Brijesh Singh
d8575c6c02 sev/i386: add command to initialize the memory encryption context
When memory encryption is enabled, KVM_SEV_INIT command is used to
initialize the platform. The command loads the SEV related persistent
data from non-volatile storage and initializes the platform context.
This command should be first issued before invoking any other guest
commands provided by the SEV firmware.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2018-03-13 17:35:16 +01:00
Brijesh Singh
a9b4942f48 target/i386: add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) object
Add a new memory encryption object 'sev-guest'. The object will be used
to create encrypted VMs on AMD EPYC CPU. The object provides the properties
to pass guest owner's public Diffie-hellman key, guest policy and session
information required to create the memory encryption context within the
SEV firmware.

e.g to launch SEV guest
 # $QEMU \
    -object sev-guest,id=sev0 \
    -machine ....,memory-encryption=sev0

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2018-03-13 12:04:03 +01:00