A HostIOMMUDevice is an abstraction for an assigned device that is protected
by a physical IOMMU (aka host IOMMU). The userspace interaction with this
physical IOMMU can be done either through the VFIO IOMMU type 1 legacy
backend or the new iommufd backend. The assigned device can be a VFIO device
or a VDPA device. The HostIOMMUDevice is needed to interact with the host
IOMMU that protects the assigned device. It is especially useful when the
device is also protected by a virtual IOMMU as this latter use the translation
services of the physical IOMMU and is constrained by it. In that context the
HostIOMMUDevice can be passed to the virtual IOMMU to collect physical IOMMU
capabilities such as the supported address width. In the future, the virtual
IOMMU will use the HostIOMMUDevice to program the guest page tables in the
first translation stage of the physical IOMMU.
Introduce .realize() to initialize HostIOMMUDevice further after instance init.
Suggested-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
This variable is about the host OS, not the target. It is used a lot
more since the Meson conversion, but the original sin dates back to 2003.
Time to fix it.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CONFIG_DARWIN, CONFIG_LINUX and CONFIG_BSD are used in some rules, but
only CONFIG_LINUX has substantial use. Convert them all to if...endif.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Introduce an iommufd object which allows the interaction
with the host /dev/iommu device.
The /dev/iommu can have been already pre-opened outside of qemu,
in which case the fd can be passed directly along with the
iommufd object:
This allows the iommufd object to be shared accross several
subsystems (VFIO, VDPA, ...). For example, libvirt would open
the /dev/iommu once.
If no fd is passed along with the iommufd object, the /dev/iommu
is opened by the qemu code.
Suggested-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Yi Liu <yi.l.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhenzhong Duan <zhenzhong.duan@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Nicolin Chen <nicolinc@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@redhat.com>
We use the user_ss[] array to hold the user emulation sources,
and the softmmu_ss[] array to hold the system emulation ones.
Hold the latter in the 'system_ss[]' array for parity with user
emulation.
Mechanical change doing:
$ sed -i -e s/softmmu_ss/system_ss/g $(git grep -l softmmu_ss)
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Message-Id: <20230613133347.82210-10-philmd@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Example of this command:
# virsh qemu-monitor-command vm --hmp info cryptodev
cryptodev1: service=[akcipher|mac|hash|cipher]
queue 0: type=builtin
cryptodev0: service=[akcipher]
queue 0: type=lkcf
Acked-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: zhenwei pi <pizhenwei@bytedance.com>
Message-Id: <20230301105847.253084-8-pizhenwei@bytedance.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
cryptodev: Added a new type of backend named lkcf-backend for
cryptodev. This backend upload asymmetric keys to linux kernel,
and let kernel do the accelerations if possible.
The lkcf stands for Linux Kernel Cryptography Framework.
Signed-off-by: lei he <helei.sig11@bytedance.com>
Message-Id: <20221008085030.70212-5-helei.sig11@bytedance.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
EPC (Enclave Page Cahe) is a specialized type of memory used by Intel
SGX (Software Guard Extensions). The SDM desribes EPC as:
The Enclave Page Cache (EPC) is the secure storage used to store
enclave pages when they are a part of an executing enclave. For an
EPC page, hardware performs additional access control checks to
restrict access to the page. After the current page access checks
and translations are performed, the hardware checks that the EPC
page is accessible to the program currently executing. Generally an
EPC page is only accessed by the owner of the executing enclave or
an instruction which is setting up an EPC page.
Because of its unique requirements, Linux manages EPC separately from
normal memory. Similar to memfd, the device /dev/sgx_vepc can be
opened to obtain a file descriptor which can in turn be used to mmap()
EPC memory.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20210719112136.57018-3-yang.zhong@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Several architectures have mechanisms which are designed to protect
guest memory from interference or eavesdropping by a compromised
hypervisor. AMD SEV does this with in-chip memory encryption and
Intel's TDX can do similar things. POWER's Protected Execution
Framework (PEF) accomplishes a similar goal using an ultravisor and
new memory protection features, instead of encryption.
To (partially) unify handling for these, this introduces a new
ConfidentialGuestSupport QOM base class. "Confidential" is kind of vague,
but "confidential computing" seems to be the buzzword about these schemes,
and "secure" or "protected" are often used in connection to unrelated
things (such as hypervisor-from-guest or guest-from-guest security).
The "support" in the name is significant because in at least some of the
cases it requires the guest to take specific actions in order to protect
itself from hypervisor eavesdropping.
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
