Commit Graph

3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Misono Tomohiro
bdfd667883 virtiofsd: Fix xattr operations
Current virtiofsd has problems about xattr operations and
they does not work properly for directory/symlink/special file.

The fundamental cause is that virtiofsd uses openat() + f...xattr()
systemcalls for xattr operation but we should not open symlink/special
file in the daemon. Therefore the function is restricted.

Fix this problem by:
 1. during setup of each thread, call unshare(CLONE_FS)
 2. in xattr operations (i.e. lo_getxattr), if inode is not a regular
    file or directory, use fchdir(proc_loot_fd) + ...xattr() +
    fchdir(root.fd) instead of openat() + f...xattr()

    (Note: for a regular file/directory openat() + f...xattr()
     is still used for performance reason)

With this patch, xfstests generic/062 passes on virtiofs.

This fix is suggested by Miklos Szeredi and Stefan Hajnoczi.
The original discussion can be found here:
  https://www.redhat.com/archives/virtio-fs/2019-October/msg00046.html

Signed-off-by: Misono Tomohiro <misono.tomohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Message-Id: <20200227055927.24566-3-misono.tomohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
2020-03-03 15:13:24 +00:00
Stefan Hajnoczi
f185621d41 virtiofsd: add --syslog command-line option
Sometimes collecting output from stderr is inconvenient or does not fit
within the overall logging architecture.  Add syslog(3) support for
cases where stderr cannot be used.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
dgilbert: Reworked as a logging function
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
2020-01-23 16:41:37 +00:00
Stefan Hajnoczi
4f8bde99c1 virtiofsd: add seccomp whitelist
Only allow system calls that are needed by virtiofsd.  All other system
calls cause SIGSYS to be directed at the thread and the process will
coredump.

Restricting system calls reduces the kernel attack surface and limits
what the process can do when compromised.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
with additional entries by:
Signed-off-by: Ganesh Maharaj Mahalingam <ganesh.mahalingam@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Masayoshi Mizuma <m.mizuma@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Misono Tomohiro <misono.tomohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: piaojun <piaojun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Ren <renzhen@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
2020-01-23 16:41:37 +00:00