virtio-net: out-of-bounds buffer write on invalid state load

CVE-2013-4150 QEMU 1.5.0 out-of-bounds buffer write in
virtio_net_load()@hw/net/virtio-net.c

This code is in hw/net/virtio-net.c:

    if (n->max_queues > 1) {
        if (n->max_queues != qemu_get_be16(f)) {
            error_report("virtio-net: different max_queues ");
            return -1;
        }

        n->curr_queues = qemu_get_be16(f);
        for (i = 1; i < n->curr_queues; i++) {
            n->vqs[i].tx_waiting = qemu_get_be32(f);
        }
    }

Number of vqs is max_queues, so if we get invalid input here,
for example if max_queues = 2, curr_queues = 3, we get
write beyond end of the buffer, with data that comes from
wire.

This might be used to corrupt qemu memory in hard to predict ways.
Since we have lots of function pointers around, RCE might be possible.

Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
Michael S. Tsirkin 2014-04-03 19:50:56 +03:00 committed by Juan Quintela
parent 71f7fe48e1
commit eea750a562

View File

@ -1407,6 +1407,11 @@ static int virtio_net_load(QEMUFile *f, void *opaque, int version_id)
}
n->curr_queues = qemu_get_be16(f);
if (n->curr_queues > n->max_queues) {
error_report("virtio-net: curr_queues %x > max_queues %x",
n->curr_queues, n->max_queues);
return -1;
}
for (i = 1; i < n->curr_queues; i++) {
n->vqs[i].tx_waiting = qemu_get_be32(f);
}