From ade0075523478fa015afd5c6f6cc70681687818d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yuval Shaia Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2019 13:23:47 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] contrib/rdmacm-mux: Fix out-of-bounds risk MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The function get_fd extract context from the received MAD message and uses it as a key to fetch the destination fd from the mapping table. A context can be dgid in case of CM request message or comm_id in case of CM SIDR response message. When MAD message with a smaller size as expected for the message type received we are hitting out-of-bounds where we are looking for the context out of message boundaries. Fix it by validating the message size. Reported-by Sam Smith Signed-off-by: Yuval Shaia Message-Id: <20190212112347.1605-1-yuval.shaia@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé Signed-off-by: Marcel Apfelbaum --- contrib/rdmacm-mux/main.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/contrib/rdmacm-mux/main.c b/contrib/rdmacm-mux/main.c index ae88c77a1e..21cc804367 100644 --- a/contrib/rdmacm-mux/main.c +++ b/contrib/rdmacm-mux/main.c @@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static void hash_tbl_remove_fd_ifid_pair(int fd) pthread_rwlock_unlock(&server.lock); } -static int get_fd(const char *mad, int *fd, __be64 *gid_ifid) +static int get_fd(const char *mad, int umad_len, int *fd, __be64 *gid_ifid) { struct umad_hdr *hdr = (struct umad_hdr *)mad; char *data = (char *)hdr + sizeof(*hdr); @@ -308,13 +308,35 @@ static int get_fd(const char *mad, int *fd, __be64 *gid_ifid) uint16_t attr_id = be16toh(hdr->attr_id); int rc = 0; + if (umad_len <= sizeof(*hdr)) { + rc = -EINVAL; + syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "Ignoring MAD packets with header only\n"); + goto out; + } + switch (attr_id) { case UMAD_CM_ATTR_REQ: + if (unlikely(umad_len < sizeof(*hdr) + CM_REQ_DGID_POS + + sizeof(*gid_ifid))) { + rc = -EINVAL; + syslog(LOG_WARNING, + "Invalid MAD packet size (%d) for attr_id 0x%x\n", umad_len, + attr_id); + goto out; + } memcpy(gid_ifid, data + CM_REQ_DGID_POS, sizeof(*gid_ifid)); rc = hash_tbl_search_fd_by_ifid(fd, gid_ifid); break; case UMAD_CM_ATTR_SIDR_REQ: + if (unlikely(umad_len < sizeof(*hdr) + CM_SIDR_REQ_DGID_POS + + sizeof(*gid_ifid))) { + rc = -EINVAL; + syslog(LOG_WARNING, + "Invalid MAD packet size (%d) for attr_id 0x%x\n", umad_len, + attr_id); + goto out; + } memcpy(gid_ifid, data + CM_SIDR_REQ_DGID_POS, sizeof(*gid_ifid)); rc = hash_tbl_search_fd_by_ifid(fd, gid_ifid); break; @@ -331,6 +353,13 @@ static int get_fd(const char *mad, int *fd, __be64 *gid_ifid) data += sizeof(comm_id); /* Fall through */ case UMAD_CM_ATTR_SIDR_REP: + if (unlikely(umad_len < sizeof(*hdr) + sizeof(comm_id))) { + rc = -EINVAL; + syslog(LOG_WARNING, + "Invalid MAD packet size (%d) for attr_id 0x%x\n", umad_len, + attr_id); + goto out; + } memcpy(&comm_id, data, sizeof(comm_id)); if (comm_id) { rc = hash_tbl_search_fd_by_comm_id(comm_id, fd, gid_ifid); @@ -344,6 +373,7 @@ static int get_fd(const char *mad, int *fd, __be64 *gid_ifid) syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "mad_to_vm: %d 0x%x 0x%x\n", *fd, attr_id, comm_id); +out: return rc; } @@ -372,7 +402,8 @@ static void *umad_recv_thread_func(void *args) } while (rc && server.run); if (server.run) { - rc = get_fd(msg.umad.mad, &fd, &msg.hdr.sgid.global.interface_id); + rc = get_fd(msg.umad.mad, msg.umad_len, &fd, + &msg.hdr.sgid.global.interface_id); if (rc) { continue; }