linux-user: implement TARGET_SO_PEERSEC
"The purpose of this option is to allow an application to obtain the security credentials of a Unix stream socket peer. It is analogous to SO_PEERCRED (which provides authentication using standard Unix credentials of pid, uid and gid), and extends this concept to other security models." -- https://lwn.net/Articles/62370/ Until now it was passed to the kernel with an "int" argument and fails when it was supported by the host because the parameter is like a filename: it is always a \0-terminated string with no embedded \0 characters, but is not guaranteed to be ASCII or UTF-8. I've tested the option with the following program: /* * cc -o getpeercon getpeercon.c */ #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <netinet/in.h> #include <arpa/inet.h> int main(void) { int fd; struct sockaddr_in server, addr; int ret; socklen_t len; char buf[256]; fd = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); if (fd == -1) { perror("socket"); return 1; } server.sin_family = AF_INET; inet_aton("127.0.0.1", &server.sin_addr); server.sin_port = htons(40390); connect(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&server, sizeof(server)); len = sizeof(buf); ret = getsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERSEC, buf, &len); if (ret == -1) { perror("getsockopt"); return 1; } printf("%d %s\n", len, buf); return 0; } On host: $ ./getpeercon 33 system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 With qemu-aarch64/bionic without the patch: $ ./getpeercon getsockopt: Numerical result out of range With the patch: $ ./getpeercon 33 system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0 Bug: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1823790 Reported-by: Matthias Lüscher <lueschem@gmail.com> Tested-by: Matthias Lüscher <lueschem@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu> Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com> Tested-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200204211901.1731821-1-laurent@vivier.eu>
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@ -2344,6 +2344,28 @@ static abi_long do_getsockopt(int sockfd, int level, int optname,
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}
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break;
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}
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case TARGET_SO_PEERSEC: {
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char *name;
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if (get_user_u32(len, optlen)) {
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return -TARGET_EFAULT;
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}
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if (len < 0) {
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return -TARGET_EINVAL;
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}
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name = lock_user(VERIFY_WRITE, optval_addr, len, 0);
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if (!name) {
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return -TARGET_EFAULT;
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}
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lv = len;
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ret = get_errno(getsockopt(sockfd, level, SO_PEERSEC,
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name, &lv));
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if (put_user_u32(lv, optlen)) {
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ret = -TARGET_EFAULT;
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}
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unlock_user(name, optval_addr, lv);
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break;
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}
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case TARGET_SO_LINGER:
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{
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struct linger lg;
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