2006-05-01 14:38:19 +04:00
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/*
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* QEMU VNC display driver
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2007-09-17 01:08:06 +04:00
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*
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2006-05-01 14:38:19 +04:00
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* Copyright (C) 2006 Anthony Liguori <anthony@codemonkey.ws>
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* Copyright (C) 2006 Fabrice Bellard
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2009-03-06 23:27:13 +03:00
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* Copyright (C) 2009 Red Hat, Inc
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2007-09-17 01:08:06 +04:00
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*
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2006-05-01 14:38:19 +04:00
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* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
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* of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
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* in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
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* to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
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* copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
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* furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
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*
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* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
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* all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
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*
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* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
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* IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
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* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL
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* THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
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* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
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* OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN
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* THE SOFTWARE.
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*/
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2009-03-06 23:27:13 +03:00
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#include "vnc.h"
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2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
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#include "vnc-jobs.h"
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2012-12-17 21:20:04 +04:00
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#include "sysemu/sysemu.h"
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2012-12-17 21:20:00 +04:00
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#include "qemu/sockets.h"
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#include "qemu/timer.h"
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#include "qemu/acl.h"
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2012-12-17 21:19:43 +04:00
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#include "qapi/qmp/types.h"
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2011-10-17 22:41:22 +04:00
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#include "qmp-commands.h"
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2012-12-17 21:20:00 +04:00
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#include "qemu/osdep.h"
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2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
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2009-08-03 13:56:01 +04:00
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#define VNC_REFRESH_INTERVAL_BASE 30
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#define VNC_REFRESH_INTERVAL_INC 50
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#define VNC_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MAX 2000
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2011-02-04 11:05:55 +03:00
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static const struct timeval VNC_REFRESH_STATS = { 0, 500000 };
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static const struct timeval VNC_REFRESH_LOSSY = { 2, 0 };
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2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
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#include "vnc_keysym.h"
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2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
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#include "d3des.h"
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2009-02-16 17:59:30 +03:00
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static VncDisplay *vnc_display; /* needed for info vnc */
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2007-02-05 23:20:30 +03:00
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2010-05-21 13:54:34 +04:00
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static int vnc_cursor_define(VncState *vs);
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2012-02-08 16:18:37 +04:00
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static void vnc_release_modifiers(VncState *vs);
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2010-05-21 13:54:34 +04:00
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2011-11-24 21:10:49 +04:00
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static void vnc_set_share_mode(VncState *vs, VncShareMode mode)
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{
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#ifdef _VNC_DEBUG
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static const char *mn[] = {
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[0] = "undefined",
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[VNC_SHARE_MODE_CONNECTING] = "connecting",
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[VNC_SHARE_MODE_SHARED] = "shared",
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[VNC_SHARE_MODE_EXCLUSIVE] = "exclusive",
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[VNC_SHARE_MODE_DISCONNECTED] = "disconnected",
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};
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fprintf(stderr, "%s/%d: %s -> %s\n", __func__,
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vs->csock, mn[vs->share_mode], mn[mode]);
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#endif
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if (vs->share_mode == VNC_SHARE_MODE_EXCLUSIVE) {
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vs->vd->num_exclusive--;
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}
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vs->share_mode = mode;
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if (vs->share_mode == VNC_SHARE_MODE_EXCLUSIVE) {
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vs->vd->num_exclusive++;
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}
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}
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2009-03-06 23:27:05 +03:00
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static char *addr_to_string(const char *format,
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struct sockaddr_storage *sa,
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socklen_t salen) {
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char *addr;
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char host[NI_MAXHOST];
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char serv[NI_MAXSERV];
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int err;
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2009-03-13 18:03:27 +03:00
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size_t addrlen;
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2009-03-06 23:27:05 +03:00
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if ((err = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)sa, salen,
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host, sizeof(host),
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serv, sizeof(serv),
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NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) {
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VNC_DEBUG("Cannot resolve address %d: %s\n",
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err, gai_strerror(err));
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return NULL;
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}
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2009-03-13 18:03:27 +03:00
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/* Enough for the existing format + the 2 vars we're
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2009-06-06 19:00:31 +04:00
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* substituting in. */
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2009-03-13 18:03:27 +03:00
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addrlen = strlen(format) + strlen(host) + strlen(serv);
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2011-08-21 07:09:37 +04:00
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addr = g_malloc(addrlen + 1);
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2009-03-13 18:03:27 +03:00
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snprintf(addr, addrlen, format, host, serv);
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addr[addrlen] = '\0';
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2009-03-06 23:27:05 +03:00
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return addr;
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}
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Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:28 +03:00
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char *vnc_socket_local_addr(const char *format, int fd) {
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2009-03-06 23:27:05 +03:00
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struct sockaddr_storage sa;
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socklen_t salen;
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salen = sizeof(sa);
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if (getsockname(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&sa, &salen) < 0)
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return NULL;
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return addr_to_string(format, &sa, salen);
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}
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|
|
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:28 +03:00
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|
char *vnc_socket_remote_addr(const char *format, int fd) {
|
2009-03-06 23:27:05 +03:00
|
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struct sockaddr_storage sa;
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socklen_t salen;
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salen = sizeof(sa);
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|
|
if (getpeername(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&sa, &salen) < 0)
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|
return NULL;
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|
|
|
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|
|
|
return addr_to_string(format, &sa, salen);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
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|
|
2009-12-10 22:16:10 +03:00
|
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static int put_addr_qdict(QDict *qdict, struct sockaddr_storage *sa,
|
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|
|
socklen_t salen)
|
|
|
|
{
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|
|
|
char host[NI_MAXHOST];
|
|
|
|
char serv[NI_MAXSERV];
|
|
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if ((err = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)sa, salen,
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|
host, sizeof(host),
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|
|
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serv, sizeof(serv),
|
|
|
|
NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) {
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|
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VNC_DEBUG("Cannot resolve address %d: %s\n",
|
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err, gai_strerror(err));
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return -1;
|
|
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|
}
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qdict_put(qdict, "host", qstring_from_str(host));
|
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qdict_put(qdict, "service", qstring_from_str(serv));
|
2010-01-20 16:42:40 +03:00
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qdict_put(qdict, "family",qstring_from_str(inet_strfamily(sa->ss_family)));
|
2009-12-10 22:16:10 +03:00
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return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
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|
|
2010-01-14 19:50:53 +03:00
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|
static int vnc_server_addr_put(QDict *qdict, int fd)
|
2009-12-10 22:16:10 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_storage sa;
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|
|
socklen_t salen;
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|
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salen = sizeof(sa);
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if (getsockname(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&sa, &salen) < 0) {
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return -1;
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}
|
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return put_addr_qdict(qdict, &sa, salen);
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}
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static int vnc_qdict_remote_addr(QDict *qdict, int fd)
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|
|
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{
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struct sockaddr_storage sa;
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socklen_t salen;
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salen = sizeof(sa);
|
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if (getpeername(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&sa, &salen) < 0) {
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return -1;
|
|
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|
}
|
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return put_addr_qdict(qdict, &sa, salen);
|
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}
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|
2009-03-06 23:27:05 +03:00
|
|
|
static const char *vnc_auth_name(VncDisplay *vd) {
|
|
|
|
switch (vd->auth) {
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_INVALID:
|
|
|
|
return "invalid";
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_NONE:
|
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|
|
return "none";
|
|
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|
case VNC_AUTH_VNC:
|
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|
|
return "vnc";
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_RA2:
|
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|
|
return "ra2";
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_RA2NE:
|
|
|
|
return "ra2ne";
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_TIGHT:
|
|
|
|
return "tight";
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_ULTRA:
|
|
|
|
return "ultra";
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_TLS:
|
|
|
|
return "tls";
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT:
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_TLS
|
|
|
|
switch (vd->subauth) {
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_PLAIN:
|
|
|
|
return "vencrypt+plain";
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_TLSNONE:
|
|
|
|
return "vencrypt+tls+none";
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_TLSVNC:
|
|
|
|
return "vencrypt+tls+vnc";
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_TLSPLAIN:
|
|
|
|
return "vencrypt+tls+plain";
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509NONE:
|
|
|
|
return "vencrypt+x509+none";
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509VNC:
|
|
|
|
return "vencrypt+x509+vnc";
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509PLAIN:
|
|
|
|
return "vencrypt+x509+plain";
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_TLSSASL:
|
|
|
|
return "vencrypt+tls+sasl";
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509SASL:
|
|
|
|
return "vencrypt+x509+sasl";
|
2009-03-06 23:27:05 +03:00
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return "vencrypt";
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
return "vencrypt";
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:28 +03:00
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_SASL:
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
return "sasl";
|
2009-03-06 23:27:05 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return "unknown";
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-01-14 19:50:53 +03:00
|
|
|
static int vnc_server_info_put(QDict *qdict)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (vnc_server_addr_put(qdict, vnc_display->lsock) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
qdict_put(qdict, "auth", qstring_from_str(vnc_auth_name(vnc_display)));
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-01-14 19:50:56 +03:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_client_cache_auth(VncState *client)
|
2009-03-06 23:27:05 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
2010-10-13 22:38:08 +04:00
|
|
|
#if defined(CONFIG_VNC_TLS) || defined(CONFIG_VNC_SASL)
|
2009-12-10 22:16:10 +03:00
|
|
|
QDict *qdict;
|
2010-10-13 22:38:08 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2009-03-06 23:27:05 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2010-01-14 19:50:56 +03:00
|
|
|
if (!client->info) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
2009-12-10 22:16:10 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
Include auth credentials in 'info vnc' ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch extends the 'info vnc' monitor output to include information
about the VNC client authentication credentials.
For clients authenticated using SASL, this will output the username.
For clients authenticated using x509 certificates, this will output
the x509 distinguished name.
Auth can be stacked, so both username & x509 dname may be shown.
Server:
address: 0.0.0.0:5902
auth: vencrypt+x509+sasl
Client:
address: 10.33.6.67:38621
x509 dname: C=GB,O=ACME,L=London,ST=London,CN=localhost
username: admin
Client:
address: 10.33.6.63:38620
x509 dname: C=GB,O=ACME,L=London,ST=London,CN=localhost
username: admin
vnc-tls.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
vnc-tls.h | 3 +++
vnc.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++--
3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6725 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:32 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2010-10-13 22:38:08 +04:00
|
|
|
#if defined(CONFIG_VNC_TLS) || defined(CONFIG_VNC_SASL)
|
2010-01-14 19:50:56 +03:00
|
|
|
qdict = qobject_to_qdict(client->info);
|
2010-10-13 22:38:08 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2010-01-14 19:50:56 +03:00
|
|
|
|
Include auth credentials in 'info vnc' ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch extends the 'info vnc' monitor output to include information
about the VNC client authentication credentials.
For clients authenticated using SASL, this will output the username.
For clients authenticated using x509 certificates, this will output
the x509 distinguished name.
Auth can be stacked, so both username & x509 dname may be shown.
Server:
address: 0.0.0.0:5902
auth: vencrypt+x509+sasl
Client:
address: 10.33.6.67:38621
x509 dname: C=GB,O=ACME,L=London,ST=London,CN=localhost
username: admin
Client:
address: 10.33.6.63:38620
x509 dname: C=GB,O=ACME,L=London,ST=London,CN=localhost
username: admin
vnc-tls.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
vnc-tls.h | 3 +++
vnc.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++--
3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6725 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:32 +03:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_TLS
|
|
|
|
if (client->tls.session &&
|
2009-12-10 22:16:10 +03:00
|
|
|
client->tls.dname) {
|
|
|
|
qdict_put(qdict, "x509_dname", qstring_from_str(client->tls.dname));
|
|
|
|
}
|
Include auth credentials in 'info vnc' ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch extends the 'info vnc' monitor output to include information
about the VNC client authentication credentials.
For clients authenticated using SASL, this will output the username.
For clients authenticated using x509 certificates, this will output
the x509 distinguished name.
Auth can be stacked, so both username & x509 dname may be shown.
Server:
address: 0.0.0.0:5902
auth: vencrypt+x509+sasl
Client:
address: 10.33.6.67:38621
x509 dname: C=GB,O=ACME,L=London,ST=London,CN=localhost
username: admin
Client:
address: 10.33.6.63:38620
x509 dname: C=GB,O=ACME,L=London,ST=London,CN=localhost
username: admin
vnc-tls.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
vnc-tls.h | 3 +++
vnc.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++--
3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6725 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:32 +03:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
|
|
|
|
if (client->sasl.conn &&
|
2009-12-10 22:16:10 +03:00
|
|
|
client->sasl.username) {
|
2010-01-14 19:50:54 +03:00
|
|
|
qdict_put(qdict, "sasl_username",
|
|
|
|
qstring_from_str(client->sasl.username));
|
2009-12-10 22:16:10 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
Include auth credentials in 'info vnc' ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch extends the 'info vnc' monitor output to include information
about the VNC client authentication credentials.
For clients authenticated using SASL, this will output the username.
For clients authenticated using x509 certificates, this will output
the x509 distinguished name.
Auth can be stacked, so both username & x509 dname may be shown.
Server:
address: 0.0.0.0:5902
auth: vencrypt+x509+sasl
Client:
address: 10.33.6.67:38621
x509 dname: C=GB,O=ACME,L=London,ST=London,CN=localhost
username: admin
Client:
address: 10.33.6.63:38620
x509 dname: C=GB,O=ACME,L=London,ST=London,CN=localhost
username: admin
vnc-tls.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
vnc-tls.h | 3 +++
vnc.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++--
3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6725 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:32 +03:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2010-01-14 19:50:56 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-12-10 22:16:10 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2010-01-14 19:50:56 +03:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_client_cache_addr(VncState *client)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
QDict *qdict;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
qdict = qdict_new();
|
|
|
|
if (vnc_qdict_remote_addr(qdict, client->csock) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
QDECREF(qdict);
|
|
|
|
/* XXX: how to report the error? */
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
client->info = QOBJECT(qdict);
|
2009-03-06 23:27:05 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
QMP: Introduce VNC_CONNECTED event
It's emitted when a VNC client connects to QEMU, client's information
such as port and IP address are provided.
Note that this event is emitted right when the connection is
established. This means that it happens before authentication
procedure and session initialization.
Event example:
{ "event": "VNC_CONNECTED",
"timestamp": { "seconds": 1262976601, "microseconds": 975795 },
"data": {
"server": { "auth": "sasl", "family": "ipv4",
"service": "5901", "host": "0.0.0.0" },
"client": { "family": "ipv4", "service": "58425",
"host": "127.0.0.1" } } }
Signed-off-by: Luiz Capitulino <lcapitulino@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
2010-01-14 19:50:57 +03:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_qmp_event(VncState *vs, MonitorEvent event)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
QDict *server;
|
|
|
|
QObject *data;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!vs->info) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
server = qdict_new();
|
|
|
|
if (vnc_server_info_put(server) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
QDECREF(server);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
data = qobject_from_jsonf("{ 'client': %p, 'server': %p }",
|
|
|
|
vs->info, QOBJECT(server));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
monitor_protocol_event(event, data);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
qobject_incref(vs->info);
|
|
|
|
qobject_decref(data);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-10-17 22:41:22 +04:00
|
|
|
static VncClientInfo *qmp_query_vnc_client(const VncState *client)
|
2007-02-05 23:20:30 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
2011-10-17 22:41:22 +04:00
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_storage sa;
|
|
|
|
socklen_t salen = sizeof(sa);
|
|
|
|
char host[NI_MAXHOST];
|
|
|
|
char serv[NI_MAXSERV];
|
|
|
|
VncClientInfo *info;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (getpeername(client->csock, (struct sockaddr *)&sa, &salen) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&sa, salen,
|
|
|
|
host, sizeof(host),
|
|
|
|
serv, sizeof(serv),
|
|
|
|
NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-12-10 22:16:10 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2011-10-17 22:41:22 +04:00
|
|
|
info = g_malloc0(sizeof(*info));
|
|
|
|
info->host = g_strdup(host);
|
|
|
|
info->service = g_strdup(serv);
|
|
|
|
info->family = g_strdup(inet_strfamily(sa.ss_family));
|
2009-12-10 22:16:10 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_TLS
|
2011-10-17 22:41:22 +04:00
|
|
|
if (client->tls.session && client->tls.dname) {
|
|
|
|
info->has_x509_dname = true;
|
|
|
|
info->x509_dname = g_strdup(client->tls.dname);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-12-10 22:16:10 +03:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
|
2011-10-17 22:41:22 +04:00
|
|
|
if (client->sasl.conn && client->sasl.username) {
|
|
|
|
info->has_sasl_username = true;
|
|
|
|
info->sasl_username = g_strdup(client->sasl.username);
|
2009-12-10 22:16:10 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-10-17 22:41:22 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2009-03-06 23:27:05 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2011-10-17 22:41:22 +04:00
|
|
|
return info;
|
2009-12-10 22:16:10 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-03-06 23:27:05 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2011-10-17 22:41:22 +04:00
|
|
|
VncInfo *qmp_query_vnc(Error **errp)
|
2009-12-10 22:16:10 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
2011-10-17 22:41:22 +04:00
|
|
|
VncInfo *info = g_malloc0(sizeof(*info));
|
|
|
|
|
2009-12-10 22:16:10 +03:00
|
|
|
if (vnc_display == NULL || vnc_display->display == NULL) {
|
2011-10-17 22:41:22 +04:00
|
|
|
info->enabled = false;
|
2009-12-10 22:16:10 +03:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2011-10-17 22:41:22 +04:00
|
|
|
VncClientInfoList *cur_item = NULL;
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_storage sa;
|
|
|
|
socklen_t salen = sizeof(sa);
|
|
|
|
char host[NI_MAXHOST];
|
|
|
|
char serv[NI_MAXSERV];
|
2010-02-05 14:04:05 +03:00
|
|
|
VncState *client;
|
2009-03-06 23:27:05 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2011-10-17 22:41:22 +04:00
|
|
|
info->enabled = true;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* for compatibility with the original command */
|
|
|
|
info->has_clients = true;
|
|
|
|
|
2010-02-05 14:04:05 +03:00
|
|
|
QTAILQ_FOREACH(client, &vnc_display->clients, next) {
|
2011-10-17 22:41:22 +04:00
|
|
|
VncClientInfoList *cinfo = g_malloc0(sizeof(*info));
|
|
|
|
cinfo->value = qmp_query_vnc_client(client);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* XXX: waiting for the qapi to support GSList */
|
|
|
|
if (!cur_item) {
|
|
|
|
info->clients = cur_item = cinfo;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
cur_item->next = cinfo;
|
|
|
|
cur_item = cinfo;
|
2009-03-06 23:27:05 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-12-10 22:16:10 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
vnc: fix "info vnc" with "-vnc ..., reverse=on"
When reverse connection is in use, there is no active VNC server
socket. Because of this, getsockopt(-1, ...) is attempted and
the following error is emitted:
$ socat TCP-LISTEN:5900,reuseaddr TCP-LISTEN:5901,reuseaddr &
$ x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64 -vnc localhost:5900,reverse -monitor stdio
QEMU 1.2.50 monitor - type 'help' for more information
(qemu) info vnc
An undefined error has occurred
Because however the host, family, service and auth fields are
optional, we can just exit if there is no active server socket.
$ x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64 -vnc localhost:5900,reverse -monitor stdio
QEMU 1.2.50 monitor - type 'help' for more information
(qemu) info vnc
Server:
Client:
address: 127.0.0.1:5900
x509_dname: none
username: none
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
2012-10-10 16:30:58 +04:00
|
|
|
if (vnc_display->lsock == -1) {
|
|
|
|
return info;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-10-17 22:41:22 +04:00
|
|
|
if (getsockname(vnc_display->lsock, (struct sockaddr *)&sa,
|
|
|
|
&salen) == -1) {
|
|
|
|
error_set(errp, QERR_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
goto out_error;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-12-10 22:16:10 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2011-10-17 22:41:22 +04:00
|
|
|
if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&sa, salen,
|
|
|
|
host, sizeof(host),
|
|
|
|
serv, sizeof(serv),
|
|
|
|
NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
error_set(errp, QERR_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
|
|
|
|
goto out_error;
|
2009-03-06 23:27:05 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-10-17 22:41:22 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
info->has_host = true;
|
|
|
|
info->host = g_strdup(host);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
info->has_service = true;
|
|
|
|
info->service = g_strdup(serv);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
info->has_family = true;
|
|
|
|
info->family = g_strdup(inet_strfamily(sa.ss_family));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
info->has_auth = true;
|
|
|
|
info->auth = g_strdup(vnc_auth_name(vnc_display));
|
2007-02-05 23:20:30 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-10-17 22:41:22 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return info;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
out_error:
|
|
|
|
qapi_free_VncInfo(info);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
2007-02-05 23:20:30 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
/* TODO
|
|
|
|
1) Get the queue working for IO.
|
|
|
|
2) there is some weirdness when using the -S option (the screen is grey
|
|
|
|
and not totally invalidated
|
|
|
|
3) resolutions > 1024
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2009-08-03 13:56:01 +04:00
|
|
|
static int vnc_update_client(VncState *vs, int has_dirty);
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
static int vnc_update_client_sync(VncState *vs, int has_dirty);
|
2009-06-16 16:19:48 +04:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_disconnect_start(VncState *vs);
|
2009-08-03 13:54:05 +04:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_init_timer(VncDisplay *vd);
|
|
|
|
static void vnc_remove_timer(VncDisplay *vd);
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2009-02-16 17:59:30 +03:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_colordepth(VncState *vs);
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
static void framebuffer_update_request(VncState *vs, int incremental,
|
|
|
|
int x_position, int y_position,
|
|
|
|
int w, int h);
|
|
|
|
static void vnc_refresh(void *opaque);
|
|
|
|
static int vnc_refresh_server_surface(VncDisplay *vd);
|
2008-09-15 20:03:41 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2012-11-13 17:51:41 +04:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_dpy_update(DisplayChangeListener *dcl,
|
|
|
|
DisplayState *ds,
|
|
|
|
int x, int y, int w, int h)
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
2013-02-28 14:34:31 +04:00
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vd = container_of(dcl, VncDisplay, dcl);
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
struct VncSurface *s = &vd->guest;
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
int width = ds_get_width(ds);
|
|
|
|
int height = ds_get_height(ds);
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
h += y;
|
|
|
|
|
2007-12-12 01:31:32 +03:00
|
|
|
/* round x down to ensure the loop only spans one 16-pixel block per,
|
|
|
|
iteration. otherwise, if (x % 16) != 0, the last iteration may span
|
|
|
|
two 16-pixel blocks but we only mark the first as dirty
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
w += (x % 16);
|
|
|
|
x -= (x % 16);
|
|
|
|
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
x = MIN(x, width);
|
|
|
|
y = MIN(y, height);
|
|
|
|
w = MIN(x + w, width) - x;
|
|
|
|
h = MIN(h, height);
|
2008-05-20 04:07:58 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
for (; y < h; y++)
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < w; i += 16)
|
2011-02-04 11:06:05 +03:00
|
|
|
set_bit((x + i) / 16, s->dirty[y]);
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-05-03 16:31:34 +04:00
|
|
|
void vnc_framebuffer_update(VncState *vs, int x, int y, int w, int h,
|
|
|
|
int32_t encoding)
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, x);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, y);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, w);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, h);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_s32(vs, encoding);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:28 +03:00
|
|
|
void buffer_reserve(Buffer *buffer, size_t len)
|
2009-02-02 18:58:47 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if ((buffer->capacity - buffer->offset) < len) {
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
buffer->capacity += (len + 1024);
|
2011-08-21 07:09:37 +04:00
|
|
|
buffer->buffer = g_realloc(buffer->buffer, buffer->capacity);
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
if (buffer->buffer == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "vnc: out of memory\n");
|
|
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-02-02 18:58:47 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-10-28 15:04:48 +04:00
|
|
|
static int buffer_empty(Buffer *buffer)
|
2009-02-02 18:58:47 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return buffer->offset == 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-01-21 14:04:44 +04:00
|
|
|
uint8_t *buffer_end(Buffer *buffer)
|
2009-02-02 18:58:47 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return buffer->buffer + buffer->offset;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:28 +03:00
|
|
|
void buffer_reset(Buffer *buffer)
|
2009-02-02 18:58:47 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
buffer->offset = 0;
|
2009-02-02 18:58:47 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-05-19 11:24:07 +04:00
|
|
|
void buffer_free(Buffer *buffer)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2011-08-21 07:09:37 +04:00
|
|
|
g_free(buffer->buffer);
|
2010-05-19 11:24:07 +04:00
|
|
|
buffer->offset = 0;
|
|
|
|
buffer->capacity = 0;
|
|
|
|
buffer->buffer = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:28 +03:00
|
|
|
void buffer_append(Buffer *buffer, const void *data, size_t len)
|
2009-02-02 18:58:47 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
memcpy(buffer->buffer + buffer->offset, data, len);
|
|
|
|
buffer->offset += len;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-01-21 14:04:43 +04:00
|
|
|
void buffer_advance(Buffer *buf, size_t len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
memmove(buf->buffer, buf->buffer + len,
|
|
|
|
(buf->offset - len));
|
|
|
|
buf->offset -= len;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-05-25 20:25:16 +04:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_desktop_resize(VncState *vs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
DisplayState *ds = vs->ds;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (vs->csock == -1 || !vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_RESIZE)) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2010-05-25 20:25:20 +04:00
|
|
|
if (vs->client_width == ds_get_width(ds) &&
|
|
|
|
vs->client_height == ds_get_height(ds)) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2010-05-25 20:25:18 +04:00
|
|
|
vs->client_width = ds_get_width(ds);
|
|
|
|
vs->client_height = ds_get_height(ds);
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_lock_output(vs);
|
2010-05-25 20:25:16 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_FRAMEBUFFER_UPDATE);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, 0);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, 1); /* number of rects */
|
2010-05-25 20:25:18 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, 0, 0, vs->client_width, vs->client_height,
|
2010-05-25 20:25:16 +04:00
|
|
|
VNC_ENCODING_DESKTOPRESIZE);
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
|
2010-05-25 20:25:16 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_abort_display_jobs(VncDisplay *vd)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
VncState *vs;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
|
|
|
|
vnc_lock_output(vs);
|
|
|
|
vs->abort = true;
|
|
|
|
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
|
|
|
|
vnc_jobs_join(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
|
|
|
|
vnc_lock_output(vs);
|
|
|
|
vs->abort = false;
|
|
|
|
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
int vnc_server_fb_stride(VncDisplay *vd)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return pixman_image_get_stride(vd->server);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void *vnc_server_fb_ptr(VncDisplay *vd, int x, int y)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *ptr;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ptr = (uint8_t *)pixman_image_get_data(vd->server);
|
|
|
|
ptr += y * vnc_server_fb_stride(vd);
|
|
|
|
ptr += x * VNC_SERVER_FB_BYTES;
|
|
|
|
return ptr;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-02-28 18:03:04 +04:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_dpy_switch(DisplayChangeListener *dcl,
|
|
|
|
DisplayState *ds,
|
|
|
|
DisplaySurface *surface)
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2013-02-28 14:34:31 +04:00
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vd = container_of(dcl, VncDisplay, dcl);
|
2010-02-05 14:04:05 +03:00
|
|
|
VncState *vs;
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_abort_display_jobs(vd);
|
|
|
|
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
/* server surface */
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
qemu_pixman_image_unref(vd->server);
|
|
|
|
vd->server = pixman_image_create_bits(VNC_SERVER_FB_FORMAT,
|
|
|
|
ds_get_width(ds),
|
|
|
|
ds_get_height(ds),
|
|
|
|
NULL, 0);
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2009-03-20 18:59:14 +03:00
|
|
|
/* guest surface */
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
#if 0 /* FIXME */
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
if (ds_get_bytes_per_pixel(ds) != vd->guest.ds->pf.bytes_per_pixel)
|
2007-10-31 01:38:53 +03:00
|
|
|
console_color_init(ds);
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
qemu_pixman_image_unref(vd->guest.fb);
|
|
|
|
vd->guest.fb = pixman_image_ref(ds->surface->image);
|
|
|
|
vd->guest.format = ds->surface->format;
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
memset(vd->guest.dirty, 0xFF, sizeof(vd->guest.dirty));
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2010-02-05 14:04:05 +03:00
|
|
|
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_colordepth(vs);
|
2010-05-25 20:25:20 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_desktop_resize(vs);
|
2010-05-21 13:54:34 +04:00
|
|
|
if (vs->vd->cursor) {
|
|
|
|
vnc_cursor_define(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
memset(vs->dirty, 0xFF, sizeof(vs->dirty));
|
2009-02-16 17:59:30 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-05-14 22:11:49 +04:00
|
|
|
/* fastest code */
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_write_pixels_copy(VncState *vs,
|
2010-05-21 13:54:34 +04:00
|
|
|
void *pixels, int size)
|
2006-05-14 22:11:49 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
vnc_write(vs, pixels, size);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* slowest but generic code. */
|
2010-05-03 16:31:34 +04:00
|
|
|
void vnc_convert_pixel(VncState *vs, uint8_t *buf, uint32_t v)
|
2006-05-14 22:11:49 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-09-15 20:03:41 +04:00
|
|
|
uint8_t r, g, b;
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
#if VNC_SERVER_FB_FORMAT == PIXMAN_FORMAT(32, PIXMAN_TYPE_ARGB, 0, 8, 8, 8)
|
|
|
|
r = (((v & 0x00ff0000) >> 16) << vs->client_pf.rbits) >> 8;
|
|
|
|
g = (((v & 0x0000ff00) >> 8) << vs->client_pf.gbits) >> 8;
|
|
|
|
b = (((v & 0x000000ff) >> 0) << vs->client_pf.bbits) >> 8;
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
# error need some bits here if you change VNC_SERVER_FB_FORMAT
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
v = (r << vs->client_pf.rshift) |
|
|
|
|
(g << vs->client_pf.gshift) |
|
|
|
|
(b << vs->client_pf.bshift);
|
|
|
|
switch (vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel) {
|
2006-05-14 22:11:49 +04:00
|
|
|
case 1:
|
|
|
|
buf[0] = v;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 2:
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
if (vs->client_be) {
|
2006-05-14 22:11:49 +04:00
|
|
|
buf[0] = v >> 8;
|
|
|
|
buf[1] = v;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
buf[1] = v >> 8;
|
|
|
|
buf[0] = v;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
case 4:
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
if (vs->client_be) {
|
2006-05-14 22:11:49 +04:00
|
|
|
buf[0] = v >> 24;
|
|
|
|
buf[1] = v >> 16;
|
|
|
|
buf[2] = v >> 8;
|
|
|
|
buf[3] = v;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
buf[3] = v >> 24;
|
|
|
|
buf[2] = v >> 16;
|
|
|
|
buf[1] = v >> 8;
|
|
|
|
buf[0] = v;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_write_pixels_generic(VncState *vs,
|
2010-05-21 13:54:34 +04:00
|
|
|
void *pixels1, int size)
|
2006-05-14 22:11:49 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
uint8_t buf[4];
|
|
|
|
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
if (VNC_SERVER_FB_BYTES == 4) {
|
2008-09-15 20:03:41 +04:00
|
|
|
uint32_t *pixels = pixels1;
|
|
|
|
int n, i;
|
|
|
|
n = size >> 2;
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
|
2008-09-15 20:03:41 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_convert_pixel(vs, buf, pixels[i]);
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_write(vs, buf, vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel);
|
2008-09-15 20:03:41 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-05-14 22:11:49 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-05-19 11:24:09 +04:00
|
|
|
int vnc_raw_send_framebuffer_update(VncState *vs, int x, int y, int w, int h)
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
2007-12-16 06:02:09 +03:00
|
|
|
uint8_t *row;
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vd = vs->vd;
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
row = vnc_server_fb_ptr(vd, x, y);
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < h; i++) {
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
vs->write_pixels(vs, row, w * VNC_SERVER_FB_BYTES);
|
|
|
|
row += vnc_server_fb_stride(vd);
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2010-05-19 11:24:09 +04:00
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
int vnc_send_framebuffer_update(VncState *vs, int x, int y, int w, int h)
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2010-05-19 11:24:09 +04:00
|
|
|
int n = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-02-02 18:58:43 +03:00
|
|
|
switch(vs->vnc_encoding) {
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_ZLIB:
|
2010-05-19 11:24:09 +04:00
|
|
|
n = vnc_zlib_send_framebuffer_update(vs, x, y, w, h);
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_HEXTILE:
|
|
|
|
vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, x, y, w, h, VNC_ENCODING_HEXTILE);
|
2010-05-19 11:24:09 +04:00
|
|
|
n = vnc_hextile_send_framebuffer_update(vs, x, y, w, h);
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2010-05-19 11:24:10 +04:00
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_TIGHT:
|
|
|
|
n = vnc_tight_send_framebuffer_update(vs, x, y, w, h);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2010-07-07 22:57:56 +04:00
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_TIGHT_PNG:
|
|
|
|
n = vnc_tight_png_send_framebuffer_update(vs, x, y, w, h);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2011-02-04 11:06:01 +03:00
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_ZRLE:
|
|
|
|
n = vnc_zrle_send_framebuffer_update(vs, x, y, w, h);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_ZYWRLE:
|
|
|
|
n = vnc_zywrle_send_framebuffer_update(vs, x, y, w, h);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, x, y, w, h, VNC_ENCODING_RAW);
|
2010-05-19 11:24:09 +04:00
|
|
|
n = vnc_raw_send_framebuffer_update(vs, x, y, w, h);
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2009-02-02 18:58:43 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2010-05-19 11:24:09 +04:00
|
|
|
return n;
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-02-16 17:59:30 +03:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_copy(VncState *vs, int src_x, int src_y, int dst_x, int dst_y, int w, int h)
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2009-07-27 19:10:48 +04:00
|
|
|
/* send bitblit op to the vnc client */
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_lock_output(vs);
|
2010-03-31 21:20:43 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_FRAMEBUFFER_UPDATE);
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, 0);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, 1); /* number of rects */
|
2009-02-02 18:58:29 +03:00
|
|
|
vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, dst_x, dst_y, w, h, VNC_ENCODING_COPYRECT);
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, src_x);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, src_y);
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-11-13 17:51:41 +04:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_dpy_copy(DisplayChangeListener *dcl,
|
|
|
|
DisplayState *ds,
|
|
|
|
int src_x, int src_y,
|
|
|
|
int dst_x, int dst_y, int w, int h)
|
2009-02-16 17:59:30 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
2013-02-28 14:34:31 +04:00
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vd = container_of(dcl, VncDisplay, dcl);
|
2009-06-16 16:19:48 +04:00
|
|
|
VncState *vs, *vn;
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
uint8_t *src_row;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *dst_row;
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
int i, x, y, pitch, inc, w_lim, s;
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
int cmp_bytes;
|
2009-06-16 16:19:48 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_refresh_server_surface(vd);
|
2010-02-05 14:04:05 +03:00
|
|
|
QTAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(vs, &vd->clients, next, vn) {
|
2009-06-16 16:19:48 +04:00
|
|
|
if (vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_COPYRECT)) {
|
|
|
|
vs->force_update = 1;
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_update_client_sync(vs, 1);
|
2009-06-16 16:19:48 +04:00
|
|
|
/* vs might be free()ed here */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
/* do bitblit op on the local surface too */
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
pitch = vnc_server_fb_stride(vd);
|
|
|
|
src_row = vnc_server_fb_ptr(vd, src_x, src_y);
|
|
|
|
dst_row = vnc_server_fb_ptr(vd, dst_x, dst_y);
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
y = dst_y;
|
|
|
|
inc = 1;
|
|
|
|
if (dst_y > src_y) {
|
|
|
|
/* copy backwards */
|
|
|
|
src_row += pitch * (h-1);
|
|
|
|
dst_row += pitch * (h-1);
|
|
|
|
pitch = -pitch;
|
|
|
|
y = dst_y + h - 1;
|
|
|
|
inc = -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
w_lim = w - (16 - (dst_x % 16));
|
|
|
|
if (w_lim < 0)
|
|
|
|
w_lim = w;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
w_lim = w - (w_lim % 16);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < h; i++) {
|
|
|
|
for (x = 0; x <= w_lim;
|
|
|
|
x += s, src_row += cmp_bytes, dst_row += cmp_bytes) {
|
|
|
|
if (x == w_lim) {
|
|
|
|
if ((s = w - w_lim) == 0)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
} else if (!x) {
|
|
|
|
s = (16 - (dst_x % 16));
|
|
|
|
s = MIN(s, w_lim);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
s = 16;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
cmp_bytes = s * VNC_SERVER_FB_BYTES;
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
if (memcmp(src_row, dst_row, cmp_bytes) == 0)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
memmove(dst_row, src_row, cmp_bytes);
|
2010-02-05 14:04:05 +03:00
|
|
|
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
|
|
|
|
if (!vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_COPYRECT)) {
|
2011-02-04 11:06:05 +03:00
|
|
|
set_bit(((x + dst_x) / 16), vs->dirty[y]);
|
2010-02-05 14:04:05 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
src_row += pitch - w * VNC_SERVER_FB_BYTES;
|
|
|
|
dst_row += pitch - w * VNC_SERVER_FB_BYTES;
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
y += inc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-02-05 14:04:05 +03:00
|
|
|
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
|
|
|
|
if (vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_COPYRECT)) {
|
2009-02-16 17:59:30 +03:00
|
|
|
vnc_copy(vs, src_x, src_y, dst_x, dst_y, w, h);
|
2010-02-05 14:04:05 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-02-16 17:59:30 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-11-13 17:51:41 +04:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_mouse_set(DisplayChangeListener *dcl,
|
|
|
|
DisplayState *ds,
|
|
|
|
int x, int y, int visible)
|
2010-05-21 13:54:34 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* can we ask the client(s) to move the pointer ??? */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int vnc_cursor_define(VncState *vs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
QEMUCursor *c = vs->vd->cursor;
|
|
|
|
int isize;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_RICH_CURSOR)) {
|
2010-07-07 22:58:03 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_lock_output(vs);
|
2010-05-21 13:54:34 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_FRAMEBUFFER_UPDATE);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, 0); /* padding */
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, 1); /* # of rects */
|
|
|
|
vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, c->hot_x, c->hot_y, c->width, c->height,
|
|
|
|
VNC_ENCODING_RICH_CURSOR);
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
isize = c->width * c->height * vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel;
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_pixels_generic(vs, c->data, isize);
|
2010-05-21 13:54:34 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_write(vs, vs->vd->cursor_mask, vs->vd->cursor_msize);
|
2010-07-07 22:58:03 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
|
2010-05-21 13:54:34 +04:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-11-13 17:51:41 +04:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_dpy_cursor_define(DisplayChangeListener *dcl,
|
|
|
|
DisplayState *ds,
|
|
|
|
QEMUCursor *c)
|
2010-05-21 13:54:34 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vd = vnc_display;
|
|
|
|
VncState *vs;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
cursor_put(vd->cursor);
|
2011-08-21 07:09:37 +04:00
|
|
|
g_free(vd->cursor_mask);
|
2010-05-21 13:54:34 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vd->cursor = c;
|
|
|
|
cursor_get(vd->cursor);
|
|
|
|
vd->cursor_msize = cursor_get_mono_bpl(c) * c->height;
|
2011-08-21 07:09:37 +04:00
|
|
|
vd->cursor_mask = g_malloc0(vd->cursor_msize);
|
2010-05-21 13:54:34 +04:00
|
|
|
cursor_get_mono_mask(c, 0, vd->cursor_mask);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
|
|
|
|
vnc_cursor_define(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
static int find_and_clear_dirty_height(struct VncState *vs,
|
2011-02-04 11:06:06 +03:00
|
|
|
int y, int last_x, int x, int height)
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int h;
|
|
|
|
|
2011-02-04 11:06:06 +03:00
|
|
|
for (h = 1; h < (height - y); h++) {
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
int tmp_x;
|
2011-02-04 11:06:05 +03:00
|
|
|
if (!test_bit(last_x, vs->dirty[y + h])) {
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2011-02-04 11:06:05 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (tmp_x = last_x; tmp_x < x; tmp_x++) {
|
|
|
|
clear_bit(tmp_x, vs->dirty[y + h]);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return h;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
static int vnc_update_client_sync(VncState *vs, int has_dirty)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret = vnc_update_client(vs, has_dirty);
|
|
|
|
vnc_jobs_join(vs);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-08-03 13:56:01 +04:00
|
|
|
static int vnc_update_client(VncState *vs, int has_dirty)
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (vs->need_update && vs->csock != -1) {
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vd = vs->vd;
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
VncJob *job;
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
int y;
|
2010-05-25 20:25:19 +04:00
|
|
|
int width, height;
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
int n = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2009-08-03 13:54:05 +04:00
|
|
|
if (vs->output.offset && !vs->audio_cap && !vs->force_update)
|
2009-03-20 18:59:24 +03:00
|
|
|
/* kernel send buffers are full -> drop frames to throttle */
|
2009-08-03 13:56:01 +04:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2008-01-14 02:51:53 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2009-08-03 13:54:05 +04:00
|
|
|
if (!has_dirty && !vs->audio_cap && !vs->force_update)
|
2009-08-03 13:56:01 +04:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2009-03-20 18:59:14 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Send screen updates to the vnc client using the server
|
|
|
|
* surface and server dirty map. guest surface updates
|
|
|
|
* happening in parallel don't disturb us, the next pass will
|
|
|
|
* send them to the client.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
job = vnc_job_new(vs);
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
width = MIN(pixman_image_get_width(vd->server), vs->client_width);
|
|
|
|
height = MIN(pixman_image_get_height(vd->server), vs->client_height);
|
2010-05-25 20:25:19 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (y = 0; y < height; y++) {
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
int x;
|
|
|
|
int last_x = -1;
|
2010-05-25 20:25:19 +04:00
|
|
|
for (x = 0; x < width / 16; x++) {
|
2011-02-04 11:06:05 +03:00
|
|
|
if (test_and_clear_bit(x, vs->dirty[y])) {
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
if (last_x == -1) {
|
|
|
|
last_x = x;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (last_x != -1) {
|
2011-02-04 11:06:06 +03:00
|
|
|
int h = find_and_clear_dirty_height(vs, y, last_x, x,
|
|
|
|
height);
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
n += vnc_job_add_rect(job, last_x * 16, y,
|
|
|
|
(x - last_x) * 16, h);
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
last_x = -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (last_x != -1) {
|
2011-02-04 11:06:06 +03:00
|
|
|
int h = find_and_clear_dirty_height(vs, y, last_x, x, height);
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
n += vnc_job_add_rect(job, last_x * 16, y,
|
|
|
|
(x - last_x) * 16, h);
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vnc_job_push(job);
|
2009-03-20 18:59:24 +03:00
|
|
|
vs->force_update = 0;
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
return n;
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-08-03 13:54:05 +04:00
|
|
|
if (vs->csock == -1)
|
2009-06-16 16:19:48 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_disconnect_finish(vs);
|
2009-08-03 13:56:01 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-12-01 23:57:48 +03:00
|
|
|
/* audio */
|
|
|
|
static void audio_capture_notify(void *opaque, audcnotification_e cmd)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
VncState *vs = opaque;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (cmd) {
|
|
|
|
case AUD_CNOTIFY_DISABLE:
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_lock_output(vs);
|
2010-03-31 21:20:43 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_QEMU);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_QEMU_AUDIO);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_QEMU_AUDIO_END);
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
|
2008-12-01 23:57:48 +03:00
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case AUD_CNOTIFY_ENABLE:
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_lock_output(vs);
|
2010-03-31 21:20:43 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_QEMU);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_QEMU_AUDIO);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_QEMU_AUDIO_BEGIN);
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
|
2008-12-01 23:57:48 +03:00
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void audio_capture_destroy(void *opaque)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void audio_capture(void *opaque, void *buf, int size)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
VncState *vs = opaque;
|
|
|
|
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_lock_output(vs);
|
2010-03-31 21:20:43 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_QEMU);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_QEMU_AUDIO);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_QEMU_AUDIO_DATA);
|
2008-12-01 23:57:48 +03:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u32(vs, size);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write(vs, buf, size);
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
|
2008-12-01 23:57:48 +03:00
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void audio_add(VncState *vs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct audio_capture_ops ops;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (vs->audio_cap) {
|
2010-02-18 13:41:55 +03:00
|
|
|
monitor_printf(default_mon, "audio already running\n");
|
2008-12-01 23:57:48 +03:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ops.notify = audio_capture_notify;
|
|
|
|
ops.destroy = audio_capture_destroy;
|
|
|
|
ops.capture = audio_capture;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-05-14 03:11:35 +04:00
|
|
|
vs->audio_cap = AUD_add_capture(&vs->as, &ops, vs);
|
2008-12-01 23:57:48 +03:00
|
|
|
if (!vs->audio_cap) {
|
2010-02-18 13:41:55 +03:00
|
|
|
monitor_printf(default_mon, "Failed to add audio capture\n");
|
2008-12-01 23:57:48 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void audio_del(VncState *vs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (vs->audio_cap) {
|
|
|
|
AUD_del_capture(vs->audio_cap, vs);
|
|
|
|
vs->audio_cap = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-06-16 16:19:48 +04:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_disconnect_start(VncState *vs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (vs->csock == -1)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
2011-11-24 21:10:49 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_set_share_mode(vs, VNC_SHARE_MODE_DISCONNECTED);
|
2009-06-16 16:19:48 +04:00
|
|
|
qemu_set_fd_handler2(vs->csock, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
|
|
|
closesocket(vs->csock);
|
|
|
|
vs->csock = -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-01-21 14:04:44 +04:00
|
|
|
void vnc_disconnect_finish(VncState *vs)
|
2009-06-16 16:19:48 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2011-02-04 11:05:56 +03:00
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_jobs_join(vs); /* Wait encoding jobs */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vnc_lock_output(vs);
|
QMP: Introduce VNC_DISCONNECTED event
It's emitted when a VNC client disconnects from QEMU, client's
information such as port and IP address are provided.
Event example:
{ "event": "VNC_DISCONNECTED",
"timestamp": { "seconds": 1262976601, "microseconds": 975795 },
"data": {
"server": { "auth": "sasl", "family": "ipv4",
"service": "5901", "host": "0.0.0.0" },
"client": { "family": "ipv4", "service": "58425",
"host": "127.0.0.1", "sasl_username": "foo" } } }
Signed-off-by: Luiz Capitulino <lcapitulino@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
2010-01-14 19:50:58 +03:00
|
|
|
vnc_qmp_event(vs, QEVENT_VNC_DISCONNECTED);
|
|
|
|
|
2010-05-19 11:24:07 +04:00
|
|
|
buffer_free(&vs->input);
|
|
|
|
buffer_free(&vs->output);
|
2013-01-21 14:04:44 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_WS
|
|
|
|
buffer_free(&vs->ws_input);
|
|
|
|
buffer_free(&vs->ws_output);
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_WS */
|
2010-01-14 19:50:56 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
qobject_decref(vs->info);
|
|
|
|
|
2010-05-19 11:24:08 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_zlib_clear(vs);
|
2010-05-19 11:24:10 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_tight_clear(vs);
|
2011-02-04 11:06:01 +03:00
|
|
|
vnc_zrle_clear(vs);
|
2010-05-19 11:24:08 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2009-06-16 16:19:48 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_TLS
|
|
|
|
vnc_tls_client_cleanup(vs);
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_TLS */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
|
|
|
|
vnc_sasl_client_cleanup(vs);
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_SASL */
|
|
|
|
audio_del(vs);
|
2012-02-08 16:18:37 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_release_modifiers(vs);
|
2009-06-16 16:19:48 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2013-01-21 14:04:45 +04:00
|
|
|
if (vs->initialized) {
|
|
|
|
QTAILQ_REMOVE(&vs->vd->clients, vs, next);
|
|
|
|
qemu_remove_mouse_mode_change_notifier(&vs->mouse_mode_notifier);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2010-02-05 14:04:05 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (QTAILQ_EMPTY(&vs->vd->clients)) {
|
2013-02-28 14:34:31 +04:00
|
|
|
vs->vd->dcl.idle = 1;
|
2010-02-05 14:04:05 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-06-16 16:19:48 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2009-08-03 13:54:05 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_remove_timer(vs->vd);
|
2010-03-10 19:12:02 +03:00
|
|
|
if (vs->vd->lock_key_sync)
|
|
|
|
qemu_remove_led_event_handler(vs->led);
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
qemu_mutex_destroy(&vs->output_mutex);
|
2013-01-21 14:04:45 +04:00
|
|
|
if (vs->bh != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
qemu_bh_delete(vs->bh);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2012-03-14 10:58:47 +04:00
|
|
|
buffer_free(&vs->jobs_buffer);
|
|
|
|
|
2011-02-04 11:05:56 +03:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < VNC_STAT_ROWS; ++i) {
|
2011-08-21 07:09:37 +04:00
|
|
|
g_free(vs->lossy_rect[i]);
|
2011-02-04 11:05:56 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-08-21 07:09:37 +04:00
|
|
|
g_free(vs->lossy_rect);
|
|
|
|
g_free(vs);
|
2009-06-16 16:19:48 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:28 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int vnc_client_io_error(VncState *vs, int ret, int last_errno)
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (ret == 0 || ret == -1) {
|
2008-04-25 03:40:55 +04:00
|
|
|
if (ret == -1) {
|
|
|
|
switch (last_errno) {
|
|
|
|
case EINTR:
|
|
|
|
case EAGAIN:
|
|
|
|
#ifdef _WIN32
|
|
|
|
case WSAEWOULDBLOCK:
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2009-06-16 16:19:48 +04:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Closing down client sock: ret %d, errno %d\n",
|
|
|
|
ret, ret < 0 ? last_errno : 0);
|
|
|
|
vnc_disconnect_start(vs);
|
2009-03-20 18:59:14 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 23:27:23 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void vnc_client_error(VncState *vs)
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2009-06-16 16:19:48 +04:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Closing down client sock: protocol error\n");
|
|
|
|
vnc_disconnect_start(vs);
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:28 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Called to write a chunk of data to the client socket. The data may
|
|
|
|
* be the raw data, or may have already been encoded by SASL.
|
|
|
|
* The data will be written either straight onto the socket, or
|
|
|
|
* written via the GNUTLS wrappers, if TLS/SSL encryption is enabled
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* NB, it is theoretically possible to have 2 layers of encryption,
|
|
|
|
* both SASL, and this TLS layer. It is highly unlikely in practice
|
|
|
|
* though, since SASL encryption will typically be a no-op if TLS
|
|
|
|
* is active
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns the number of bytes written, which may be less than
|
|
|
|
* the requested 'datalen' if the socket would block. Returns
|
|
|
|
* -1 on error, and disconnects the client socket.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
long vnc_client_write_buf(VncState *vs, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen)
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2006-05-04 01:18:59 +04:00
|
|
|
long ret;
|
2008-09-06 21:47:39 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_TLS
|
2009-03-06 23:27:23 +03:00
|
|
|
if (vs->tls.session) {
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
ret = gnutls_write(vs->tls.session, data, datalen);
|
|
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (ret == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN)
|
|
|
|
errno = EAGAIN;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
errno = EIO;
|
|
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-08-25 05:37:51 +04:00
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_TLS */
|
2009-06-13 15:05:27 +04:00
|
|
|
ret = send(vs->csock, (const void *)data, datalen, 0);
|
2009-03-20 18:59:18 +03:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Wrote wire %p %zd -> %ld\n", data, datalen, ret);
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:28 +03:00
|
|
|
return vnc_client_io_error(vs, ret, socket_error());
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Called to write buffered data to the client socket, when not
|
|
|
|
* using any SASL SSF encryption layers. Will write as much data
|
|
|
|
* as possible without blocking. If all buffered data is written,
|
|
|
|
* will switch the FD poll() handler back to read monitoring.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns the number of bytes written, which may be less than
|
|
|
|
* the buffered output data if the socket would block. Returns
|
|
|
|
* -1 on error, and disconnects the client socket.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static long vnc_client_write_plain(VncState *vs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
long ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
|
2009-03-20 18:59:18 +03:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Write Plain: Pending output %p size %zd offset %zd. Wait SSF %d\n",
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:28 +03:00
|
|
|
vs->output.buffer, vs->output.capacity, vs->output.offset,
|
|
|
|
vs->sasl.waitWriteSSF);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (vs->sasl.conn &&
|
|
|
|
vs->sasl.runSSF &&
|
|
|
|
vs->sasl.waitWriteSSF) {
|
|
|
|
ret = vnc_client_write_buf(vs, vs->output.buffer, vs->sasl.waitWriteSSF);
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
|
|
vs->sasl.waitWriteSSF -= ret;
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_SASL */
|
|
|
|
ret = vnc_client_write_buf(vs, vs->output.buffer, vs->output.offset);
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
if (!ret)
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:28 +03:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2013-01-21 14:04:43 +04:00
|
|
|
buffer_advance(&vs->output, ret);
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (vs->output.offset == 0) {
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
qemu_set_fd_handler2(vs->csock, NULL, vnc_client_read, NULL, vs);
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:28 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* First function called whenever there is data to be written to
|
|
|
|
* the client socket. Will delegate actual work according to whether
|
|
|
|
* SASL SSF layers are enabled (thus requiring encryption calls)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_client_write_locked(void *opaque)
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:28 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
VncState *vs = opaque;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
|
|
|
|
if (vs->sasl.conn &&
|
|
|
|
vs->sasl.runSSF &&
|
2010-04-25 22:35:52 +04:00
|
|
|
!vs->sasl.waitWriteSSF) {
|
|
|
|
vnc_client_write_sasl(vs);
|
|
|
|
} else
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:28 +03:00
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_SASL */
|
2013-01-21 14:04:44 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_WS
|
|
|
|
if (vs->encode_ws) {
|
|
|
|
vnc_client_write_ws(vs);
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_WS */
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
vnc_client_write_plain(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
void vnc_client_write(void *opaque)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
VncState *vs = opaque;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vnc_lock_output(vs);
|
2013-01-21 14:04:44 +04:00
|
|
|
if (vs->output.offset
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_WS
|
|
|
|
|| vs->ws_output.offset
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
) {
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_client_write_locked(opaque);
|
2010-08-20 14:10:41 +04:00
|
|
|
} else if (vs->csock != -1) {
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
qemu_set_fd_handler2(vs->csock, NULL, vnc_client_read, NULL, vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 23:27:23 +03:00
|
|
|
void vnc_read_when(VncState *vs, VncReadEvent *func, size_t expecting)
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
vs->read_handler = func;
|
|
|
|
vs->read_handler_expect = expecting;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:28 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Called to read a chunk of data from the client socket. The data may
|
|
|
|
* be the raw data, or may need to be further decoded by SASL.
|
|
|
|
* The data will be read either straight from to the socket, or
|
|
|
|
* read via the GNUTLS wrappers, if TLS/SSL encryption is enabled
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* NB, it is theoretically possible to have 2 layers of encryption,
|
|
|
|
* both SASL, and this TLS layer. It is highly unlikely in practice
|
|
|
|
* though, since SASL encryption will typically be a no-op if TLS
|
|
|
|
* is active
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns the number of bytes read, which may be less than
|
|
|
|
* the requested 'datalen' if the socket would block. Returns
|
|
|
|
* -1 on error, and disconnects the client socket.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
long vnc_client_read_buf(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t datalen)
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2006-05-04 01:18:59 +04:00
|
|
|
long ret;
|
2008-09-06 21:47:39 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_TLS
|
2009-03-06 23:27:23 +03:00
|
|
|
if (vs->tls.session) {
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
ret = gnutls_read(vs->tls.session, data, datalen);
|
|
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (ret == GNUTLS_E_AGAIN)
|
|
|
|
errno = EAGAIN;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
errno = EIO;
|
|
|
|
ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-08-25 05:37:51 +04:00
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_TLS */
|
2011-07-24 00:04:29 +04:00
|
|
|
ret = qemu_recv(vs->csock, data, datalen, 0);
|
2009-03-20 18:59:18 +03:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Read wire %p %zd -> %ld\n", data, datalen, ret);
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:28 +03:00
|
|
|
return vnc_client_io_error(vs, ret, socket_error());
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:28 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Called to read data from the client socket to the input buffer,
|
|
|
|
* when not using any SASL SSF encryption layers. Will read as much
|
|
|
|
* data as possible without blocking.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns the number of bytes read. Returns -1 on error, and
|
|
|
|
* disconnects the client socket.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static long vnc_client_read_plain(VncState *vs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
2009-03-20 18:59:18 +03:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Read plain %p size %zd offset %zd\n",
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:28 +03:00
|
|
|
vs->input.buffer, vs->input.capacity, vs->input.offset);
|
|
|
|
buffer_reserve(&vs->input, 4096);
|
|
|
|
ret = vnc_client_read_buf(vs, buffer_end(&vs->input), 4096);
|
|
|
|
if (!ret)
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
vs->input.offset += ret;
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:28 +03:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-03-14 10:58:47 +04:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_jobs_bh(void *opaque)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
VncState *vs = opaque;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vnc_jobs_consume_buffer(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:28 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* First function called whenever there is more data to be read from
|
|
|
|
* the client socket. Will delegate actual work according to whether
|
|
|
|
* SASL SSF layers are enabled (thus requiring decryption calls)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void vnc_client_read(void *opaque)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
VncState *vs = opaque;
|
|
|
|
long ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
|
|
|
|
if (vs->sasl.conn && vs->sasl.runSSF)
|
|
|
|
ret = vnc_client_read_sasl(vs);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_SASL */
|
2013-01-21 14:04:44 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_WS
|
|
|
|
if (vs->encode_ws) {
|
|
|
|
ret = vnc_client_read_ws(vs);
|
|
|
|
if (ret == -1) {
|
|
|
|
vnc_disconnect_start(vs);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
} else if (ret == -2) {
|
|
|
|
vnc_client_error(vs);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_WS */
|
|
|
|
{
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:28 +03:00
|
|
|
ret = vnc_client_read_plain(vs);
|
2013-01-21 14:04:44 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-06-16 16:19:48 +04:00
|
|
|
if (!ret) {
|
|
|
|
if (vs->csock == -1)
|
|
|
|
vnc_disconnect_finish(vs);
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2009-06-16 16:19:48 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while (vs->read_handler && vs->input.offset >= vs->read_handler_expect) {
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
size_t len = vs->read_handler_expect;
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = vs->read_handler(vs, vs->input.buffer, len);
|
2009-06-16 16:19:48 +04:00
|
|
|
if (vs->csock == -1) {
|
|
|
|
vnc_disconnect_finish(vs);
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2009-06-16 16:19:48 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!ret) {
|
2013-01-21 14:04:43 +04:00
|
|
|
buffer_advance(&vs->input, len);
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
vs->read_handler_expect = ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 23:27:23 +03:00
|
|
|
void vnc_write(VncState *vs, const void *data, size_t len)
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
buffer_reserve(&vs->output, len);
|
|
|
|
|
2009-06-16 16:19:48 +04:00
|
|
|
if (vs->csock != -1 && buffer_empty(&vs->output)) {
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
qemu_set_fd_handler2(vs->csock, NULL, vnc_client_read, vnc_client_write, vs);
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
buffer_append(&vs->output, data, len);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 23:27:23 +03:00
|
|
|
void vnc_write_s32(VncState *vs, int32_t value)
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u32(vs, *(uint32_t *)&value);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 23:27:23 +03:00
|
|
|
void vnc_write_u32(VncState *vs, uint32_t value)
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
uint8_t buf[4];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
buf[0] = (value >> 24) & 0xFF;
|
|
|
|
buf[1] = (value >> 16) & 0xFF;
|
|
|
|
buf[2] = (value >> 8) & 0xFF;
|
|
|
|
buf[3] = value & 0xFF;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vnc_write(vs, buf, 4);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 23:27:23 +03:00
|
|
|
void vnc_write_u16(VncState *vs, uint16_t value)
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2006-08-25 00:36:44 +04:00
|
|
|
uint8_t buf[2];
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
buf[0] = (value >> 8) & 0xFF;
|
|
|
|
buf[1] = value & 0xFF;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vnc_write(vs, buf, 2);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 23:27:23 +03:00
|
|
|
void vnc_write_u8(VncState *vs, uint8_t value)
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
vnc_write(vs, (char *)&value, 1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 23:27:23 +03:00
|
|
|
void vnc_flush(VncState *vs)
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_lock_output(vs);
|
2013-01-21 14:04:44 +04:00
|
|
|
if (vs->csock != -1 && (vs->output.offset
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_WS
|
|
|
|
|| vs->ws_output.offset
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
)) {
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_client_write_locked(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-10-28 15:04:48 +04:00
|
|
|
static uint8_t read_u8(uint8_t *data, size_t offset)
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return data[offset];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-10-28 15:04:48 +04:00
|
|
|
static uint16_t read_u16(uint8_t *data, size_t offset)
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return ((data[offset] & 0xFF) << 8) | (data[offset + 1] & 0xFF);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-10-28 15:04:48 +04:00
|
|
|
static int32_t read_s32(uint8_t *data, size_t offset)
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return (int32_t)((data[offset] << 24) | (data[offset + 1] << 16) |
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
(data[offset + 2] << 8) | data[offset + 3]);
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 23:27:23 +03:00
|
|
|
uint32_t read_u32(uint8_t *data, size_t offset)
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return ((data[offset] << 24) | (data[offset + 1] << 16) |
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
(data[offset + 2] << 8) | data[offset + 3]);
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-12-16 06:02:09 +03:00
|
|
|
static void client_cut_text(VncState *vs, size_t len, uint8_t *text)
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-06-20 16:06:26 +04:00
|
|
|
static void check_pointer_type_change(Notifier *notifier, void *data)
|
2007-02-05 23:14:10 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
2010-03-10 18:38:29 +03:00
|
|
|
VncState *vs = container_of(notifier, VncState, mouse_mode_notifier);
|
|
|
|
int absolute = kbd_mouse_is_absolute();
|
|
|
|
|
2009-02-02 18:58:29 +03:00
|
|
|
if (vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_POINTER_TYPE_CHANGE) && vs->absolute != absolute) {
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_lock_output(vs);
|
2010-03-31 21:20:43 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_FRAMEBUFFER_UPDATE);
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, 0);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, 1);
|
|
|
|
vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, absolute, 0,
|
|
|
|
ds_get_width(vs->ds), ds_get_height(vs->ds),
|
2009-02-02 18:58:29 +03:00
|
|
|
VNC_ENCODING_POINTER_TYPE_CHANGE);
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
2007-02-05 23:14:10 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vs->absolute = absolute;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
static void pointer_event(VncState *vs, int button_mask, int x, int y)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int buttons = 0;
|
|
|
|
int dz = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (button_mask & 0x01)
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
buttons |= MOUSE_EVENT_LBUTTON;
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
if (button_mask & 0x02)
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
buttons |= MOUSE_EVENT_MBUTTON;
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
if (button_mask & 0x04)
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
buttons |= MOUSE_EVENT_RBUTTON;
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
if (button_mask & 0x08)
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
dz = -1;
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
if (button_mask & 0x10)
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
dz = 1;
|
2007-02-05 23:14:10 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (vs->absolute) {
|
2010-03-08 17:34:49 +03:00
|
|
|
kbd_mouse_event(ds_get_width(vs->ds) > 1 ?
|
|
|
|
x * 0x7FFF / (ds_get_width(vs->ds) - 1) : 0x4000,
|
|
|
|
ds_get_height(vs->ds) > 1 ?
|
|
|
|
y * 0x7FFF / (ds_get_height(vs->ds) - 1) : 0x4000,
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
dz, buttons);
|
2009-02-02 18:58:29 +03:00
|
|
|
} else if (vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_POINTER_TYPE_CHANGE)) {
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
x -= 0x7FFF;
|
|
|
|
y -= 0x7FFF;
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
kbd_mouse_event(x, y, dz, buttons);
|
2007-02-05 23:14:10 +03:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
if (vs->last_x != -1)
|
|
|
|
kbd_mouse_event(x - vs->last_x,
|
|
|
|
y - vs->last_y,
|
|
|
|
dz, buttons);
|
|
|
|
vs->last_x = x;
|
|
|
|
vs->last_y = y;
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-08-25 00:36:44 +04:00
|
|
|
static void reset_keys(VncState *vs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for(i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
|
|
|
|
if (vs->modifiers_state[i]) {
|
2010-02-28 23:03:00 +03:00
|
|
|
if (i & SCANCODE_GREY)
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keycode(SCANCODE_EMUL0);
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keycode(i | SCANCODE_UP);
|
2006-08-25 00:36:44 +04:00
|
|
|
vs->modifiers_state[i] = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-10-31 01:38:53 +03:00
|
|
|
static void press_key(VncState *vs, int keysym)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2010-02-28 23:03:00 +03:00
|
|
|
int keycode = keysym2scancode(vs->vd->kbd_layout, keysym) & SCANCODE_KEYMASK;
|
|
|
|
if (keycode & SCANCODE_GREY)
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keycode(SCANCODE_EMUL0);
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keycode(keycode & SCANCODE_KEYCODEMASK);
|
|
|
|
if (keycode & SCANCODE_GREY)
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keycode(SCANCODE_EMUL0);
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keycode(keycode | SCANCODE_UP);
|
2007-10-31 01:38:53 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-02-26 19:17:39 +03:00
|
|
|
static void kbd_leds(void *opaque, int ledstate)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
VncState *vs = opaque;
|
|
|
|
int caps, num;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
caps = ledstate & QEMU_CAPS_LOCK_LED ? 1 : 0;
|
|
|
|
num = ledstate & QEMU_NUM_LOCK_LED ? 1 : 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (vs->modifiers_state[0x3a] != caps) {
|
|
|
|
vs->modifiers_state[0x3a] = caps;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (vs->modifiers_state[0x45] != num) {
|
|
|
|
vs->modifiers_state[0x45] = num;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-08-24 03:27:37 +04:00
|
|
|
static void do_key_event(VncState *vs, int down, int keycode, int sym)
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2006-08-25 00:36:44 +04:00
|
|
|
/* QEMU console switch */
|
|
|
|
switch(keycode) {
|
|
|
|
case 0x2a: /* Left Shift */
|
|
|
|
case 0x36: /* Right Shift */
|
|
|
|
case 0x1d: /* Left CTRL */
|
|
|
|
case 0x9d: /* Right CTRL */
|
|
|
|
case 0x38: /* Left ALT */
|
|
|
|
case 0xb8: /* Right ALT */
|
|
|
|
if (down)
|
|
|
|
vs->modifiers_state[keycode] = 1;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
vs->modifiers_state[keycode] = 0;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2007-09-17 01:08:06 +04:00
|
|
|
case 0x02 ... 0x0a: /* '1' to '9' keys */
|
2006-08-25 00:36:44 +04:00
|
|
|
if (down && vs->modifiers_state[0x1d] && vs->modifiers_state[0x38]) {
|
|
|
|
/* Reset the modifiers sent to the current console */
|
|
|
|
reset_keys(vs);
|
|
|
|
console_select(keycode - 0x02);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
case 0x3a: /* CapsLock */
|
|
|
|
case 0x45: /* NumLock */
|
2010-02-26 19:17:39 +03:00
|
|
|
if (down)
|
2007-10-31 01:38:53 +03:00
|
|
|
vs->modifiers_state[keycode] ^= 1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-01-14 12:56:54 +03:00
|
|
|
if (down && vs->vd->lock_key_sync &&
|
2010-03-10 19:12:02 +03:00
|
|
|
keycode_is_keypad(vs->vd->kbd_layout, keycode)) {
|
2007-10-31 01:38:53 +03:00
|
|
|
/* If the numlock state needs to change then simulate an additional
|
|
|
|
keypress before sending this one. This will happen if the user
|
|
|
|
toggles numlock away from the VNC window.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2009-02-16 17:59:30 +03:00
|
|
|
if (keysym_is_numlock(vs->vd->kbd_layout, sym & 0xFFFF)) {
|
2007-10-31 01:38:53 +03:00
|
|
|
if (!vs->modifiers_state[0x45]) {
|
|
|
|
vs->modifiers_state[0x45] = 1;
|
|
|
|
press_key(vs, 0xff7f);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (vs->modifiers_state[0x45]) {
|
|
|
|
vs->modifiers_state[0x45] = 0;
|
|
|
|
press_key(vs, 0xff7f);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-08-25 00:36:44 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2011-01-14 12:56:54 +03:00
|
|
|
if (down && vs->vd->lock_key_sync &&
|
2010-03-10 19:12:02 +03:00
|
|
|
((sym >= 'A' && sym <= 'Z') || (sym >= 'a' && sym <= 'z'))) {
|
2009-11-02 14:47:06 +03:00
|
|
|
/* If the capslock state needs to change then simulate an additional
|
|
|
|
keypress before sending this one. This will happen if the user
|
|
|
|
toggles capslock away from the VNC window.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int uppercase = !!(sym >= 'A' && sym <= 'Z');
|
|
|
|
int shift = !!(vs->modifiers_state[0x2a] | vs->modifiers_state[0x36]);
|
|
|
|
int capslock = !!(vs->modifiers_state[0x3a]);
|
|
|
|
if (capslock) {
|
|
|
|
if (uppercase == shift) {
|
|
|
|
vs->modifiers_state[0x3a] = 0;
|
|
|
|
press_key(vs, 0xffe5);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (uppercase != shift) {
|
|
|
|
vs->modifiers_state[0x3a] = 1;
|
|
|
|
press_key(vs, 0xffe5);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-08-25 00:36:44 +04:00
|
|
|
if (is_graphic_console()) {
|
2010-02-28 23:03:00 +03:00
|
|
|
if (keycode & SCANCODE_GREY)
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keycode(SCANCODE_EMUL0);
|
2006-08-25 00:36:44 +04:00
|
|
|
if (down)
|
2010-02-28 23:03:00 +03:00
|
|
|
kbd_put_keycode(keycode & SCANCODE_KEYCODEMASK);
|
2006-08-25 00:36:44 +04:00
|
|
|
else
|
2010-02-28 23:03:00 +03:00
|
|
|
kbd_put_keycode(keycode | SCANCODE_UP);
|
2006-08-25 00:36:44 +04:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2011-11-08 13:02:16 +04:00
|
|
|
bool numlock = vs->modifiers_state[0x45];
|
|
|
|
bool control = (vs->modifiers_state[0x1d] ||
|
|
|
|
vs->modifiers_state[0x9d]);
|
2006-08-25 00:36:44 +04:00
|
|
|
/* QEMU console emulation */
|
|
|
|
if (down) {
|
|
|
|
switch (keycode) {
|
|
|
|
case 0x2a: /* Left Shift */
|
|
|
|
case 0x36: /* Right Shift */
|
|
|
|
case 0x1d: /* Left CTRL */
|
|
|
|
case 0x9d: /* Right CTRL */
|
|
|
|
case 0x38: /* Left ALT */
|
|
|
|
case 0xb8: /* Right ALT */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0xc8:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(QEMU_KEY_UP);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0xd0:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(QEMU_KEY_DOWN);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0xcb:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(QEMU_KEY_LEFT);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0xcd:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(QEMU_KEY_RIGHT);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0xd3:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(QEMU_KEY_DELETE);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0xc7:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(QEMU_KEY_HOME);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0xcf:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(QEMU_KEY_END);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0xc9:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(QEMU_KEY_PAGEUP);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0xd1:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(QEMU_KEY_PAGEDOWN);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2009-06-11 13:32:14 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case 0x47:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(numlock ? '7' : QEMU_KEY_HOME);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0x48:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(numlock ? '8' : QEMU_KEY_UP);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0x49:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(numlock ? '9' : QEMU_KEY_PAGEUP);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0x4b:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(numlock ? '4' : QEMU_KEY_LEFT);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0x4c:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym('5');
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0x4d:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(numlock ? '6' : QEMU_KEY_RIGHT);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0x4f:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(numlock ? '1' : QEMU_KEY_END);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0x50:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(numlock ? '2' : QEMU_KEY_DOWN);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0x51:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(numlock ? '3' : QEMU_KEY_PAGEDOWN);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0x52:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym('0');
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0x53:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(numlock ? '.' : QEMU_KEY_DELETE);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case 0xb5:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym('/');
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0x37:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym('*');
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0x4a:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym('-');
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0x4e:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym('+');
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case 0x9c:
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym('\n');
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
2006-08-25 00:36:44 +04:00
|
|
|
default:
|
2011-11-08 13:02:16 +04:00
|
|
|
if (control) {
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(sym & 0x1f);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keysym(sym);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-08-25 00:36:44 +04:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-02-08 16:18:37 +04:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_release_modifiers(VncState *vs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
static const int keycodes[] = {
|
|
|
|
/* shift, control, alt keys, both left & right */
|
|
|
|
0x2a, 0x36, 0x1d, 0x9d, 0x38, 0xb8,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
int i, keycode;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!is_graphic_console()) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(keycodes); i++) {
|
|
|
|
keycode = keycodes[i];
|
|
|
|
if (!vs->modifiers_state[keycode]) {
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (keycode & SCANCODE_GREY) {
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keycode(SCANCODE_EMUL0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
kbd_put_keycode(keycode | SCANCODE_UP);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-05-02 01:44:22 +04:00
|
|
|
static void key_event(VncState *vs, int down, uint32_t sym)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2008-08-24 03:27:37 +04:00
|
|
|
int keycode;
|
2009-12-11 13:25:07 +03:00
|
|
|
int lsym = sym;
|
2008-08-24 03:27:37 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2009-12-11 13:25:07 +03:00
|
|
|
if (lsym >= 'A' && lsym <= 'Z' && is_graphic_console()) {
|
|
|
|
lsym = lsym - 'A' + 'a';
|
|
|
|
}
|
2008-08-24 03:27:37 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2010-02-28 23:03:00 +03:00
|
|
|
keycode = keysym2scancode(vs->vd->kbd_layout, lsym & 0xFFFF) & SCANCODE_KEYMASK;
|
2008-08-24 03:27:37 +04:00
|
|
|
do_key_event(vs, down, keycode, sym);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void ext_key_event(VncState *vs, int down,
|
|
|
|
uint32_t sym, uint16_t keycode)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* if the user specifies a keyboard layout, always use it */
|
|
|
|
if (keyboard_layout)
|
|
|
|
key_event(vs, down, sym);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
do_key_event(vs, down, keycode, sym);
|
2006-05-02 01:44:22 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
static void framebuffer_update_request(VncState *vs, int incremental,
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
int x_position, int y_position,
|
|
|
|
int w, int h)
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2011-03-11 12:10:32 +03:00
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
const size_t width = ds_get_width(vs->ds) / 16;
|
|
|
|
|
2008-11-24 22:29:13 +03:00
|
|
|
if (y_position > ds_get_height(vs->ds))
|
|
|
|
y_position = ds_get_height(vs->ds);
|
|
|
|
if (y_position + h >= ds_get_height(vs->ds))
|
|
|
|
h = ds_get_height(vs->ds) - y_position;
|
2007-04-29 05:53:20 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
vs->need_update = 1;
|
|
|
|
if (!incremental) {
|
2009-04-27 18:39:52 +04:00
|
|
|
vs->force_update = 1;
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < h; i++) {
|
2011-03-11 12:10:32 +03:00
|
|
|
bitmap_set(vs->dirty[y_position + i], 0, width);
|
|
|
|
bitmap_clear(vs->dirty[y_position + i], width,
|
2011-03-22 19:27:33 +03:00
|
|
|
VNC_DIRTY_BITS - width);
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-08-24 03:27:37 +04:00
|
|
|
static void send_ext_key_event_ack(VncState *vs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_lock_output(vs);
|
2010-03-31 21:20:43 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_FRAMEBUFFER_UPDATE);
|
2008-08-24 03:27:37 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, 0);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, 1);
|
2009-02-02 18:58:29 +03:00
|
|
|
vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, 0, 0, ds_get_width(vs->ds), ds_get_height(vs->ds),
|
|
|
|
VNC_ENCODING_EXT_KEY_EVENT);
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
|
2008-08-24 03:27:37 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-12-01 23:57:48 +03:00
|
|
|
static void send_ext_audio_ack(VncState *vs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_lock_output(vs);
|
2010-03-31 21:20:43 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_FRAMEBUFFER_UPDATE);
|
2008-12-01 23:57:48 +03:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, 0);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, 1);
|
2009-02-02 18:58:29 +03:00
|
|
|
vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, 0, 0, ds_get_width(vs->ds), ds_get_height(vs->ds),
|
|
|
|
VNC_ENCODING_AUDIO);
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
|
2008-12-01 23:57:48 +03:00
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
static void set_encodings(VncState *vs, int32_t *encodings, size_t n_encodings)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
2009-02-02 18:58:29 +03:00
|
|
|
unsigned int enc = 0;
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2009-02-02 18:58:29 +03:00
|
|
|
vs->features = 0;
|
2010-05-19 11:24:01 +04:00
|
|
|
vs->vnc_encoding = 0;
|
2010-07-07 22:57:59 +04:00
|
|
|
vs->tight.compression = 9;
|
|
|
|
vs->tight.quality = -1; /* Lossless by default */
|
2007-02-05 23:14:10 +03:00
|
|
|
vs->absolute = -1;
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2010-05-19 11:24:02 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Start from the end because the encodings are sent in order of preference.
|
2011-11-22 14:06:24 +04:00
|
|
|
* This way the preferred encoding (first encoding defined in the array)
|
2010-05-19 11:24:02 +04:00
|
|
|
* will be set at the end of the loop.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
for (i = n_encodings - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
|
2009-02-02 18:58:29 +03:00
|
|
|
enc = encodings[i];
|
|
|
|
switch (enc) {
|
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_RAW:
|
2010-05-19 11:24:01 +04:00
|
|
|
vs->vnc_encoding = enc;
|
2009-02-02 18:58:29 +03:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_COPYRECT:
|
2009-02-16 17:59:30 +03:00
|
|
|
vs->features |= VNC_FEATURE_COPYRECT_MASK;
|
2009-02-02 18:58:29 +03:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_HEXTILE:
|
|
|
|
vs->features |= VNC_FEATURE_HEXTILE_MASK;
|
2010-05-19 11:24:01 +04:00
|
|
|
vs->vnc_encoding = enc;
|
2009-02-02 18:58:29 +03:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2010-05-19 11:24:10 +04:00
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_TIGHT:
|
|
|
|
vs->features |= VNC_FEATURE_TIGHT_MASK;
|
|
|
|
vs->vnc_encoding = enc;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2012-05-16 16:54:25 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_PNG
|
2010-07-07 22:57:56 +04:00
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_TIGHT_PNG:
|
|
|
|
vs->features |= VNC_FEATURE_TIGHT_PNG_MASK;
|
|
|
|
vs->vnc_encoding = enc;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2012-05-16 16:54:25 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2009-02-02 18:58:54 +03:00
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_ZLIB:
|
|
|
|
vs->features |= VNC_FEATURE_ZLIB_MASK;
|
2010-05-19 11:24:01 +04:00
|
|
|
vs->vnc_encoding = enc;
|
2009-02-02 18:58:54 +03:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2011-02-04 11:06:01 +03:00
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_ZRLE:
|
|
|
|
vs->features |= VNC_FEATURE_ZRLE_MASK;
|
|
|
|
vs->vnc_encoding = enc;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_ZYWRLE:
|
|
|
|
vs->features |= VNC_FEATURE_ZYWRLE_MASK;
|
|
|
|
vs->vnc_encoding = enc;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2009-02-02 18:58:29 +03:00
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_DESKTOPRESIZE:
|
|
|
|
vs->features |= VNC_FEATURE_RESIZE_MASK;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_POINTER_TYPE_CHANGE:
|
|
|
|
vs->features |= VNC_FEATURE_POINTER_TYPE_CHANGE_MASK;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2010-05-21 13:54:34 +04:00
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_RICH_CURSOR:
|
|
|
|
vs->features |= VNC_FEATURE_RICH_CURSOR_MASK;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2009-02-02 18:58:29 +03:00
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_EXT_KEY_EVENT:
|
2008-08-24 03:27:37 +04:00
|
|
|
send_ext_key_event_ack(vs);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2009-02-02 18:58:29 +03:00
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_AUDIO:
|
2008-12-01 23:57:48 +03:00
|
|
|
send_ext_audio_ack(vs);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2009-02-02 18:58:29 +03:00
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_WMVi:
|
|
|
|
vs->features |= VNC_FEATURE_WMVI_MASK;
|
2008-09-15 20:05:16 +04:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2009-02-02 18:58:43 +03:00
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_COMPRESSLEVEL0 ... VNC_ENCODING_COMPRESSLEVEL0 + 9:
|
2010-07-07 22:57:59 +04:00
|
|
|
vs->tight.compression = (enc & 0x0F);
|
2009-02-02 18:58:43 +03:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VNC_ENCODING_QUALITYLEVEL0 ... VNC_ENCODING_QUALITYLEVEL0 + 9:
|
2011-02-04 11:05:54 +03:00
|
|
|
if (vs->vd->lossy) {
|
|
|
|
vs->tight.quality = (enc & 0x0F);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-02-02 18:58:43 +03:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2009-02-02 18:58:29 +03:00
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Unknown encoding: %d (0x%.8x): %d\n", i, enc, enc);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2010-05-25 20:25:17 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_desktop_resize(vs);
|
2011-06-20 16:06:26 +04:00
|
|
|
check_pointer_type_change(&vs->mouse_mode_notifier, NULL);
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-01-16 01:17:38 +03:00
|
|
|
static void set_pixel_conversion(VncState *vs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
pixman_format_code_t fmt = qemu_pixman_get_format(&vs->client_pf);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (fmt == VNC_SERVER_FB_FORMAT) {
|
2009-01-16 01:17:38 +03:00
|
|
|
vs->write_pixels = vnc_write_pixels_copy;
|
2010-05-03 16:31:34 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_hextile_set_pixel_conversion(vs, 0);
|
2009-01-16 01:17:38 +03:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
vs->write_pixels = vnc_write_pixels_generic;
|
2010-05-03 16:31:34 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_hextile_set_pixel_conversion(vs, 1);
|
2009-01-16 01:17:38 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
static void set_pixel_format(VncState *vs,
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
int bits_per_pixel, int depth,
|
|
|
|
int big_endian_flag, int true_color_flag,
|
|
|
|
int red_max, int green_max, int blue_max,
|
|
|
|
int red_shift, int green_shift, int blue_shift)
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2006-05-14 22:11:49 +04:00
|
|
|
if (!true_color_flag) {
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
vnc_client_error(vs);
|
2006-05-14 22:11:49 +04:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
vs->client_pf.rmax = red_max;
|
|
|
|
vs->client_pf.rbits = hweight_long(red_max);
|
|
|
|
vs->client_pf.rshift = red_shift;
|
|
|
|
vs->client_pf.rmask = red_max << red_shift;
|
|
|
|
vs->client_pf.gmax = green_max;
|
|
|
|
vs->client_pf.gbits = hweight_long(green_max);
|
|
|
|
vs->client_pf.gshift = green_shift;
|
|
|
|
vs->client_pf.gmask = green_max << green_shift;
|
|
|
|
vs->client_pf.bmax = blue_max;
|
|
|
|
vs->client_pf.bbits = hweight_long(blue_max);
|
|
|
|
vs->client_pf.bshift = blue_shift;
|
|
|
|
vs->client_pf.bmask = blue_max << blue_shift;
|
|
|
|
vs->client_pf.bits_per_pixel = bits_per_pixel;
|
|
|
|
vs->client_pf.bytes_per_pixel = bits_per_pixel / 8;
|
|
|
|
vs->client_pf.depth = bits_per_pixel == 32 ? 24 : bits_per_pixel;
|
|
|
|
vs->client_be = big_endian_flag;
|
2009-01-16 01:17:38 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
set_pixel_conversion(vs);
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vga_hw_invalidate();
|
|
|
|
vga_hw_update();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-09-15 20:05:16 +04:00
|
|
|
static void pixel_format_message (VncState *vs) {
|
|
|
|
char pad[3] = { 0, 0, 0 };
|
|
|
|
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
vs->client_pf = qemu_default_pixelformat(32);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, vs->client_pf.bits_per_pixel); /* bits-per-pixel */
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, vs->client_pf.depth); /* depth */
|
2008-09-15 20:05:16 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2009-07-27 18:13:06 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef HOST_WORDS_BIGENDIAN
|
2008-09-15 20:05:16 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, 1); /* big-endian-flag */
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, 0); /* big-endian-flag */
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, 1); /* true-color-flag */
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, vs->client_pf.rmax); /* red-max */
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, vs->client_pf.gmax); /* green-max */
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, vs->client_pf.bmax); /* blue-max */
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, vs->client_pf.rshift); /* red-shift */
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, vs->client_pf.gshift); /* green-shift */
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, vs->client_pf.bshift); /* blue-shift */
|
|
|
|
vnc_write(vs, pad, 3); /* padding */
|
2010-05-03 16:31:34 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vnc_hextile_set_pixel_conversion(vs, 0);
|
2008-09-15 20:05:16 +04:00
|
|
|
vs->write_pixels = vnc_write_pixels_copy;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-02-16 17:59:30 +03:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_colordepth(VncState *vs)
|
2008-09-15 20:03:41 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2009-02-16 17:59:30 +03:00
|
|
|
if (vnc_has_feature(vs, VNC_FEATURE_WMVI)) {
|
2008-09-15 20:05:16 +04:00
|
|
|
/* Sending a WMVi message to notify the client*/
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_lock_output(vs);
|
2010-03-31 21:20:43 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, VNC_MSG_SERVER_FRAMEBUFFER_UPDATE);
|
2008-09-15 20:05:16 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, 0);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, 1); /* number of rects */
|
2009-02-16 17:59:30 +03:00
|
|
|
vnc_framebuffer_update(vs, 0, 0, ds_get_width(vs->ds),
|
|
|
|
ds_get_height(vs->ds), VNC_ENCODING_WMVi);
|
2008-09-15 20:05:16 +04:00
|
|
|
pixel_format_message(vs);
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_unlock_output(vs);
|
2008-09-15 20:05:16 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
2008-09-15 20:03:41 +04:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2009-01-16 01:17:38 +03:00
|
|
|
set_pixel_conversion(vs);
|
2008-09-15 20:03:41 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-12-16 06:02:09 +03:00
|
|
|
static int protocol_client_msg(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t len)
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
uint16_t limit;
|
2009-08-03 13:56:01 +04:00
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vd = vs->vd;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (data[0] > 3) {
|
|
|
|
vd->timer_interval = VNC_REFRESH_INTERVAL_BASE;
|
2011-03-11 18:47:48 +03:00
|
|
|
if (!qemu_timer_expired(vd->timer, qemu_get_clock_ms(rt_clock) + vd->timer_interval))
|
|
|
|
qemu_mod_timer(vd->timer, qemu_get_clock_ms(rt_clock) + vd->timer_interval);
|
2009-08-03 13:56:01 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (data[0]) {
|
2010-03-31 21:20:43 +04:00
|
|
|
case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_SET_PIXEL_FORMAT:
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
if (len == 1)
|
|
|
|
return 20;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
set_pixel_format(vs, read_u8(data, 4), read_u8(data, 5),
|
|
|
|
read_u8(data, 6), read_u8(data, 7),
|
|
|
|
read_u16(data, 8), read_u16(data, 10),
|
|
|
|
read_u16(data, 12), read_u8(data, 14),
|
|
|
|
read_u8(data, 15), read_u8(data, 16));
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2010-03-31 21:20:43 +04:00
|
|
|
case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_SET_ENCODINGS:
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
if (len == 1)
|
|
|
|
return 4;
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
if (len == 4) {
|
2008-12-23 00:06:23 +03:00
|
|
|
limit = read_u16(data, 2);
|
|
|
|
if (limit > 0)
|
|
|
|
return 4 + (limit * 4);
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
limit = read_u16(data, 2);
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < limit; i++) {
|
|
|
|
int32_t val = read_s32(data, 4 + (i * 4));
|
|
|
|
memcpy(data + 4 + (i * 4), &val, sizeof(val));
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
set_encodings(vs, (int32_t *)(data + 4), limit);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2010-03-31 21:20:43 +04:00
|
|
|
case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_FRAMEBUFFER_UPDATE_REQUEST:
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
if (len == 1)
|
|
|
|
return 10;
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
framebuffer_update_request(vs,
|
|
|
|
read_u8(data, 1), read_u16(data, 2), read_u16(data, 4),
|
|
|
|
read_u16(data, 6), read_u16(data, 8));
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2010-03-31 21:20:43 +04:00
|
|
|
case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_KEY_EVENT:
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
if (len == 1)
|
|
|
|
return 8;
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
key_event(vs, read_u8(data, 1), read_u32(data, 4));
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2010-03-31 21:20:43 +04:00
|
|
|
case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_POINTER_EVENT:
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
if (len == 1)
|
|
|
|
return 6;
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
pointer_event(vs, read_u8(data, 1), read_u16(data, 2), read_u16(data, 4));
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2010-03-31 21:20:43 +04:00
|
|
|
case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_CUT_TEXT:
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
if (len == 1)
|
|
|
|
return 8;
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
if (len == 8) {
|
2007-09-13 16:41:42 +04:00
|
|
|
uint32_t dlen = read_u32(data, 4);
|
|
|
|
if (dlen > 0)
|
|
|
|
return 8 + dlen;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
client_cut_text(vs, read_u32(data, 4), data + 8);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2010-03-31 21:20:43 +04:00
|
|
|
case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_QEMU:
|
2008-08-24 03:27:37 +04:00
|
|
|
if (len == 1)
|
|
|
|
return 2;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (read_u8(data, 1)) {
|
2010-03-31 21:20:43 +04:00
|
|
|
case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_QEMU_EXT_KEY_EVENT:
|
2008-08-24 03:27:37 +04:00
|
|
|
if (len == 2)
|
|
|
|
return 12;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ext_key_event(vs, read_u16(data, 2),
|
|
|
|
read_u32(data, 4), read_u32(data, 8));
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2010-03-31 21:20:43 +04:00
|
|
|
case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_QEMU_AUDIO:
|
2008-12-01 23:57:48 +03:00
|
|
|
if (len == 2)
|
|
|
|
return 4;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (read_u16 (data, 2)) {
|
2010-03-31 21:20:43 +04:00
|
|
|
case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_QEMU_AUDIO_ENABLE:
|
2008-12-01 23:57:48 +03:00
|
|
|
audio_add(vs);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2010-03-31 21:20:43 +04:00
|
|
|
case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_QEMU_AUDIO_DISABLE:
|
2008-12-01 23:57:48 +03:00
|
|
|
audio_del(vs);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2010-03-31 21:20:43 +04:00
|
|
|
case VNC_MSG_CLIENT_QEMU_AUDIO_SET_FORMAT:
|
2008-12-01 23:57:48 +03:00
|
|
|
if (len == 4)
|
|
|
|
return 10;
|
|
|
|
switch (read_u8(data, 4)) {
|
|
|
|
case 0: vs->as.fmt = AUD_FMT_U8; break;
|
|
|
|
case 1: vs->as.fmt = AUD_FMT_S8; break;
|
|
|
|
case 2: vs->as.fmt = AUD_FMT_U16; break;
|
|
|
|
case 3: vs->as.fmt = AUD_FMT_S16; break;
|
|
|
|
case 4: vs->as.fmt = AUD_FMT_U32; break;
|
|
|
|
case 5: vs->as.fmt = AUD_FMT_S32; break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
printf("Invalid audio format %d\n", read_u8(data, 4));
|
|
|
|
vnc_client_error(vs);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vs->as.nchannels = read_u8(data, 5);
|
|
|
|
if (vs->as.nchannels != 1 && vs->as.nchannels != 2) {
|
|
|
|
printf("Invalid audio channel coount %d\n",
|
|
|
|
read_u8(data, 5));
|
|
|
|
vnc_client_error(vs);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vs->as.freq = read_u32(data, 6);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
printf ("Invalid audio message %d\n", read_u8(data, 4));
|
|
|
|
vnc_client_error(vs);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
2008-08-24 03:27:37 +04:00
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
printf("Msg: %d\n", read_u16(data, 0));
|
|
|
|
vnc_client_error(vs);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
default:
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
printf("Msg: %d\n", data[0]);
|
|
|
|
vnc_client_error(vs);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-09-17 01:08:06 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_read_when(vs, protocol_client_msg, 1);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-12-16 06:02:09 +03:00
|
|
|
static int protocol_client_init(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t len)
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2007-03-19 18:17:08 +03:00
|
|
|
char buf[1024];
|
2011-11-24 21:10:49 +04:00
|
|
|
VncShareMode mode;
|
2007-03-19 18:17:08 +03:00
|
|
|
int size;
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2011-11-24 21:10:49 +04:00
|
|
|
mode = data[0] ? VNC_SHARE_MODE_SHARED : VNC_SHARE_MODE_EXCLUSIVE;
|
|
|
|
switch (vs->vd->share_policy) {
|
|
|
|
case VNC_SHARE_POLICY_IGNORE:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Ignore the shared flag. Nothing to do here.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Doesn't conform to the rfb spec but is traditional qemu
|
|
|
|
* behavior, thus left here as option for compatibility
|
|
|
|
* reasons.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VNC_SHARE_POLICY_ALLOW_EXCLUSIVE:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Policy: Allow clients ask for exclusive access.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Implementation: When a client asks for exclusive access,
|
|
|
|
* disconnect all others. Shared connects are allowed as long
|
|
|
|
* as no exclusive connection exists.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This is how the rfb spec suggests to handle the shared flag.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (mode == VNC_SHARE_MODE_EXCLUSIVE) {
|
|
|
|
VncState *client;
|
|
|
|
QTAILQ_FOREACH(client, &vs->vd->clients, next) {
|
|
|
|
if (vs == client) {
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (client->share_mode != VNC_SHARE_MODE_EXCLUSIVE &&
|
|
|
|
client->share_mode != VNC_SHARE_MODE_SHARED) {
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vnc_disconnect_start(client);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (mode == VNC_SHARE_MODE_SHARED) {
|
|
|
|
if (vs->vd->num_exclusive > 0) {
|
|
|
|
vnc_disconnect_start(vs);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VNC_SHARE_POLICY_FORCE_SHARED:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Policy: Shared connects only.
|
|
|
|
* Implementation: Disallow clients asking for exclusive access.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Useful for shared desktop sessions where you don't want
|
|
|
|
* someone forgetting to say -shared when running the vnc
|
|
|
|
* client disconnect everybody else.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (mode == VNC_SHARE_MODE_EXCLUSIVE) {
|
|
|
|
vnc_disconnect_start(vs);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vnc_set_share_mode(vs, mode);
|
|
|
|
|
2010-05-25 20:25:18 +04:00
|
|
|
vs->client_width = ds_get_width(vs->ds);
|
|
|
|
vs->client_height = ds_get_height(vs->ds);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, vs->client_width);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u16(vs, vs->client_height);
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2008-09-15 20:05:16 +04:00
|
|
|
pixel_format_message(vs);
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2007-03-19 18:17:08 +03:00
|
|
|
if (qemu_name)
|
|
|
|
size = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "QEMU (%s)", qemu_name);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
size = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "QEMU");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u32(vs, size);
|
|
|
|
vnc_write(vs, buf, size);
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
|
|
|
|
2010-01-14 19:50:56 +03:00
|
|
|
vnc_client_cache_auth(vs);
|
QMP: Introduce VNC_INITIALIZED event
It's emitted when a VNC client session is activated by QEMU,
client's information such as port, IP and auth ID (if the
session is authenticated) are provided.
Event example:
{ "event": "VNC_INITIALIZED",
"timestamp": {"seconds": 1263475302, "microseconds": 150772},
"data": {
"server": { "auth": "sasl", "family": "ipv4",
"service": "5901", "host": "0.0.0.0"},
"client": { "family": "ipv4", "service": "46089",
"host": "127.0.0.1", "sasl_username": "lcapitulino" } } }
Signed-off-by: Luiz Capitulino <lcapitulino@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
2010-01-14 19:50:59 +03:00
|
|
|
vnc_qmp_event(vs, QEVENT_VNC_INITIALIZED);
|
2010-01-14 19:50:56 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_read_when(vs, protocol_client_msg, 1);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 23:27:23 +03:00
|
|
|
void start_client_init(VncState *vs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
vnc_read_when(vs, protocol_client_init, 1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
static void make_challenge(VncState *vs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
srand(time(NULL)+getpid()+getpid()*987654+rand());
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0 ; i < sizeof(vs->challenge) ; i++)
|
|
|
|
vs->challenge[i] = (int) (256.0*rand()/(RAND_MAX+1.0));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-12-16 06:02:09 +03:00
|
|
|
static int protocol_client_auth_vnc(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t len)
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2007-12-16 06:02:09 +03:00
|
|
|
unsigned char response[VNC_AUTH_CHALLENGE_SIZE];
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
int i, j, pwlen;
|
2007-12-16 06:02:09 +03:00
|
|
|
unsigned char key[8];
|
2010-10-07 13:50:45 +04:00
|
|
|
time_t now = time(NULL);
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2011-01-31 23:27:36 +03:00
|
|
|
if (!vs->vd->password) {
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("No password configured on server");
|
2010-10-07 13:50:24 +04:00
|
|
|
goto reject;
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2010-10-07 13:50:45 +04:00
|
|
|
if (vs->vd->expires < now) {
|
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Password is expired");
|
|
|
|
goto reject;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(response, vs->challenge, VNC_AUTH_CHALLENGE_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Calculate the expected challenge response */
|
2009-02-16 17:59:30 +03:00
|
|
|
pwlen = strlen(vs->vd->password);
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
for (i=0; i<sizeof(key); i++)
|
2009-02-16 17:59:30 +03:00
|
|
|
key[i] = i<pwlen ? vs->vd->password[i] : 0;
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
deskey(key, EN0);
|
|
|
|
for (j = 0; j < VNC_AUTH_CHALLENGE_SIZE; j += 8)
|
|
|
|
des(response+j, response+j);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Compare expected vs actual challenge response */
|
|
|
|
if (memcmp(response, data, VNC_AUTH_CHALLENGE_SIZE) != 0) {
|
2011-11-22 14:06:24 +04:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Client challenge response did not match\n");
|
2010-10-07 13:50:24 +04:00
|
|
|
goto reject;
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Accepting VNC challenge response\n");
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u32(vs, 0); /* Accept auth */
|
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 23:27:23 +03:00
|
|
|
start_client_init(vs);
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2010-10-07 13:50:24 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
reject:
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u32(vs, 1); /* Reject auth */
|
|
|
|
if (vs->minor >= 8) {
|
|
|
|
static const char err[] = "Authentication failed";
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u32(vs, sizeof(err));
|
|
|
|
vnc_write(vs, err, sizeof(err));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
|
|
|
vnc_client_error(vs);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-03-06 23:27:23 +03:00
|
|
|
void start_auth_vnc(VncState *vs)
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
make_challenge(vs);
|
|
|
|
/* Send client a 'random' challenge */
|
|
|
|
vnc_write(vs, vs->challenge, sizeof(vs->challenge));
|
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vnc_read_when(vs, protocol_client_auth_vnc, sizeof(vs->challenge));
|
2007-08-25 05:39:10 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2007-12-16 06:02:09 +03:00
|
|
|
static int protocol_client_auth(VncState *vs, uint8_t *data, size_t len)
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* We only advertise 1 auth scheme at a time, so client
|
|
|
|
* must pick the one we sent. Verify this */
|
2011-06-23 16:31:41 +04:00
|
|
|
if (data[0] != vs->auth) { /* Reject auth */
|
Include auth credentials in 'info vnc' ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch extends the 'info vnc' monitor output to include information
about the VNC client authentication credentials.
For clients authenticated using SASL, this will output the username.
For clients authenticated using x509 certificates, this will output
the x509 distinguished name.
Auth can be stacked, so both username & x509 dname may be shown.
Server:
address: 0.0.0.0:5902
auth: vencrypt+x509+sasl
Client:
address: 10.33.6.67:38621
x509 dname: C=GB,O=ACME,L=London,ST=London,CN=localhost
username: admin
Client:
address: 10.33.6.63:38620
x509 dname: C=GB,O=ACME,L=London,ST=London,CN=localhost
username: admin
vnc-tls.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
vnc-tls.h | 3 +++
vnc.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++--
3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6725 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:32 +03:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Reject auth %d because it didn't match advertized\n", (int)data[0]);
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u32(vs, 1);
|
|
|
|
if (vs->minor >= 8) {
|
|
|
|
static const char err[] = "Authentication failed";
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u32(vs, sizeof(err));
|
|
|
|
vnc_write(vs, err, sizeof(err));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vnc_client_error(vs);
|
|
|
|
} else { /* Accept requested auth */
|
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Client requested auth %d\n", (int)data[0]);
|
2011-06-23 16:31:41 +04:00
|
|
|
switch (vs->auth) {
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_NONE:
|
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Accept auth none\n");
|
2007-10-31 04:58:56 +03:00
|
|
|
if (vs->minor >= 8) {
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u32(vs, 0); /* Accept auth completion */
|
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-03-06 23:27:23 +03:00
|
|
|
start_client_init(vs);
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_VNC:
|
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Start VNC auth\n");
|
2009-03-06 23:27:23 +03:00
|
|
|
start_auth_vnc(vs);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2008-09-06 21:47:39 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_TLS
|
2007-08-25 05:37:51 +04:00
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT:
|
2011-11-29 12:52:38 +04:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Accept VeNCrypt auth\n");
|
2009-03-06 23:27:23 +03:00
|
|
|
start_auth_vencrypt(vs);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2007-08-25 05:37:51 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_TLS */
|
|
|
|
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:28 +03:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
|
|
|
|
case VNC_AUTH_SASL:
|
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Accept SASL auth\n");
|
|
|
|
start_auth_sasl(vs);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_SASL */
|
|
|
|
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
default: /* Should not be possible, but just in case */
|
2011-06-23 16:31:41 +04:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Reject auth %d server code bug\n", vs->auth);
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, 1);
|
|
|
|
if (vs->minor >= 8) {
|
|
|
|
static const char err[] = "Authentication failed";
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u32(vs, sizeof(err));
|
|
|
|
vnc_write(vs, err, sizeof(err));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vnc_client_error(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-12-16 06:02:09 +03:00
|
|
|
static int protocol_version(VncState *vs, uint8_t *version, size_t len)
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char local[13];
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(local, version, 12);
|
|
|
|
local[12] = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
if (sscanf(local, "RFB %03d.%03d\n", &vs->major, &vs->minor) != 2) {
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Malformed protocol version %s\n", local);
|
|
|
|
vnc_client_error(vs);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Client request protocol version %d.%d\n", vs->major, vs->minor);
|
|
|
|
if (vs->major != 3 ||
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
(vs->minor != 3 &&
|
|
|
|
vs->minor != 4 &&
|
|
|
|
vs->minor != 5 &&
|
|
|
|
vs->minor != 7 &&
|
|
|
|
vs->minor != 8)) {
|
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Unsupported client version\n");
|
|
|
|
vnc_write_u32(vs, VNC_AUTH_INVALID);
|
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
|
|
|
vnc_client_error(vs);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-09-30 17:01:15 +04:00
|
|
|
/* Some broken clients report v3.4 or v3.5, which spec requires to be treated
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
* as equivalent to v3.3 by servers
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2007-09-30 17:01:15 +04:00
|
|
|
if (vs->minor == 4 || vs->minor == 5)
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
vs->minor = 3;
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (vs->minor == 3) {
|
2011-06-23 16:31:41 +04:00
|
|
|
if (vs->auth == VNC_AUTH_NONE) {
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Tell client auth none\n");
|
2011-06-23 16:31:41 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u32(vs, vs->auth);
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
start_client_init(vs);
|
2011-06-23 16:31:41 +04:00
|
|
|
} else if (vs->auth == VNC_AUTH_VNC) {
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Tell client VNC auth\n");
|
2011-06-23 16:31:41 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u32(vs, vs->auth);
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
|
|
|
start_auth_vnc(vs);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2011-06-23 16:31:41 +04:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Unsupported auth %d for protocol 3.3\n", vs->auth);
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u32(vs, VNC_AUTH_INVALID);
|
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
|
|
|
vnc_client_error(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2011-06-23 16:31:41 +04:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Telling client we support auth %d\n", vs->auth);
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, 1); /* num auth */
|
2011-06-23 16:31:41 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_write_u8(vs, vs->auth);
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
vnc_read_when(vs, protocol_client_auth, 1);
|
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-02-04 11:05:55 +03:00
|
|
|
static VncRectStat *vnc_stat_rect(VncDisplay *vd, int x, int y)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct VncSurface *vs = &vd->guest;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return &vs->stats[y / VNC_STAT_RECT][x / VNC_STAT_RECT];
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-02-04 11:05:56 +03:00
|
|
|
void vnc_sent_lossy_rect(VncState *vs, int x, int y, int w, int h)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i, j;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
w = (x + w) / VNC_STAT_RECT;
|
|
|
|
h = (y + h) / VNC_STAT_RECT;
|
|
|
|
x /= VNC_STAT_RECT;
|
|
|
|
y /= VNC_STAT_RECT;
|
|
|
|
|
2011-02-04 11:06:03 +03:00
|
|
|
for (j = y; j <= h; j++) {
|
|
|
|
for (i = x; i <= w; i++) {
|
2011-02-04 11:05:56 +03:00
|
|
|
vs->lossy_rect[j][i] = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int vnc_refresh_lossy_rect(VncDisplay *vd, int x, int y)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
VncState *vs;
|
|
|
|
int sty = y / VNC_STAT_RECT;
|
|
|
|
int stx = x / VNC_STAT_RECT;
|
|
|
|
int has_dirty = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
y = y / VNC_STAT_RECT * VNC_STAT_RECT;
|
|
|
|
x = x / VNC_STAT_RECT * VNC_STAT_RECT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
|
2011-02-04 11:06:05 +03:00
|
|
|
int j;
|
2011-02-04 11:05:56 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* kernel send buffers are full -> refresh later */
|
|
|
|
if (vs->output.offset) {
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!vs->lossy_rect[sty][stx]) {
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-02-04 11:06:03 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2011-02-04 11:05:56 +03:00
|
|
|
vs->lossy_rect[sty][stx] = 0;
|
|
|
|
for (j = 0; j < VNC_STAT_RECT; ++j) {
|
2011-02-04 11:06:05 +03:00
|
|
|
bitmap_set(vs->dirty[y + j], x / 16, VNC_STAT_RECT / 16);
|
2011-02-04 11:05:56 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
has_dirty++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-02-04 11:06:03 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2011-02-04 11:05:56 +03:00
|
|
|
return has_dirty;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int vnc_update_stats(VncDisplay *vd, struct timeval * tv)
|
2011-02-04 11:05:55 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
int width = pixman_image_get_width(vd->guest.fb);
|
|
|
|
int height = pixman_image_get_height(vd->guest.fb);
|
2011-02-04 11:05:55 +03:00
|
|
|
int x, y;
|
|
|
|
struct timeval res;
|
2011-02-04 11:05:56 +03:00
|
|
|
int has_dirty = 0;
|
2011-02-04 11:05:55 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
for (y = 0; y < height; y += VNC_STAT_RECT) {
|
|
|
|
for (x = 0; x < width; x += VNC_STAT_RECT) {
|
2011-02-04 11:05:55 +03:00
|
|
|
VncRectStat *rect = vnc_stat_rect(vd, x, y);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rect->updated = false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-03-13 13:30:52 +03:00
|
|
|
qemu_timersub(tv, &VNC_REFRESH_STATS, &res);
|
2011-02-04 11:05:55 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (timercmp(&vd->guest.last_freq_check, &res, >)) {
|
2011-02-04 11:05:56 +03:00
|
|
|
return has_dirty;
|
2011-02-04 11:05:55 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vd->guest.last_freq_check = *tv;
|
|
|
|
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
for (y = 0; y < height; y += VNC_STAT_RECT) {
|
|
|
|
for (x = 0; x < width; x += VNC_STAT_RECT) {
|
2011-02-04 11:05:55 +03:00
|
|
|
VncRectStat *rect= vnc_stat_rect(vd, x, y);
|
|
|
|
int count = ARRAY_SIZE(rect->times);
|
|
|
|
struct timeval min, max;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!timerisset(&rect->times[count - 1])) {
|
|
|
|
continue ;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
max = rect->times[(rect->idx + count - 1) % count];
|
2011-03-13 13:30:52 +03:00
|
|
|
qemu_timersub(tv, &max, &res);
|
2011-02-04 11:05:55 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (timercmp(&res, &VNC_REFRESH_LOSSY, >)) {
|
|
|
|
rect->freq = 0;
|
2011-02-04 11:05:56 +03:00
|
|
|
has_dirty += vnc_refresh_lossy_rect(vd, x, y);
|
2011-02-04 11:05:55 +03:00
|
|
|
memset(rect->times, 0, sizeof (rect->times));
|
|
|
|
continue ;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
min = rect->times[rect->idx];
|
|
|
|
max = rect->times[(rect->idx + count - 1) % count];
|
2011-03-13 13:30:52 +03:00
|
|
|
qemu_timersub(&max, &min, &res);
|
2011-02-04 11:05:55 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rect->freq = res.tv_sec + res.tv_usec / 1000000.;
|
|
|
|
rect->freq /= count;
|
|
|
|
rect->freq = 1. / rect->freq;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-02-04 11:05:56 +03:00
|
|
|
return has_dirty;
|
2011-02-04 11:05:55 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
double vnc_update_freq(VncState *vs, int x, int y, int w, int h)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i, j;
|
|
|
|
double total = 0;
|
|
|
|
int num = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
x = (x / VNC_STAT_RECT) * VNC_STAT_RECT;
|
|
|
|
y = (y / VNC_STAT_RECT) * VNC_STAT_RECT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (j = y; j <= y + h; j += VNC_STAT_RECT) {
|
|
|
|
for (i = x; i <= x + w; i += VNC_STAT_RECT) {
|
|
|
|
total += vnc_stat_rect(vs->vd, i, j)->freq;
|
|
|
|
num++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (num) {
|
|
|
|
return total / num;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void vnc_rect_updated(VncDisplay *vd, int x, int y, struct timeval * tv)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
VncRectStat *rect;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
rect = vnc_stat_rect(vd, x, y);
|
|
|
|
if (rect->updated) {
|
|
|
|
return ;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rect->times[rect->idx] = *tv;
|
|
|
|
rect->idx = (rect->idx + 1) % ARRAY_SIZE(rect->times);
|
|
|
|
rect->updated = true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
static int vnc_refresh_server_surface(VncDisplay *vd)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
int width = pixman_image_get_width(vd->guest.fb);
|
|
|
|
int height = pixman_image_get_height(vd->guest.fb);
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
int y;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *guest_row;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *server_row;
|
|
|
|
int cmp_bytes;
|
2010-02-05 14:04:05 +03:00
|
|
|
VncState *vs;
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
int has_dirty = 0;
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
pixman_image_t *tmpbuf = NULL;
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2011-02-04 11:06:08 +03:00
|
|
|
struct timeval tv = { 0, 0 };
|
2011-02-04 11:05:55 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2011-02-04 11:06:08 +03:00
|
|
|
if (!vd->non_adaptive) {
|
|
|
|
gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
|
|
|
|
has_dirty = vnc_update_stats(vd, &tv);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-02-04 11:05:55 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Walk through the guest dirty map.
|
|
|
|
* Check and copy modified bits from guest to server surface.
|
|
|
|
* Update server dirty map.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
cmp_bytes = 64;
|
|
|
|
if (cmp_bytes > vnc_server_fb_stride(vd)) {
|
|
|
|
cmp_bytes = vnc_server_fb_stride(vd);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (vd->guest.format != VNC_SERVER_FB_FORMAT) {
|
|
|
|
int width = pixman_image_get_width(vd->server);
|
|
|
|
tmpbuf = qemu_pixman_linebuf_create(VNC_SERVER_FB_FORMAT, width);
|
2012-03-14 10:58:48 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
guest_row = (uint8_t *)pixman_image_get_data(vd->guest.fb);
|
|
|
|
server_row = (uint8_t *)pixman_image_get_data(vd->server);
|
|
|
|
for (y = 0; y < height; y++) {
|
2011-03-03 23:37:55 +03:00
|
|
|
if (!bitmap_empty(vd->guest.dirty[y], VNC_DIRTY_BITS)) {
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
int x;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *guest_ptr;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t *server_ptr;
|
|
|
|
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
if (vd->guest.format != VNC_SERVER_FB_FORMAT) {
|
2012-12-14 11:54:24 +04:00
|
|
|
qemu_pixman_linebuf_fill(tmpbuf, vd->guest.fb, width, 0, y);
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
guest_ptr = (uint8_t *)pixman_image_get_data(tmpbuf);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
guest_ptr = guest_row;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
server_ptr = server_row;
|
|
|
|
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
for (x = 0; x + 15 < width;
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
x += 16, guest_ptr += cmp_bytes, server_ptr += cmp_bytes) {
|
2011-02-04 11:06:05 +03:00
|
|
|
if (!test_and_clear_bit((x / 16), vd->guest.dirty[y]))
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (memcmp(server_ptr, guest_ptr, cmp_bytes) == 0)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(server_ptr, guest_ptr, cmp_bytes);
|
2011-02-04 11:06:08 +03:00
|
|
|
if (!vd->non_adaptive)
|
|
|
|
vnc_rect_updated(vd, x, y, &tv);
|
2010-02-05 14:04:05 +03:00
|
|
|
QTAILQ_FOREACH(vs, &vd->clients, next) {
|
2011-02-04 11:06:05 +03:00
|
|
|
set_bit((x / 16), vs->dirty[y]);
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
has_dirty++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
guest_row += pixman_image_get_stride(vd->guest.fb);
|
|
|
|
server_row += pixman_image_get_stride(vd->server);
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2012-10-10 15:29:43 +04:00
|
|
|
qemu_pixman_image_unref(tmpbuf);
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
return has_dirty;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-08-03 13:54:05 +04:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_refresh(void *opaque)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vd = opaque;
|
2010-02-05 14:04:05 +03:00
|
|
|
VncState *vs, *vn;
|
|
|
|
int has_dirty, rects = 0;
|
2009-08-03 13:54:05 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vga_hw_update();
|
|
|
|
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
if (vnc_trylock_display(vd)) {
|
|
|
|
vd->timer_interval = VNC_REFRESH_INTERVAL_BASE;
|
2011-03-11 18:47:48 +03:00
|
|
|
qemu_mod_timer(vd->timer, qemu_get_clock_ms(rt_clock) +
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
vd->timer_interval);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
has_dirty = vnc_refresh_server_surface(vd);
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_unlock_display(vd);
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2010-02-05 14:04:05 +03:00
|
|
|
QTAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(vs, &vd->clients, next, vn) {
|
2009-08-03 13:56:01 +04:00
|
|
|
rects += vnc_update_client(vs, has_dirty);
|
2010-01-25 15:54:57 +03:00
|
|
|
/* vs might be free()ed here */
|
2009-08-03 13:54:05 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2010-01-11 20:30:50 +03:00
|
|
|
/* vd->timer could be NULL now if the last client disconnected,
|
|
|
|
* in this case don't update the timer */
|
|
|
|
if (vd->timer == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
2009-08-03 13:54:05 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2009-08-03 13:56:01 +04:00
|
|
|
if (has_dirty && rects) {
|
|
|
|
vd->timer_interval /= 2;
|
|
|
|
if (vd->timer_interval < VNC_REFRESH_INTERVAL_BASE)
|
|
|
|
vd->timer_interval = VNC_REFRESH_INTERVAL_BASE;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
vd->timer_interval += VNC_REFRESH_INTERVAL_INC;
|
|
|
|
if (vd->timer_interval > VNC_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MAX)
|
|
|
|
vd->timer_interval = VNC_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MAX;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-03-11 18:47:48 +03:00
|
|
|
qemu_mod_timer(vd->timer, qemu_get_clock_ms(rt_clock) + vd->timer_interval);
|
2009-08-03 13:54:05 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void vnc_init_timer(VncDisplay *vd)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2009-08-03 13:56:01 +04:00
|
|
|
vd->timer_interval = VNC_REFRESH_INTERVAL_BASE;
|
2010-02-05 14:04:05 +03:00
|
|
|
if (vd->timer == NULL && !QTAILQ_EMPTY(&vd->clients)) {
|
2011-03-11 18:47:48 +03:00
|
|
|
vd->timer = qemu_new_timer_ms(rt_clock, vnc_refresh, vd);
|
2013-02-28 18:03:04 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_dpy_switch(&vd->dcl, vd->ds, vd->ds->surface);
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_refresh(vd);
|
2009-08-03 13:54:05 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void vnc_remove_timer(VncDisplay *vd)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2010-02-05 14:04:05 +03:00
|
|
|
if (vd->timer != NULL && QTAILQ_EMPTY(&vd->clients)) {
|
2009-08-03 13:54:05 +04:00
|
|
|
qemu_del_timer(vd->timer);
|
|
|
|
qemu_free_timer(vd->timer);
|
|
|
|
vd->timer = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-01-21 14:04:44 +04:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_connect(VncDisplay *vd, int csock, int skipauth, bool websocket)
|
2008-02-03 05:54:04 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
2011-08-21 07:09:37 +04:00
|
|
|
VncState *vs = g_malloc0(sizeof(VncState));
|
2011-02-04 11:05:56 +03:00
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-02-16 17:59:30 +03:00
|
|
|
vs->csock = csock;
|
2011-06-23 16:31:41 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (skipauth) {
|
|
|
|
vs->auth = VNC_AUTH_NONE;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_TLS
|
|
|
|
vs->subauth = VNC_AUTH_INVALID;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
vs->auth = vd->auth;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_TLS
|
|
|
|
vs->subauth = vd->subauth;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-08-21 07:09:37 +04:00
|
|
|
vs->lossy_rect = g_malloc0(VNC_STAT_ROWS * sizeof (*vs->lossy_rect));
|
2011-02-04 11:05:56 +03:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < VNC_STAT_ROWS; ++i) {
|
2011-08-21 07:09:37 +04:00
|
|
|
vs->lossy_rect[i] = g_malloc0(VNC_STAT_COLS * sizeof (uint8_t));
|
2011-02-04 11:05:56 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-02-16 17:59:30 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("New client on socket %d\n", csock);
|
2013-02-28 14:34:31 +04:00
|
|
|
vd->dcl.idle = 0;
|
2008-02-03 05:54:04 +03:00
|
|
|
socket_set_nonblock(vs->csock);
|
2013-01-21 14:04:44 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_WS
|
|
|
|
if (websocket) {
|
|
|
|
vs->websocket = 1;
|
|
|
|
qemu_set_fd_handler2(vs->csock, NULL, vncws_handshake_read, NULL, vs);
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_WS */
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
qemu_set_fd_handler2(vs->csock, NULL, vnc_client_read, NULL, vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2009-02-16 17:59:30 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2010-01-14 19:50:56 +03:00
|
|
|
vnc_client_cache_addr(vs);
|
QMP: Introduce VNC_CONNECTED event
It's emitted when a VNC client connects to QEMU, client's information
such as port and IP address are provided.
Note that this event is emitted right when the connection is
established. This means that it happens before authentication
procedure and session initialization.
Event example:
{ "event": "VNC_CONNECTED",
"timestamp": { "seconds": 1262976601, "microseconds": 975795 },
"data": {
"server": { "auth": "sasl", "family": "ipv4",
"service": "5901", "host": "0.0.0.0" },
"client": { "family": "ipv4", "service": "58425",
"host": "127.0.0.1" } } }
Signed-off-by: Luiz Capitulino <lcapitulino@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
2010-01-14 19:50:57 +03:00
|
|
|
vnc_qmp_event(vs, QEVENT_VNC_CONNECTED);
|
2011-11-24 21:10:49 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_set_share_mode(vs, VNC_SHARE_MODE_CONNECTING);
|
2010-01-14 19:50:56 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2009-02-16 17:59:30 +03:00
|
|
|
vs->vd = vd;
|
2013-01-21 14:04:44 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_WS
|
|
|
|
if (!vs->websocket)
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
vnc_init_state(vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void vnc_init_state(VncState *vs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2013-01-21 14:04:45 +04:00
|
|
|
vs->initialized = true;
|
2013-01-21 14:04:44 +04:00
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vd = vs->vd;
|
|
|
|
|
2009-02-16 17:59:30 +03:00
|
|
|
vs->ds = vd->ds;
|
|
|
|
vs->last_x = -1;
|
|
|
|
vs->last_y = -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vs->as.freq = 44100;
|
|
|
|
vs->as.nchannels = 2;
|
|
|
|
vs->as.fmt = AUD_FMT_S16;
|
|
|
|
vs->as.endianness = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
qemu_mutex_init(&vs->output_mutex);
|
2012-03-14 10:58:47 +04:00
|
|
|
vs->bh = qemu_bh_new(vnc_jobs_bh, vs);
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2010-02-05 14:04:05 +03:00
|
|
|
QTAILQ_INSERT_HEAD(&vd->clients, vs, next);
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vga_hw_update();
|
|
|
|
|
2008-02-03 05:54:04 +03:00
|
|
|
vnc_write(vs, "RFB 003.008\n", 12);
|
|
|
|
vnc_flush(vs);
|
|
|
|
vnc_read_when(vs, protocol_version, 12);
|
2008-12-01 23:57:52 +03:00
|
|
|
reset_keys(vs);
|
2010-03-10 19:12:02 +03:00
|
|
|
if (vs->vd->lock_key_sync)
|
|
|
|
vs->led = qemu_add_led_event_handler(kbd_leds, vs);
|
2009-02-16 17:59:30 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2010-03-10 18:38:29 +03:00
|
|
|
vs->mouse_mode_notifier.notify = check_pointer_type_change;
|
|
|
|
qemu_add_mouse_mode_change_notifier(&vs->mouse_mode_notifier);
|
|
|
|
|
2009-08-03 13:54:05 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_init_timer(vd);
|
2009-08-03 13:54:32 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2009-06-16 16:19:48 +04:00
|
|
|
/* vs might be free()ed here */
|
2008-02-03 05:54:04 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-01-21 14:04:44 +04:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_listen_read(void *opaque, bool websocket)
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2009-02-16 17:59:30 +03:00
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vs = opaque;
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
struct sockaddr_in addr;
|
|
|
|
socklen_t addrlen = sizeof(addr);
|
2013-01-21 14:04:44 +04:00
|
|
|
int csock;
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2008-01-15 00:45:55 +03:00
|
|
|
/* Catch-up */
|
|
|
|
vga_hw_update();
|
2013-01-21 14:04:44 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_WS
|
|
|
|
if (websocket) {
|
|
|
|
csock = qemu_accept(vs->lwebsock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen);
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_WS */
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
csock = qemu_accept(vs->lsock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2008-01-15 00:45:55 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2009-02-16 17:59:30 +03:00
|
|
|
if (csock != -1) {
|
2013-01-21 14:04:44 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_connect(vs, csock, 0, websocket);
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2013-01-21 14:04:44 +04:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_listen_regular_read(void *opaque)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
vnc_listen_read(opaque, 0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_WS
|
|
|
|
static void vnc_listen_websocket_read(void *opaque)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
vnc_listen_read(opaque, 1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_WS */
|
|
|
|
|
2012-11-13 17:51:41 +04:00
|
|
|
static const DisplayChangeListenerOps dcl_ops = {
|
|
|
|
.dpy_name = "vnc",
|
|
|
|
.dpy_gfx_copy = vnc_dpy_copy,
|
|
|
|
.dpy_gfx_update = vnc_dpy_update,
|
2013-02-28 18:03:04 +04:00
|
|
|
.dpy_gfx_switch = vnc_dpy_switch,
|
2012-11-13 17:51:41 +04:00
|
|
|
.dpy_mouse_set = vnc_mouse_set,
|
|
|
|
.dpy_cursor_define = vnc_dpy_cursor_define,
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
2007-08-25 05:35:38 +04:00
|
|
|
void vnc_display_init(DisplayState *ds)
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2011-08-21 07:09:37 +04:00
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vs = g_malloc0(sizeof(*vs));
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2013-02-28 14:34:31 +04:00
|
|
|
vs->dcl.idle = 1;
|
2009-02-16 17:59:30 +03:00
|
|
|
vnc_display = vs;
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vs->lsock = -1;
|
2013-01-21 14:04:44 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_WS
|
|
|
|
vs->lwebsock = -1;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vs->ds = ds;
|
2010-02-05 14:04:05 +03:00
|
|
|
QTAILQ_INIT(&vs->clients);
|
2010-10-07 13:50:45 +04:00
|
|
|
vs->expires = TIME_MAX;
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2008-08-24 03:27:37 +04:00
|
|
|
if (keyboard_layout)
|
2009-03-06 23:27:10 +03:00
|
|
|
vs->kbd_layout = init_keyboard_layout(name2keysym, keyboard_layout);
|
2008-08-24 03:27:37 +04:00
|
|
|
else
|
2009-03-06 23:27:10 +03:00
|
|
|
vs->kbd_layout = init_keyboard_layout(name2keysym, "en-us");
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!vs->kbd_layout)
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
exit(1);
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2010-07-07 22:58:02 +04:00
|
|
|
qemu_mutex_init(&vs->mutex);
|
|
|
|
vnc_start_worker_thread();
|
|
|
|
|
2013-02-28 14:34:31 +04:00
|
|
|
vs->dcl.ops = &dcl_ops;
|
|
|
|
register_displaychangelistener(ds, &vs->dcl);
|
2007-08-25 05:35:38 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-08-25 05:39:57 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2012-10-28 15:04:48 +04:00
|
|
|
static void vnc_display_close(DisplayState *ds)
|
2007-08-25 05:35:38 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2013-02-28 14:34:31 +04:00
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vs = vnc_display;
|
2007-08-25 05:35:38 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2009-02-12 00:00:38 +03:00
|
|
|
if (!vs)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
2007-08-25 05:35:38 +04:00
|
|
|
if (vs->display) {
|
2011-08-21 07:09:37 +04:00
|
|
|
g_free(vs->display);
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
vs->display = NULL;
|
2007-08-25 05:35:38 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (vs->lsock != -1) {
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
qemu_set_fd_handler2(vs->lsock, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
|
|
|
close(vs->lsock);
|
|
|
|
vs->lsock = -1;
|
2007-08-25 05:35:38 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2013-01-21 14:04:44 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_WS
|
|
|
|
g_free(vs->ws_display);
|
|
|
|
vs->ws_display = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (vs->lwebsock != -1) {
|
|
|
|
qemu_set_fd_handler2(vs->lwebsock, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
|
|
|
close(vs->lwebsock);
|
|
|
|
vs->lwebsock = -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_WS */
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
vs->auth = VNC_AUTH_INVALID;
|
2008-09-06 21:47:39 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_TLS
|
2007-08-25 05:37:51 +04:00
|
|
|
vs->subauth = VNC_AUTH_INVALID;
|
2009-03-06 23:27:23 +03:00
|
|
|
vs->tls.x509verify = 0;
|
2007-08-25 05:37:51 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-10-28 15:04:48 +04:00
|
|
|
static int vnc_display_disable_login(DisplayState *ds)
|
2011-01-31 23:27:36 +03:00
|
|
|
{
|
2013-02-28 14:34:31 +04:00
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vs = vnc_display;
|
2011-01-31 23:27:36 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!vs) {
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (vs->password) {
|
2011-08-21 07:09:37 +04:00
|
|
|
g_free(vs->password);
|
2011-01-31 23:27:36 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
vs->password = NULL;
|
2012-02-14 16:37:29 +04:00
|
|
|
if (vs->auth == VNC_AUTH_NONE) {
|
|
|
|
vs->auth = VNC_AUTH_VNC;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-01-31 23:27:36 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
int vnc_display_password(DisplayState *ds, const char *password)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2013-02-28 14:34:31 +04:00
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vs = vnc_display;
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2009-07-30 14:15:00 +04:00
|
|
|
if (!vs) {
|
2011-12-07 16:19:10 +04:00
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
2009-07-30 14:15:00 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-01-31 23:27:36 +03:00
|
|
|
if (!password) {
|
|
|
|
/* This is not the intention of this interface but err on the side
|
|
|
|
of being safe */
|
2011-12-07 16:19:10 +04:00
|
|
|
return vnc_display_disable_login(ds);
|
2011-01-31 23:27:36 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
if (vs->password) {
|
2011-08-21 07:09:37 +04:00
|
|
|
g_free(vs->password);
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
vs->password = NULL;
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-08-21 07:09:37 +04:00
|
|
|
vs->password = g_strdup(password);
|
2012-02-14 16:37:29 +04:00
|
|
|
if (vs->auth == VNC_AUTH_NONE) {
|
|
|
|
vs->auth = VNC_AUTH_VNC;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-12-07 16:19:10 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2007-08-25 05:35:38 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-10-07 13:50:45 +04:00
|
|
|
int vnc_display_pw_expire(DisplayState *ds, time_t expires)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2013-02-28 14:34:31 +04:00
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vs = vnc_display;
|
2010-10-07 13:50:45 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2012-05-24 12:55:01 +04:00
|
|
|
if (!vs) {
|
|
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2010-10-07 13:50:45 +04:00
|
|
|
vs->expires = expires;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2009-05-20 22:01:02 +04:00
|
|
|
char *vnc_display_local_addr(DisplayState *ds)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2013-02-28 14:34:31 +04:00
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vs = vnc_display;
|
2009-05-20 22:01:02 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return vnc_socket_local_addr("%s:%s", vs->lsock);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2012-10-02 12:17:21 +04:00
|
|
|
void vnc_display_open(DisplayState *ds, const char *display, Error **errp)
|
2007-08-25 05:35:38 +04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2013-02-28 14:34:31 +04:00
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vs = vnc_display;
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
const char *options;
|
|
|
|
int password = 0;
|
2008-02-03 05:54:04 +03:00
|
|
|
int reverse = 0;
|
2008-09-06 21:47:39 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_TLS
|
2007-08-25 05:38:36 +04:00
|
|
|
int tls = 0, x509 = 0;
|
2007-08-25 05:37:51 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:28 +03:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
|
|
|
|
int sasl = 0;
|
|
|
|
int saslErr;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2010-10-13 22:38:08 +04:00
|
|
|
#if defined(CONFIG_VNC_TLS) || defined(CONFIG_VNC_SASL)
|
Support ACLs for controlling VNC access ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch introduces a generic internal API for access control lists
to be used by network servers in QEMU. It adds support for checking
these ACL in the VNC server, in two places. The first ACL is for the
SASL authentication mechanism, checking the SASL username. This ACL
is called 'vnc.username'. The second is for the TLS authentication
mechanism, when x509 client certificates are turned on, checking against
the Distinguished Name of the client. This ACL is called 'vnc.x509dname'
The internal API provides for an ACL with the following characteristics
- A unique name, eg vnc.username, and vnc.x509dname.
- A default policy, allow or deny
- An ordered series of match rules, with allow or deny policy
If none of the match rules apply, then the default policy is
used.
There is a monitor API to manipulate the ACLs, which I'll describe via
examples
(qemu) acl show vnc.username
policy: allow
(qemu) acl policy vnc.username denya
acl: policy set to 'deny'
(qemu) acl allow vnc.username fred
acl: added rule at position 1
(qemu) acl allow vnc.username bob
acl: added rule at position 2
(qemu) acl allow vnc.username joe 1
acl: added rule at position 1
(qemu) acl show vnc.username
policy: deny
0: allow fred
1: allow joe
2: allow bob
(qemu) acl show vnc.x509dname
policy: allow
(qemu) acl policy vnc.x509dname deny
acl: policy set to 'deny'
(qemu) acl allow vnc.x509dname C=GB,O=ACME,L=London,CN=*
acl: added rule at position 1
(qemu) acl allow vnc.x509dname C=GB,O=ACME,L=Boston,CN=bob
acl: added rule at position 2
(qemu) acl show vnc.x509dname
policy: deny
0: allow C=GB,O=ACME,L=London,CN=*
1: allow C=GB,O=ACME,L=Boston,CN=bob
By default the VNC server will not use any ACLs, allowing access to
the server if the user successfully authenticates. To enable use of
ACLs to restrict user access, the ',acl' flag should be given when
starting QEMU. The initial ACL activated will be a 'deny all' policy
and should be customized using monitor commands.
eg enable SASL auth and ACLs
qemu .... -vnc localhost:1,sasl,acl
The next patch will provide a way to load a pre-defined ACL when
starting up
Makefile | 6 +
b/acl.c | 185 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/acl.h | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++
configure | 18 +++++
monitor.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
qemu-doc.texi | 49 ++++++++++++++
vnc-auth-sasl.c | 16 +++-
vnc-auth-sasl.h | 7 ++
vnc-tls.c | 19 +++++
vnc-tls.h | 3
vnc.c | 21 ++++++
vnc.h | 3
12 files changed, 491 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6726 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:37 +03:00
|
|
|
int acl = 0;
|
2010-10-13 22:38:08 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2010-03-10 19:12:02 +03:00
|
|
|
int lock_key_sync = 1;
|
2007-08-25 05:35:38 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2012-10-02 12:17:21 +04:00
|
|
|
if (!vnc_display) {
|
|
|
|
error_setg(errp, "VNC display not active");
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-08-25 05:35:38 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_display_close(ds);
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
if (strcmp(display, "none") == 0)
|
2012-10-02 12:17:21 +04:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2012-10-18 11:07:05 +04:00
|
|
|
vs->display = g_strdup(display);
|
2011-11-24 21:10:49 +04:00
|
|
|
vs->share_policy = VNC_SHARE_POLICY_ALLOW_EXCLUSIVE;
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
options = display;
|
|
|
|
while ((options = strchr(options, ','))) {
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
options++;
|
|
|
|
if (strncmp(options, "password", 8) == 0) {
|
2012-08-03 22:39:21 +04:00
|
|
|
if (fips_get_state()) {
|
2012-10-02 12:17:21 +04:00
|
|
|
error_setg(errp,
|
|
|
|
"VNC password auth disabled due to FIPS mode, "
|
|
|
|
"consider using the VeNCrypt or SASL authentication "
|
|
|
|
"methods as an alternative");
|
2012-10-18 11:07:05 +04:00
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
2012-08-03 22:39:21 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
password = 1; /* Require password auth */
|
|
|
|
} else if (strncmp(options, "reverse", 7) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
reverse = 1;
|
2012-01-06 20:57:45 +04:00
|
|
|
} else if (strncmp(options, "no-lock-key-sync", 16) == 0) {
|
2010-03-10 19:12:02 +03:00
|
|
|
lock_key_sync = 0;
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:28 +03:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
} else if (strncmp(options, "sasl", 4) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
sasl = 1; /* Require SASL auth */
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:28 +03:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2013-01-21 14:04:44 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_WS
|
|
|
|
} else if (strncmp(options, "websocket", 9) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
char *start, *end;
|
|
|
|
vs->websocket = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Check for 'websocket=<port>' */
|
|
|
|
start = strchr(options, '=');
|
|
|
|
end = strchr(options, ',');
|
|
|
|
if (start && (!end || (start < end))) {
|
|
|
|
int len = end ? end-(start+1) : strlen(start+1);
|
|
|
|
if (len < 6) {
|
|
|
|
/* extract the host specification from display */
|
|
|
|
char *host = NULL, *port = NULL, *host_end = NULL;
|
|
|
|
port = g_strndup(start + 1, len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* ipv6 hosts have colons */
|
|
|
|
end = strchr(display, ',');
|
|
|
|
host_end = g_strrstr_len(display, end - display, ":");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (host_end) {
|
|
|
|
host = g_strndup(display, host_end - display + 1);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
host = g_strndup(":", 1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vs->ws_display = g_strconcat(host, port, NULL);
|
|
|
|
g_free(host);
|
|
|
|
g_free(port);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_WS */
|
2008-09-06 21:47:39 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_TLS
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
} else if (strncmp(options, "tls", 3) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
tls = 1; /* Require TLS */
|
|
|
|
} else if (strncmp(options, "x509", 4) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
char *start, *end;
|
|
|
|
x509 = 1; /* Require x509 certificates */
|
|
|
|
if (strncmp(options, "x509verify", 10) == 0)
|
|
|
|
vs->tls.x509verify = 1; /* ...and verify client certs */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Now check for 'x509=/some/path' postfix
|
|
|
|
* and use that to setup x509 certificate/key paths */
|
|
|
|
start = strchr(options, '=');
|
|
|
|
end = strchr(options, ',');
|
|
|
|
if (start && (!end || (start < end))) {
|
|
|
|
int len = end ? end-(start+1) : strlen(start+1);
|
2011-08-21 07:09:37 +04:00
|
|
|
char *path = g_strndup(start + 1, len);
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Trying certificate path '%s'\n", path);
|
|
|
|
if (vnc_tls_set_x509_creds_dir(vs, path) < 0) {
|
2012-10-02 12:17:21 +04:00
|
|
|
error_setg(errp, "Failed to find x509 certificates/keys in %s", path);
|
2011-08-21 07:09:37 +04:00
|
|
|
g_free(path);
|
2012-10-18 11:07:05 +04:00
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2011-08-21 07:09:37 +04:00
|
|
|
g_free(path);
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2012-10-02 12:17:21 +04:00
|
|
|
error_setg(errp, "No certificate path provided");
|
2012-10-18 11:07:05 +04:00
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-08-25 05:37:51 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2010-10-13 22:38:08 +04:00
|
|
|
#if defined(CONFIG_VNC_TLS) || defined(CONFIG_VNC_SASL)
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
} else if (strncmp(options, "acl", 3) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
acl = 1;
|
2010-10-13 22:38:08 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2010-07-07 22:57:51 +04:00
|
|
|
} else if (strncmp(options, "lossy", 5) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
vs->lossy = true;
|
2012-11-10 04:01:26 +04:00
|
|
|
} else if (strncmp(options, "non-adaptive", 12) == 0) {
|
2011-02-04 11:06:08 +03:00
|
|
|
vs->non_adaptive = true;
|
2011-11-24 21:10:49 +04:00
|
|
|
} else if (strncmp(options, "share=", 6) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (strncmp(options+6, "ignore", 6) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
vs->share_policy = VNC_SHARE_POLICY_IGNORE;
|
|
|
|
} else if (strncmp(options+6, "allow-exclusive", 15) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
vs->share_policy = VNC_SHARE_POLICY_ALLOW_EXCLUSIVE;
|
|
|
|
} else if (strncmp(options+6, "force-shared", 12) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
vs->share_policy = VNC_SHARE_POLICY_FORCE_SHARED;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2012-10-02 12:17:21 +04:00
|
|
|
error_setg(errp, "unknown vnc share= option");
|
2012-10-18 11:07:05 +04:00
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
2011-11-24 21:10:49 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Support ACLs for controlling VNC access ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch introduces a generic internal API for access control lists
to be used by network servers in QEMU. It adds support for checking
these ACL in the VNC server, in two places. The first ACL is for the
SASL authentication mechanism, checking the SASL username. This ACL
is called 'vnc.username'. The second is for the TLS authentication
mechanism, when x509 client certificates are turned on, checking against
the Distinguished Name of the client. This ACL is called 'vnc.x509dname'
The internal API provides for an ACL with the following characteristics
- A unique name, eg vnc.username, and vnc.x509dname.
- A default policy, allow or deny
- An ordered series of match rules, with allow or deny policy
If none of the match rules apply, then the default policy is
used.
There is a monitor API to manipulate the ACLs, which I'll describe via
examples
(qemu) acl show vnc.username
policy: allow
(qemu) acl policy vnc.username denya
acl: policy set to 'deny'
(qemu) acl allow vnc.username fred
acl: added rule at position 1
(qemu) acl allow vnc.username bob
acl: added rule at position 2
(qemu) acl allow vnc.username joe 1
acl: added rule at position 1
(qemu) acl show vnc.username
policy: deny
0: allow fred
1: allow joe
2: allow bob
(qemu) acl show vnc.x509dname
policy: allow
(qemu) acl policy vnc.x509dname deny
acl: policy set to 'deny'
(qemu) acl allow vnc.x509dname C=GB,O=ACME,L=London,CN=*
acl: added rule at position 1
(qemu) acl allow vnc.x509dname C=GB,O=ACME,L=Boston,CN=bob
acl: added rule at position 2
(qemu) acl show vnc.x509dname
policy: deny
0: allow C=GB,O=ACME,L=London,CN=*
1: allow C=GB,O=ACME,L=Boston,CN=bob
By default the VNC server will not use any ACLs, allowing access to
the server if the user successfully authenticates. To enable use of
ACLs to restrict user access, the ',acl' flag should be given when
starting QEMU. The initial ACL activated will be a 'deny all' policy
and should be customized using monitor commands.
eg enable SASL auth and ACLs
qemu .... -vnc localhost:1,sasl,acl
The next patch will provide a way to load a pre-defined ACL when
starting up
Makefile | 6 +
b/acl.c | 185 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/acl.h | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++
configure | 18 +++++
monitor.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
qemu-doc.texi | 49 ++++++++++++++
vnc-auth-sasl.c | 16 +++-
vnc-auth-sasl.h | 7 ++
vnc-tls.c | 19 +++++
vnc-tls.h | 3
vnc.c | 21 ++++++
vnc.h | 3
12 files changed, 491 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6726 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:37 +03:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_TLS
|
|
|
|
if (acl && x509 && vs->tls.x509verify) {
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
if (!(vs->tls.acl = qemu_acl_init("vnc.x509dname"))) {
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to create x509 dname ACL\n");
|
|
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
Support ACLs for controlling VNC access ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch introduces a generic internal API for access control lists
to be used by network servers in QEMU. It adds support for checking
these ACL in the VNC server, in two places. The first ACL is for the
SASL authentication mechanism, checking the SASL username. This ACL
is called 'vnc.username'. The second is for the TLS authentication
mechanism, when x509 client certificates are turned on, checking against
the Distinguished Name of the client. This ACL is called 'vnc.x509dname'
The internal API provides for an ACL with the following characteristics
- A unique name, eg vnc.username, and vnc.x509dname.
- A default policy, allow or deny
- An ordered series of match rules, with allow or deny policy
If none of the match rules apply, then the default policy is
used.
There is a monitor API to manipulate the ACLs, which I'll describe via
examples
(qemu) acl show vnc.username
policy: allow
(qemu) acl policy vnc.username denya
acl: policy set to 'deny'
(qemu) acl allow vnc.username fred
acl: added rule at position 1
(qemu) acl allow vnc.username bob
acl: added rule at position 2
(qemu) acl allow vnc.username joe 1
acl: added rule at position 1
(qemu) acl show vnc.username
policy: deny
0: allow fred
1: allow joe
2: allow bob
(qemu) acl show vnc.x509dname
policy: allow
(qemu) acl policy vnc.x509dname deny
acl: policy set to 'deny'
(qemu) acl allow vnc.x509dname C=GB,O=ACME,L=London,CN=*
acl: added rule at position 1
(qemu) acl allow vnc.x509dname C=GB,O=ACME,L=Boston,CN=bob
acl: added rule at position 2
(qemu) acl show vnc.x509dname
policy: deny
0: allow C=GB,O=ACME,L=London,CN=*
1: allow C=GB,O=ACME,L=Boston,CN=bob
By default the VNC server will not use any ACLs, allowing access to
the server if the user successfully authenticates. To enable use of
ACLs to restrict user access, the ',acl' flag should be given when
starting QEMU. The initial ACL activated will be a 'deny all' policy
and should be customized using monitor commands.
eg enable SASL auth and ACLs
qemu .... -vnc localhost:1,sasl,acl
The next patch will provide a way to load a pre-defined ACL when
starting up
Makefile | 6 +
b/acl.c | 185 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/acl.h | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++
configure | 18 +++++
monitor.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
qemu-doc.texi | 49 ++++++++++++++
vnc-auth-sasl.c | 16 +++-
vnc-auth-sasl.h | 7 ++
vnc-tls.c | 19 +++++
vnc-tls.h | 3
vnc.c | 21 ++++++
vnc.h | 3
12 files changed, 491 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6726 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:37 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
|
|
|
|
if (acl && sasl) {
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
if (!(vs->sasl.acl = qemu_acl_init("vnc.username"))) {
|
|
|
|
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to create username ACL\n");
|
|
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
Support ACLs for controlling VNC access ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch introduces a generic internal API for access control lists
to be used by network servers in QEMU. It adds support for checking
these ACL in the VNC server, in two places. The first ACL is for the
SASL authentication mechanism, checking the SASL username. This ACL
is called 'vnc.username'. The second is for the TLS authentication
mechanism, when x509 client certificates are turned on, checking against
the Distinguished Name of the client. This ACL is called 'vnc.x509dname'
The internal API provides for an ACL with the following characteristics
- A unique name, eg vnc.username, and vnc.x509dname.
- A default policy, allow or deny
- An ordered series of match rules, with allow or deny policy
If none of the match rules apply, then the default policy is
used.
There is a monitor API to manipulate the ACLs, which I'll describe via
examples
(qemu) acl show vnc.username
policy: allow
(qemu) acl policy vnc.username denya
acl: policy set to 'deny'
(qemu) acl allow vnc.username fred
acl: added rule at position 1
(qemu) acl allow vnc.username bob
acl: added rule at position 2
(qemu) acl allow vnc.username joe 1
acl: added rule at position 1
(qemu) acl show vnc.username
policy: deny
0: allow fred
1: allow joe
2: allow bob
(qemu) acl show vnc.x509dname
policy: allow
(qemu) acl policy vnc.x509dname deny
acl: policy set to 'deny'
(qemu) acl allow vnc.x509dname C=GB,O=ACME,L=London,CN=*
acl: added rule at position 1
(qemu) acl allow vnc.x509dname C=GB,O=ACME,L=Boston,CN=bob
acl: added rule at position 2
(qemu) acl show vnc.x509dname
policy: deny
0: allow C=GB,O=ACME,L=London,CN=*
1: allow C=GB,O=ACME,L=Boston,CN=bob
By default the VNC server will not use any ACLs, allowing access to
the server if the user successfully authenticates. To enable use of
ACLs to restrict user access, the ',acl' flag should be given when
starting QEMU. The initial ACL activated will be a 'deny all' policy
and should be customized using monitor commands.
eg enable SASL auth and ACLs
qemu .... -vnc localhost:1,sasl,acl
The next patch will provide a way to load a pre-defined ACL when
starting up
Makefile | 6 +
b/acl.c | 185 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/acl.h | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++
configure | 18 +++++
monitor.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
qemu-doc.texi | 49 ++++++++++++++
vnc-auth-sasl.c | 16 +++-
vnc-auth-sasl.h | 7 ++
vnc-tls.c | 19 +++++
vnc-tls.h | 3
vnc.c | 21 ++++++
vnc.h | 3
12 files changed, 491 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6726 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:37 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:28 +03:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Combinations we support here:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* - no-auth (clear text, no auth)
|
|
|
|
* - password (clear text, weak auth)
|
|
|
|
* - sasl (encrypt, good auth *IF* using Kerberos via GSSAPI)
|
|
|
|
* - tls (encrypt, weak anonymous creds, no auth)
|
|
|
|
* - tls + password (encrypt, weak anonymous creds, weak auth)
|
|
|
|
* - tls + sasl (encrypt, weak anonymous creds, good auth)
|
|
|
|
* - tls + x509 (encrypt, good x509 creds, no auth)
|
|
|
|
* - tls + x509 + password (encrypt, good x509 creds, weak auth)
|
|
|
|
* - tls + x509 + sasl (encrypt, good x509 creds, good auth)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* NB1. TLS is a stackable auth scheme.
|
|
|
|
* NB2. the x509 schemes have option to validate a client cert dname
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
if (password) {
|
2008-09-06 21:47:39 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_TLS
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
if (tls) {
|
|
|
|
vs->auth = VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT;
|
|
|
|
if (x509) {
|
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Initializing VNC server with x509 password auth\n");
|
|
|
|
vs->subauth = VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509VNC;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Initializing VNC server with TLS password auth\n");
|
|
|
|
vs->subauth = VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_TLSVNC;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:28 +03:00
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_TLS */
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Initializing VNC server with password auth\n");
|
|
|
|
vs->auth = VNC_AUTH_VNC;
|
2008-09-06 21:47:39 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_TLS
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
vs->subauth = VNC_AUTH_INVALID;
|
|
|
|
}
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:28 +03:00
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_TLS */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
|
|
|
|
} else if (sasl) {
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_TLS
|
|
|
|
if (tls) {
|
|
|
|
vs->auth = VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT;
|
|
|
|
if (x509) {
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Initializing VNC server with x509 SASL auth\n");
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:28 +03:00
|
|
|
vs->subauth = VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509SASL;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Initializing VNC server with TLS SASL auth\n");
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:28 +03:00
|
|
|
vs->subauth = VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_TLSSASL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_TLS */
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Initializing VNC server with SASL auth\n");
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:28 +03:00
|
|
|
vs->auth = VNC_AUTH_SASL;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_TLS
|
|
|
|
vs->subauth = VNC_AUTH_INVALID;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_TLS */
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_SASL */
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2008-09-06 21:47:39 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_TLS
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
if (tls) {
|
|
|
|
vs->auth = VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT;
|
|
|
|
if (x509) {
|
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Initializing VNC server with x509 no auth\n");
|
|
|
|
vs->subauth = VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_X509NONE;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Initializing VNC server with TLS no auth\n");
|
|
|
|
vs->subauth = VNC_AUTH_VENCRYPT_TLSNONE;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2007-08-25 05:37:51 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
VNC_DEBUG("Initializing VNC server with no auth\n");
|
|
|
|
vs->auth = VNC_AUTH_NONE;
|
2008-09-06 21:47:39 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_TLS
|
2009-03-06 23:27:40 +03:00
|
|
|
vs->subauth = VNC_AUTH_INVALID;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-08-25 05:37:51 +04:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2007-08-25 05:37:05 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:28 +03:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_SASL
|
|
|
|
if ((saslErr = sasl_server_init(NULL, "qemu")) != SASL_OK) {
|
2012-10-02 12:17:21 +04:00
|
|
|
error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize SASL auth: %s",
|
|
|
|
sasl_errstring(saslErr, NULL, NULL));
|
2012-10-18 11:07:05 +04:00
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:28 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2010-03-10 19:12:02 +03:00
|
|
|
vs->lock_key_sync = lock_key_sync;
|
Add SASL authentication support ("Daniel P. Berrange")
This patch adds the new SASL authentication protocol to the VNC server.
It is enabled by setting the 'sasl' flag when launching VNC. SASL can
optionally provide encryption via its SSF layer, if a suitable mechanism
is configured (eg, GSSAPI/Kerberos, or Digest-MD5). If an SSF layer is
not available, then it should be combined with the x509 VNC authentication
protocol which provides encryption.
eg, if using GSSAPI
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl
eg if using TLS/x509 for encryption
qemu -vnc localhost:1,sasl,tls,x509
By default the Cyrus SASL library will look for its configuration in
the file /etc/sasl2/qemu.conf. For non-root users, this can be overridden
by setting the SASL_CONF_PATH environment variable, eg to make it look in
$HOME/.sasl2. NB unprivileged users may not have access to the full range
of SASL mechanisms, since some of them require some administrative privileges
to configure. The patch includes an example SASL configuration file which
illustrates config for GSSAPI and Digest-MD5, though it should be noted that
the latter is not really considered secure any more.
Most of the SASL authentication code is located in a separate source file,
vnc-auth-sasl.c. The main vnc.c file only contains minimal integration
glue, specifically parsing of command line flags / setup, and calls to
start the SASL auth process, to do encoding/decoding for data.
There are several possible stacks for reading & writing of data, depending
on the combo of VNC authentication methods in use
- Clear. read/write straight to socket
- TLS. read/write via GNUTLS helpers
- SASL. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write to socket
- SASL+TLS. encode/decode via SASL SSF layer, then read/write via GNUTLS
Hence, the vnc_client_read & vnc_client_write methods have been refactored
a little.
vnc_client_read: main entry point for reading, calls either
- vnc_client_read_plain reading, with no intermediate decoding
- vnc_client_read_sasl reading, with SASL SSF decoding
These two methods, then call vnc_client_read_buf(). This decides
whether to write to the socket directly or write via GNUTLS.
The situation is the same for writing data. More extensive comments
have been added in the code / patch. The vnc_client_read_sasl and
vnc_client_write_sasl method implementations live in the separate
vnc-auth-sasl.c file.
The state required for the SASL auth mechanism is kept in a separate
VncStateSASL struct, defined in vnc-auth-sasl.h and included in the
main VncState.
The configure script probes for SASL and automatically enables it
if found, unless --disable-vnc-sasl was given to override it.
Makefile | 7
Makefile.target | 5
b/qemu.sasl | 34 ++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.c | 626 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
b/vnc-auth-sasl.h | 67 +++++
configure | 34 ++
qemu-doc.texi | 97 ++++++++
vnc-auth-vencrypt.c | 12
vnc.c | 249 ++++++++++++++++++--
vnc.h | 31 ++
10 files changed, 1129 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.nongnu.org/qemu/trunk@6724 c046a42c-6fe2-441c-8c8c-71466251a162
2009-03-06 23:27:28 +03:00
|
|
|
|
2008-02-03 05:54:04 +03:00
|
|
|
if (reverse) {
|
2008-11-11 23:51:59 +03:00
|
|
|
/* connect to viewer */
|
2012-10-18 11:01:01 +04:00
|
|
|
int csock;
|
|
|
|
vs->lsock = -1;
|
2013-01-21 14:04:44 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_WS
|
|
|
|
vs->lwebsock = -1;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2012-10-18 11:01:01 +04:00
|
|
|
if (strncmp(display, "unix:", 5) == 0) {
|
2012-10-02 12:17:21 +04:00
|
|
|
csock = unix_connect(display+5, errp);
|
2008-02-03 05:54:04 +03:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2012-10-02 12:17:21 +04:00
|
|
|
csock = inet_connect(display, errp);
|
2008-02-03 05:54:04 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2012-10-18 11:01:01 +04:00
|
|
|
if (csock < 0) {
|
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2013-01-21 14:04:44 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_connect(vs, csock, 0, 0);
|
2008-11-11 23:51:59 +03:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* listen for connects */
|
|
|
|
char *dpy;
|
2011-08-21 07:09:37 +04:00
|
|
|
dpy = g_malloc(256);
|
2008-11-11 23:51:59 +03:00
|
|
|
if (strncmp(display, "unix:", 5) == 0) {
|
2009-01-14 21:34:22 +03:00
|
|
|
pstrcpy(dpy, 256, "unix:");
|
2012-10-02 12:17:21 +04:00
|
|
|
vs->lsock = unix_listen(display+5, dpy+5, 256-5, errp);
|
2008-11-11 23:51:59 +03:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2012-05-10 20:28:26 +04:00
|
|
|
vs->lsock = inet_listen(display, dpy, 256,
|
2012-10-02 12:17:21 +04:00
|
|
|
SOCK_STREAM, 5900, errp);
|
2013-01-21 14:04:44 +04:00
|
|
|
if (vs->lsock < 0) {
|
|
|
|
g_free(dpy);
|
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_WS
|
|
|
|
if (vs->websocket) {
|
|
|
|
if (vs->ws_display) {
|
|
|
|
vs->lwebsock = inet_listen(vs->ws_display, NULL, 256,
|
|
|
|
SOCK_STREAM, 0, errp);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
vs->lwebsock = inet_listen(vs->display, NULL, 256,
|
|
|
|
SOCK_STREAM, 5700, errp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (vs->lwebsock < 0) {
|
|
|
|
if (vs->lsock) {
|
|
|
|
close(vs->lsock);
|
|
|
|
vs->lsock = -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
g_free(dpy);
|
|
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_WS */
|
2008-11-11 23:51:59 +03:00
|
|
|
}
|
2012-10-18 11:07:05 +04:00
|
|
|
g_free(vs->display);
|
|
|
|
vs->display = dpy;
|
2013-01-21 14:04:44 +04:00
|
|
|
qemu_set_fd_handler2(vs->lsock, NULL,
|
|
|
|
vnc_listen_regular_read, NULL, vs);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_WS
|
|
|
|
if (vs->websocket) {
|
|
|
|
qemu_set_fd_handler2(vs->lwebsock, NULL,
|
|
|
|
vnc_listen_websocket_read, NULL, vs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_WS */
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2012-10-02 12:17:21 +04:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2012-10-18 11:07:05 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fail:
|
|
|
|
g_free(vs->display);
|
|
|
|
vs->display = NULL;
|
2013-01-21 14:04:44 +04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_VNC_WS
|
|
|
|
g_free(vs->ws_display);
|
|
|
|
vs->ws_display = NULL;
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_VNC_WS */
|
2006-05-01 01:28:36 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|
Introduce a 'client_add' monitor command accepting an open FD
Allow client connections for VNC and socket based character
devices to be passed in over the monitor using SCM_RIGHTS.
One intended usage scenario is to start QEMU with VNC on a
UNIX domain socket. An unprivileged user which cannot access
the UNIX domain socket, can then connect to QEMU's VNC server
by passing an open FD to libvirt, which passes it onto QEMU.
{ "execute": "get_fd", "arguments": { "fdname": "myclient" } }
{ "return": {} }
{ "execute": "add_client", "arguments": { "protocol": "vnc",
"fdname": "myclient",
"skipauth": true } }
{ "return": {} }
In this case 'protocol' can be 'vnc' or 'spice', or the name
of a character device (eg from -chardev id=XXXX)
The 'skipauth' parameter can be used to skip any configured
VNC authentication scheme, which is useful if the mgmt layer
talking to the monitor has already authenticated the client
in another way.
* console.h: Define 'vnc_display_add_client' method
* monitor.c: Implement 'client_add' command
* qemu-char.c, qemu-char.h: Add 'qemu_char_add_client' method
* qerror.c, qerror.h: Add QERR_ADD_CLIENT_FAILED
* qmp-commands.hx: Declare 'client_add' command
* ui/vnc.c: Implement 'vnc_display_add_client' method
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
2011-06-23 16:31:42 +04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void vnc_display_add_client(DisplayState *ds, int csock, int skipauth)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2013-02-28 14:34:31 +04:00
|
|
|
VncDisplay *vs = vnc_display;
|
Introduce a 'client_add' monitor command accepting an open FD
Allow client connections for VNC and socket based character
devices to be passed in over the monitor using SCM_RIGHTS.
One intended usage scenario is to start QEMU with VNC on a
UNIX domain socket. An unprivileged user which cannot access
the UNIX domain socket, can then connect to QEMU's VNC server
by passing an open FD to libvirt, which passes it onto QEMU.
{ "execute": "get_fd", "arguments": { "fdname": "myclient" } }
{ "return": {} }
{ "execute": "add_client", "arguments": { "protocol": "vnc",
"fdname": "myclient",
"skipauth": true } }
{ "return": {} }
In this case 'protocol' can be 'vnc' or 'spice', or the name
of a character device (eg from -chardev id=XXXX)
The 'skipauth' parameter can be used to skip any configured
VNC authentication scheme, which is useful if the mgmt layer
talking to the monitor has already authenticated the client
in another way.
* console.h: Define 'vnc_display_add_client' method
* monitor.c: Implement 'client_add' command
* qemu-char.c, qemu-char.h: Add 'qemu_char_add_client' method
* qerror.c, qerror.h: Add QERR_ADD_CLIENT_FAILED
* qmp-commands.hx: Declare 'client_add' command
* ui/vnc.c: Implement 'vnc_display_add_client' method
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
2011-06-23 16:31:42 +04:00
|
|
|
|
2013-01-21 14:04:44 +04:00
|
|
|
vnc_connect(vs, csock, skipauth, 0);
|
Introduce a 'client_add' monitor command accepting an open FD
Allow client connections for VNC and socket based character
devices to be passed in over the monitor using SCM_RIGHTS.
One intended usage scenario is to start QEMU with VNC on a
UNIX domain socket. An unprivileged user which cannot access
the UNIX domain socket, can then connect to QEMU's VNC server
by passing an open FD to libvirt, which passes it onto QEMU.
{ "execute": "get_fd", "arguments": { "fdname": "myclient" } }
{ "return": {} }
{ "execute": "add_client", "arguments": { "protocol": "vnc",
"fdname": "myclient",
"skipauth": true } }
{ "return": {} }
In this case 'protocol' can be 'vnc' or 'spice', or the name
of a character device (eg from -chardev id=XXXX)
The 'skipauth' parameter can be used to skip any configured
VNC authentication scheme, which is useful if the mgmt layer
talking to the monitor has already authenticated the client
in another way.
* console.h: Define 'vnc_display_add_client' method
* monitor.c: Implement 'client_add' command
* qemu-char.c, qemu-char.h: Add 'qemu_char_add_client' method
* qerror.c, qerror.h: Add QERR_ADD_CLIENT_FAILED
* qmp-commands.hx: Declare 'client_add' command
* ui/vnc.c: Implement 'vnc_display_add_client' method
Signed-off-by: Anthony Liguori <aliguori@us.ibm.com>
2011-06-23 16:31:42 +04:00
|
|
|
}
|