2018-11-16 18:53:25 +03:00
QA output created by 233
== preparing TLS creds ==
Generating a self signed certificate...
Generating a self signed certificate...
Generating a signed certificate...
Generating a signed certificate...
Generating a signed certificate...
qemu-nbd: add support for authorization of TLS clients
Currently any client which can complete the TLS handshake is able to use
the NBD server. The server admin can turn on the 'verify-peer' option
for the x509 creds to require the client to provide a x509 certificate.
This means the client will have to acquire a certificate from the CA
before they are permitted to use the NBD server. This is still a fairly
low bar to cross.
This adds a '--tls-authz OBJECT-ID' option to the qemu-nbd command which
takes the ID of a previously added 'QAuthZ' object instance. This will
be used to validate the client's x509 distinguished name. Clients
failing the authorization check will not be permitted to use the NBD
server.
For example to setup authorization that only allows connection from a client
whose x509 certificate distinguished name is
CN=laptop.example.com,O=Example Org,L=London,ST=London,C=GB
escape the commas in the name and use:
qemu-nbd --object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/home/berrange/qemutls,\
endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
--object 'authz-simple,id=auth0,identity=CN=laptop.example.com,,\
O=Example Org,,L=London,,ST=London,,C=GB' \
--tls-creds tls0 \
--tls-authz authz0 \
....other qemu-nbd args...
NB: a real shell command line would not have leading whitespace after
the line continuation, it is just included here for clarity.
Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190227162035.18543-2-berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
[eblake: split long line in --help text, tweak 233 to show that whitespace
after ,, in identity= portion is actually okay]
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
2019-02-27 19:20:33 +03:00
Generating a signed certificate...
2022-03-04 22:36:10 +03:00
Generating a random key for user 'psk1'
Generating a random key for user 'psk2'
2018-11-16 18:53:25 +03:00
== preparing image ==
Formatting 'TEST_DIR/t.IMGFMT', fmt=IMGFMT size=67108864
2018-11-18 05:24:03 +03:00
wrote 1048576/1048576 bytes at offset 1048576
1 MiB, X ops; XX:XX:XX.X (XXX YYY/sec and XXX ops/sec)
2018-11-16 18:53:25 +03:00
== check TLS client to plain server fails ==
qemu-img: Could not open 'driver=nbd,host=127.0.0.1,port=PORT,tls-creds=tls0': Denied by server for option 5 (starttls)
server reported: TLS not configured
2019-01-17 22:36:58 +03:00
qemu-nbd: Denied by server for option 5 (starttls)
2018-11-16 18:53:25 +03:00
== check plain client to TLS server fails ==
2019-08-24 20:28:13 +03:00
qemu-img: Could not open 'nbd://localhost:PORT': TLS negotiation required before option 7 (go)
nbd/client: Add hint when TLS is missing
I received an off-list report of failure to connect to an NBD server
expecting an x509 certificate, when the client was attempting something
similar to this command line:
$ ./x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64 -name 'blah' -machine q35 -nodefaults \
-object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,endpoint=client,dir=$path_to_certs \
-device virtio-scsi-pci,id=virtio_scsi_pci0,bus=pcie.0,addr=0x6 \
-drive id=drive_image1,if=none,snapshot=off,aio=threads,cache=none,format=raw,file=nbd:localhost:9000,werror=stop,rerror=stop,tls-creds=tls0 \
-device scsi-hd,id=image1,drive=drive_image1,bootindex=0
qemu-system-x86_64: -drive id=drive_image1,if=none,snapshot=off,aio=threads,cache=none,format=raw,file=nbd:localhost:9000,werror=stop,rerror=stop,tls-creds=tls0: TLS negotiation required before option 7 (go)
server reported: Option 0x7 not permitted before TLS
The problem? As specified, -drive is trying to pass tls-creds to the
raw format driver instead of the nbd protocol driver, but before we
get to the point where we can detect that raw doesn't know what to do
with tls-creds, the nbd driver has already failed because the server
complained. The fix to the broken command line? Pass
'...,file.tls-creds=tls0' to ensure the tls-creds option is handed to
nbd, not raw. But since the error message was rather cryptic, I'm
trying to improve the error message.
With this patch, the error message adds a line:
qemu-system-x86_64: -drive id=drive_image1,if=none,snapshot=off,aio=threads,cache=none,format=raw,file=nbd:localhost:9000,werror=stop,rerror=stop,tls-creds=tls0: TLS negotiation required before option 7 (go)
Did you forget a valid tls-creds?
server reported: Option 0x7 not permitted before TLS
And with luck, someone grepping for that error message will find this
commit message and figure out their command line mistake. Sadly, the
only mention of file.tls-creds in our docs relates to an --image-opts
use of PSK encryption with qemu-img as the client, rather than x509
certificate encryption with qemu-kvm as the client.
CC: Tingting Mao <timao@redhat.com>
CC: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190907172055.26870-1-eblake@redhat.com>
[eblake: squash in iotest 233 fix]
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
2019-09-07 20:20:55 +03:00
Did you forget a valid tls-creds?
2019-08-24 20:28:13 +03:00
server reported: Option 0x7 not permitted before TLS
qemu-nbd: TLS negotiation required before option 3 (list)
2018-11-16 18:53:25 +03:00
== check TLS works ==
image: nbd://127.0.0.1:PORT
file format: nbd
2019-04-17 20:11:01 +03:00
virtual size: 64 MiB (67108864 bytes)
2018-11-16 18:53:25 +03:00
disk size: unavailable
qemu-nbd: add support for authorization of TLS clients
Currently any client which can complete the TLS handshake is able to use
the NBD server. The server admin can turn on the 'verify-peer' option
for the x509 creds to require the client to provide a x509 certificate.
This means the client will have to acquire a certificate from the CA
before they are permitted to use the NBD server. This is still a fairly
low bar to cross.
This adds a '--tls-authz OBJECT-ID' option to the qemu-nbd command which
takes the ID of a previously added 'QAuthZ' object instance. This will
be used to validate the client's x509 distinguished name. Clients
failing the authorization check will not be permitted to use the NBD
server.
For example to setup authorization that only allows connection from a client
whose x509 certificate distinguished name is
CN=laptop.example.com,O=Example Org,L=London,ST=London,C=GB
escape the commas in the name and use:
qemu-nbd --object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/home/berrange/qemutls,\
endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
--object 'authz-simple,id=auth0,identity=CN=laptop.example.com,,\
O=Example Org,,L=London,,ST=London,,C=GB' \
--tls-creds tls0 \
--tls-authz authz0 \
....other qemu-nbd args...
NB: a real shell command line would not have leading whitespace after
the line continuation, it is just included here for clarity.
Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190227162035.18543-2-berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
[eblake: split long line in --help text, tweak 233 to show that whitespace
after ,, in identity= portion is actually okay]
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
2019-02-27 19:20:33 +03:00
image: nbd://127.0.0.1:PORT
file format: nbd
2019-04-17 20:11:01 +03:00
virtual size: 64 MiB (67108864 bytes)
qemu-nbd: add support for authorization of TLS clients
Currently any client which can complete the TLS handshake is able to use
the NBD server. The server admin can turn on the 'verify-peer' option
for the x509 creds to require the client to provide a x509 certificate.
This means the client will have to acquire a certificate from the CA
before they are permitted to use the NBD server. This is still a fairly
low bar to cross.
This adds a '--tls-authz OBJECT-ID' option to the qemu-nbd command which
takes the ID of a previously added 'QAuthZ' object instance. This will
be used to validate the client's x509 distinguished name. Clients
failing the authorization check will not be permitted to use the NBD
server.
For example to setup authorization that only allows connection from a client
whose x509 certificate distinguished name is
CN=laptop.example.com,O=Example Org,L=London,ST=London,C=GB
escape the commas in the name and use:
qemu-nbd --object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/home/berrange/qemutls,\
endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
--object 'authz-simple,id=auth0,identity=CN=laptop.example.com,,\
O=Example Org,,L=London,,ST=London,,C=GB' \
--tls-creds tls0 \
--tls-authz authz0 \
....other qemu-nbd args...
NB: a real shell command line would not have leading whitespace after
the line continuation, it is just included here for clarity.
Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190227162035.18543-2-berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
[eblake: split long line in --help text, tweak 233 to show that whitespace
after ,, in identity= portion is actually okay]
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
2019-02-27 19:20:33 +03:00
disk size: unavailable
2019-01-17 22:36:58 +03:00
exports available: 1
export: ''
size: 67108864
nbd/server: Advertise actual minimum block size
Both NBD_CMD_BLOCK_STATUS and structured NBD_CMD_READ will split their
reply according to bdrv_block_status() boundaries. If the block device
has a request_alignment smaller than 512, but we advertise a block
alignment of 512 to the client, then this can result in the server
reply violating client expectations by reporting a smaller region of
the export than what the client is permitted to address (although this
is less of an issue for qemu 4.0 clients, given recent client patches
to overlook our non-compliance at EOF). Since it's always better to
be strict in what we send, it is worth advertising the actual minimum
block limit rather than blindly rounding it up to 512.
Note that this patch is not foolproof - it is still possible to
provoke non-compliant server behavior using:
$ qemu-nbd --image-opts driver=blkdebug,align=512,image.driver=file,image.filename=/path/to/non-aligned-file
That is arguably a bug in the blkdebug driver (it should never pass
back block status smaller than its alignment, even if it has to make
multiple bdrv_get_status calls and determine the
least-common-denominator status among the group to return). It may
also be possible to observe issues with a backing layer with smaller
alignment than the active layer, although so far I have been unable to
write a reliable iotest for that scenario (but again, an issue like
that could be argued to be a bug in the block layer, or something
where we need a flag to bdrv_block_status() to state whether the
result must be aligned to the current layer's limits or can be
subdivided for accuracy when chasing backing files).
Anyways, as blkdebug is not normally used, and as this patch makes our
server more interoperable with qemu 3.1 clients, it is worth applying
now, even while we still work on a larger patch series for the 4.1
timeframe to have byte-accurate file lengths.
Note that the iotests output changes - for 223 and 233, we can see the
server's better granularity advertisement; and for 241, the three test
cases have the following effects:
- natural alignment: the server's smaller alignment is now advertised,
and the hole reported at EOF is now the right result; we've gotten rid
of the server's non-compliance
- forced server alignment: the server still advertises 512 bytes, but
still sends a mid-sector hole. This is still a server compliance bug,
which needs to be fixed in the block layer in a later patch; output
does not change because the client is already being tolerant of the
non-compliance
- forced client alignment: the server's smaller alignment means that
the client now sees the server's status change mid-sector without any
protocol violations, but the fact that the map shows an unaligned
mid-sector hole is evidence of the block layer problems with aligned
block status, to be fixed in a later patch
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190329042750.14704-7-eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
[eblake: rebase to enhanced iotest 241 coverage]
2019-03-31 04:36:36 +03:00
min block: 1
2023-09-25 22:22:39 +03:00
transaction size: 64-bit
2018-11-16 18:53:25 +03:00
2022-03-04 22:36:08 +03:00
== check TLS fail over TCP with mismatched hostname ==
qemu-img: Could not open 'driver=nbd,host=localhost,port=PORT,tls-creds=tls0': Certificate does not match the hostname localhost
qemu-nbd: Certificate does not match the hostname localhost
== check TLS works over TCP with mismatched hostname and override ==
image: nbd://localhost:PORT
file format: nbd
virtual size: 64 MiB (67108864 bytes)
disk size: unavailable
exports available: 1
export: ''
size: 67108864
min block: 1
2023-09-25 22:22:39 +03:00
transaction size: 64-bit
2022-03-04 22:36:08 +03:00
2018-11-16 18:53:25 +03:00
== check TLS with different CA fails ==
qemu-img: Could not open 'driver=nbd,host=127.0.0.1,port=PORT,tls-creds=tls0': The certificate hasn't got a known issuer
2019-01-17 22:36:58 +03:00
qemu-nbd: The certificate hasn't got a known issuer
2018-11-18 05:24:03 +03:00
== perform I/O over TLS ==
read 1048576/1048576 bytes at offset 1048576
1 MiB, X ops; XX:XX:XX.X (XXX YYY/sec and XXX ops/sec)
wrote 1048576/1048576 bytes at offset 1048576
1 MiB, X ops; XX:XX:XX.X (XXX YYY/sec and XXX ops/sec)
read 1048576/1048576 bytes at offset 1048576
1 MiB, X ops; XX:XX:XX.X (XXX YYY/sec and XXX ops/sec)
2019-01-17 22:36:38 +03:00
qemu-nbd: add support for authorization of TLS clients
Currently any client which can complete the TLS handshake is able to use
the NBD server. The server admin can turn on the 'verify-peer' option
for the x509 creds to require the client to provide a x509 certificate.
This means the client will have to acquire a certificate from the CA
before they are permitted to use the NBD server. This is still a fairly
low bar to cross.
This adds a '--tls-authz OBJECT-ID' option to the qemu-nbd command which
takes the ID of a previously added 'QAuthZ' object instance. This will
be used to validate the client's x509 distinguished name. Clients
failing the authorization check will not be permitted to use the NBD
server.
For example to setup authorization that only allows connection from a client
whose x509 certificate distinguished name is
CN=laptop.example.com,O=Example Org,L=London,ST=London,C=GB
escape the commas in the name and use:
qemu-nbd --object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/home/berrange/qemutls,\
endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
--object 'authz-simple,id=auth0,identity=CN=laptop.example.com,,\
O=Example Org,,L=London,,ST=London,,C=GB' \
--tls-creds tls0 \
--tls-authz authz0 \
....other qemu-nbd args...
NB: a real shell command line would not have leading whitespace after
the line continuation, it is just included here for clarity.
Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190227162035.18543-2-berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
[eblake: split long line in --help text, tweak 233 to show that whitespace
after ,, in identity= portion is actually okay]
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
2019-02-27 19:20:33 +03:00
== check TLS with authorization ==
2019-05-06 19:05:29 +03:00
qemu-img: Could not open 'driver=nbd,host=127.0.0.1,port=PORT,tls-creds=tls0': Failed to read option reply: Cannot read from TLS channel: Software caused connection abort
qemu-img: Could not open 'driver=nbd,host=127.0.0.1,port=PORT,tls-creds=tls0': Failed to read option reply: Cannot read from TLS channel: Software caused connection abort
qemu-nbd: add support for authorization of TLS clients
Currently any client which can complete the TLS handshake is able to use
the NBD server. The server admin can turn on the 'verify-peer' option
for the x509 creds to require the client to provide a x509 certificate.
This means the client will have to acquire a certificate from the CA
before they are permitted to use the NBD server. This is still a fairly
low bar to cross.
This adds a '--tls-authz OBJECT-ID' option to the qemu-nbd command which
takes the ID of a previously added 'QAuthZ' object instance. This will
be used to validate the client's x509 distinguished name. Clients
failing the authorization check will not be permitted to use the NBD
server.
For example to setup authorization that only allows connection from a client
whose x509 certificate distinguished name is
CN=laptop.example.com,O=Example Org,L=London,ST=London,C=GB
escape the commas in the name and use:
qemu-nbd --object tls-creds-x509,id=tls0,dir=/home/berrange/qemutls,\
endpoint=server,verify-peer=yes \
--object 'authz-simple,id=auth0,identity=CN=laptop.example.com,,\
O=Example Org,,L=London,,ST=London,,C=GB' \
--tls-creds tls0 \
--tls-authz authz0 \
....other qemu-nbd args...
NB: a real shell command line would not have leading whitespace after
the line continuation, it is just included here for clarity.
Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190227162035.18543-2-berrange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
[eblake: split long line in --help text, tweak 233 to show that whitespace
after ,, in identity= portion is actually okay]
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
2019-02-27 19:20:33 +03:00
2022-03-04 22:36:09 +03:00
== check TLS fail over UNIX with no hostname ==
qemu-img: Could not open 'driver=nbd,path=SOCK_DIR/qemu-nbd.sock,tls-creds=tls0': No hostname for certificate validation
qemu-nbd: No hostname for certificate validation
== check TLS works over UNIX with hostname override ==
image: nbd+unix://?socket=SOCK_DIR/qemu-nbd.sock
file format: nbd
virtual size: 64 MiB (67108864 bytes)
disk size: unavailable
exports available: 1
export: ''
size: 67108864
min block: 1
2023-09-25 22:22:39 +03:00
transaction size: 64-bit
2022-03-04 22:36:09 +03:00
2022-03-04 22:36:10 +03:00
== check TLS works over UNIX with PSK ==
image: nbd+unix://?socket=SOCK_DIR/qemu-nbd.sock
file format: nbd
virtual size: 64 MiB (67108864 bytes)
disk size: unavailable
exports available: 1
export: ''
size: 67108864
min block: 1
2023-09-25 22:22:39 +03:00
transaction size: 64-bit
2022-03-04 22:36:10 +03:00
== check TLS fails over UNIX with mismatch PSK ==
qemu-img: Could not open 'driver=nbd,path=SOCK_DIR/qemu-nbd.sock,tls-creds=tls0': TLS handshake failed: The TLS connection was non-properly terminated.
qemu-nbd: TLS handshake failed: The TLS connection was non-properly terminated.
2019-01-17 22:36:38 +03:00
== final server log ==
2022-03-04 22:36:08 +03:00
qemu-nbd: option negotiation failed: Failed to read opts magic: Cannot read from TLS channel: Software caused connection abort
qemu-nbd: option negotiation failed: Failed to read opts magic: Cannot read from TLS channel: Software caused connection abort
2019-01-17 22:36:38 +03:00
qemu-nbd: option negotiation failed: Verify failed: No certificate was found.
2019-01-17 22:36:58 +03:00
qemu-nbd: option negotiation failed: Verify failed: No certificate was found.
2021-08-04 21:03:30 +03:00
qemu-nbd: option negotiation failed: TLS x509 authz check for DISTINGUISHED-NAME is denied
qemu-nbd: option negotiation failed: TLS x509 authz check for DISTINGUISHED-NAME is denied
2022-03-04 22:36:09 +03:00
qemu-nbd: option negotiation failed: Failed to read opts magic: Cannot read from TLS channel: Software caused connection abort
qemu-nbd: option negotiation failed: Failed to read opts magic: Cannot read from TLS channel: Software caused connection abort
2022-03-04 22:36:10 +03:00
qemu-nbd: option negotiation failed: TLS handshake failed: An illegal parameter has been received.
qemu-nbd: option negotiation failed: TLS handshake failed: An illegal parameter has been received.
2018-11-16 18:53:25 +03:00
*** done
