qemu/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h

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9pfs: introduce relative_openat_nofollow() helper When using the passthrough security mode, symbolic links created by the guest are actual symbolic links on the host file system. Since the resolution of symbolic links during path walk is supposed to occur on the client side. The server should hence never receive any path pointing to an actual symbolic link. This isn't guaranteed by the protocol though, and malicious code in the guest can trick the server to issue various syscalls on paths whose one or more elements are symbolic links. In the case of the "local" backend using the "passthrough" or "none" security modes, the guest can directly create symbolic links to arbitrary locations on the host (as per spec). The "mapped-xattr" and "mapped-file" security modes are also affected to a lesser extent as they require some help from an external entity to create actual symbolic links on the host, i.e. another guest using "passthrough" mode for example. The current code hence relies on O_NOFOLLOW and "l*()" variants of system calls. Unfortunately, this only applies to the rightmost path component. A guest could maliciously replace any component in a trusted path with a symbolic link. This could allow any guest to escape a virtfs shared folder. This patch introduces a variant of the openat() syscall that successively opens each path element with O_NOFOLLOW. When passing a file descriptor pointing to a trusted directory, one is guaranteed to be returned a file descriptor pointing to a path which is beneath the trusted directory. This will be used by subsequent patches to implement symlink-safe path walk for any access to the backend. Symbolic links aren't the only threats actually: a malicious guest could change a path element to point to other types of file with undesirable effects: - a named pipe or any other thing that would cause openat() to block - a terminal device which would become QEMU's controlling terminal These issues can be addressed with O_NONBLOCK and O_NOCTTY. Two helpers are introduced: one to open intermediate path elements and one to open the rightmost path element. Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> (renamed openat_nofollow() to relative_openat_nofollow(), assert path is relative and doesn't contain '//', fixed side-effect in assert, Greg Kurz) Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
2017-02-27 01:42:03 +03:00
/*
* 9p utilities
*
* Copyright IBM, Corp. 2017
*
* Authors:
* Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
*
* This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or later.
* See the COPYING file in the top-level directory.
*/
#ifndef QEMU_9P_UTIL_H
#define QEMU_9P_UTIL_H
#ifdef O_PATH
#define O_PATH_9P_UTIL O_PATH
#else
#define O_PATH_9P_UTIL 0
#endif
#if !defined(CONFIG_LINUX)
/*
* Generates a Linux device number (a.k.a. dev_t) for given device major
* and minor numbers.
*
* To be more precise: it generates a device number in glibc's format
* (MMMM_Mmmm_mmmM_MMmm, 64 bits) actually, which is compatible with
* Linux's format (mmmM_MMmm, 32 bits), as described in <bits/sysmacros.h>.
*/
static inline uint64_t makedev_dotl(uint32_t dev_major, uint32_t dev_minor)
{
uint64_t dev;
// from glibc sysmacros.h:
dev = (((uint64_t) (dev_major & 0x00000fffu)) << 8);
dev |= (((uint64_t) (dev_major & 0xfffff000u)) << 32);
dev |= (((uint64_t) (dev_minor & 0x000000ffu)) << 0);
dev |= (((uint64_t) (dev_minor & 0xffffff00u)) << 12);
return dev;
}
#endif
/*
* Converts given device number from host's device number format to Linux
* device number format. As both the size of type dev_t and encoding of
* dev_t is system dependant, we have to convert them for Linux guests if
* host is not running Linux.
*/
static inline uint64_t host_dev_to_dotl_dev(dev_t dev)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_LINUX
return dev;
#else
return makedev_dotl(major(dev), minor(dev));
#endif
}
/* Translates errno from host -> Linux if needed */
static inline int errno_to_dotl(int err) {
#if defined(CONFIG_LINUX)
/* nothing to translate (Linux -> Linux) */
#elif defined(CONFIG_DARWIN)
/*
* translation mandatory for macOS hosts
*
* FIXME: Only most important errnos translated here yet, this should be
* extended to as many errnos being translated as possible in future.
*/
if (err == ENAMETOOLONG) {
err = 36; /* ==ENAMETOOLONG on Linux */
} else if (err == ENOTEMPTY) {
err = 39; /* ==ENOTEMPTY on Linux */
} else if (err == ELOOP) {
err = 40; /* ==ELOOP on Linux */
} else if (err == ENOATTR) {
err = 61; /* ==ENODATA on Linux */
} else if (err == ENOTSUP) {
err = 95; /* ==EOPNOTSUPP on Linux */
} else if (err == EOPNOTSUPP) {
err = 95; /* ==EOPNOTSUPP on Linux */
}
#else
#error Missing errno translation to Linux for this host system
#endif
return err;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_DARWIN
#define qemu_fgetxattr(...) fgetxattr(__VA_ARGS__, 0, 0)
#define qemu_lgetxattr(...) getxattr(__VA_ARGS__, 0, XATTR_NOFOLLOW)
#define qemu_llistxattr(...) listxattr(__VA_ARGS__, XATTR_NOFOLLOW)
#define qemu_lremovexattr(...) removexattr(__VA_ARGS__, XATTR_NOFOLLOW)
static inline int qemu_lsetxattr(const char *path, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags) {
return setxattr(path, name, value, size, 0, flags | XATTR_NOFOLLOW);
}
#else
#define qemu_fgetxattr fgetxattr
#define qemu_lgetxattr lgetxattr
#define qemu_llistxattr llistxattr
#define qemu_lremovexattr lremovexattr
#define qemu_lsetxattr lsetxattr
#endif
9pfs: introduce relative_openat_nofollow() helper When using the passthrough security mode, symbolic links created by the guest are actual symbolic links on the host file system. Since the resolution of symbolic links during path walk is supposed to occur on the client side. The server should hence never receive any path pointing to an actual symbolic link. This isn't guaranteed by the protocol though, and malicious code in the guest can trick the server to issue various syscalls on paths whose one or more elements are symbolic links. In the case of the "local" backend using the "passthrough" or "none" security modes, the guest can directly create symbolic links to arbitrary locations on the host (as per spec). The "mapped-xattr" and "mapped-file" security modes are also affected to a lesser extent as they require some help from an external entity to create actual symbolic links on the host, i.e. another guest using "passthrough" mode for example. The current code hence relies on O_NOFOLLOW and "l*()" variants of system calls. Unfortunately, this only applies to the rightmost path component. A guest could maliciously replace any component in a trusted path with a symbolic link. This could allow any guest to escape a virtfs shared folder. This patch introduces a variant of the openat() syscall that successively opens each path element with O_NOFOLLOW. When passing a file descriptor pointing to a trusted directory, one is guaranteed to be returned a file descriptor pointing to a path which is beneath the trusted directory. This will be used by subsequent patches to implement symlink-safe path walk for any access to the backend. Symbolic links aren't the only threats actually: a malicious guest could change a path element to point to other types of file with undesirable effects: - a named pipe or any other thing that would cause openat() to block - a terminal device which would become QEMU's controlling terminal These issues can be addressed with O_NONBLOCK and O_NOCTTY. Two helpers are introduced: one to open intermediate path elements and one to open the rightmost path element. Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> (renamed openat_nofollow() to relative_openat_nofollow(), assert path is relative and doesn't contain '//', fixed side-effect in assert, Greg Kurz) Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
2017-02-27 01:42:03 +03:00
static inline void close_preserve_errno(int fd)
{
int serrno = errno;
close(fd);
errno = serrno;
}
static inline int openat_dir(int dirfd, const char *name)
{
return openat(dirfd, name,
O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_PATH_9P_UTIL);
9pfs: introduce relative_openat_nofollow() helper When using the passthrough security mode, symbolic links created by the guest are actual symbolic links on the host file system. Since the resolution of symbolic links during path walk is supposed to occur on the client side. The server should hence never receive any path pointing to an actual symbolic link. This isn't guaranteed by the protocol though, and malicious code in the guest can trick the server to issue various syscalls on paths whose one or more elements are symbolic links. In the case of the "local" backend using the "passthrough" or "none" security modes, the guest can directly create symbolic links to arbitrary locations on the host (as per spec). The "mapped-xattr" and "mapped-file" security modes are also affected to a lesser extent as they require some help from an external entity to create actual symbolic links on the host, i.e. another guest using "passthrough" mode for example. The current code hence relies on O_NOFOLLOW and "l*()" variants of system calls. Unfortunately, this only applies to the rightmost path component. A guest could maliciously replace any component in a trusted path with a symbolic link. This could allow any guest to escape a virtfs shared folder. This patch introduces a variant of the openat() syscall that successively opens each path element with O_NOFOLLOW. When passing a file descriptor pointing to a trusted directory, one is guaranteed to be returned a file descriptor pointing to a path which is beneath the trusted directory. This will be used by subsequent patches to implement symlink-safe path walk for any access to the backend. Symbolic links aren't the only threats actually: a malicious guest could change a path element to point to other types of file with undesirable effects: - a named pipe or any other thing that would cause openat() to block - a terminal device which would become QEMU's controlling terminal These issues can be addressed with O_NONBLOCK and O_NOCTTY. Two helpers are introduced: one to open intermediate path elements and one to open the rightmost path element. Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> (renamed openat_nofollow() to relative_openat_nofollow(), assert path is relative and doesn't contain '//', fixed side-effect in assert, Greg Kurz) Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
2017-02-27 01:42:03 +03:00
}
static inline int openat_file(int dirfd, const char *name, int flags,
mode_t mode)
{
int fd, serrno, ret;
#ifndef CONFIG_DARWIN
again:
#endif
9pfs: introduce relative_openat_nofollow() helper When using the passthrough security mode, symbolic links created by the guest are actual symbolic links on the host file system. Since the resolution of symbolic links during path walk is supposed to occur on the client side. The server should hence never receive any path pointing to an actual symbolic link. This isn't guaranteed by the protocol though, and malicious code in the guest can trick the server to issue various syscalls on paths whose one or more elements are symbolic links. In the case of the "local" backend using the "passthrough" or "none" security modes, the guest can directly create symbolic links to arbitrary locations on the host (as per spec). The "mapped-xattr" and "mapped-file" security modes are also affected to a lesser extent as they require some help from an external entity to create actual symbolic links on the host, i.e. another guest using "passthrough" mode for example. The current code hence relies on O_NOFOLLOW and "l*()" variants of system calls. Unfortunately, this only applies to the rightmost path component. A guest could maliciously replace any component in a trusted path with a symbolic link. This could allow any guest to escape a virtfs shared folder. This patch introduces a variant of the openat() syscall that successively opens each path element with O_NOFOLLOW. When passing a file descriptor pointing to a trusted directory, one is guaranteed to be returned a file descriptor pointing to a path which is beneath the trusted directory. This will be used by subsequent patches to implement symlink-safe path walk for any access to the backend. Symbolic links aren't the only threats actually: a malicious guest could change a path element to point to other types of file with undesirable effects: - a named pipe or any other thing that would cause openat() to block - a terminal device which would become QEMU's controlling terminal These issues can be addressed with O_NONBLOCK and O_NOCTTY. Two helpers are introduced: one to open intermediate path elements and one to open the rightmost path element. Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> (renamed openat_nofollow() to relative_openat_nofollow(), assert path is relative and doesn't contain '//', fixed side-effect in assert, Greg Kurz) Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
2017-02-27 01:42:03 +03:00
fd = openat(dirfd, name, flags | O_NOFOLLOW | O_NOCTTY | O_NONBLOCK,
mode);
if (fd == -1) {
#ifndef CONFIG_DARWIN
if (errno == EPERM && (flags & O_NOATIME)) {
/*
* The client passed O_NOATIME but we lack permissions to honor it.
* Rather than failing the open, fall back without O_NOATIME. This
* doesn't break the semantics on the client side, as the Linux
* open(2) man page notes that O_NOATIME "may not be effective on
* all filesystems". In particular, NFS and other network
* filesystems ignore it entirely.
*/
flags &= ~O_NOATIME;
goto again;
}
#endif
9pfs: introduce relative_openat_nofollow() helper When using the passthrough security mode, symbolic links created by the guest are actual symbolic links on the host file system. Since the resolution of symbolic links during path walk is supposed to occur on the client side. The server should hence never receive any path pointing to an actual symbolic link. This isn't guaranteed by the protocol though, and malicious code in the guest can trick the server to issue various syscalls on paths whose one or more elements are symbolic links. In the case of the "local" backend using the "passthrough" or "none" security modes, the guest can directly create symbolic links to arbitrary locations on the host (as per spec). The "mapped-xattr" and "mapped-file" security modes are also affected to a lesser extent as they require some help from an external entity to create actual symbolic links on the host, i.e. another guest using "passthrough" mode for example. The current code hence relies on O_NOFOLLOW and "l*()" variants of system calls. Unfortunately, this only applies to the rightmost path component. A guest could maliciously replace any component in a trusted path with a symbolic link. This could allow any guest to escape a virtfs shared folder. This patch introduces a variant of the openat() syscall that successively opens each path element with O_NOFOLLOW. When passing a file descriptor pointing to a trusted directory, one is guaranteed to be returned a file descriptor pointing to a path which is beneath the trusted directory. This will be used by subsequent patches to implement symlink-safe path walk for any access to the backend. Symbolic links aren't the only threats actually: a malicious guest could change a path element to point to other types of file with undesirable effects: - a named pipe or any other thing that would cause openat() to block - a terminal device which would become QEMU's controlling terminal These issues can be addressed with O_NONBLOCK and O_NOCTTY. Two helpers are introduced: one to open intermediate path elements and one to open the rightmost path element. Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> (renamed openat_nofollow() to relative_openat_nofollow(), assert path is relative and doesn't contain '//', fixed side-effect in assert, Greg Kurz) Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
2017-02-27 01:42:03 +03:00
return -1;
}
serrno = errno;
/* O_NONBLOCK was only needed to open the file. Let's drop it. We don't
* do that with O_PATH since fcntl(F_SETFL) isn't supported, and openat()
* ignored it anyway.
*/
if (!(flags & O_PATH_9P_UTIL)) {
ret = fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flags);
assert(!ret);
}
9pfs: introduce relative_openat_nofollow() helper When using the passthrough security mode, symbolic links created by the guest are actual symbolic links on the host file system. Since the resolution of symbolic links during path walk is supposed to occur on the client side. The server should hence never receive any path pointing to an actual symbolic link. This isn't guaranteed by the protocol though, and malicious code in the guest can trick the server to issue various syscalls on paths whose one or more elements are symbolic links. In the case of the "local" backend using the "passthrough" or "none" security modes, the guest can directly create symbolic links to arbitrary locations on the host (as per spec). The "mapped-xattr" and "mapped-file" security modes are also affected to a lesser extent as they require some help from an external entity to create actual symbolic links on the host, i.e. another guest using "passthrough" mode for example. The current code hence relies on O_NOFOLLOW and "l*()" variants of system calls. Unfortunately, this only applies to the rightmost path component. A guest could maliciously replace any component in a trusted path with a symbolic link. This could allow any guest to escape a virtfs shared folder. This patch introduces a variant of the openat() syscall that successively opens each path element with O_NOFOLLOW. When passing a file descriptor pointing to a trusted directory, one is guaranteed to be returned a file descriptor pointing to a path which is beneath the trusted directory. This will be used by subsequent patches to implement symlink-safe path walk for any access to the backend. Symbolic links aren't the only threats actually: a malicious guest could change a path element to point to other types of file with undesirable effects: - a named pipe or any other thing that would cause openat() to block - a terminal device which would become QEMU's controlling terminal These issues can be addressed with O_NONBLOCK and O_NOCTTY. Two helpers are introduced: one to open intermediate path elements and one to open the rightmost path element. Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> (renamed openat_nofollow() to relative_openat_nofollow(), assert path is relative and doesn't contain '//', fixed side-effect in assert, Greg Kurz) Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
2017-02-27 01:42:03 +03:00
errno = serrno;
return fd;
}
ssize_t fgetxattrat_nofollow(int dirfd, const char *path, const char *name,
void *value, size_t size);
int fsetxattrat_nofollow(int dirfd, const char *path, const char *name,
void *value, size_t size, int flags);
ssize_t flistxattrat_nofollow(int dirfd, const char *filename,
char *list, size_t size);
ssize_t fremovexattrat_nofollow(int dirfd, const char *filename,
const char *name);
9pfs: introduce relative_openat_nofollow() helper When using the passthrough security mode, symbolic links created by the guest are actual symbolic links on the host file system. Since the resolution of symbolic links during path walk is supposed to occur on the client side. The server should hence never receive any path pointing to an actual symbolic link. This isn't guaranteed by the protocol though, and malicious code in the guest can trick the server to issue various syscalls on paths whose one or more elements are symbolic links. In the case of the "local" backend using the "passthrough" or "none" security modes, the guest can directly create symbolic links to arbitrary locations on the host (as per spec). The "mapped-xattr" and "mapped-file" security modes are also affected to a lesser extent as they require some help from an external entity to create actual symbolic links on the host, i.e. another guest using "passthrough" mode for example. The current code hence relies on O_NOFOLLOW and "l*()" variants of system calls. Unfortunately, this only applies to the rightmost path component. A guest could maliciously replace any component in a trusted path with a symbolic link. This could allow any guest to escape a virtfs shared folder. This patch introduces a variant of the openat() syscall that successively opens each path element with O_NOFOLLOW. When passing a file descriptor pointing to a trusted directory, one is guaranteed to be returned a file descriptor pointing to a path which is beneath the trusted directory. This will be used by subsequent patches to implement symlink-safe path walk for any access to the backend. Symbolic links aren't the only threats actually: a malicious guest could change a path element to point to other types of file with undesirable effects: - a named pipe or any other thing that would cause openat() to block - a terminal device which would become QEMU's controlling terminal These issues can be addressed with O_NONBLOCK and O_NOCTTY. Two helpers are introduced: one to open intermediate path elements and one to open the rightmost path element. Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> (renamed openat_nofollow() to relative_openat_nofollow(), assert path is relative and doesn't contain '//', fixed side-effect in assert, Greg Kurz) Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
2017-02-27 01:42:03 +03:00
/*
* Darwin has d_seekoff, which appears to function similarly to d_off.
* However, it does not appear to be supported on all file systems,
* so ensure it is manually injected earlier and call here when
* needed.
*/
static inline off_t qemu_dirent_off(struct dirent *dent)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_DARWIN
return dent->d_seekoff;
#else
return dent->d_off;
#endif
}
/**
* qemu_dirent_dup() - Duplicate directory entry @dent.
*
* @dent: original directory entry to be duplicated
* Return: duplicated directory entry which should be freed with g_free()
*
* It is highly recommended to use this function instead of open coding
* duplication of dirent objects, because the actual struct dirent
* size may be bigger or shorter than sizeof(struct dirent) and correct
* handling is platform specific (see gitlab issue #841).
*/
static inline struct dirent *qemu_dirent_dup(struct dirent *dent)
{
size_t sz = 0;
#if defined _DIRENT_HAVE_D_RECLEN
/* Avoid use of strlen() if platform supports d_reclen. */
sz = dent->d_reclen;
#endif
/*
* Test sz for zero even if d_reclen is available
* because some drivers may set d_reclen to zero.
*/
if (sz == 0) {
/* Fallback to the most portable way. */
sz = offsetof(struct dirent, d_name) +
strlen(dent->d_name) + 1;
}
return g_memdup(dent, sz);
}
/*
* As long as mknodat is not available on macOS, this workaround
* using pthread_fchdir_np is needed. qemu_mknodat is defined in
* os-posix.c. pthread_fchdir_np is weakly linked here as a guard
* in case it disappears in future macOS versions, because it is
* is a private API.
*/
#if defined CONFIG_DARWIN && defined CONFIG_PTHREAD_FCHDIR_NP
int pthread_fchdir_np(int fd) __attribute__((weak_import));
#endif
int qemu_mknodat(int dirfd, const char *filename, mode_t mode, dev_t dev);
9pfs: introduce relative_openat_nofollow() helper When using the passthrough security mode, symbolic links created by the guest are actual symbolic links on the host file system. Since the resolution of symbolic links during path walk is supposed to occur on the client side. The server should hence never receive any path pointing to an actual symbolic link. This isn't guaranteed by the protocol though, and malicious code in the guest can trick the server to issue various syscalls on paths whose one or more elements are symbolic links. In the case of the "local" backend using the "passthrough" or "none" security modes, the guest can directly create symbolic links to arbitrary locations on the host (as per spec). The "mapped-xattr" and "mapped-file" security modes are also affected to a lesser extent as they require some help from an external entity to create actual symbolic links on the host, i.e. another guest using "passthrough" mode for example. The current code hence relies on O_NOFOLLOW and "l*()" variants of system calls. Unfortunately, this only applies to the rightmost path component. A guest could maliciously replace any component in a trusted path with a symbolic link. This could allow any guest to escape a virtfs shared folder. This patch introduces a variant of the openat() syscall that successively opens each path element with O_NOFOLLOW. When passing a file descriptor pointing to a trusted directory, one is guaranteed to be returned a file descriptor pointing to a path which is beneath the trusted directory. This will be used by subsequent patches to implement symlink-safe path walk for any access to the backend. Symbolic links aren't the only threats actually: a malicious guest could change a path element to point to other types of file with undesirable effects: - a named pipe or any other thing that would cause openat() to block - a terminal device which would become QEMU's controlling terminal These issues can be addressed with O_NONBLOCK and O_NOCTTY. Two helpers are introduced: one to open intermediate path elements and one to open the rightmost path element. Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> (renamed openat_nofollow() to relative_openat_nofollow(), assert path is relative and doesn't contain '//', fixed side-effect in assert, Greg Kurz) Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
2017-02-27 01:42:03 +03:00
#endif