qemu/tools/virtiofsd/seccomp.h

/*
 * Seccomp sandboxing for virtiofsd
 *
 * Copyright (C) 2019 Red Hat, Inc.
 *
 * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
 */

#ifndef VIRTIOFSD_SECCOMP_H
#define VIRTIOFSD_SECCOMP_H

#include <stdbool.h>

void setup_seccomp(bool enable_syslog);

#endif /* VIRTIOFSD_SECCOMP_H */
virtiofsd: add seccomp whitelist Only allow system calls that are needed by virtiofsd. All other system calls cause SIGSYS to be directed at the thread and the process will coredump. Restricting system calls reduces the kernel attack surface and limits what the process can do when compromised. Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> with additional entries by: Signed-off-by: Ganesh Maharaj Mahalingam <ganesh.mahalingam@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Masayoshi Mizuma <m.mizuma@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Misono Tomohiro <misono.tomohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: piaojun <piaojun@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Ren <renzhen@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com> 2019-03-13 12:32:51 +03:00			`/*`
			`* Seccomp sandboxing for virtiofsd`
			`*`
			`* Copyright (C) 2019 Red Hat, Inc.`
			`*`
			`* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later`
			`*/`

			`#ifndef VIRTIOFSD_SECCOMP_H`
			`#define VIRTIOFSD_SECCOMP_H`

virtiofsd: add --syslog command-line option Sometimes collecting output from stderr is inconvenient or does not fit within the overall logging architecture. Add syslog(3) support for cases where stderr cannot be used. Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> dgilbert: Reworked as a logging function Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com> 2019-06-26 12:25:54 +03:00			`#include <stdbool.h>`

			`void setup_seccomp(bool enable_syslog);`
virtiofsd: add seccomp whitelist Only allow system calls that are needed by virtiofsd. All other system calls cause SIGSYS to be directed at the thread and the process will coredump. Restricting system calls reduces the kernel attack surface and limits what the process can do when compromised. Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> with additional entries by: Signed-off-by: Ganesh Maharaj Mahalingam <ganesh.mahalingam@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Masayoshi Mizuma <m.mizuma@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Misono Tomohiro <misono.tomohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: piaojun <piaojun@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Ren <renzhen@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com> 2019-03-13 12:32:51 +03:00
			`#endif /* VIRTIOFSD_SECCOMP_H */`