qemu/target/arm/arm-semi.c

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/*
* Arm "Angel" semihosting syscalls
*
* Copyright (c) 2005, 2007 CodeSourcery.
* Copyright (c) 2019 Linaro
* Written by Paul Brook.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
* ARM Semihosting is documented in:
* Semihosting for AArch32 and AArch64 Release 2.0
* https://static.docs.arm.com/100863/0200/semihosting.pdf
*/
#include "qemu/osdep.h"
#include "cpu.h"
#include "hw/semihosting/semihost.h"
#include "hw/semihosting/console.h"
#include "qemu/log.h"
#ifdef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
#include "qemu.h"
#define ARM_ANGEL_HEAP_SIZE (128 * 1024 * 1024)
#else
#include "exec/gdbstub.h"
#include "qemu/cutils.h"
#endif
#define TARGET_SYS_OPEN 0x01
#define TARGET_SYS_CLOSE 0x02
#define TARGET_SYS_WRITEC 0x03
#define TARGET_SYS_WRITE0 0x04
#define TARGET_SYS_WRITE 0x05
#define TARGET_SYS_READ 0x06
#define TARGET_SYS_READC 0x07
#define TARGET_SYS_ISTTY 0x09
#define TARGET_SYS_SEEK 0x0a
#define TARGET_SYS_FLEN 0x0c
#define TARGET_SYS_TMPNAM 0x0d
#define TARGET_SYS_REMOVE 0x0e
#define TARGET_SYS_RENAME 0x0f
#define TARGET_SYS_CLOCK 0x10
#define TARGET_SYS_TIME 0x11
#define TARGET_SYS_SYSTEM 0x12
#define TARGET_SYS_ERRNO 0x13
#define TARGET_SYS_GET_CMDLINE 0x15
#define TARGET_SYS_HEAPINFO 0x16
#define TARGET_SYS_EXIT 0x18
#define TARGET_SYS_SYNCCACHE 0x19
/* ADP_Stopped_ApplicationExit is used for exit(0),
* anything else is implemented as exit(1) */
#define ADP_Stopped_ApplicationExit (0x20026)
#ifndef O_BINARY
#define O_BINARY 0
#endif
#define GDB_O_RDONLY 0x000
#define GDB_O_WRONLY 0x001
#define GDB_O_RDWR 0x002
#define GDB_O_APPEND 0x008
#define GDB_O_CREAT 0x200
#define GDB_O_TRUNC 0x400
#define GDB_O_BINARY 0
static int gdb_open_modeflags[12] = {
GDB_O_RDONLY,
GDB_O_RDONLY | GDB_O_BINARY,
GDB_O_RDWR,
GDB_O_RDWR | GDB_O_BINARY,
GDB_O_WRONLY | GDB_O_CREAT | GDB_O_TRUNC,
GDB_O_WRONLY | GDB_O_CREAT | GDB_O_TRUNC | GDB_O_BINARY,
GDB_O_RDWR | GDB_O_CREAT | GDB_O_TRUNC,
GDB_O_RDWR | GDB_O_CREAT | GDB_O_TRUNC | GDB_O_BINARY,
GDB_O_WRONLY | GDB_O_CREAT | GDB_O_APPEND,
GDB_O_WRONLY | GDB_O_CREAT | GDB_O_APPEND | GDB_O_BINARY,
GDB_O_RDWR | GDB_O_CREAT | GDB_O_APPEND,
GDB_O_RDWR | GDB_O_CREAT | GDB_O_APPEND | GDB_O_BINARY
};
static int open_modeflags[12] = {
O_RDONLY,
O_RDONLY | O_BINARY,
O_RDWR,
O_RDWR | O_BINARY,
O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC,
O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_BINARY,
O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC,
O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_BINARY,
O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_APPEND,
O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_APPEND | O_BINARY,
O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_APPEND,
O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_APPEND | O_BINARY
};
target/arm/arm-semi: Make semihosting code hand out its own file descriptors Currently the Arm semihosting code returns the guest file descriptors (handles) which are simply the fd values from the host OS or the remote gdbstub. Part of the semihosting 2.0 specification requires that we implement special handling of opening a ":semihosting-features" filename. Guest fds which result from opening the special file won't correspond to host fds, so to ensure that we don't end up with duplicate fds we need to have QEMU code control the allocation of the fd values we give the guest. Add in an abstraction layer which lets us allocate new guest FD values, and translate from a guest FD value back to the host one. This also fixes an odd hole where a semihosting guest could use the semihosting API to read, write or close file descriptors that it had never allocated but which were being used by QEMU itself. (This isn't a security hole, because enabling semihosting permits the guest to do arbitrary file access to the whole host filesystem, and so should only be done if the guest is completely trusted.) Currently the only kind of guest fd is one which maps to a host fd, but in a following commit we will add one which maps to the :semihosting-features magic data. If the guest is migrated with an open semihosting file descriptor then subsequent attempts to use the fd will all fail; this is not a change from the previous situation (where the host fd being used on the source end would not be re-opened on the destination end). Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Message-id: 20190916141544.17540-5-peter.maydell@linaro.org
2019-09-16 17:15:33 +03:00
typedef enum GuestFDType {
GuestFDUnused = 0,
GuestFDHost = 1,
} GuestFDType;
/*
* Guest file descriptors are integer indexes into an array of
* these structures (we will dynamically resize as necessary).
*/
typedef struct GuestFD {
GuestFDType type;
int hostfd;
} GuestFD;
static GArray *guestfd_array;
/*
* Allocate a new guest file descriptor and return it; if we
* couldn't allocate a new fd then return -1.
* This is a fairly simplistic implementation because we don't
* expect that most semihosting guest programs will make very
* heavy use of opening and closing fds.
*/
static int alloc_guestfd(void)
{
guint i;
if (!guestfd_array) {
/* New entries zero-initialized, i.e. type GuestFDUnused */
guestfd_array = g_array_new(FALSE, TRUE, sizeof(GuestFD));
}
for (i = 0; i < guestfd_array->len; i++) {
GuestFD *gf = &g_array_index(guestfd_array, GuestFD, i);
if (gf->type == GuestFDUnused) {
return i;
}
}
/* All elements already in use: expand the array */
g_array_set_size(guestfd_array, i + 1);
return i;
}
/*
* Look up the guestfd in the data structure; return NULL
* for out of bounds, but don't check whether the slot is unused.
* This is used internally by the other guestfd functions.
*/
static GuestFD *do_get_guestfd(int guestfd)
{
if (!guestfd_array) {
return NULL;
}
if (guestfd < 0 || guestfd >= guestfd_array->len) {
return NULL;
}
return &g_array_index(guestfd_array, GuestFD, guestfd);
}
/*
* Associate the specified guest fd (which must have been
* allocated via alloc_fd() and not previously used) with
* the specified host fd.
*/
static void associate_guestfd(int guestfd, int hostfd)
{
GuestFD *gf = do_get_guestfd(guestfd);
assert(gf);
gf->type = GuestFDHost;
gf->hostfd = hostfd;
}
/*
* Deallocate the specified guest file descriptor. This doesn't
* close the host fd, it merely undoes the work of alloc_fd().
*/
static void dealloc_guestfd(int guestfd)
{
GuestFD *gf = do_get_guestfd(guestfd);
assert(gf);
gf->type = GuestFDUnused;
}
/*
* Given a guest file descriptor, get the associated struct.
* If the fd is not valid, return NULL. This is the function
* used by the various semihosting calls to validate a handle
* from the guest.
* Note: calling alloc_guestfd() or dealloc_guestfd() will
* invalidate any GuestFD* obtained by calling this function.
*/
static GuestFD *get_guestfd(int guestfd)
{
GuestFD *gf = do_get_guestfd(guestfd);
if (!gf || gf->type == GuestFDUnused) {
return NULL;
}
return gf;
}
/*
* The semihosting API has no concept of its errno being thread-safe,
* as the API design predates SMP CPUs and was intended as a simple
* real-hardware set of debug functionality. For QEMU, we make the
* errno be per-thread in linux-user mode; in softmmu it is a simple
* global, and we assume that the guest takes care of avoiding any races.
*/
#ifndef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
static target_ulong syscall_err;
#include "exec/softmmu-semi.h"
#endif
static inline uint32_t set_swi_errno(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t code)
{
if (code == (uint32_t)-1) {
#ifdef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
CPUState *cs = env_cpu(env);
TaskState *ts = cs->opaque;
ts->swi_errno = errno;
#else
syscall_err = errno;
#endif
}
return code;
}
static inline uint32_t get_swi_errno(CPUARMState *env)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
CPUState *cs = env_cpu(env);
TaskState *ts = cs->opaque;
return ts->swi_errno;
#else
return syscall_err;
#endif
}
static target_ulong arm_semi_syscall_len;
static void arm_semi_cb(CPUState *cs, target_ulong ret, target_ulong err)
{
ARMCPU *cpu = ARM_CPU(cs);
CPUARMState *env = &cpu->env;
#ifdef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
TaskState *ts = cs->opaque;
#endif
target_ulong reg0 = is_a64(env) ? env->xregs[0] : env->regs[0];
if (ret == (target_ulong)-1) {
#ifdef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
ts->swi_errno = err;
#else
syscall_err = err;
#endif
reg0 = ret;
} else {
/* Fixup syscalls that use nonstardard return conventions. */
switch (reg0) {
case TARGET_SYS_WRITE:
case TARGET_SYS_READ:
reg0 = arm_semi_syscall_len - ret;
break;
case TARGET_SYS_SEEK:
reg0 = 0;
break;
default:
reg0 = ret;
break;
}
}
if (is_a64(env)) {
env->xregs[0] = reg0;
} else {
env->regs[0] = reg0;
}
}
static target_ulong arm_flen_buf(ARMCPU *cpu)
{
/* Return an address in target memory of 64 bytes where the remote
* gdb should write its stat struct. (The format of this structure
* is defined by GDB's remote protocol and is not target-specific.)
* We put this on the guest's stack just below SP.
*/
CPUARMState *env = &cpu->env;
target_ulong sp;
if (is_a64(env)) {
sp = env->xregs[31];
} else {
sp = env->regs[13];
}
return sp - 64;
}
static void arm_semi_flen_cb(CPUState *cs, target_ulong ret, target_ulong err)
{
ARMCPU *cpu = ARM_CPU(cs);
CPUARMState *env = &cpu->env;
/* The size is always stored in big-endian order, extract
the value. We assume the size always fit in 32 bits. */
uint32_t size;
cpu_memory_rw_debug(cs, arm_flen_buf(cpu) + 32, (uint8_t *)&size, 4, 0);
size = be32_to_cpu(size);
if (is_a64(env)) {
env->xregs[0] = size;
} else {
env->regs[0] = size;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
((TaskState *)cs->opaque)->swi_errno = err;
#else
syscall_err = err;
#endif
}
target/arm/arm-semi: Make semihosting code hand out its own file descriptors Currently the Arm semihosting code returns the guest file descriptors (handles) which are simply the fd values from the host OS or the remote gdbstub. Part of the semihosting 2.0 specification requires that we implement special handling of opening a ":semihosting-features" filename. Guest fds which result from opening the special file won't correspond to host fds, so to ensure that we don't end up with duplicate fds we need to have QEMU code control the allocation of the fd values we give the guest. Add in an abstraction layer which lets us allocate new guest FD values, and translate from a guest FD value back to the host one. This also fixes an odd hole where a semihosting guest could use the semihosting API to read, write or close file descriptors that it had never allocated but which were being used by QEMU itself. (This isn't a security hole, because enabling semihosting permits the guest to do arbitrary file access to the whole host filesystem, and so should only be done if the guest is completely trusted.) Currently the only kind of guest fd is one which maps to a host fd, but in a following commit we will add one which maps to the :semihosting-features magic data. If the guest is migrated with an open semihosting file descriptor then subsequent attempts to use the fd will all fail; this is not a change from the previous situation (where the host fd being used on the source end would not be re-opened on the destination end). Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Message-id: 20190916141544.17540-5-peter.maydell@linaro.org
2019-09-16 17:15:33 +03:00
static int arm_semi_open_guestfd;
static void arm_semi_open_cb(CPUState *cs, target_ulong ret, target_ulong err)
{
ARMCPU *cpu = ARM_CPU(cs);
CPUARMState *env = &cpu->env;
#ifdef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
TaskState *ts = cs->opaque;
#endif
if (ret == (target_ulong)-1) {
#ifdef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
ts->swi_errno = err;
#else
syscall_err = err;
#endif
dealloc_guestfd(arm_semi_open_guestfd);
} else {
associate_guestfd(arm_semi_open_guestfd, ret);
ret = arm_semi_open_guestfd;
}
if (is_a64(env)) {
env->xregs[0] = ret;
} else {
env->regs[0] = ret;
}
}
static target_ulong arm_gdb_syscall(ARMCPU *cpu, gdb_syscall_complete_cb cb,
const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list va;
CPUARMState *env = &cpu->env;
va_start(va, fmt);
gdb_do_syscallv(cb, fmt, va);
va_end(va);
/*
* FIXME: in softmmu mode, the gdbstub will schedule our callback
* to occur, but will not actually call it to complete the syscall
* until after this function has returned and we are back in the
* CPU main loop. Therefore callers to this function must not
* do anything with its return value, because it is not necessarily
* the result of the syscall, but could just be the old value of X0.
* The only thing safe to do with this is that the callers of
* do_arm_semihosting() will write it straight back into X0.
* (In linux-user mode, the callback will have happened before
* gdb_do_syscallv() returns.)
*
* We should tidy this up so neither this function nor
* do_arm_semihosting() return a value, so the mistake of
* doing something with the return value is not possible to make.
*/
return is_a64(env) ? env->xregs[0] : env->regs[0];
}
/* Read the input value from the argument block; fail the semihosting
* call if the memory read fails.
*/
#define GET_ARG(n) do { \
if (is_a64(env)) { \
if (get_user_u64(arg ## n, args + (n) * 8)) { \
errno = EFAULT; \
return set_swi_errno(env, -1); \
} \
} else { \
if (get_user_u32(arg ## n, args + (n) * 4)) { \
errno = EFAULT; \
return set_swi_errno(env, -1); \
} \
} \
} while (0)
#define SET_ARG(n, val) \
(is_a64(env) ? \
put_user_u64(val, args + (n) * 8) : \
put_user_u32(val, args + (n) * 4))
/*
* Do a semihosting call.
*
* The specification always says that the "return register" either
* returns a specific value or is corrupted, so we don't need to
* report to our caller whether we are returning a value or trying to
* leave the register unchanged. We use 0xdeadbeef as the return value
* when there isn't a defined return value for the call.
*/
target_ulong do_arm_semihosting(CPUARMState *env)
{
ARMCPU *cpu = env_archcpu(env);
CPUState *cs = env_cpu(env);
target_ulong args;
target_ulong arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3;
char * s;
int nr;
uint32_t ret;
uint32_t len;
target/arm/arm-semi: Make semihosting code hand out its own file descriptors Currently the Arm semihosting code returns the guest file descriptors (handles) which are simply the fd values from the host OS or the remote gdbstub. Part of the semihosting 2.0 specification requires that we implement special handling of opening a ":semihosting-features" filename. Guest fds which result from opening the special file won't correspond to host fds, so to ensure that we don't end up with duplicate fds we need to have QEMU code control the allocation of the fd values we give the guest. Add in an abstraction layer which lets us allocate new guest FD values, and translate from a guest FD value back to the host one. This also fixes an odd hole where a semihosting guest could use the semihosting API to read, write or close file descriptors that it had never allocated but which were being used by QEMU itself. (This isn't a security hole, because enabling semihosting permits the guest to do arbitrary file access to the whole host filesystem, and so should only be done if the guest is completely trusted.) Currently the only kind of guest fd is one which maps to a host fd, but in a following commit we will add one which maps to the :semihosting-features magic data. If the guest is migrated with an open semihosting file descriptor then subsequent attempts to use the fd will all fail; this is not a change from the previous situation (where the host fd being used on the source end would not be re-opened on the destination end). Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Message-id: 20190916141544.17540-5-peter.maydell@linaro.org
2019-09-16 17:15:33 +03:00
GuestFD *gf;
if (is_a64(env)) {
/* Note that the syscall number is in W0, not X0 */
nr = env->xregs[0] & 0xffffffffU;
args = env->xregs[1];
} else {
nr = env->regs[0];
args = env->regs[1];
}
switch (nr) {
case TARGET_SYS_OPEN:
target/arm/arm-semi: Make semihosting code hand out its own file descriptors Currently the Arm semihosting code returns the guest file descriptors (handles) which are simply the fd values from the host OS or the remote gdbstub. Part of the semihosting 2.0 specification requires that we implement special handling of opening a ":semihosting-features" filename. Guest fds which result from opening the special file won't correspond to host fds, so to ensure that we don't end up with duplicate fds we need to have QEMU code control the allocation of the fd values we give the guest. Add in an abstraction layer which lets us allocate new guest FD values, and translate from a guest FD value back to the host one. This also fixes an odd hole where a semihosting guest could use the semihosting API to read, write or close file descriptors that it had never allocated but which were being used by QEMU itself. (This isn't a security hole, because enabling semihosting permits the guest to do arbitrary file access to the whole host filesystem, and so should only be done if the guest is completely trusted.) Currently the only kind of guest fd is one which maps to a host fd, but in a following commit we will add one which maps to the :semihosting-features magic data. If the guest is migrated with an open semihosting file descriptor then subsequent attempts to use the fd will all fail; this is not a change from the previous situation (where the host fd being used on the source end would not be re-opened on the destination end). Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Message-id: 20190916141544.17540-5-peter.maydell@linaro.org
2019-09-16 17:15:33 +03:00
{
int guestfd;
GET_ARG(0);
GET_ARG(1);
GET_ARG(2);
s = lock_user_string(arg0);
if (!s) {
errno = EFAULT;
return set_swi_errno(env, -1);
}
if (arg1 >= 12) {
unlock_user(s, arg0, 0);
errno = EINVAL;
return set_swi_errno(env, -1);
}
target/arm/arm-semi: Make semihosting code hand out its own file descriptors Currently the Arm semihosting code returns the guest file descriptors (handles) which are simply the fd values from the host OS or the remote gdbstub. Part of the semihosting 2.0 specification requires that we implement special handling of opening a ":semihosting-features" filename. Guest fds which result from opening the special file won't correspond to host fds, so to ensure that we don't end up with duplicate fds we need to have QEMU code control the allocation of the fd values we give the guest. Add in an abstraction layer which lets us allocate new guest FD values, and translate from a guest FD value back to the host one. This also fixes an odd hole where a semihosting guest could use the semihosting API to read, write or close file descriptors that it had never allocated but which were being used by QEMU itself. (This isn't a security hole, because enabling semihosting permits the guest to do arbitrary file access to the whole host filesystem, and so should only be done if the guest is completely trusted.) Currently the only kind of guest fd is one which maps to a host fd, but in a following commit we will add one which maps to the :semihosting-features magic data. If the guest is migrated with an open semihosting file descriptor then subsequent attempts to use the fd will all fail; this is not a change from the previous situation (where the host fd being used on the source end would not be re-opened on the destination end). Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Message-id: 20190916141544.17540-5-peter.maydell@linaro.org
2019-09-16 17:15:33 +03:00
guestfd = alloc_guestfd();
if (guestfd < 0) {
unlock_user(s, arg0, 0);
errno = EMFILE;
return set_swi_errno(env, -1);
target/arm/arm-semi: Make semihosting code hand out its own file descriptors Currently the Arm semihosting code returns the guest file descriptors (handles) which are simply the fd values from the host OS or the remote gdbstub. Part of the semihosting 2.0 specification requires that we implement special handling of opening a ":semihosting-features" filename. Guest fds which result from opening the special file won't correspond to host fds, so to ensure that we don't end up with duplicate fds we need to have QEMU code control the allocation of the fd values we give the guest. Add in an abstraction layer which lets us allocate new guest FD values, and translate from a guest FD value back to the host one. This also fixes an odd hole where a semihosting guest could use the semihosting API to read, write or close file descriptors that it had never allocated but which were being used by QEMU itself. (This isn't a security hole, because enabling semihosting permits the guest to do arbitrary file access to the whole host filesystem, and so should only be done if the guest is completely trusted.) Currently the only kind of guest fd is one which maps to a host fd, but in a following commit we will add one which maps to the :semihosting-features magic data. If the guest is migrated with an open semihosting file descriptor then subsequent attempts to use the fd will all fail; this is not a change from the previous situation (where the host fd being used on the source end would not be re-opened on the destination end). Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Message-id: 20190916141544.17540-5-peter.maydell@linaro.org
2019-09-16 17:15:33 +03:00
}
if (strcmp(s, ":tt") == 0) {
int result_fileno = arg1 < 4 ? STDIN_FILENO : STDOUT_FILENO;
target/arm/arm-semi: Make semihosting code hand out its own file descriptors Currently the Arm semihosting code returns the guest file descriptors (handles) which are simply the fd values from the host OS or the remote gdbstub. Part of the semihosting 2.0 specification requires that we implement special handling of opening a ":semihosting-features" filename. Guest fds which result from opening the special file won't correspond to host fds, so to ensure that we don't end up with duplicate fds we need to have QEMU code control the allocation of the fd values we give the guest. Add in an abstraction layer which lets us allocate new guest FD values, and translate from a guest FD value back to the host one. This also fixes an odd hole where a semihosting guest could use the semihosting API to read, write or close file descriptors that it had never allocated but which were being used by QEMU itself. (This isn't a security hole, because enabling semihosting permits the guest to do arbitrary file access to the whole host filesystem, and so should only be done if the guest is completely trusted.) Currently the only kind of guest fd is one which maps to a host fd, but in a following commit we will add one which maps to the :semihosting-features magic data. If the guest is migrated with an open semihosting file descriptor then subsequent attempts to use the fd will all fail; this is not a change from the previous situation (where the host fd being used on the source end would not be re-opened on the destination end). Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Message-id: 20190916141544.17540-5-peter.maydell@linaro.org
2019-09-16 17:15:33 +03:00
associate_guestfd(guestfd, result_fileno);
unlock_user(s, arg0, 0);
target/arm/arm-semi: Make semihosting code hand out its own file descriptors Currently the Arm semihosting code returns the guest file descriptors (handles) which are simply the fd values from the host OS or the remote gdbstub. Part of the semihosting 2.0 specification requires that we implement special handling of opening a ":semihosting-features" filename. Guest fds which result from opening the special file won't correspond to host fds, so to ensure that we don't end up with duplicate fds we need to have QEMU code control the allocation of the fd values we give the guest. Add in an abstraction layer which lets us allocate new guest FD values, and translate from a guest FD value back to the host one. This also fixes an odd hole where a semihosting guest could use the semihosting API to read, write or close file descriptors that it had never allocated but which were being used by QEMU itself. (This isn't a security hole, because enabling semihosting permits the guest to do arbitrary file access to the whole host filesystem, and so should only be done if the guest is completely trusted.) Currently the only kind of guest fd is one which maps to a host fd, but in a following commit we will add one which maps to the :semihosting-features magic data. If the guest is migrated with an open semihosting file descriptor then subsequent attempts to use the fd will all fail; this is not a change from the previous situation (where the host fd being used on the source end would not be re-opened on the destination end). Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Message-id: 20190916141544.17540-5-peter.maydell@linaro.org
2019-09-16 17:15:33 +03:00
return guestfd;
}
if (use_gdb_syscalls()) {
target/arm/arm-semi: Make semihosting code hand out its own file descriptors Currently the Arm semihosting code returns the guest file descriptors (handles) which are simply the fd values from the host OS or the remote gdbstub. Part of the semihosting 2.0 specification requires that we implement special handling of opening a ":semihosting-features" filename. Guest fds which result from opening the special file won't correspond to host fds, so to ensure that we don't end up with duplicate fds we need to have QEMU code control the allocation of the fd values we give the guest. Add in an abstraction layer which lets us allocate new guest FD values, and translate from a guest FD value back to the host one. This also fixes an odd hole where a semihosting guest could use the semihosting API to read, write or close file descriptors that it had never allocated but which were being used by QEMU itself. (This isn't a security hole, because enabling semihosting permits the guest to do arbitrary file access to the whole host filesystem, and so should only be done if the guest is completely trusted.) Currently the only kind of guest fd is one which maps to a host fd, but in a following commit we will add one which maps to the :semihosting-features magic data. If the guest is migrated with an open semihosting file descriptor then subsequent attempts to use the fd will all fail; this is not a change from the previous situation (where the host fd being used on the source end would not be re-opened on the destination end). Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Message-id: 20190916141544.17540-5-peter.maydell@linaro.org
2019-09-16 17:15:33 +03:00
arm_semi_open_guestfd = guestfd;
ret = arm_gdb_syscall(cpu, arm_semi_open_cb, "open,%s,%x,1a4", arg0,
(int)arg2+1, gdb_open_modeflags[arg1]);
} else {
ret = set_swi_errno(env, open(s, open_modeflags[arg1], 0644));
target/arm/arm-semi: Make semihosting code hand out its own file descriptors Currently the Arm semihosting code returns the guest file descriptors (handles) which are simply the fd values from the host OS or the remote gdbstub. Part of the semihosting 2.0 specification requires that we implement special handling of opening a ":semihosting-features" filename. Guest fds which result from opening the special file won't correspond to host fds, so to ensure that we don't end up with duplicate fds we need to have QEMU code control the allocation of the fd values we give the guest. Add in an abstraction layer which lets us allocate new guest FD values, and translate from a guest FD value back to the host one. This also fixes an odd hole where a semihosting guest could use the semihosting API to read, write or close file descriptors that it had never allocated but which were being used by QEMU itself. (This isn't a security hole, because enabling semihosting permits the guest to do arbitrary file access to the whole host filesystem, and so should only be done if the guest is completely trusted.) Currently the only kind of guest fd is one which maps to a host fd, but in a following commit we will add one which maps to the :semihosting-features magic data. If the guest is migrated with an open semihosting file descriptor then subsequent attempts to use the fd will all fail; this is not a change from the previous situation (where the host fd being used on the source end would not be re-opened on the destination end). Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Message-id: 20190916141544.17540-5-peter.maydell@linaro.org
2019-09-16 17:15:33 +03:00
if (ret == (uint32_t)-1) {
dealloc_guestfd(guestfd);
} else {
associate_guestfd(guestfd, ret);
ret = guestfd;
}
}
unlock_user(s, arg0, 0);
return ret;
target/arm/arm-semi: Make semihosting code hand out its own file descriptors Currently the Arm semihosting code returns the guest file descriptors (handles) which are simply the fd values from the host OS or the remote gdbstub. Part of the semihosting 2.0 specification requires that we implement special handling of opening a ":semihosting-features" filename. Guest fds which result from opening the special file won't correspond to host fds, so to ensure that we don't end up with duplicate fds we need to have QEMU code control the allocation of the fd values we give the guest. Add in an abstraction layer which lets us allocate new guest FD values, and translate from a guest FD value back to the host one. This also fixes an odd hole where a semihosting guest could use the semihosting API to read, write or close file descriptors that it had never allocated but which were being used by QEMU itself. (This isn't a security hole, because enabling semihosting permits the guest to do arbitrary file access to the whole host filesystem, and so should only be done if the guest is completely trusted.) Currently the only kind of guest fd is one which maps to a host fd, but in a following commit we will add one which maps to the :semihosting-features magic data. If the guest is migrated with an open semihosting file descriptor then subsequent attempts to use the fd will all fail; this is not a change from the previous situation (where the host fd being used on the source end would not be re-opened on the destination end). Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Message-id: 20190916141544.17540-5-peter.maydell@linaro.org
2019-09-16 17:15:33 +03:00
}
case TARGET_SYS_CLOSE:
GET_ARG(0);
target/arm/arm-semi: Make semihosting code hand out its own file descriptors Currently the Arm semihosting code returns the guest file descriptors (handles) which are simply the fd values from the host OS or the remote gdbstub. Part of the semihosting 2.0 specification requires that we implement special handling of opening a ":semihosting-features" filename. Guest fds which result from opening the special file won't correspond to host fds, so to ensure that we don't end up with duplicate fds we need to have QEMU code control the allocation of the fd values we give the guest. Add in an abstraction layer which lets us allocate new guest FD values, and translate from a guest FD value back to the host one. This also fixes an odd hole where a semihosting guest could use the semihosting API to read, write or close file descriptors that it had never allocated but which were being used by QEMU itself. (This isn't a security hole, because enabling semihosting permits the guest to do arbitrary file access to the whole host filesystem, and so should only be done if the guest is completely trusted.) Currently the only kind of guest fd is one which maps to a host fd, but in a following commit we will add one which maps to the :semihosting-features magic data. If the guest is migrated with an open semihosting file descriptor then subsequent attempts to use the fd will all fail; this is not a change from the previous situation (where the host fd being used on the source end would not be re-opened on the destination end). Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Message-id: 20190916141544.17540-5-peter.maydell@linaro.org
2019-09-16 17:15:33 +03:00
gf = get_guestfd(arg0);
if (!gf) {
errno = EBADF;
return set_swi_errno(env, -1);
target/arm/arm-semi: Make semihosting code hand out its own file descriptors Currently the Arm semihosting code returns the guest file descriptors (handles) which are simply the fd values from the host OS or the remote gdbstub. Part of the semihosting 2.0 specification requires that we implement special handling of opening a ":semihosting-features" filename. Guest fds which result from opening the special file won't correspond to host fds, so to ensure that we don't end up with duplicate fds we need to have QEMU code control the allocation of the fd values we give the guest. Add in an abstraction layer which lets us allocate new guest FD values, and translate from a guest FD value back to the host one. This also fixes an odd hole where a semihosting guest could use the semihosting API to read, write or close file descriptors that it had never allocated but which were being used by QEMU itself. (This isn't a security hole, because enabling semihosting permits the guest to do arbitrary file access to the whole host filesystem, and so should only be done if the guest is completely trusted.) Currently the only kind of guest fd is one which maps to a host fd, but in a following commit we will add one which maps to the :semihosting-features magic data. If the guest is migrated with an open semihosting file descriptor then subsequent attempts to use the fd will all fail; this is not a change from the previous situation (where the host fd being used on the source end would not be re-opened on the destination end). Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Message-id: 20190916141544.17540-5-peter.maydell@linaro.org
2019-09-16 17:15:33 +03:00
}
if (use_gdb_syscalls()) {
target/arm/arm-semi: Make semihosting code hand out its own file descriptors Currently the Arm semihosting code returns the guest file descriptors (handles) which are simply the fd values from the host OS or the remote gdbstub. Part of the semihosting 2.0 specification requires that we implement special handling of opening a ":semihosting-features" filename. Guest fds which result from opening the special file won't correspond to host fds, so to ensure that we don't end up with duplicate fds we need to have QEMU code control the allocation of the fd values we give the guest. Add in an abstraction layer which lets us allocate new guest FD values, and translate from a guest FD value back to the host one. This also fixes an odd hole where a semihosting guest could use the semihosting API to read, write or close file descriptors that it had never allocated but which were being used by QEMU itself. (This isn't a security hole, because enabling semihosting permits the guest to do arbitrary file access to the whole host filesystem, and so should only be done if the guest is completely trusted.) Currently the only kind of guest fd is one which maps to a host fd, but in a following commit we will add one which maps to the :semihosting-features magic data. If the guest is migrated with an open semihosting file descriptor then subsequent attempts to use the fd will all fail; this is not a change from the previous situation (where the host fd being used on the source end would not be re-opened on the destination end). Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Message-id: 20190916141544.17540-5-peter.maydell@linaro.org
2019-09-16 17:15:33 +03:00
ret = arm_gdb_syscall(cpu, arm_semi_cb, "close,%x", gf->hostfd);
} else {
ret = set_swi_errno(env, close(gf->hostfd));
}
target/arm/arm-semi: Make semihosting code hand out its own file descriptors Currently the Arm semihosting code returns the guest file descriptors (handles) which are simply the fd values from the host OS or the remote gdbstub. Part of the semihosting 2.0 specification requires that we implement special handling of opening a ":semihosting-features" filename. Guest fds which result from opening the special file won't correspond to host fds, so to ensure that we don't end up with duplicate fds we need to have QEMU code control the allocation of the fd values we give the guest. Add in an abstraction layer which lets us allocate new guest FD values, and translate from a guest FD value back to the host one. This also fixes an odd hole where a semihosting guest could use the semihosting API to read, write or close file descriptors that it had never allocated but which were being used by QEMU itself. (This isn't a security hole, because enabling semihosting permits the guest to do arbitrary file access to the whole host filesystem, and so should only be done if the guest is completely trusted.) Currently the only kind of guest fd is one which maps to a host fd, but in a following commit we will add one which maps to the :semihosting-features magic data. If the guest is migrated with an open semihosting file descriptor then subsequent attempts to use the fd will all fail; this is not a change from the previous situation (where the host fd being used on the source end would not be re-opened on the destination end). Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Message-id: 20190916141544.17540-5-peter.maydell@linaro.org
2019-09-16 17:15:33 +03:00
dealloc_guestfd(arg0);
return ret;
case TARGET_SYS_WRITEC:
qemu_semihosting_console_outc(env, args);
return 0xdeadbeef;
case TARGET_SYS_WRITE0:
return qemu_semihosting_console_outs(env, args);
case TARGET_SYS_WRITE:
GET_ARG(0);
GET_ARG(1);
GET_ARG(2);
len = arg2;
target/arm/arm-semi: Make semihosting code hand out its own file descriptors Currently the Arm semihosting code returns the guest file descriptors (handles) which are simply the fd values from the host OS or the remote gdbstub. Part of the semihosting 2.0 specification requires that we implement special handling of opening a ":semihosting-features" filename. Guest fds which result from opening the special file won't correspond to host fds, so to ensure that we don't end up with duplicate fds we need to have QEMU code control the allocation of the fd values we give the guest. Add in an abstraction layer which lets us allocate new guest FD values, and translate from a guest FD value back to the host one. This also fixes an odd hole where a semihosting guest could use the semihosting API to read, write or close file descriptors that it had never allocated but which were being used by QEMU itself. (This isn't a security hole, because enabling semihosting permits the guest to do arbitrary file access to the whole host filesystem, and so should only be done if the guest is completely trusted.) Currently the only kind of guest fd is one which maps to a host fd, but in a following commit we will add one which maps to the :semihosting-features magic data. If the guest is migrated with an open semihosting file descriptor then subsequent attempts to use the fd will all fail; this is not a change from the previous situation (where the host fd being used on the source end would not be re-opened on the destination end). Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Message-id: 20190916141544.17540-5-peter.maydell@linaro.org
2019-09-16 17:15:33 +03:00
gf = get_guestfd(arg0);
if (!gf) {
errno = EBADF;
return set_swi_errno(env, -1);
target/arm/arm-semi: Make semihosting code hand out its own file descriptors Currently the Arm semihosting code returns the guest file descriptors (handles) which are simply the fd values from the host OS or the remote gdbstub. Part of the semihosting 2.0 specification requires that we implement special handling of opening a ":semihosting-features" filename. Guest fds which result from opening the special file won't correspond to host fds, so to ensure that we don't end up with duplicate fds we need to have QEMU code control the allocation of the fd values we give the guest. Add in an abstraction layer which lets us allocate new guest FD values, and translate from a guest FD value back to the host one. This also fixes an odd hole where a semihosting guest could use the semihosting API to read, write or close file descriptors that it had never allocated but which were being used by QEMU itself. (This isn't a security hole, because enabling semihosting permits the guest to do arbitrary file access to the whole host filesystem, and so should only be done if the guest is completely trusted.) Currently the only kind of guest fd is one which maps to a host fd, but in a following commit we will add one which maps to the :semihosting-features magic data. If the guest is migrated with an open semihosting file descriptor then subsequent attempts to use the fd will all fail; this is not a change from the previous situation (where the host fd being used on the source end would not be re-opened on the destination end). Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Message-id: 20190916141544.17540-5-peter.maydell@linaro.org
2019-09-16 17:15:33 +03:00
}
if (use_gdb_syscalls()) {
arm_semi_syscall_len = len;
return arm_gdb_syscall(cpu, arm_semi_cb, "write,%x,%x,%x",
target/arm/arm-semi: Make semihosting code hand out its own file descriptors Currently the Arm semihosting code returns the guest file descriptors (handles) which are simply the fd values from the host OS or the remote gdbstub. Part of the semihosting 2.0 specification requires that we implement special handling of opening a ":semihosting-features" filename. Guest fds which result from opening the special file won't correspond to host fds, so to ensure that we don't end up with duplicate fds we need to have QEMU code control the allocation of the fd values we give the guest. Add in an abstraction layer which lets us allocate new guest FD values, and translate from a guest FD value back to the host one. This also fixes an odd hole where a semihosting guest could use the semihosting API to read, write or close file descriptors that it had never allocated but which were being used by QEMU itself. (This isn't a security hole, because enabling semihosting permits the guest to do arbitrary file access to the whole host filesystem, and so should only be done if the guest is completely trusted.) Currently the only kind of guest fd is one which maps to a host fd, but in a following commit we will add one which maps to the :semihosting-features magic data. If the guest is migrated with an open semihosting file descriptor then subsequent attempts to use the fd will all fail; this is not a change from the previous situation (where the host fd being used on the source end would not be re-opened on the destination end). Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Message-id: 20190916141544.17540-5-peter.maydell@linaro.org
2019-09-16 17:15:33 +03:00
gf->hostfd, arg1, len);
} else {
s = lock_user(VERIFY_READ, arg1, len, 1);
if (!s) {
/* Return bytes not written on error */
return len;
}
ret = set_swi_errno(env, write(gf->hostfd, s, len));
unlock_user(s, arg1, 0);
if (ret == (uint32_t)-1) {
ret = 0;
}
/* Return bytes not written */
return len - ret;
}
case TARGET_SYS_READ:
GET_ARG(0);
GET_ARG(1);
GET_ARG(2);
len = arg2;
target/arm/arm-semi: Make semihosting code hand out its own file descriptors Currently the Arm semihosting code returns the guest file descriptors (handles) which are simply the fd values from the host OS or the remote gdbstub. Part of the semihosting 2.0 specification requires that we implement special handling of opening a ":semihosting-features" filename. Guest fds which result from opening the special file won't correspond to host fds, so to ensure that we don't end up with duplicate fds we need to have QEMU code control the allocation of the fd values we give the guest. Add in an abstraction layer which lets us allocate new guest FD values, and translate from a guest FD value back to the host one. This also fixes an odd hole where a semihosting guest could use the semihosting API to read, write or close file descriptors that it had never allocated but which were being used by QEMU itself. (This isn't a security hole, because enabling semihosting permits the guest to do arbitrary file access to the whole host filesystem, and so should only be done if the guest is completely trusted.) Currently the only kind of guest fd is one which maps to a host fd, but in a following commit we will add one which maps to the :semihosting-features magic data. If the guest is migrated with an open semihosting file descriptor then subsequent attempts to use the fd will all fail; this is not a change from the previous situation (where the host fd being used on the source end would not be re-opened on the destination end). Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Message-id: 20190916141544.17540-5-peter.maydell@linaro.org
2019-09-16 17:15:33 +03:00
gf = get_guestfd(arg0);
if (!gf) {
errno = EBADF;
return set_swi_errno(env, -1);
target/arm/arm-semi: Make semihosting code hand out its own file descriptors Currently the Arm semihosting code returns the guest file descriptors (handles) which are simply the fd values from the host OS or the remote gdbstub. Part of the semihosting 2.0 specification requires that we implement special handling of opening a ":semihosting-features" filename. Guest fds which result from opening the special file won't correspond to host fds, so to ensure that we don't end up with duplicate fds we need to have QEMU code control the allocation of the fd values we give the guest. Add in an abstraction layer which lets us allocate new guest FD values, and translate from a guest FD value back to the host one. This also fixes an odd hole where a semihosting guest could use the semihosting API to read, write or close file descriptors that it had never allocated but which were being used by QEMU itself. (This isn't a security hole, because enabling semihosting permits the guest to do arbitrary file access to the whole host filesystem, and so should only be done if the guest is completely trusted.) Currently the only kind of guest fd is one which maps to a host fd, but in a following commit we will add one which maps to the :semihosting-features magic data. If the guest is migrated with an open semihosting file descriptor then subsequent attempts to use the fd will all fail; this is not a change from the previous situation (where the host fd being used on the source end would not be re-opened on the destination end). Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Message-id: 20190916141544.17540-5-peter.maydell@linaro.org
2019-09-16 17:15:33 +03:00
}
if (use_gdb_syscalls()) {
arm_semi_syscall_len = len;
return arm_gdb_syscall(cpu, arm_semi_cb, "read,%x,%x,%x",
target/arm/arm-semi: Make semihosting code hand out its own file descriptors Currently the Arm semihosting code returns the guest file descriptors (handles) which are simply the fd values from the host OS or the remote gdbstub. Part of the semihosting 2.0 specification requires that we implement special handling of opening a ":semihosting-features" filename. Guest fds which result from opening the special file won't correspond to host fds, so to ensure that we don't end up with duplicate fds we need to have QEMU code control the allocation of the fd values we give the guest. Add in an abstraction layer which lets us allocate new guest FD values, and translate from a guest FD value back to the host one. This also fixes an odd hole where a semihosting guest could use the semihosting API to read, write or close file descriptors that it had never allocated but which were being used by QEMU itself. (This isn't a security hole, because enabling semihosting permits the guest to do arbitrary file access to the whole host filesystem, and so should only be done if the guest is completely trusted.) Currently the only kind of guest fd is one which maps to a host fd, but in a following commit we will add one which maps to the :semihosting-features magic data. If the guest is migrated with an open semihosting file descriptor then subsequent attempts to use the fd will all fail; this is not a change from the previous situation (where the host fd being used on the source end would not be re-opened on the destination end). Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Message-id: 20190916141544.17540-5-peter.maydell@linaro.org
2019-09-16 17:15:33 +03:00
gf->hostfd, arg1, len);
} else {
s = lock_user(VERIFY_WRITE, arg1, len, 0);
if (!s) {
/* return bytes not read */
return len;
}
do {
ret = set_swi_errno(env, read(gf->hostfd, s, len));
} while (ret == -1 && errno == EINTR);
unlock_user(s, arg1, len);
if (ret == (uint32_t)-1) {
ret = 0;
}
/* Return bytes not read */
return len - ret;
}
case TARGET_SYS_READC:
qemu_log_mask(LOG_UNIMP, "%s: SYS_READC not implemented", __func__);
return 0;
case TARGET_SYS_ISTTY:
GET_ARG(0);
target/arm/arm-semi: Make semihosting code hand out its own file descriptors Currently the Arm semihosting code returns the guest file descriptors (handles) which are simply the fd values from the host OS or the remote gdbstub. Part of the semihosting 2.0 specification requires that we implement special handling of opening a ":semihosting-features" filename. Guest fds which result from opening the special file won't correspond to host fds, so to ensure that we don't end up with duplicate fds we need to have QEMU code control the allocation of the fd values we give the guest. Add in an abstraction layer which lets us allocate new guest FD values, and translate from a guest FD value back to the host one. This also fixes an odd hole where a semihosting guest could use the semihosting API to read, write or close file descriptors that it had never allocated but which were being used by QEMU itself. (This isn't a security hole, because enabling semihosting permits the guest to do arbitrary file access to the whole host filesystem, and so should only be done if the guest is completely trusted.) Currently the only kind of guest fd is one which maps to a host fd, but in a following commit we will add one which maps to the :semihosting-features magic data. If the guest is migrated with an open semihosting file descriptor then subsequent attempts to use the fd will all fail; this is not a change from the previous situation (where the host fd being used on the source end would not be re-opened on the destination end). Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Message-id: 20190916141544.17540-5-peter.maydell@linaro.org
2019-09-16 17:15:33 +03:00
gf = get_guestfd(arg0);
if (!gf) {
errno = EBADF;
return set_swi_errno(env, -1);
target/arm/arm-semi: Make semihosting code hand out its own file descriptors Currently the Arm semihosting code returns the guest file descriptors (handles) which are simply the fd values from the host OS or the remote gdbstub. Part of the semihosting 2.0 specification requires that we implement special handling of opening a ":semihosting-features" filename. Guest fds which result from opening the special file won't correspond to host fds, so to ensure that we don't end up with duplicate fds we need to have QEMU code control the allocation of the fd values we give the guest. Add in an abstraction layer which lets us allocate new guest FD values, and translate from a guest FD value back to the host one. This also fixes an odd hole where a semihosting guest could use the semihosting API to read, write or close file descriptors that it had never allocated but which were being used by QEMU itself. (This isn't a security hole, because enabling semihosting permits the guest to do arbitrary file access to the whole host filesystem, and so should only be done if the guest is completely trusted.) Currently the only kind of guest fd is one which maps to a host fd, but in a following commit we will add one which maps to the :semihosting-features magic data. If the guest is migrated with an open semihosting file descriptor then subsequent attempts to use the fd will all fail; this is not a change from the previous situation (where the host fd being used on the source end would not be re-opened on the destination end). Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Message-id: 20190916141544.17540-5-peter.maydell@linaro.org
2019-09-16 17:15:33 +03:00
}
if (use_gdb_syscalls()) {
target/arm/arm-semi: Make semihosting code hand out its own file descriptors Currently the Arm semihosting code returns the guest file descriptors (handles) which are simply the fd values from the host OS or the remote gdbstub. Part of the semihosting 2.0 specification requires that we implement special handling of opening a ":semihosting-features" filename. Guest fds which result from opening the special file won't correspond to host fds, so to ensure that we don't end up with duplicate fds we need to have QEMU code control the allocation of the fd values we give the guest. Add in an abstraction layer which lets us allocate new guest FD values, and translate from a guest FD value back to the host one. This also fixes an odd hole where a semihosting guest could use the semihosting API to read, write or close file descriptors that it had never allocated but which were being used by QEMU itself. (This isn't a security hole, because enabling semihosting permits the guest to do arbitrary file access to the whole host filesystem, and so should only be done if the guest is completely trusted.) Currently the only kind of guest fd is one which maps to a host fd, but in a following commit we will add one which maps to the :semihosting-features magic data. If the guest is migrated with an open semihosting file descriptor then subsequent attempts to use the fd will all fail; this is not a change from the previous situation (where the host fd being used on the source end would not be re-opened on the destination end). Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Message-id: 20190916141544.17540-5-peter.maydell@linaro.org
2019-09-16 17:15:33 +03:00
return arm_gdb_syscall(cpu, arm_semi_cb, "isatty,%x", gf->hostfd);
} else {
target/arm/arm-semi: Make semihosting code hand out its own file descriptors Currently the Arm semihosting code returns the guest file descriptors (handles) which are simply the fd values from the host OS or the remote gdbstub. Part of the semihosting 2.0 specification requires that we implement special handling of opening a ":semihosting-features" filename. Guest fds which result from opening the special file won't correspond to host fds, so to ensure that we don't end up with duplicate fds we need to have QEMU code control the allocation of the fd values we give the guest. Add in an abstraction layer which lets us allocate new guest FD values, and translate from a guest FD value back to the host one. This also fixes an odd hole where a semihosting guest could use the semihosting API to read, write or close file descriptors that it had never allocated but which were being used by QEMU itself. (This isn't a security hole, because enabling semihosting permits the guest to do arbitrary file access to the whole host filesystem, and so should only be done if the guest is completely trusted.) Currently the only kind of guest fd is one which maps to a host fd, but in a following commit we will add one which maps to the :semihosting-features magic data. If the guest is migrated with an open semihosting file descriptor then subsequent attempts to use the fd will all fail; this is not a change from the previous situation (where the host fd being used on the source end would not be re-opened on the destination end). Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Message-id: 20190916141544.17540-5-peter.maydell@linaro.org
2019-09-16 17:15:33 +03:00
return isatty(gf->hostfd);
}
case TARGET_SYS_SEEK:
GET_ARG(0);
GET_ARG(1);
target/arm/arm-semi: Make semihosting code hand out its own file descriptors Currently the Arm semihosting code returns the guest file descriptors (handles) which are simply the fd values from the host OS or the remote gdbstub. Part of the semihosting 2.0 specification requires that we implement special handling of opening a ":semihosting-features" filename. Guest fds which result from opening the special file won't correspond to host fds, so to ensure that we don't end up with duplicate fds we need to have QEMU code control the allocation of the fd values we give the guest. Add in an abstraction layer which lets us allocate new guest FD values, and translate from a guest FD value back to the host one. This also fixes an odd hole where a semihosting guest could use the semihosting API to read, write or close file descriptors that it had never allocated but which were being used by QEMU itself. (This isn't a security hole, because enabling semihosting permits the guest to do arbitrary file access to the whole host filesystem, and so should only be done if the guest is completely trusted.) Currently the only kind of guest fd is one which maps to a host fd, but in a following commit we will add one which maps to the :semihosting-features magic data. If the guest is migrated with an open semihosting file descriptor then subsequent attempts to use the fd will all fail; this is not a change from the previous situation (where the host fd being used on the source end would not be re-opened on the destination end). Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Message-id: 20190916141544.17540-5-peter.maydell@linaro.org
2019-09-16 17:15:33 +03:00
gf = get_guestfd(arg0);
if (!gf) {
errno = EBADF;
return set_swi_errno(env, -1);
target/arm/arm-semi: Make semihosting code hand out its own file descriptors Currently the Arm semihosting code returns the guest file descriptors (handles) which are simply the fd values from the host OS or the remote gdbstub. Part of the semihosting 2.0 specification requires that we implement special handling of opening a ":semihosting-features" filename. Guest fds which result from opening the special file won't correspond to host fds, so to ensure that we don't end up with duplicate fds we need to have QEMU code control the allocation of the fd values we give the guest. Add in an abstraction layer which lets us allocate new guest FD values, and translate from a guest FD value back to the host one. This also fixes an odd hole where a semihosting guest could use the semihosting API to read, write or close file descriptors that it had never allocated but which were being used by QEMU itself. (This isn't a security hole, because enabling semihosting permits the guest to do arbitrary file access to the whole host filesystem, and so should only be done if the guest is completely trusted.) Currently the only kind of guest fd is one which maps to a host fd, but in a following commit we will add one which maps to the :semihosting-features magic data. If the guest is migrated with an open semihosting file descriptor then subsequent attempts to use the fd will all fail; this is not a change from the previous situation (where the host fd being used on the source end would not be re-opened on the destination end). Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Message-id: 20190916141544.17540-5-peter.maydell@linaro.org
2019-09-16 17:15:33 +03:00
}
if (use_gdb_syscalls()) {
return arm_gdb_syscall(cpu, arm_semi_cb, "lseek,%x,%x,0",
target/arm/arm-semi: Make semihosting code hand out its own file descriptors Currently the Arm semihosting code returns the guest file descriptors (handles) which are simply the fd values from the host OS or the remote gdbstub. Part of the semihosting 2.0 specification requires that we implement special handling of opening a ":semihosting-features" filename. Guest fds which result from opening the special file won't correspond to host fds, so to ensure that we don't end up with duplicate fds we need to have QEMU code control the allocation of the fd values we give the guest. Add in an abstraction layer which lets us allocate new guest FD values, and translate from a guest FD value back to the host one. This also fixes an odd hole where a semihosting guest could use the semihosting API to read, write or close file descriptors that it had never allocated but which were being used by QEMU itself. (This isn't a security hole, because enabling semihosting permits the guest to do arbitrary file access to the whole host filesystem, and so should only be done if the guest is completely trusted.) Currently the only kind of guest fd is one which maps to a host fd, but in a following commit we will add one which maps to the :semihosting-features magic data. If the guest is migrated with an open semihosting file descriptor then subsequent attempts to use the fd will all fail; this is not a change from the previous situation (where the host fd being used on the source end would not be re-opened on the destination end). Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Message-id: 20190916141544.17540-5-peter.maydell@linaro.org
2019-09-16 17:15:33 +03:00
gf->hostfd, arg1);
} else {
ret = set_swi_errno(env, lseek(gf->hostfd, arg1, SEEK_SET));
if (ret == (uint32_t)-1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
case TARGET_SYS_FLEN:
GET_ARG(0);
target/arm/arm-semi: Make semihosting code hand out its own file descriptors Currently the Arm semihosting code returns the guest file descriptors (handles) which are simply the fd values from the host OS or the remote gdbstub. Part of the semihosting 2.0 specification requires that we implement special handling of opening a ":semihosting-features" filename. Guest fds which result from opening the special file won't correspond to host fds, so to ensure that we don't end up with duplicate fds we need to have QEMU code control the allocation of the fd values we give the guest. Add in an abstraction layer which lets us allocate new guest FD values, and translate from a guest FD value back to the host one. This also fixes an odd hole where a semihosting guest could use the semihosting API to read, write or close file descriptors that it had never allocated but which were being used by QEMU itself. (This isn't a security hole, because enabling semihosting permits the guest to do arbitrary file access to the whole host filesystem, and so should only be done if the guest is completely trusted.) Currently the only kind of guest fd is one which maps to a host fd, but in a following commit we will add one which maps to the :semihosting-features magic data. If the guest is migrated with an open semihosting file descriptor then subsequent attempts to use the fd will all fail; this is not a change from the previous situation (where the host fd being used on the source end would not be re-opened on the destination end). Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Message-id: 20190916141544.17540-5-peter.maydell@linaro.org
2019-09-16 17:15:33 +03:00
gf = get_guestfd(arg0);
if (!gf) {
errno = EBADF;
return set_swi_errno(env, -1);
target/arm/arm-semi: Make semihosting code hand out its own file descriptors Currently the Arm semihosting code returns the guest file descriptors (handles) which are simply the fd values from the host OS or the remote gdbstub. Part of the semihosting 2.0 specification requires that we implement special handling of opening a ":semihosting-features" filename. Guest fds which result from opening the special file won't correspond to host fds, so to ensure that we don't end up with duplicate fds we need to have QEMU code control the allocation of the fd values we give the guest. Add in an abstraction layer which lets us allocate new guest FD values, and translate from a guest FD value back to the host one. This also fixes an odd hole where a semihosting guest could use the semihosting API to read, write or close file descriptors that it had never allocated but which were being used by QEMU itself. (This isn't a security hole, because enabling semihosting permits the guest to do arbitrary file access to the whole host filesystem, and so should only be done if the guest is completely trusted.) Currently the only kind of guest fd is one which maps to a host fd, but in a following commit we will add one which maps to the :semihosting-features magic data. If the guest is migrated with an open semihosting file descriptor then subsequent attempts to use the fd will all fail; this is not a change from the previous situation (where the host fd being used on the source end would not be re-opened on the destination end). Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Message-id: 20190916141544.17540-5-peter.maydell@linaro.org
2019-09-16 17:15:33 +03:00
}
if (use_gdb_syscalls()) {
return arm_gdb_syscall(cpu, arm_semi_flen_cb, "fstat,%x,%x",
target/arm/arm-semi: Make semihosting code hand out its own file descriptors Currently the Arm semihosting code returns the guest file descriptors (handles) which are simply the fd values from the host OS or the remote gdbstub. Part of the semihosting 2.0 specification requires that we implement special handling of opening a ":semihosting-features" filename. Guest fds which result from opening the special file won't correspond to host fds, so to ensure that we don't end up with duplicate fds we need to have QEMU code control the allocation of the fd values we give the guest. Add in an abstraction layer which lets us allocate new guest FD values, and translate from a guest FD value back to the host one. This also fixes an odd hole where a semihosting guest could use the semihosting API to read, write or close file descriptors that it had never allocated but which were being used by QEMU itself. (This isn't a security hole, because enabling semihosting permits the guest to do arbitrary file access to the whole host filesystem, and so should only be done if the guest is completely trusted.) Currently the only kind of guest fd is one which maps to a host fd, but in a following commit we will add one which maps to the :semihosting-features magic data. If the guest is migrated with an open semihosting file descriptor then subsequent attempts to use the fd will all fail; this is not a change from the previous situation (where the host fd being used on the source end would not be re-opened on the destination end). Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> Message-id: 20190916141544.17540-5-peter.maydell@linaro.org
2019-09-16 17:15:33 +03:00
gf->hostfd, arm_flen_buf(cpu));
} else {
struct stat buf;
ret = set_swi_errno(env, fstat(gf->hostfd, &buf));
if (ret == (uint32_t)-1)
return -1;
return buf.st_size;
}
case TARGET_SYS_TMPNAM:
qemu_log_mask(LOG_UNIMP, "%s: SYS_TMPNAM not implemented", __func__);
return -1;
case TARGET_SYS_REMOVE:
GET_ARG(0);
GET_ARG(1);
if (use_gdb_syscalls()) {
ret = arm_gdb_syscall(cpu, arm_semi_cb, "unlink,%s",
arg0, (int)arg1+1);
} else {
s = lock_user_string(arg0);
if (!s) {
errno = EFAULT;
return set_swi_errno(env, -1);
}
ret = set_swi_errno(env, remove(s));
unlock_user(s, arg0, 0);
}
return ret;
case TARGET_SYS_RENAME:
GET_ARG(0);
GET_ARG(1);
GET_ARG(2);
GET_ARG(3);
if (use_gdb_syscalls()) {
return arm_gdb_syscall(cpu, arm_semi_cb, "rename,%s,%s",
arg0, (int)arg1+1, arg2, (int)arg3+1);
} else {
char *s2;
s = lock_user_string(arg0);
s2 = lock_user_string(arg2);
if (!s || !s2) {
errno = EFAULT;
ret = set_swi_errno(env, -1);
} else {
ret = set_swi_errno(env, rename(s, s2));
}
if (s2)
unlock_user(s2, arg2, 0);
if (s)
unlock_user(s, arg0, 0);
return ret;
}
case TARGET_SYS_CLOCK:
return clock() / (CLOCKS_PER_SEC / 100);
case TARGET_SYS_TIME:
return set_swi_errno(env, time(NULL));
case TARGET_SYS_SYSTEM:
GET_ARG(0);
GET_ARG(1);
if (use_gdb_syscalls()) {
return arm_gdb_syscall(cpu, arm_semi_cb, "system,%s",
arg0, (int)arg1+1);
} else {
s = lock_user_string(arg0);
if (!s) {
errno = EFAULT;
return set_swi_errno(env, -1);
}
ret = set_swi_errno(env, system(s));
unlock_user(s, arg0, 0);
return ret;
}
case TARGET_SYS_ERRNO:
return get_swi_errno(env);
case TARGET_SYS_GET_CMDLINE:
{
/* Build a command-line from the original argv.
*
* The inputs are:
* * arg0, pointer to a buffer of at least the size
* specified in arg1.
* * arg1, size of the buffer pointed to by arg0 in
* bytes.
*
* The outputs are:
* * arg0, pointer to null-terminated string of the
* command line.
* * arg1, length of the string pointed to by arg0.
*/
char *output_buffer;
size_t input_size;
size_t output_size;
int status = 0;
#if !defined(CONFIG_USER_ONLY)
const char *cmdline;
#else
TaskState *ts = cs->opaque;
#endif
GET_ARG(0);
GET_ARG(1);
input_size = arg1;
/* Compute the size of the output string. */
#if !defined(CONFIG_USER_ONLY)
cmdline = semihosting_get_cmdline();
if (cmdline == NULL) {
cmdline = ""; /* Default to an empty line. */
}
output_size = strlen(cmdline) + 1; /* Count terminating 0. */
#else
unsigned int i;
output_size = ts->info->arg_end - ts->info->arg_start;
if (!output_size) {
/*
* We special-case the "empty command line" case (argc==0).
* Just provide the terminating 0.
*/
output_size = 1;
}
#endif
if (output_size > input_size) {
/* Not enough space to store command-line arguments. */
errno = E2BIG;
return set_swi_errno(env, -1);
}
/* Adjust the command-line length. */
if (SET_ARG(1, output_size - 1)) {
/* Couldn't write back to argument block */
errno = EFAULT;
return set_swi_errno(env, -1);
}
/* Lock the buffer on the ARM side. */
output_buffer = lock_user(VERIFY_WRITE, arg0, output_size, 0);
if (!output_buffer) {
errno = EFAULT;
return set_swi_errno(env, -1);
}
/* Copy the command-line arguments. */
#if !defined(CONFIG_USER_ONLY)
pstrcpy(output_buffer, output_size, cmdline);
#else
if (output_size == 1) {
/* Empty command-line. */
output_buffer[0] = '\0';
goto out;
}
if (copy_from_user(output_buffer, ts->info->arg_start,
output_size)) {
errno = EFAULT;
status = set_swi_errno(env, -1);
goto out;
}
/* Separate arguments by white spaces. */
for (i = 0; i < output_size - 1; i++) {
if (output_buffer[i] == 0) {
output_buffer[i] = ' ';
}
}
out:
#endif
/* Unlock the buffer on the ARM side. */
unlock_user(output_buffer, arg0, output_size);
return status;
}
case TARGET_SYS_HEAPINFO:
{
target_ulong retvals[4];
target_ulong limit;
int i;
#ifdef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
TaskState *ts = cs->opaque;
#endif
GET_ARG(0);
#ifdef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
/*
* Some C libraries assume the heap immediately follows .bss, so
* allocate it using sbrk.
*/
if (!ts->heap_limit) {
abi_ulong ret;
ts->heap_base = do_brk(0);
limit = ts->heap_base + ARM_ANGEL_HEAP_SIZE;
/* Try a big heap, and reduce the size if that fails. */
for (;;) {
ret = do_brk(limit);
if (ret >= limit) {
break;
}
limit = (ts->heap_base >> 1) + (limit >> 1);
}
ts->heap_limit = limit;
}
retvals[0] = ts->heap_base;
retvals[1] = ts->heap_limit;
retvals[2] = ts->stack_base;
retvals[3] = 0; /* Stack limit. */
#else
limit = ram_size;
/* TODO: Make this use the limit of the loaded application. */
retvals[0] = limit / 2;
retvals[1] = limit;
retvals[2] = limit; /* Stack base */
retvals[3] = 0; /* Stack limit. */
#endif
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(retvals); i++) {
bool fail;
if (is_a64(env)) {
fail = put_user_u64(retvals[i], arg0 + i * 8);
} else {
fail = put_user_u32(retvals[i], arg0 + i * 4);
}
if (fail) {
/* Couldn't write back to argument block */
errno = EFAULT;
return set_swi_errno(env, -1);
}
}
return 0;
}
case TARGET_SYS_EXIT:
if (is_a64(env)) {
/*
* The A64 version of this call takes a parameter block,
* so the application-exit type can return a subcode which
* is the exit status code from the application.
*/
GET_ARG(0);
GET_ARG(1);
if (arg0 == ADP_Stopped_ApplicationExit) {
ret = arg1;
} else {
ret = 1;
}
} else {
/*
* ARM specifies only Stopped_ApplicationExit as normal
* exit, everything else is considered an error
*/
ret = (args == ADP_Stopped_ApplicationExit) ? 0 : 1;
}
gdb_exit(env, ret);
exit(ret);
case TARGET_SYS_SYNCCACHE:
/*
* Clean the D-cache and invalidate the I-cache for the specified
* virtual address range. This is a nop for us since we don't
* implement caches. This is only present on A64.
*/
if (is_a64(env)) {
return 0;
}
/* fall through -- invalid for A32/T32 */
default:
fprintf(stderr, "qemu: Unsupported SemiHosting SWI 0x%02x\n", nr);
cpu_dump_state(cs, stderr, 0);
abort();
}
}