ae643747b1
have no other gods before c.h'. Also remove some demonstrably redundant #include lines, mostly of <errno.h> which was added to c.h years ago.
936 lines
24 KiB
C
936 lines
24 KiB
C
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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*
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* auth.c
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* Routines to handle network authentication
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*
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* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2006, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
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* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
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*
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*
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* IDENTIFICATION
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* $PostgreSQL: pgsql/src/backend/libpq/auth.c,v 1.138 2006/07/14 05:28:27 tgl Exp $
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*
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*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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*/
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#include "postgres.h"
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <sys/socket.h>
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#if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_CMSGCRED) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_FCRED) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKCRED)
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#include <sys/uio.h>
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#include <sys/ucred.h>
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#endif
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#include <netinet/in.h>
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#include <arpa/inet.h>
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#include "libpq/auth.h"
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#include "libpq/crypt.h"
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#include "libpq/hba.h"
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#include "libpq/ip.h"
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#include "libpq/libpq.h"
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#include "libpq/pqcomm.h"
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#include "libpq/pqformat.h"
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#include "miscadmin.h"
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#include "storage/ipc.h"
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static void sendAuthRequest(Port *port, AuthRequest areq);
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static void auth_failed(Port *port, int status);
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static char *recv_password_packet(Port *port);
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static int recv_and_check_password_packet(Port *port);
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char *pg_krb_server_keyfile;
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char *pg_krb_srvnam;
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bool pg_krb_caseins_users;
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char *pg_krb_server_hostname = NULL;
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#ifdef USE_PAM
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#ifdef HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H
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#include <pam/pam_appl.h>
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#endif
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#ifdef HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H
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#include <security/pam_appl.h>
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#endif
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#define PGSQL_PAM_SERVICE "postgresql" /* Service name passed to PAM */
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static int CheckPAMAuth(Port *port, char *user, char *password);
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static int pam_passwd_conv_proc(int num_msg, const struct pam_message ** msg,
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struct pam_response ** resp, void *appdata_ptr);
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static struct pam_conv pam_passw_conv = {
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&pam_passwd_conv_proc,
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NULL
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};
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static char *pam_passwd = NULL; /* Workaround for Solaris 2.6 brokenness */
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static Port *pam_port_cludge; /* Workaround for passing "Port *port" into
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* pam_passwd_conv_proc */
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#endif /* USE_PAM */
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#ifdef USE_LDAP
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#ifndef WIN32
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/* We use a deprecated function to keep the codepaths the same as the
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* win32 one. */
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#define LDAP_DEPRECATED 1
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#include <ldap.h>
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#else
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/* Header broken in MingW */
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#define ldap_start_tls_sA __BROKEN_LDAP_HEADER
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#include <winldap.h>
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#undef ldap_start_tls_sA
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/* Correct header from the Platform SDK */
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WINLDAPAPI ULONG ldap_start_tls_sA (
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IN PLDAP ExternalHandle,
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OUT PULONG ServerReturnValue,
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OUT LDAPMessage **result,
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IN PLDAPControlA *ServerControls,
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IN PLDAPControlA *ClientControls
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);
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#endif
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static int CheckLDAPAuth(Port *port);
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#endif
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#ifdef KRB5
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/*----------------------------------------------------------------
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* MIT Kerberos authentication system - protocol version 5
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*----------------------------------------------------------------
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*/
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#include <krb5.h>
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/* Some old versions of Kerberos do not include <com_err.h> in <krb5.h> */
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#if !defined(__COM_ERR_H) && !defined(__COM_ERR_H__)
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#include <com_err.h>
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#endif
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/*
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* pg_an_to_ln -- return the local name corresponding to an authentication
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* name
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*
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* XXX Assumes that the first aname component is the user name. This is NOT
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* necessarily so, since an aname can actually be something out of your
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* worst X.400 nightmare, like
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* ORGANIZATION=U. C. Berkeley/NAME=Paul M. Aoki@CS.BERKELEY.EDU
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* Note that the MIT an_to_ln code does the same thing if you don't
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* provide an aname mapping database...it may be a better idea to use
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* krb5_an_to_ln, except that it punts if multiple components are found,
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* and we can't afford to punt.
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*/
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static char *
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pg_an_to_ln(char *aname)
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{
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char *p;
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if ((p = strchr(aname, '/')) || (p = strchr(aname, '@')))
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*p = '\0';
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return aname;
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}
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/*
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* Various krb5 state which is not connection specfic, and a flag to
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* indicate whether we have initialised it yet.
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*/
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static int pg_krb5_initialised;
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static krb5_context pg_krb5_context;
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static krb5_keytab pg_krb5_keytab;
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static krb5_principal pg_krb5_server;
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static int
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pg_krb5_init(void)
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{
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krb5_error_code retval;
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char *khostname;
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if (pg_krb5_initialised)
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return STATUS_OK;
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retval = krb5_init_context(&pg_krb5_context);
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if (retval)
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{
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ereport(LOG,
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(errmsg("Kerberos initialization returned error %d",
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retval)));
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com_err("postgres", retval, "while initializing krb5");
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return STATUS_ERROR;
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}
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retval = krb5_kt_resolve(pg_krb5_context, pg_krb_server_keyfile, &pg_krb5_keytab);
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if (retval)
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{
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ereport(LOG,
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(errmsg("Kerberos keytab resolving returned error %d",
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retval)));
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com_err("postgres", retval, "while resolving keytab file \"%s\"",
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pg_krb_server_keyfile);
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krb5_free_context(pg_krb5_context);
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return STATUS_ERROR;
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}
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/*
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* If no hostname was specified, pg_krb_server_hostname is already NULL.
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* If it's set to blank, force it to NULL.
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*/
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khostname = pg_krb_server_hostname;
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if (khostname && khostname[0] == '\0')
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khostname = NULL;
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retval = krb5_sname_to_principal(pg_krb5_context,
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khostname,
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pg_krb_srvnam,
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KRB5_NT_SRV_HST,
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&pg_krb5_server);
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if (retval)
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{
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ereport(LOG,
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(errmsg("Kerberos sname_to_principal(\"%s\", \"%s\") returned error %d",
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khostname ? khostname : "server hostname", pg_krb_srvnam, retval)));
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com_err("postgres", retval,
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"while getting server principal for server \"%s\" for service \"%s\"",
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khostname ? khostname : "server hostname", pg_krb_srvnam);
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krb5_kt_close(pg_krb5_context, pg_krb5_keytab);
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krb5_free_context(pg_krb5_context);
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return STATUS_ERROR;
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}
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pg_krb5_initialised = 1;
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return STATUS_OK;
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}
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/*
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* pg_krb5_recvauth -- server routine to receive authentication information
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* from the client
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*
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* We still need to compare the username obtained from the client's setup
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* packet to the authenticated name.
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*
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* We have our own keytab file because postgres is unlikely to run as root,
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* and so cannot read the default keytab.
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*/
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static int
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pg_krb5_recvauth(Port *port)
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{
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krb5_error_code retval;
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int ret;
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krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
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krb5_ticket *ticket;
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char *kusername;
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ret = pg_krb5_init();
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if (ret != STATUS_OK)
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return ret;
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retval = krb5_recvauth(pg_krb5_context, &auth_context,
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(krb5_pointer) & port->sock, pg_krb_srvnam,
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pg_krb5_server, 0, pg_krb5_keytab, &ticket);
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if (retval)
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{
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ereport(LOG,
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(errmsg("Kerberos recvauth returned error %d",
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retval)));
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com_err("postgres", retval, "from krb5_recvauth");
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return STATUS_ERROR;
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}
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/*
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* The "client" structure comes out of the ticket and is therefore
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* authenticated. Use it to check the username obtained from the
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* postmaster startup packet.
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*
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* I have no idea why this is considered necessary.
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*/
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#if defined(HAVE_KRB5_TICKET_ENC_PART2)
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retval = krb5_unparse_name(pg_krb5_context,
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ticket->enc_part2->client, &kusername);
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#elif defined(HAVE_KRB5_TICKET_CLIENT)
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retval = krb5_unparse_name(pg_krb5_context,
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ticket->client, &kusername);
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#else
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#error "bogus configuration"
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#endif
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if (retval)
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{
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ereport(LOG,
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(errmsg("Kerberos unparse_name returned error %d",
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retval)));
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com_err("postgres", retval, "while unparsing client name");
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krb5_free_ticket(pg_krb5_context, ticket);
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krb5_auth_con_free(pg_krb5_context, auth_context);
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return STATUS_ERROR;
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}
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kusername = pg_an_to_ln(kusername);
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if (pg_krb_caseins_users)
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ret = pg_strncasecmp(port->user_name, kusername, SM_DATABASE_USER);
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else
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ret = strncmp(port->user_name, kusername, SM_DATABASE_USER);
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if (ret)
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{
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ereport(LOG,
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(errmsg("unexpected Kerberos user name received from client (received \"%s\", expected \"%s\")",
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port->user_name, kusername)));
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ret = STATUS_ERROR;
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}
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else
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ret = STATUS_OK;
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krb5_free_ticket(pg_krb5_context, ticket);
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krb5_auth_con_free(pg_krb5_context, auth_context);
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free(kusername);
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return ret;
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}
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#else
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static int
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pg_krb5_recvauth(Port *port)
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{
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ereport(LOG,
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(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
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errmsg("Kerberos 5 not implemented on this server")));
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return STATUS_ERROR;
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}
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#endif /* KRB5 */
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|
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/*
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* Tell the user the authentication failed, but not (much about) why.
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*
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* There is a tradeoff here between security concerns and making life
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* unnecessarily difficult for legitimate users. We would not, for example,
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* want to report the password we were expecting to receive...
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* But it seems useful to report the username and authorization method
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* in use, and these are items that must be presumed known to an attacker
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* anyway.
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* Note that many sorts of failure report additional information in the
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* postmaster log, which we hope is only readable by good guys.
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*/
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static void
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auth_failed(Port *port, int status)
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{
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const char *errstr;
|
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|
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/*
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* If we failed due to EOF from client, just quit; there's no point in
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* trying to send a message to the client, and not much point in logging
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* the failure in the postmaster log. (Logging the failure might be
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* desirable, were it not for the fact that libpq closes the connection
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* unceremoniously if challenged for a password when it hasn't got one to
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* send. We'll get a useless log entry for every psql connection under
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* password auth, even if it's perfectly successful, if we log STATUS_EOF
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* events.)
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*/
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if (status == STATUS_EOF)
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proc_exit(0);
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switch (port->auth_method)
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{
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case uaReject:
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errstr = gettext_noop("authentication failed for user \"%s\": host rejected");
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break;
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case uaKrb5:
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errstr = gettext_noop("Kerberos 5 authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
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break;
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case uaTrust:
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errstr = gettext_noop("\"trust\" authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
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break;
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case uaIdent:
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errstr = gettext_noop("Ident authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
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break;
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case uaMD5:
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case uaCrypt:
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case uaPassword:
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errstr = gettext_noop("password authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
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break;
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#ifdef USE_PAM
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case uaPAM:
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errstr = gettext_noop("PAM authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
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break;
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#endif /* USE_PAM */
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#ifdef USE_LDAP
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case uaLDAP:
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errstr = gettext_noop("LDAP authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
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break;
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#endif /* USE_LDAP */
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default:
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errstr = gettext_noop("authentication failed for user \"%s\": invalid authentication method");
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break;
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}
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ereport(FATAL,
|
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(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
|
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errmsg(errstr, port->user_name)));
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/* doesn't return */
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}
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|
|
|
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/*
|
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* Client authentication starts here. If there is an error, this
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* function does not return and the backend process is terminated.
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*/
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void
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ClientAuthentication(Port *port)
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{
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int status = STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
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* Get the authentication method to use for this frontend/database
|
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* combination. Note: a failure return indicates a problem with the hba
|
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* config file, not with the request. hba.c should have dropped an error
|
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* message into the postmaster logfile if it failed.
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|
*/
|
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if (hba_getauthmethod(port) != STATUS_OK)
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ereport(FATAL,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
|
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errmsg("missing or erroneous pg_hba.conf file"),
|
|
errhint("See server log for details.")));
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|
|
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switch (port->auth_method)
|
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{
|
|
case uaReject:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This could have come from an explicit "reject" entry in
|
|
* pg_hba.conf, but more likely it means there was no matching
|
|
* entry. Take pity on the poor user and issue a helpful error
|
|
* message. NOTE: this is not a security breach, because all the
|
|
* info reported here is known at the frontend and must be assumed
|
|
* known to bad guys. We're merely helping out the less clueful
|
|
* good guys.
|
|
*/
|
|
{
|
|
char hostinfo[NI_MAXHOST];
|
|
|
|
pg_getnameinfo_all(&port->raddr.addr, port->raddr.salen,
|
|
hostinfo, sizeof(hostinfo),
|
|
NULL, 0,
|
|
NI_NUMERICHOST);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_SSL
|
|
ereport(FATAL,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
|
|
errmsg("no pg_hba.conf entry for host \"%s\", user \"%s\", database \"%s\", %s",
|
|
hostinfo, port->user_name, port->database_name,
|
|
port->ssl ? _("SSL on") : _("SSL off"))));
|
|
#else
|
|
ereport(FATAL,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
|
|
errmsg("no pg_hba.conf entry for host \"%s\", user \"%s\", database \"%s\"",
|
|
hostinfo, port->user_name, port->database_name)));
|
|
#endif
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case uaKrb5:
|
|
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_KRB5);
|
|
status = pg_krb5_recvauth(port);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case uaIdent:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we are doing ident on unix-domain sockets, use SCM_CREDS
|
|
* only if it is defined and SO_PEERCRED isn't.
|
|
*/
|
|
#if !defined(HAVE_GETPEEREID) && !defined(SO_PEERCRED) && \
|
|
(defined(HAVE_STRUCT_CMSGCRED) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_FCRED) || \
|
|
(defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKCRED) && defined(LOCAL_CREDS)))
|
|
if (port->raddr.addr.ss_family == AF_UNIX)
|
|
{
|
|
#if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_FCRED) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKCRED)
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Receive credentials on next message receipt, BSD/OS,
|
|
* NetBSD. We need to set this before the client sends the
|
|
* next packet.
|
|
*/
|
|
int on = 1;
|
|
|
|
if (setsockopt(port->sock, 0, LOCAL_CREDS, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
|
|
ereport(FATAL,
|
|
(errcode_for_socket_access(),
|
|
errmsg("could not enable credential reception: %m")));
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_SCM_CREDS);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
status = authident(port);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case uaMD5:
|
|
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_MD5);
|
|
status = recv_and_check_password_packet(port);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case uaCrypt:
|
|
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_CRYPT);
|
|
status = recv_and_check_password_packet(port);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case uaPassword:
|
|
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD);
|
|
status = recv_and_check_password_packet(port);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_PAM
|
|
case uaPAM:
|
|
pam_port_cludge = port;
|
|
status = CheckPAMAuth(port, port->user_name, "");
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* USE_PAM */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_LDAP
|
|
case uaLDAP:
|
|
status = CheckLDAPAuth(port);
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
case uaTrust:
|
|
status = STATUS_OK;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (status == STATUS_OK)
|
|
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_OK);
|
|
else
|
|
auth_failed(port, status);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Send an authentication request packet to the frontend.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
sendAuthRequest(Port *port, AuthRequest areq)
|
|
{
|
|
StringInfoData buf;
|
|
|
|
pq_beginmessage(&buf, 'R');
|
|
pq_sendint(&buf, (int32) areq, sizeof(int32));
|
|
|
|
/* Add the salt for encrypted passwords. */
|
|
if (areq == AUTH_REQ_MD5)
|
|
pq_sendbytes(&buf, port->md5Salt, 4);
|
|
else if (areq == AUTH_REQ_CRYPT)
|
|
pq_sendbytes(&buf, port->cryptSalt, 2);
|
|
|
|
pq_endmessage(&buf);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Flush message so client will see it, except for AUTH_REQ_OK, which need
|
|
* not be sent until we are ready for queries.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (areq != AUTH_REQ_OK)
|
|
pq_flush();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_PAM
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* PAM conversation function
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
pam_passwd_conv_proc(int num_msg, const struct pam_message ** msg,
|
|
struct pam_response ** resp, void *appdata_ptr)
|
|
{
|
|
if (num_msg != 1 || msg[0]->msg_style != PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (msg[0]->msg_style)
|
|
{
|
|
case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("error from underlying PAM layer: %s",
|
|
msg[0]->msg)));
|
|
return PAM_CONV_ERR;
|
|
default:
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("unsupported PAM conversation %d/%s",
|
|
msg[0]->msg_style, msg[0]->msg)));
|
|
return PAM_CONV_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!appdata_ptr)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* Workaround for Solaris 2.6 where the PAM library is broken and does
|
|
* not pass appdata_ptr to the conversation routine
|
|
*/
|
|
appdata_ptr = pam_passwd;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Password wasn't passed to PAM the first time around - let's go ask the
|
|
* client to send a password, which we then stuff into PAM.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (strlen(appdata_ptr) == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
char *passwd;
|
|
|
|
sendAuthRequest(pam_port_cludge, AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD);
|
|
passwd = recv_password_packet(pam_port_cludge);
|
|
|
|
if (passwd == NULL)
|
|
return PAM_CONV_ERR; /* client didn't want to send password */
|
|
|
|
if (strlen(passwd) == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("empty password returned by client")));
|
|
return PAM_CONV_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
appdata_ptr = passwd;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Explicitly not using palloc here - PAM will free this memory in
|
|
* pam_end()
|
|
*/
|
|
*resp = calloc(num_msg, sizeof(struct pam_response));
|
|
if (!*resp)
|
|
{
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
|
|
errmsg("out of memory")));
|
|
return PAM_CONV_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
(*resp)[0].resp = strdup((char *) appdata_ptr);
|
|
(*resp)[0].resp_retcode = 0;
|
|
|
|
return ((*resp)[0].resp ? PAM_SUCCESS : PAM_CONV_ERR);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check authentication against PAM.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
CheckPAMAuth(Port *port, char *user, char *password)
|
|
{
|
|
int retval;
|
|
pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Apparently, Solaris 2.6 is broken, and needs ugly static variable
|
|
* workaround
|
|
*/
|
|
pam_passwd = password;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set the application data portion of the conversation struct This is
|
|
* later used inside the PAM conversation to pass the password to the
|
|
* authentication module.
|
|
*/
|
|
pam_passw_conv.appdata_ptr = (char *) password; /* from password above,
|
|
* not allocated */
|
|
|
|
/* Optionally, one can set the service name in pg_hba.conf */
|
|
if (port->auth_arg && port->auth_arg[0] != '\0')
|
|
retval = pam_start(port->auth_arg, "pgsql@",
|
|
&pam_passw_conv, &pamh);
|
|
else
|
|
retval = pam_start(PGSQL_PAM_SERVICE, "pgsql@",
|
|
&pam_passw_conv, &pamh);
|
|
|
|
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
|
|
{
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("could not create PAM authenticator: %s",
|
|
pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
|
|
pam_passwd = NULL; /* Unset pam_passwd */
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_USER, user);
|
|
|
|
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
|
|
{
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("pam_set_item(PAM_USER) failed: %s",
|
|
pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
|
|
pam_passwd = NULL; /* Unset pam_passwd */
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_CONV, &pam_passw_conv);
|
|
|
|
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
|
|
{
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("pam_set_item(PAM_CONV) failed: %s",
|
|
pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
|
|
pam_passwd = NULL; /* Unset pam_passwd */
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
retval = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
|
|
{
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("pam_authenticate failed: %s",
|
|
pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
|
|
pam_passwd = NULL; /* Unset pam_passwd */
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
retval = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
|
|
{
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("pam_acct_mgmt failed: %s",
|
|
pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
|
|
pam_passwd = NULL; /* Unset pam_passwd */
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
retval = pam_end(pamh, retval);
|
|
|
|
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
|
|
{
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("could not release PAM authenticator: %s",
|
|
pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pam_passwd = NULL; /* Unset pam_passwd */
|
|
|
|
return (retval == PAM_SUCCESS ? STATUS_OK : STATUS_ERROR);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* USE_PAM */
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_LDAP
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
CheckLDAPAuth(Port *port)
|
|
{
|
|
char *passwd;
|
|
char server[128];
|
|
char basedn[128];
|
|
char prefix[128];
|
|
char suffix[128];
|
|
LDAP *ldap;
|
|
int ssl = 0;
|
|
int r;
|
|
int ldapversion = LDAP_VERSION3;
|
|
int ldapport = LDAP_PORT;
|
|
char fulluser[128];
|
|
|
|
if (!port->auth_arg || port->auth_arg[0] == '\0')
|
|
{
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("LDAP configuration URL not specified")));
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Crack the LDAP url. We do a very trivial parse..
|
|
* ldap[s]://<server>[:<port>]/<basedn>[;prefix[;suffix]]
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
server[0] = '\0';
|
|
basedn[0] = '\0';
|
|
prefix[0] = '\0';
|
|
suffix[0] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
/* ldap, including port number */
|
|
r = sscanf(port->auth_arg,
|
|
"ldap://%127[^:]:%i/%127[^;];%127[^;];%127s",
|
|
server, &ldapport, basedn, prefix, suffix);
|
|
if (r < 3)
|
|
{
|
|
/* ldaps, including port number */
|
|
r = sscanf(port->auth_arg,
|
|
"ldaps://%127[^:]:%i/%127[^;];%127[^;];%127s",
|
|
server, &ldapport, basedn, prefix, suffix);
|
|
if (r >=3) ssl = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (r < 3)
|
|
{
|
|
/* ldap, no port number */
|
|
r = sscanf(port->auth_arg,
|
|
"ldap://%127[^/]/%127[^;];%127[^;];%127s",
|
|
server, basedn, prefix, suffix);
|
|
}
|
|
if (r < 2)
|
|
{
|
|
/* ldaps, no port number */
|
|
r = sscanf(port->auth_arg,
|
|
"ldaps://%127[^/]/%127[^;];%127[^;];%127s",
|
|
server, basedn, prefix, suffix);
|
|
if (r >= 2) ssl = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (r < 2)
|
|
{
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("invalid LDAP URL: \"%s\"",
|
|
port->auth_arg)));
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD);
|
|
|
|
passwd = recv_password_packet(port);
|
|
if (passwd == NULL)
|
|
return STATUS_EOF; /* client wouldn't send password */
|
|
|
|
ldap = ldap_init(server, ldapport);
|
|
if (!ldap)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef WIN32
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("could not initialize LDAP: error %d",
|
|
errno)));
|
|
#else
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("could not initialize LDAP: error %d",
|
|
(int) LdapGetLastError())));
|
|
#endif
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((r = ldap_set_option(ldap, LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, &ldapversion)) != LDAP_SUCCESS)
|
|
{
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("could not set LDAP protocol version: error %d", r)));
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef WIN32
|
|
if ((r = ldap_start_tls_s(ldap, NULL, NULL)) != LDAP_SUCCESS)
|
|
#else
|
|
if ((r = ldap_start_tls_sA(ldap, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != LDAP_SUCCESS)
|
|
#endif
|
|
{
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("could not start LDAP TLS session: error %d", r)));
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
snprintf(fulluser, sizeof(fulluser)-1, "%s%s%s",
|
|
prefix, port->user_name, suffix);
|
|
fulluser[sizeof(fulluser)-1] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
r = ldap_simple_bind_s(ldap, fulluser, passwd);
|
|
ldap_unbind(ldap);
|
|
|
|
if (r != LDAP_SUCCESS)
|
|
{
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("LDAP login failed for user \"%s\" on server \"%s\": error %d",
|
|
fulluser, server, r)));
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return STATUS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* USE_LDAP */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Collect password response packet from frontend.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns NULL if couldn't get password, else palloc'd string.
|
|
*/
|
|
static char *
|
|
recv_password_packet(Port *port)
|
|
{
|
|
StringInfoData buf;
|
|
|
|
if (PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(port->proto) >= 3)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Expect 'p' message type */
|
|
int mtype;
|
|
|
|
mtype = pq_getbyte();
|
|
if (mtype != 'p')
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the client just disconnects without offering a password,
|
|
* don't make a log entry. This is legal per protocol spec and in
|
|
* fact commonly done by psql, so complaining just clutters the
|
|
* log.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (mtype != EOF)
|
|
ereport(COMMERROR,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
|
|
errmsg("expected password response, got message type %d",
|
|
mtype)));
|
|
return NULL; /* EOF or bad message type */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* For pre-3.0 clients, avoid log entry if they just disconnect */
|
|
if (pq_peekbyte() == EOF)
|
|
return NULL; /* EOF */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
initStringInfo(&buf);
|
|
if (pq_getmessage(&buf, 1000)) /* receive password */
|
|
{
|
|
/* EOF - pq_getmessage already logged a suitable message */
|
|
pfree(buf.data);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Apply sanity check: password packet length should agree with length of
|
|
* contained string. Note it is safe to use strlen here because
|
|
* StringInfo is guaranteed to have an appended '\0'.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (strlen(buf.data) + 1 != buf.len)
|
|
ereport(COMMERROR,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
|
|
errmsg("invalid password packet size")));
|
|
|
|
/* Do not echo password to logs, for security. */
|
|
ereport(DEBUG5,
|
|
(errmsg("received password packet")));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Return the received string. Note we do not attempt to do any
|
|
* character-set conversion on it; since we don't yet know the client's
|
|
* encoding, there wouldn't be much point.
|
|
*/
|
|
return buf.data;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Called when we have sent an authorization request for a password.
|
|
* Get the response and check it.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
recv_and_check_password_packet(Port *port)
|
|
{
|
|
char *passwd;
|
|
int result;
|
|
|
|
passwd = recv_password_packet(port);
|
|
|
|
if (passwd == NULL)
|
|
return STATUS_EOF; /* client wouldn't send password */
|
|
|
|
result = md5_crypt_verify(port, port->user_name, passwd);
|
|
|
|
pfree(passwd);
|
|
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|