The GRANT reference page failed to mention that the USAGE privilege
allows modifying associated user mappings, although this was already
documented on the CREATE/ALTER/DROP USER MAPPING pages.
In particular, we are now more explicit about the fact that you may need
wal_sync_method=fsync_writethrough for crash-safety on some platforms,
including MaxOS X. There's also now an explicit caution against assuming
that the default setting of wal_sync_method is either crash-safe or best
for performance.
There are numerous methods by which a Perl or Tcl function can subvert
the behavior of another such function executed later; for example, by
redefining standard functions or operators called by the target function.
If the target function is SECURITY DEFINER, or is called by such a
function, this means that any ordinary SQL user with Perl or Tcl language
usage rights can do essentially anything with the privileges of the target
function's owner.
To close this security hole, create a separate Perl or Tcl interpreter for
each SQL userid under which plperl or pltcl functions are executed within
a session. However, all plperlu or pltclu functions run within a session
still share a single interpreter, since they all execute at the trust
level of a database superuser anyway.
Note: this change results in a functionality loss when libperl has been
built without the "multiplicity" option: it's no longer possible to call
plperl functions under different userids in one session, since such a
libperl can't support multiple interpreters in one process. However, such
a libperl already failed to support concurrent use of plperl and plperlu,
so it's likely that few people use such versions with Postgres.
Security: CVE-2010-3433
parameter against server cert's CN field) to succeed in the case where
both host and hostaddr are specified. As with the existing precedents
for Kerberos, GSSAPI, SSPI, it is the calling application's responsibility
that host and hostaddr match up --- we just use the host name as given.
Per bug #5559 from Christopher Head.
In passing, make the error handling and messages for the no-host-name-given
failure more consistent among these four cases, and correct a lie in the
documentation: we don't attempt to reverse-lookup host from hostaddr
if host is missing.
Back-patch to 8.4 where SSL cert verification was introduced.
formats for geometric types. Per bug #5536 from Jon Strait, and my own
testing.
Back-patch to all supported branches, since this doco has been wrong right
along -- we certainly haven't changed the I/O behavior of these types in
many years.
In HEAD, emit a warning when an operator named => is defined.
In both HEAD and the backbranches (except in 8.2, where contrib
modules do not have documentation), document that hstore's text =>
text operator may be removed in a future release, and encourage the
use of the hstore(text, text) function instead. This function only
exists in HEAD (previously, it was called tconvert), so backpatch
it back to 8.2, when hstore was added. Per discussion.
to be initialized with proper values. Affected parameters are
fillfactor, analyze_threshold, and analyze_scale_factor.
Especially uninitialized fillfactor caused inefficient page usage
because we built a StdRdOptions struct in which fillfactor is zero
if any reloption is set for the toast table.
In addition, we disallow toast.autovacuum_analyze_threshold and
toast.autovacuum_analyze_scale_factor because we didn't actually
support them; they are always ignored.
Report by Rumko on pgsql-bugs on 12 May 2010.
Analysis by Tom Lane and Alvaro Herrera. Patch by me.
Backpatch to 8.4.
that is a regular table or view owned by a superuser. This prevents a
trojan horse attack whereby any unprivileged SQL user could create such a
table and insert code into it that would then get executed in other users'
sessions whenever they call pltcl functions.
Worse yet, because the code was automatically loaded into both the "normal"
and "safe" interpreters at first use, the attacker could execute unrestricted
Tcl code in the "normal" interpreter without there being any pltclu functions
anywhere, or indeed anyone else using pltcl at all: installing pltcl is
sufficient to open the hole. Change the initialization logic so that the
"unknown" code is only loaded into an interpreter when the interpreter is
first really used. (That doesn't add any additional security in this
particular context, but it seems a prudent change, and anyway the former
behavior violated the principle of least astonishment.)
Security: CVE-2010-1170
fundamentally insecure. Instead apply an opmask to the whole interpreter that
imposes restrictions on unsafe operations. These restrictions are much harder
to subvert than is Safe.pm, since there is no container to be broken out of.
Backported to release 7.4.
In releases 7.4, 8.0 and 8.1 this also includes the necessary backporting of
the two interpreters model for plperl and plperlu adopted in release 8.2.
In versions 8.0 and up, the use of Perl's POSIX module to undo its locale
mangling on Windows has become insecure with these changes, so it is
replaced by our own routine, which is also faster.
Nice side effects of the changes include that it is now possible to use perl's
"strict" pragma in a natural way in plperl, and that perl's $a and
$b variables now work as expected in sort routines, and that function
compilation is significantly faster.
Tim Bunce and Andrew Dunstan, with reviews from Alex Hunsaker and
Alexey Klyukin.
Security: CVE-2010-1169
This change was previously committed to HEAD, but the consensus seems to be
in favor of back-patching it. I'm only backpatching as far as 8.3.X, however,
because it's not clear to me to what degree this advice applies to older
branches, and in any case our first advice to anyone attempting to tune those
versions is likely to be "upgrade".
how often we do SSL session key renegotiation. Can be set to
0 to disable renegotiation completely, which is required if
a broken SSL library is used (broken patches to CVE-2009-3555
a known cause) or when using a client library that can't do
renegotiation.
