This makes almost all core code follow the policy introduced in the
previous commit. Specific decisions:
- Text search support functions with char* and length arguments, such as
prsstart and lexize, may receive unaligned strings. I doubt
maintainers of non-core text search code will notice.
- Use plain VARDATA() on values detoasted or synthesized earlier in the
same function. Use VARDATA_ANY() on varlenas sourced outside the
function, even if they happen to always have four-byte headers. As an
exception, retain the universal practice of using VARDATA() on return
values of SendFunctionCall().
- Retain PG_GETARG_BYTEA_P() in pageinspect. (Page images are too large
for a one-byte header, so this misses no optimization.) Sites that do
not call get_page_from_raw() typically need the four-byte alignment.
- For now, do not change btree_gist. Its use of four-byte headers in
memory is partly entangled with storage of 4-byte headers inside
GBT_VARKEY, on disk.
- For now, do not change gtrgm_consistent() or gtrgm_distance(). They
incorporate the varlena header into a cache, and there are multiple
credible implementation strategies to consider.
This introduces a new generic SASL authentication method, similar to the
GSS and SSPI methods. The server first tells the client which SASL
authentication mechanism to use, and then the mechanism-specific SASL
messages are exchanged in AuthenticationSASLcontinue and PasswordMessage
messages. Only SCRAM-SHA-256 is supported at the moment, but this allows
adding more SASL mechanisms in the future, without changing the overall
protocol.
Support for channel binding, aka SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS is left for later.
The SASLPrep algorithm, for pre-processing the password, is not yet
implemented. That could cause trouble, if you use a password with
non-ASCII characters, and a client library that does implement SASLprep.
That will hopefully be added later.
Authorization identities, as specified in the SCRAM-SHA-256 specification,
are ignored. SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION provides more or less the same
functionality, anyway.
If a user doesn't exist, perform a "mock" authentication, by constructing
an authentic-looking challenge on the fly. The challenge is derived from
a new system-wide random value, "mock authentication nonce", which is
created at initdb, and stored in the control file. We go through these
motions, in order to not give away the information on whether the user
exists, to unauthenticated users.
Bumps PG_CONTROL_VERSION, because of the new field in control file.
Patch by Michael Paquier and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed at different
stages by Robert Haas, Stephen Frost, David Steele, Aleksander Alekseev,
and many others.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRbR3GmFYdedCAhzukfKrgBLTLtMvENOmPrVWREsZkF8g%40mail.gmail.com
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqSMXU35g%3DW9X74HVeQp0uvgJxvYOuA4A-A3M%2B0wfEBv-w%40mail.gmail.com
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/55192AFE.6080106@iki.fi
This way both frontend and backends can use them. The functions are taken
from pgcrypto, which now fetches the source files it needs from
src/common/.
A new interface is designed for the SHA2 functions, which allow linking
to either OpenSSL or the in-core stuff taken from KAME as needed.
Michael Paquier, reviewed by Robert Haas.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqTGKuTM5jiZriHrNaQeVqp5e_iT3X4BFLWY_HyHxLvySQ%40mail.gmail.com
c.h #includes a number of core libc header files, such as <stdio.h>.
There's no point in re-including these after having read postgres.h,
postgres_fe.h, or c.h; so remove code that did so.
While at it, also fix some places that were ignoring our standard pattern
of "include postgres[_fe].h, then system header files, then other Postgres
header files". While there's not any great magic in doing it that way
rather than system headers last, it's silly to have just a few files
deviating from the general pattern. (But I didn't attempt to enforce this
globally, only in files I was touching anyway.)
I'd be the first to say that this is mostly compulsive neatnik-ism,
but over time it might save enough compile cycles to be useful.
This adds a new routine, pg_strong_random() for generating random bytes,
for use in both frontend and backend. At the moment, it's only used in
the backend, but the upcoming SCRAM authentication patches need strong
random numbers in libpq as well.
pg_strong_random() is based on, and replaces, the existing implementation
in pgcrypto. It can acquire strong random numbers from a number of sources,
depending on what's available:
- OpenSSL RAND_bytes(), if built with OpenSSL
- On Windows, the native cryptographic functions are used
- /dev/urandom
Unlike the current pgcrypto function, the source is chosen by configure.
That makes it easier to test different implementations, and ensures that
we don't accidentally fall back to a less secure implementation, if the
primary source fails. All of those methods are quite reliable, it would be
pretty surprising for them to fail, so we'd rather find out by failing
hard.
If no strong random source is available, we fall back to using erand48(),
seeded from current timestamp, like PostmasterRandom() was. That isn't
cryptographically secure, but allows us to still work on platforms that
don't have any of the above stronger sources. Because it's not very secure,
the built-in implementation is only used if explicitly requested with
--disable-strong-random.
This replaces the more complicated Fortuna algorithm we used to have in
pgcrypto, which is unfortunate, but all modern platforms have /dev/urandom,
so it doesn't seem worth the maintenance effort to keep that. pgcrypto
functions that require strong random numbers will be disabled with
--disable-strong-random.
Original patch by Magnus Hagander, tons of further work by Michael Paquier
and me.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRy3krN8quR9XujMVVHYtXJ0_60nqgVc6oUk8ygyVkZsA@mail.gmail.com
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRWkNYRRPJA7-cF+LfroYV10pvjdz6GNvxk-Eee9FypKA@mail.gmail.com
pgp-pubkey-DISABLED test has been unused since 2006, when support for
built-in bignum math was added (commit 1abf76e8). pgp-encrypt-DISABLED has
been unused forever, AFAICS.
Also remove a couple of unused error codes.
This reverts commit 9e083fd468. That was a
few bricks shy of a load:
* Query cancel stopped working
* Buildfarm member pademelon stopped working, because the box doesn't have
/dev/urandom nor /dev/random.
This clearly needs some more discussion, and a quite different patch, so
revert for now.
The old "low-level" API is deprecated, and doesn't support hardware
acceleration. And this makes the code simpler, too.
Discussion: <561274F1.1030000@iki.fi>
This adds a new routine, pg_strong_random() for generating random bytes,
for use in both frontend and backend. At the moment, it's only used in
the backend, but the upcoming SCRAM authentication patches need strong
random numbers in libpq as well.
pg_strong_random() is based on, and replaces, the existing implementation
in pgcrypto. It can acquire strong random numbers from a number of sources,
depending on what's available:
- OpenSSL RAND_bytes(), if built with OpenSSL
- On Windows, the native cryptographic functions are used
- /dev/urandom
- /dev/random
Original patch by Magnus Hagander, with further work by Michael Paquier
and me.
Discussion: <CAB7nPqRy3krN8quR9XujMVVHYtXJ0_60nqgVc6oUk8ygyVkZsA@mail.gmail.com>
Prototypes for functions implementing V1-callable functions are no
longer necessary.
Reviewed-by: Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Munro <thomas.munro@enterprisedb.com>
LibreSSL defines OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER to claim that it is version 2.0.0,
but it doesn't have the functions added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. Add autoconf
checks for the individual functions we need, and stop relying on
OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER.
Backport to 9.5 and 9.6, like the patch that broke this. In the
back-branches, there are still a few OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER checks left,
to check for OpenSSL 0.9.8 or 0.9.7. I left them as they were - LibreSSL
has all those functions, so they work as intended.
Per buildfarm member curculio.
Discussion: <2442.1473957669@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Changes needed to build at all:
- Check for SSL_new in configure, now that SSL_library_init is a macro.
- Do not access struct members directly. This includes some new code in
pgcrypto, to use the resource owner mechanism to ensure that we don't
leak OpenSSL handles, now that we can't embed them in other structs
anymore.
- RAND_SSLeay() -> RAND_OpenSSL()
Changes that were needed to silence deprecation warnings, but were not
strictly necessary:
- RAND_pseudo_bytes() -> RAND_bytes().
- SSL_library_init() and OpenSSL_config() -> OPENSSL_init_ssl()
- ASN1_STRING_data() -> ASN1_STRING_get0_data()
- DH_generate_parameters() -> DH_generate_parameters()
- Locking callbacks are not needed with OpenSSL 1.1.0 anymore. (Good
riddance!)
Also change references to SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER with OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER,
for the sake of consistency. OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER has existed since time
immemorial.
Fix SSL test suite to work with OpenSSL 1.1.0. CA certificates must have
the "CA:true" basic constraint extension now, or OpenSSL will refuse them.
Regenerate the test certificates with that. The "openssl" binary, used to
generate the certificates, is also now more picky, and throws an error
if an X509 extension is specified in "req_extensions", but that section
is empty.
Backpatch to all supported branches, per popular demand. In back-branches,
we still support OpenSSL 0.9.7 and above. OpenSSL 0.9.6 should still work
too, but I didn't test it. In master, we only support 0.9.8 and above.
Patch by Andreas Karlsson, with additional changes by me.
Discussion: <20160627151604.GD1051@msg.df7cb.de>
OpenSSL officially only supports 1.0.1 and newer. Some OS distributions
still provide patches for 0.9.8, but anything older than that is not
interesting anymore. Let's simplify things by removing compatibility code.
Andreas Karlsson, with small changes by me.
Extension scripts should never use CREATE OR REPLACE for initial object
creation. If there is a collision with a pre-existing (probably
user-created) object, we want extension installation to fail, not silently
overwrite the user's object. Bloom and sslinfo both violated this precept.
Also fix a number of scripts that had no standard header (the file name
comment and the \echo...\quit guard). Probably the \echo...\quit hack
is less important now than it was in 9.1 days, but that doesn't mean
that individual extensions get to choose whether to use it or not.
And fix a couple of evident copy-and-pasteos in file name comments.
No need for back-patch: the REPLACE bugs are both new in 9.6, and the
rest of this is pretty much cosmetic.
Andreas Karlsson and Tom Lane
pgcrypto already supports key-stretching during symmetric encryption,
including the salted-and-iterated method; but the number of iterations
was not configurable. This commit implements a new s2k-count parameter
to pgp_sym_encrypt() which permits selecting a larger number of
iterations.
Author: Jeff Janes
Both Blowfish and DES implementations of crypt() can take arbitrarily
long time, depending on the number of rounds specified by the caller;
make sure they can be interrupted.
Author: Andreas Karlsson
Reviewer: Jeff Janes
Backpatch to 9.1.
Certain short salts crashed the backend or disclosed a few bytes of
backend memory. For existing salt-induced error conditions, emit a
message saying as much. Back-patch to 9.0 (all supported versions).
Josh Kupershmidt
Security: CVE-2015-5288
This has been the predominant outcome. When the output of decrypting
with a wrong key coincidentally resembled an OpenPGP packet header,
pgcrypto could instead report "Corrupt data", "Not text data" or
"Unsupported compression algorithm". The distinct "Corrupt data"
message added no value. The latter two error messages misled when the
decrypted payload also exhibited fundamental integrity problems. Worse,
error message variance in other systems has enabled cryptologic attacks;
see RFC 4880 section "14. Security Considerations". Whether these
pgcrypto behaviors are likewise exploitable is unknown.
In passing, document that pgcrypto does not resist side-channel attacks.
Back-patch to 9.0 (all supported versions).
Security: CVE-2015-3167
This improves on commit bbfd7edae5 by
making two simple changes:
* pg_attribute_noreturn now takes parentheses, ie pg_attribute_noreturn().
Likewise pg_attribute_unused(), pg_attribute_packed(). This reduces
pgindent's tendency to misformat declarations involving them.
* attributes are now always attached to function declarations, not
definitions. Previously some places were taking creative shortcuts,
which were not merely candidates for bad misformatting by pgindent
but often were outright wrong anyway. (It does little good to put a
noreturn annotation where callers can't see it.) In any case, if
we would like to believe that these macros can be used with non-gcc
compilers, we should avoid gratuitous variance in usage patterns.
I also went through and manually improved the formatting of a lot of
declarations, and got rid of excessively repetitive (and now obsolete
anyway) comments informing the reader what pg_attribute_printf is for.
Until now __attribute__() was defined to be empty for all compilers but
gcc. That's problematic because it prevents using it in other compilers;
which is necessary e.g. for atomics portability. It's also just
generally dubious to do so in a header as widely included as c.h.
Instead add pg_attribute_format_arg, pg_attribute_printf,
pg_attribute_noreturn macros which are implemented in the compilers that
understand them. Also add pg_attribute_noreturn and pg_attribute_packed,
but don't provide fallbacks, since they can affect functionality.
This means that external code that, possibly unwittingly, relied on
__attribute__ defined to be empty on !gcc compilers may now run into
warnings or errors on those compilers. But there shouldn't be many
occurances of that and it's hard to work around...
Discussion: 54B58BA3.8040302@ohmu.fi
Author: Oskari Saarenmaa, with some minor changes by me.
This function uses uninitialized stack and heap buffers as supplementary
entropy sources. Mark them so Memcheck will not complain. Back-patch
to 9.4, where Valgrind Memcheck cooperation first appeared.
Marko Tiikkaja
This covers alterations to buffer sizing and zeroing made between imath
1.3 and imath 1.20. Valgrind Memcheck identified the buffer overruns
and reliance on uninitialized data; their exploit potential is unknown.
Builds specifying --with-openssl are unaffected, because they use the
OpenSSL BIGNUM facility instead of imath. Back-patch to 9.0 (all
supported versions).
Security: CVE-2015-0243
Most callers pass a stack buffer. The ensuing stack smash can crash the
server, and we have not ruled out the viability of attacks that lead to
privilege escalation. Back-patch to 9.0 (all supported versions).
Marko Tiikkaja
Security: CVE-2015-0243
Coverity points out that mdc_finish returns a pointer to a local buffer
(which of course is gone as soon as the function returns), leaving open
a risk of misbehaviors possibly as bad as a stack overwrite.
In reality, the only possible call site is in process_data_packets()
which does not examine the returned pointer at all. So there's no
live bug, but nonetheless the code is confusing and risky. Refactor
to avoid the issue by letting process_data_packets() call mdc_finish()
directly instead of going through the pullf_read() API.
Although this is only cosmetic, it seems good to back-patch so that
the logic in pgp-decrypt.c stays in sync across all branches.
Marko Kreen
strncpy() has a well-deserved reputation for being unsafe, so make an
effort to get rid of nearly all occurrences in HEAD.
A large fraction of the remaining uses were passing length less than or
equal to the known strlen() of the source, in which case no null-padding
can occur and the behavior is equivalent to memcpy(), though doubtless
slower and certainly harder to reason about. So just use memcpy() in
these cases.
In other cases, use either StrNCpy() or strlcpy() as appropriate (depending
on whether padding to the full length of the destination buffer seems
useful).
I left a few strncpy() calls alone in the src/timezone/ code, to keep it
in sync with upstream (the IANA tzcode distribution). There are also a
few such calls in ecpg that could possibly do with more analysis.
AFAICT, none of these changes are more than cosmetic, except for the four
occurrences in fe-secure-openssl.c, which are in fact buggy: an overlength
source leads to a non-null-terminated destination buffer and ensuing
misbehavior. These don't seem like security issues, first because no stack
clobber is possible and second because if your values of sslcert etc are
coming from untrusted sources then you've got problems way worse than this.
Still, it's undesirable to have unpredictable behavior for overlength
inputs, so back-patch those four changes to all active branches.
This fixes a scenario in which pgp_sym_decrypt() failed with "Wrong key
or corrupt data" on messages whose length is 6 less than a power of 2.
Per bug #11905 from Connor Penhale. Fix by Marko Tiikkaja, regression
test case from Jeff Janes.
pgp_sym_encrypt's option is spelled "sess-key", not "enable-session-key".
Spotted by Jeff Janes.
In passing, improve a comment in pgp-pgsql.c to make it clearer that
the debugging options are intentionally undocumented.
This add a new pgp_armor_headers function to extract armor headers from an
ASCII-armored blob, and a new overloaded variant of the armor function, for
constructing an ASCII-armor with extra headers.
Marko Tiikkaja and me.
Instead of trying to accurately calculate the space needed, use a StringInfo
that's enlarged as needed. This is just moving things around currently - the
old code was not wrong - but this is in preparation for a patch that adds
support for extra armor headers, and would make the space calculation more
complicated.
Marko Tiikkaja
Some of the many error messages introduced in 458857cc missed 'FROM
unpackaged'. Also e016b724 and 45ffeb7e forgot to quote extension
version numbers.
Backpatch to 9.1, just like 458857cc which introduced the messages. Do
so because the error messages thrown when the wrong command is copy &
pasted aren't easy to understand.
ws2_32 is the new version of the library that should be used, as
it contains the require functionality from wsock32 as well as some
more (which is why some binaries were already using ws2_32).
Michael Paquier, reviewed by MauMau
Prominent binaries already had this metadata. A handful of minor
binaries, such as pg_regress.exe, still lack it; efforts to eliminate
such exceptions are welcome.
Michael Paquier, reviewed by MauMau.
Because of gcc -Wmissing-prototypes, all functions in dynamically
loadable modules must have a separate prototype declaration. This is
meant to detect global functions that are not declared in header files,
but in cases where the function is called via dfmgr, this is redundant.
Besides filling up space with boilerplate, this is a frequent source of
compiler warnings in extension modules.
We can fix that by creating the function prototype as part of the
PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1 macro, which such modules have to use anyway. That
makes the code of modules cleaner, because there is one less place where
the entry points have to be listed, and creates an additional check that
functions have the right prototype.
Remove now redundant prototypes from contrib and other modules.
Specifically, on-stack memset() might be removed, so:
* Replace memset() with px_memset()
* Add px_memset to copy_crlf()
* Add px_memset to pgp-s2k.c
Patch by Marko Kreen
Report by PVS-Studio
Backpatch through 8.4.
This function provides a way of generating version 4 (pseudorandom) UUIDs
based on pgcrypto's PRNG. The main reason for doing this is that the
OSSP UUID library depended on by contrib/uuid-ossp is becoming more and
more of a porting headache, so we need an alternative for people who can't
install that. A nice side benefit though is that this implementation is
noticeably faster than uuid-ossp's uuid_generate_v4() function.
Oskari Saarenmaa, reviewed by Emre Hasegeli
Peter Eisentraut