diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml index c5ce96933b..82f472ed19 100644 --- a/doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml +++ b/doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml @@ -1467,6 +1467,20 @@ SELCT 1/0; and proceed without requesting SSL. + + When SSL encryption can be performed, the server + is expected to send only the single S byte and then + wait for the frontend to initiate an SSL handshake. + If additional bytes are available to read at this point, it likely + means that a man-in-the-middle is attempting to perform a + buffer-stuffing attack + (CVE-2021-23222). + Frontends should be coded either to read exactly one byte from the + socket before turning the socket over to their SSL library, or to + treat it as a protocol violation if they find they have read additional + bytes. + + An initial SSLRequest can also be used in a connection that is being opened to send a CancelRequest message. diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c index 457d5c1244..19318ad487 100644 --- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c +++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c @@ -2720,6 +2720,19 @@ keep_going: /* We will come back to here until there is pollres = pqsecure_open_client(conn); if (pollres == PGRES_POLLING_OK) { + /* + * At this point we should have no data already buffered. + * If we do, it was received before we performed the SSL + * handshake, so it wasn't encrypted and indeed may have + * been injected by a man-in-the-middle. + */ + if (conn->inCursor != conn->inEnd) + { + appendPQExpBufferStr(&conn->errorMessage, + libpq_gettext("received unencrypted data after SSL response\n")); + goto error_return; + } + /* SSL handshake done, ready to send startup packet */ conn->status = CONNECTION_MADE; return PGRES_POLLING_WRITING;