Rearrange the code in auth.c so that all functions for a single authentication

method is grouped together in a reasonably similar way, keeping the "global
shared functions" together in their own section as well. Makes it a lot easier
to find your way around the code.
This commit is contained in:
Magnus Hagander 2008-08-01 11:41:12 +00:00
parent c30c1b8786
commit 26e6991a2d
1 changed files with 449 additions and 381 deletions

View File

@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
*
*
* IDENTIFICATION
* $PostgreSQL: pgsql/src/backend/libpq/auth.c,v 1.166 2008/08/01 09:09:49 mha Exp $
* $PostgreSQL: pgsql/src/backend/libpq/auth.c,v 1.167 2008/08/01 11:41:12 mha Exp $
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
@ -32,25 +32,33 @@
#include "libpq/pqformat.h"
#include "storage/ipc.h"
/*----------------------------------------------------------------
* Global authentication functions
*----------------------------------------------------------------
*/
static void sendAuthRequest(Port *port, AuthRequest areq);
static void auth_failed(Port *port, int status);
static char *recv_password_packet(Port *port);
static int recv_and_check_password_packet(Port *port);
static int authident(hbaPort *port);
char *pg_krb_server_keyfile;
char *pg_krb_srvnam;
bool pg_krb_caseins_users;
char *pg_krb_server_hostname = NULL;
char *pg_krb_realm = NULL;
/*----------------------------------------------------------------
* Ident authentication
*----------------------------------------------------------------
*/
/* Max size of username ident server can return */
#define IDENT_USERNAME_MAX 512
/* Standard TCP port number for Ident service. Assigned by IANA */
#define IDENT_PORT 113
static int authident(hbaPort *port);
/*----------------------------------------------------------------
* PAM authentication
*----------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#ifdef USE_PAM
#ifdef HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H
#include <pam/pam_appl.h>
@ -75,6 +83,11 @@ static Port *pam_port_cludge; /* Workaround for passing "Port *port" into
* pam_passwd_conv_proc */
#endif /* USE_PAM */
/*----------------------------------------------------------------
* LDAP authentication
*----------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#ifdef USE_LDAP
#ifndef WIN32
/* We use a deprecated function to keep the codepath the same as win32. */
@ -95,21 +108,33 @@ ULONG(*__ldap_start_tls_sA) (
#endif
static int CheckLDAPAuth(Port *port);
#endif
#endif /* USE_LDAP */
/*----------------------------------------------------------------
* Kerberos and GSSAPI GUCs
*----------------------------------------------------------------
*/
char *pg_krb_server_keyfile;
char *pg_krb_srvnam;
bool pg_krb_caseins_users;
char *pg_krb_server_hostname = NULL;
char *pg_krb_realm = NULL;
#ifdef KRB5
/*----------------------------------------------------------------
* MIT Kerberos authentication system - protocol version 5
*----------------------------------------------------------------
*/
static int pg_krb5_recvauth(Port *port);
#ifdef KRB5
#include <krb5.h>
/* Some old versions of Kerberos do not include <com_err.h> in <krb5.h> */
#if !defined(__COM_ERR_H) && !defined(__COM_ERR_H__)
#include <com_err.h>
#endif
/*
* Various krb5 state which is not connection specfic, and a flag to
* indicate whether we have initialised it yet.
@ -118,8 +143,414 @@ static int pg_krb5_initialised;
static krb5_context pg_krb5_context;
static krb5_keytab pg_krb5_keytab;
static krb5_principal pg_krb5_server;
#endif /* KRB5 */
/*----------------------------------------------------------------
* GSSAPI Authentication
*----------------------------------------------------------------
*/
static int pg_GSS_recvauth(Port *port);
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
#if defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_H)
#include <gssapi.h>
#else
#include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
#endif
#endif /* ENABLE_GSS */
/*----------------------------------------------------------------
* SSPI Authentication
*----------------------------------------------------------------
*/
static int pg_SSPI_recvauth(Port *port);
#ifdef ENABLE_SSPI
typedef SECURITY_STATUS
(WINAPI * QUERY_SECURITY_CONTEXT_TOKEN_FN) (
PCtxtHandle, void **);
#endif
/*----------------------------------------------------------------
* Global authentication functions
*----------------------------------------------------------------
*/
/*
* Tell the user the authentication failed, but not (much about) why.
*
* There is a tradeoff here between security concerns and making life
* unnecessarily difficult for legitimate users. We would not, for example,
* want to report the password we were expecting to receive...
* But it seems useful to report the username and authorization method
* in use, and these are items that must be presumed known to an attacker
* anyway.
* Note that many sorts of failure report additional information in the
* postmaster log, which we hope is only readable by good guys.
*/
static void
auth_failed(Port *port, int status)
{
const char *errstr;
/*
* If we failed due to EOF from client, just quit; there's no point in
* trying to send a message to the client, and not much point in logging
* the failure in the postmaster log. (Logging the failure might be
* desirable, were it not for the fact that libpq closes the connection
* unceremoniously if challenged for a password when it hasn't got one to
* send. We'll get a useless log entry for every psql connection under
* password auth, even if it's perfectly successful, if we log STATUS_EOF
* events.)
*/
if (status == STATUS_EOF)
proc_exit(0);
switch (port->auth_method)
{
case uaReject:
errstr = gettext_noop("authentication failed for user \"%s\": host rejected");
break;
case uaKrb5:
errstr = gettext_noop("Kerberos 5 authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
break;
case uaGSS:
errstr = gettext_noop("GSSAPI authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
break;
case uaSSPI:
errstr = gettext_noop("SSPI authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
break;
case uaTrust:
errstr = gettext_noop("\"trust\" authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
break;
case uaIdent:
errstr = gettext_noop("Ident authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
break;
case uaMD5:
case uaCrypt:
case uaPassword:
errstr = gettext_noop("password authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
break;
#ifdef USE_PAM
case uaPAM:
errstr = gettext_noop("PAM authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
break;
#endif /* USE_PAM */
#ifdef USE_LDAP
case uaLDAP:
errstr = gettext_noop("LDAP authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
break;
#endif /* USE_LDAP */
default:
errstr = gettext_noop("authentication failed for user \"%s\": invalid authentication method");
break;
}
ereport(FATAL,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
errmsg(errstr, port->user_name)));
/* doesn't return */
}
/*
* Client authentication starts here. If there is an error, this
* function does not return and the backend process is terminated.
*/
void
ClientAuthentication(Port *port)
{
int status = STATUS_ERROR;
/*
* Get the authentication method to use for this frontend/database
* combination. Note: a failure return indicates a problem with the hba
* config file, not with the request. hba.c should have dropped an error
* message into the postmaster logfile if it failed.
*/
if (hba_getauthmethod(port) != STATUS_OK)
ereport(FATAL,
(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
errmsg("missing or erroneous pg_hba.conf file"),
errhint("See server log for details.")));
switch (port->auth_method)
{
case uaReject:
/*
* This could have come from an explicit "reject" entry in
* pg_hba.conf, but more likely it means there was no matching
* entry. Take pity on the poor user and issue a helpful error
* message. NOTE: this is not a security breach, because all the
* info reported here is known at the frontend and must be assumed
* known to bad guys. We're merely helping out the less clueful
* good guys.
*/
{
char hostinfo[NI_MAXHOST];
pg_getnameinfo_all(&port->raddr.addr, port->raddr.salen,
hostinfo, sizeof(hostinfo),
NULL, 0,
NI_NUMERICHOST);
#ifdef USE_SSL
ereport(FATAL,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
errmsg("no pg_hba.conf entry for host \"%s\", user \"%s\", database \"%s\", %s",
hostinfo, port->user_name, port->database_name,
port->ssl ? _("SSL on") : _("SSL off"))));
#else
ereport(FATAL,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
errmsg("no pg_hba.conf entry for host \"%s\", user \"%s\", database \"%s\"",
hostinfo, port->user_name, port->database_name)));
#endif
break;
}
case uaKrb5:
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_KRB5);
status = pg_krb5_recvauth(port);
break;
case uaGSS:
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_GSS);
status = pg_GSS_recvauth(port);
break;
case uaSSPI:
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_SSPI);
status = pg_SSPI_recvauth(port);
break;
case uaIdent:
/*
* If we are doing ident on unix-domain sockets, use SCM_CREDS
* only if it is defined and SO_PEERCRED isn't.
*/
#if !defined(HAVE_GETPEEREID) && !defined(SO_PEERCRED) && \
(defined(HAVE_STRUCT_CMSGCRED) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_FCRED) || \
(defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKCRED) && defined(LOCAL_CREDS)))
if (port->raddr.addr.ss_family == AF_UNIX)
{
#if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_FCRED) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKCRED)
/*
* Receive credentials on next message receipt, BSD/OS,
* NetBSD. We need to set this before the client sends the
* next packet.
*/
int on = 1;
if (setsockopt(port->sock, 0, LOCAL_CREDS, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
ereport(FATAL,
(errcode_for_socket_access(),
errmsg("could not enable credential reception: %m")));
#endif
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_SCM_CREDS);
}
#endif
status = authident(port);
break;
case uaMD5:
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_MD5);
status = recv_and_check_password_packet(port);
break;
case uaCrypt:
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_CRYPT);
status = recv_and_check_password_packet(port);
break;
case uaPassword:
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD);
status = recv_and_check_password_packet(port);
break;
#ifdef USE_PAM
case uaPAM:
pam_port_cludge = port;
status = CheckPAMAuth(port, port->user_name, "");
break;
#endif /* USE_PAM */
#ifdef USE_LDAP
case uaLDAP:
status = CheckLDAPAuth(port);
break;
#endif
case uaTrust:
status = STATUS_OK;
break;
}
if (status == STATUS_OK)
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_OK);
else
auth_failed(port, status);
}
/*
* Send an authentication request packet to the frontend.
*/
static void
sendAuthRequest(Port *port, AuthRequest areq)
{
StringInfoData buf;
pq_beginmessage(&buf, 'R');
pq_sendint(&buf, (int32) areq, sizeof(int32));
/* Add the salt for encrypted passwords. */
if (areq == AUTH_REQ_MD5)
pq_sendbytes(&buf, port->md5Salt, 4);
else if (areq == AUTH_REQ_CRYPT)
pq_sendbytes(&buf, port->cryptSalt, 2);
#if defined(ENABLE_GSS) || defined(ENABLE_SSPI)
/*
* Add the authentication data for the next step of the GSSAPI or SSPI
* negotiation.
*/
else if (areq == AUTH_REQ_GSS_CONT)
{
if (port->gss->outbuf.length > 0)
{
elog(DEBUG4, "sending GSS token of length %u",
(unsigned int) port->gss->outbuf.length);
pq_sendbytes(&buf, port->gss->outbuf.value, port->gss->outbuf.length);
}
}
#endif
pq_endmessage(&buf);
/*
* Flush message so client will see it, except for AUTH_REQ_OK, which need
* not be sent until we are ready for queries.
*/
if (areq != AUTH_REQ_OK)
pq_flush();
}
/*
* Collect password response packet from frontend.
*
* Returns NULL if couldn't get password, else palloc'd string.
*/
static char *
recv_password_packet(Port *port)
{
StringInfoData buf;
if (PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(port->proto) >= 3)
{
/* Expect 'p' message type */
int mtype;
mtype = pq_getbyte();
if (mtype != 'p')
{
/*
* If the client just disconnects without offering a password,
* don't make a log entry. This is legal per protocol spec and in
* fact commonly done by psql, so complaining just clutters the
* log.
*/
if (mtype != EOF)
ereport(COMMERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
errmsg("expected password response, got message type %d",
mtype)));
return NULL; /* EOF or bad message type */
}
}
else
{
/* For pre-3.0 clients, avoid log entry if they just disconnect */
if (pq_peekbyte() == EOF)
return NULL; /* EOF */
}
initStringInfo(&buf);
if (pq_getmessage(&buf, 1000)) /* receive password */
{
/* EOF - pq_getmessage already logged a suitable message */
pfree(buf.data);
return NULL;
}
/*
* Apply sanity check: password packet length should agree with length of
* contained string. Note it is safe to use strlen here because
* StringInfo is guaranteed to have an appended '\0'.
*/
if (strlen(buf.data) + 1 != buf.len)
ereport(COMMERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
errmsg("invalid password packet size")));
/* Do not echo password to logs, for security. */
ereport(DEBUG5,
(errmsg("received password packet")));
/*
* Return the received string. Note we do not attempt to do any
* character-set conversion on it; since we don't yet know the client's
* encoding, there wouldn't be much point.
*/
return buf.data;
}
/*----------------------------------------------------------------
* MD5 and crypt authentication
*----------------------------------------------------------------
*/
/*
* Called when we have sent an authorization request for a password.
* Get the response and check it.
*/
static int
recv_and_check_password_packet(Port *port)
{
char *passwd;
int result;
passwd = recv_password_packet(port);
if (passwd == NULL)
return STATUS_EOF; /* client wouldn't send password */
result = md5_crypt_verify(port, port->user_name, passwd);
pfree(passwd);
return result;
}
/*----------------------------------------------------------------
* MIT Kerberos authentication system - protocol version 5
*----------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#ifdef KRB5
static int
pg_krb5_init(void)
{
@ -314,19 +745,13 @@ pg_krb5_recvauth(Port *port)
}
#endif /* KRB5 */
/*----------------------------------------------------------------
* GSSAPI authentication system
*----------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
#if defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_H)
#include <gssapi.h>
#else
#include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
#endif
#if defined(WIN32) && !defined(WIN32_ONLY_COMPILER)
/*
* MIT Kerberos GSSAPI DLL doesn't properly export the symbols for MingW
@ -629,17 +1054,12 @@ pg_GSS_recvauth(Port *port)
#endif /* ENABLE_GSS */
/*----------------------------------------------------------------
* SSPI authentication system
*----------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#ifdef ENABLE_SSPI
typedef SECURITY_STATUS
(WINAPI * QUERY_SECURITY_CONTEXT_TOKEN_FN) (
PCtxtHandle, void **);
static void
pg_SSPI_error(int severity, char *errmsg, SECURITY_STATUS r)
{
@ -935,271 +1355,6 @@ pg_SSPI_recvauth(Port *port)
#endif /* ENABLE_SSPI */
/*
* Tell the user the authentication failed, but not (much about) why.
*
* There is a tradeoff here between security concerns and making life
* unnecessarily difficult for legitimate users. We would not, for example,
* want to report the password we were expecting to receive...
* But it seems useful to report the username and authorization method
* in use, and these are items that must be presumed known to an attacker
* anyway.
* Note that many sorts of failure report additional information in the
* postmaster log, which we hope is only readable by good guys.
*/
static void
auth_failed(Port *port, int status)
{
const char *errstr;
/*
* If we failed due to EOF from client, just quit; there's no point in
* trying to send a message to the client, and not much point in logging
* the failure in the postmaster log. (Logging the failure might be
* desirable, were it not for the fact that libpq closes the connection
* unceremoniously if challenged for a password when it hasn't got one to
* send. We'll get a useless log entry for every psql connection under
* password auth, even if it's perfectly successful, if we log STATUS_EOF
* events.)
*/
if (status == STATUS_EOF)
proc_exit(0);
switch (port->auth_method)
{
case uaReject:
errstr = gettext_noop("authentication failed for user \"%s\": host rejected");
break;
case uaKrb5:
errstr = gettext_noop("Kerberos 5 authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
break;
case uaGSS:
errstr = gettext_noop("GSSAPI authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
break;
case uaSSPI:
errstr = gettext_noop("SSPI authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
break;
case uaTrust:
errstr = gettext_noop("\"trust\" authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
break;
case uaIdent:
errstr = gettext_noop("Ident authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
break;
case uaMD5:
case uaCrypt:
case uaPassword:
errstr = gettext_noop("password authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
break;
#ifdef USE_PAM
case uaPAM:
errstr = gettext_noop("PAM authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
break;
#endif /* USE_PAM */
#ifdef USE_LDAP
case uaLDAP:
errstr = gettext_noop("LDAP authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
break;
#endif /* USE_LDAP */
default:
errstr = gettext_noop("authentication failed for user \"%s\": invalid authentication method");
break;
}
ereport(FATAL,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
errmsg(errstr, port->user_name)));
/* doesn't return */
}
/*
* Client authentication starts here. If there is an error, this
* function does not return and the backend process is terminated.
*/
void
ClientAuthentication(Port *port)
{
int status = STATUS_ERROR;
/*
* Get the authentication method to use for this frontend/database
* combination. Note: a failure return indicates a problem with the hba
* config file, not with the request. hba.c should have dropped an error
* message into the postmaster logfile if it failed.
*/
if (hba_getauthmethod(port) != STATUS_OK)
ereport(FATAL,
(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
errmsg("missing or erroneous pg_hba.conf file"),
errhint("See server log for details.")));
switch (port->auth_method)
{
case uaReject:
/*
* This could have come from an explicit "reject" entry in
* pg_hba.conf, but more likely it means there was no matching
* entry. Take pity on the poor user and issue a helpful error
* message. NOTE: this is not a security breach, because all the
* info reported here is known at the frontend and must be assumed
* known to bad guys. We're merely helping out the less clueful
* good guys.
*/
{
char hostinfo[NI_MAXHOST];
pg_getnameinfo_all(&port->raddr.addr, port->raddr.salen,
hostinfo, sizeof(hostinfo),
NULL, 0,
NI_NUMERICHOST);
#ifdef USE_SSL
ereport(FATAL,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
errmsg("no pg_hba.conf entry for host \"%s\", user \"%s\", database \"%s\", %s",
hostinfo, port->user_name, port->database_name,
port->ssl ? _("SSL on") : _("SSL off"))));
#else
ereport(FATAL,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
errmsg("no pg_hba.conf entry for host \"%s\", user \"%s\", database \"%s\"",
hostinfo, port->user_name, port->database_name)));
#endif
break;
}
case uaKrb5:
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_KRB5);
status = pg_krb5_recvauth(port);
break;
case uaGSS:
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_GSS);
status = pg_GSS_recvauth(port);
break;
case uaSSPI:
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_SSPI);
status = pg_SSPI_recvauth(port);
break;
case uaIdent:
/*
* If we are doing ident on unix-domain sockets, use SCM_CREDS
* only if it is defined and SO_PEERCRED isn't.
*/
#if !defined(HAVE_GETPEEREID) && !defined(SO_PEERCRED) && \
(defined(HAVE_STRUCT_CMSGCRED) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_FCRED) || \
(defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKCRED) && defined(LOCAL_CREDS)))
if (port->raddr.addr.ss_family == AF_UNIX)
{
#if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_FCRED) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKCRED)
/*
* Receive credentials on next message receipt, BSD/OS,
* NetBSD. We need to set this before the client sends the
* next packet.
*/
int on = 1;
if (setsockopt(port->sock, 0, LOCAL_CREDS, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
ereport(FATAL,
(errcode_for_socket_access(),
errmsg("could not enable credential reception: %m")));
#endif
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_SCM_CREDS);
}
#endif
status = authident(port);
break;
case uaMD5:
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_MD5);
status = recv_and_check_password_packet(port);
break;
case uaCrypt:
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_CRYPT);
status = recv_and_check_password_packet(port);
break;
case uaPassword:
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD);
status = recv_and_check_password_packet(port);
break;
#ifdef USE_PAM
case uaPAM:
pam_port_cludge = port;
status = CheckPAMAuth(port, port->user_name, "");
break;
#endif /* USE_PAM */
#ifdef USE_LDAP
case uaLDAP:
status = CheckLDAPAuth(port);
break;
#endif
case uaTrust:
status = STATUS_OK;
break;
}
if (status == STATUS_OK)
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_OK);
else
auth_failed(port, status);
}
/*
* Send an authentication request packet to the frontend.
*/
static void
sendAuthRequest(Port *port, AuthRequest areq)
{
StringInfoData buf;
pq_beginmessage(&buf, 'R');
pq_sendint(&buf, (int32) areq, sizeof(int32));
/* Add the salt for encrypted passwords. */
if (areq == AUTH_REQ_MD5)
pq_sendbytes(&buf, port->md5Salt, 4);
else if (areq == AUTH_REQ_CRYPT)
pq_sendbytes(&buf, port->cryptSalt, 2);
#if defined(ENABLE_GSS) || defined(ENABLE_SSPI)
/*
* Add the authentication data for the next step of the GSSAPI or SSPI
* negotiation.
*/
else if (areq == AUTH_REQ_GSS_CONT)
{
if (port->gss->outbuf.length > 0)
{
elog(DEBUG4, "sending GSS token of length %u",
(unsigned int) port->gss->outbuf.length);
pq_sendbytes(&buf, port->gss->outbuf.value, port->gss->outbuf.length);
}
}
#endif
pq_endmessage(&buf);
/*
* Flush message so client will see it, except for AUTH_REQ_OK, which need
* not be sent until we are ready for queries.
*/
if (areq != AUTH_REQ_OK)
pq_flush();
}
/*----------------------------------------------------------------
* Ident authentication system
@ -1655,7 +1810,6 @@ authident(hbaPort *port)
* PAM authentication system
*----------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#ifdef USE_PAM
/*
@ -1835,6 +1989,11 @@ CheckPAMAuth(Port *port, char *user, char *password)
#endif /* USE_PAM */
/*----------------------------------------------------------------
* LDAP authentication system
*----------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#ifdef USE_LDAP
static int
@ -2014,94 +2173,3 @@ CheckLDAPAuth(Port *port)
}
#endif /* USE_LDAP */
/*
* Collect password response packet from frontend.
*
* Returns NULL if couldn't get password, else palloc'd string.
*/
static char *
recv_password_packet(Port *port)
{
StringInfoData buf;
if (PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(port->proto) >= 3)
{
/* Expect 'p' message type */
int mtype;
mtype = pq_getbyte();
if (mtype != 'p')
{
/*
* If the client just disconnects without offering a password,
* don't make a log entry. This is legal per protocol spec and in
* fact commonly done by psql, so complaining just clutters the
* log.
*/
if (mtype != EOF)
ereport(COMMERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
errmsg("expected password response, got message type %d",
mtype)));
return NULL; /* EOF or bad message type */
}
}
else
{
/* For pre-3.0 clients, avoid log entry if they just disconnect */
if (pq_peekbyte() == EOF)
return NULL; /* EOF */
}
initStringInfo(&buf);
if (pq_getmessage(&buf, 1000)) /* receive password */
{
/* EOF - pq_getmessage already logged a suitable message */
pfree(buf.data);
return NULL;
}
/*
* Apply sanity check: password packet length should agree with length of
* contained string. Note it is safe to use strlen here because
* StringInfo is guaranteed to have an appended '\0'.
*/
if (strlen(buf.data) + 1 != buf.len)
ereport(COMMERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
errmsg("invalid password packet size")));
/* Do not echo password to logs, for security. */
ereport(DEBUG5,
(errmsg("received password packet")));
/*
* Return the received string. Note we do not attempt to do any
* character-set conversion on it; since we don't yet know the client's
* encoding, there wouldn't be much point.
*/
return buf.data;
}
/*
* Called when we have sent an authorization request for a password.
* Get the response and check it.
*/
static int
recv_and_check_password_packet(Port *port)
{
char *passwd;
int result;
passwd = recv_password_packet(port);
if (passwd == NULL)
return STATUS_EOF; /* client wouldn't send password */
result = md5_crypt_verify(port, port->user_name, passwd);
pfree(passwd);
return result;
}