mirrors/nano
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of git://git.sv.gnu.org/nano.git synced 2024-12-24 03:16:52 +03:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Okay, now abort if the symlink isn't owned by the user, and some mode fixes

Browse Source 
git-svn-id: svn://svn.savannah.gnu.org/nano/trunk/nano@364 35c25a1d-7b9e-4130-9fde-d3aeb78583b8
This commit is contained in:
Chris Allegretta 2000-12-02 21:13:50 +00:00
parent 3ea0a8f1d6
commit f7ee9e6996
2 changed files with 26 additions and 20 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

3
ChangeLog
View File

@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ CVS code -
- files.c:
write_file()
- Unsetting modified on temp files bug fixed (Rocco Corsi).
- Okay, if tmp == 1 and the file is a symlink, we return -1.
- Okay, if tmp == 1 and the file is a symlink the user doesn't
own, we return -1.
do_insertfile()
- Added call to real_name_from tilde, oops. Added check for
DISABLE_TABCOMP.

43
files.c
View File

@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ int write_file(char *name, int tmp)
long size, lineswritten = 0;
char buf[PATH_MAX + 1];
filestruct *fileptr;
int fd, mask = 0;
int fd, mask = 0, realexists;
struct stat st;
static char *realname = NULL;
@ -321,16 +321,20 @@ int write_file(char *name, int tmp)
realname = mallocstrcpy(realname, name);
#endif
/* Save the state of file at the end of the symlink */
realexists = stat(realname, &st);
/* Check to see if the file is a regular file and FOLLOW_SYMLINKS is
set. If so then don't do the delete and recreate code which would
cause unexpected behavior */
lstat(realname, &st);
/* New case: if it's a symlink and tmp is set, abort. It could be
a symlink attack */
if (tmp && S_ISLNK(st.st_mode))
/* New case: if it's a symlink and tmp is set AND the user does not
own the symlink, abort. It could be a symlink attack */
if (tmp && S_ISLNK(st.st_mode) && getuid() != st.st_uid)
return -1;
else if (!tmp && (ISSET(FOLLOW_SYMLINKS) || !S_ISLNK(st.st_mode))) {
else if (ISSET(FOLLOW_SYMLINKS) || !S_ISLNK(st.st_mode)) {
/* Open the file and truncate it. Trust the symlink. */
if ((fd = open(realname, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC,
@ -413,7 +417,7 @@ int write_file(char *name, int tmp)
}
if (!ISSET(FOLLOW_SYMLINKS) || tmp) {
if (stat(realname, &st) == -1) {
if (realexists == -1) {
/* Use default umask as file permisions if file is a new file. */
mask = umask(0);
umask(mask);
@ -426,7 +430,7 @@ int write_file(char *name, int tmp)
} else {
/* Use permissions from file we are overwriting. */
mask = st.st_mode;
if (unlink(realname) == -1) {
if (!tmp && unlink(realname) == -1) {
if (errno != ENOENT) {
statusbar(_("Could not open %s for writing: %s"),
realname, strerror(errno));
@ -436,23 +440,24 @@ int write_file(char *name, int tmp)
}
}
if (link(buf, realname) != -1)
unlink(buf);
else if (errno != EPERM) {
statusbar(_("Could not open %s for writing: %s"),
if (!tmp) {
if (link(buf, realname) != -1)
unlink(buf);
else if (errno != EPERM) {
statusbar(_("Could not open %s for writing: %s"),
name, strerror(errno));
unlink(buf);
return -1;
} else if (rename(buf, realname) == -1) { /* Try a rename?? */
statusbar(_("Could not open %s for writing: %s"),
unlink(buf);
return -1;
} else if (rename(buf, realname) == -1) { /* Try a rename?? */
statusbar(_("Could not open %s for writing: %s"),
realname, strerror(errno));
unlink(buf);
return -1;
unlink(buf);
return -1;
}
}
if (chmod(realname, mask) == -1) {
if (chmod(realname, mask) == -1)
statusbar(_("Could not set permissions %o on %s: %s"),
mask, realname, strerror(errno));
}
}
if (!tmp) {