mirror of
https://github.com/0intro/conterm
synced 2024-11-29 00:43:11 +03:00
51 lines
1.1 KiB
C
51 lines
1.1 KiB
C
#include <u.h>
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#include <libc.h>
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#include <auth.h>
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#include <authsrv.h>
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#include "authlocal.h"
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/*
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* compute the proper response. We encrypt the ascii of
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* challenge number, with trailing binary zero fill.
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* This process was derived empirically.
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* this was copied from inet's guard.
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*/
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static void
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netresp(char *key, long chal, char *answer)
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{
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uchar buf[8];
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memset(buf, 0, 8);
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sprint((char *)buf, "%lud", chal);
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if(encrypt(key, buf, 8) < 0)
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abort();
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chal = (buf[0]<<24)+(buf[1]<<16)+(buf[2]<<8)+buf[3];
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sprint(answer, "%.8lux", chal);
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}
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AuthInfo*
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auth_userpasswd(char *user, char *passwd)
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{
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char key[DESKEYLEN], resp[16];
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AuthInfo *ai;
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Chalstate *ch;
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/*
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* Probably we should have a factotum protocol
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* to check a raw password. For now, we use
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* p9cr, which is simplest to speak.
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*/
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if((ch = auth_challenge("user=%q proto=p9cr role=server", user)) == nil)
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return nil;
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passtokey(key, passwd);
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netresp(key, atol(ch->chal), resp);
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memset(key, 0, sizeof key);
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ch->resp = resp;
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ch->nresp = strlen(resp);
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ai = auth_response(ch);
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auth_freechal(ch);
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return ai;
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}
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