* Remove duplications in rdpRsaKey, reuse rdpCertificate for public
components
* Move all private key and certificate code to certificate.c,
remove the tssk_* variables from gcc
* Handle update of client and server random keys in wrapping functions
* Simplify gcc_write_server_security_data, use certificate.c functions
to write the certificate data
* Refactor security_establish_keys, use the random values stored in
settings directly
RDP security is rarely used nowadays, but there have been reports about
situations where the encryption key is missing.
Add this check to properly terminate the connection in case of such an
unexpected event.
* Fixed remdesk settings pointer
* Fixed sign warnings in display_write_monitor_layout_pdu
* Use freerdp_abort_connect_context and freerdp_shall_disconnect_context
* Added and updates settings
* info assert/dynamic timezone
* mcs assert/log/flags
* Fixed and added assertions for wStream
* Unified stream length checks
* Added new function to check for lenght and log
* Replace all usages with this new function
* Cleaned up PER, added parser logging
* Cleaned up BER, added parser logging
* log messages
* Modified Stream_CheckAndLogRequiredLengthEx
* Allow custom format and options
* Add Stream_CheckAndLogRequiredLengthExVa for prepared va_list
* Improved Stream_CheckAndLogRequiredLength
* Now have log level adjustable
* Added function equivalents for existing logger
* Added a backtrace in case of a failure is detected
* Fixed public API input checks
p is 20 and r is 1 in the last iteration of fips_expand_key_bits,
which means that buf[21] is read (of BYTE buf[21];). However,
the value is not needed, because it is consequently discarded by
"c & 0xfe" statement. Let's do not read buf[p + 1] when r is 1
to avoid this.
This option will ensure that NLA is disabled(since NTLM uses weak crypto algorithms), FIPS
encryption is enabled, and ensure fips mode is enabled for openssl.
Selectively override specific uses of MD5/RC4 with new API calls specifically tailored to override FIPS.
Add comments on why overriding the use of these algorithms under FIPS is acceptable for the locations where overrides happen.
Remove check of server proprietary certificate which was already being ignore to avoid use of MD5.
Initialize winpr openssl earlier to ensure fips mode is set before starting using any crypto algorithms.
- winpr_HMAC_New() now just returnes the opaque WINPR_HMAC_CTX* pointer
which has to be passed to winpr_HMAC_Init() for (re)initialization
and since winpr_HMAC_Final() no more frees the context you always have to
use the new function winpr_HMAC_Free() once winpr_HMAC_New() has succeded
- winpr_Digest_New() now just returns the opaque WINPR_DIGEST_CTX* pointer
which has to be passed to winpr_Digest_Init() for (re)initialization
and since winpr_Digest_Final() no more frees the context you always have to
use the new function winpr_Digest_Free() once winpr_Digest_New() has succeded
[MS-RDPBCGR] Section 5.3 describes the encryption level and method values for
standard RDP security.
Looking at the current usage of these values in the FreeRDP code gives me
reason to believe that there is a certain lack of understanding of how these
values should be handled.
The encryption level is only configured on the server side in the "Encryption
Level" setting found in the Remote Desktop Session Host Configuration RDP-Tcp
properties dialog and this value is never transferred from the client to the
server over the wire.
The possible options are "None", "Low", "Client Compatible", "High" and
"FIPS Compliant". The client receices this value in the Server Security Data
block (TS_UD_SC_SEC1), probably only for informational purposes and maybe to
give the client the possibility to verify if the server's decision for the
encryption method confirms to the server's encryption level.
The possible encryption methods are "NONE", "40BIT", "56BIT", "128BIT" and
"FIPS" and the RDP client advertises the ones it supports to the server in the
Client Security Data block (TS_UD_CS_SEC).
The server's configured encryption level value restricts the possible final
encryption method.
Something that I was not able to find in the documentation is the priority
level of the individual encryption methods based on which the server makes its
final method decision if there are several options.
My analysis with Windows Servers reveiled that the order is 128, 56, 40, FIPS.
The server only chooses FIPS if the level is "FIPS Comliant" or if it is the
only method advertised by the client.
Bottom line:
* FreeRDP's client side does not need to set settings->EncryptionLevel
(which was done quite frequently).
* FreeRDP's server side does not have to set the supported encryption methods
list in settings->EncryptionMethods
Changes in this commit:
Removed unnecessary/confusing changes of EncryptionLevel/Methods settings
Refactor settings->DisableEncryption
* This value actually means "Advanced RDP Encryption (NLA/TLS) is NOT used"
* The old name caused lots of confusion among developers
* Renamed it to "UseRdpSecurityLayer" (the compare logic stays untouched)
Any client's setting of settings->EncryptionMethods were annihilated
* All clients "want" to set all supported methods
* Some clients forgot 56bit because 56bit was not supported at the time the
code was written
* settings->EncryptionMethods was overwritten anyways in nego_connect()
* Removed all client side settings of settings->EncryptionMethods
The default is "None" (0)
* Changed nego_connect() to advertise all supported methods if
settings->EncryptionMethods is 0 (None)
* Added a commandline option /encryption-methods:comma separated list of the
values "40", "56", "128", "FIPS". E.g. /encryption-methods:56,128
* Print warning if server chooses non-advertised method
Verify received level and method in client's gcc_read_server_security_data
* Only accept valid/known encryption methods
* Verify encryption level/method combinations according to MS-RDPBCGR 5.3.2
Server implementations can now set settings->EncryptionLevel
* The default for settings->EncryptionLevel is 0 (None)
* nego_send_negotiation_response() changes it to ClientCompatible in that case
* default to ClientCompatible if the server implementation set an invalid level
Fix server's gcc_write_server_security_data
* Verify server encryption level value set by server implementations
* Choose rdp encryption method based on level and supported client methods
* Moved FIPS to the lowest priority (only used if other methods are possible)
Updated sample server
* Support RDP Security (RdpKeyFile was not set)
* Added commented sample code for setting the security level
- fixed invalid stream position if extEncryptionMethods is not used
- enabled 56bit rdp security method
- fixed entropy reduction of the keys for 40 bit and 56 bit
- added rdp security incl. FIPS for fastpath output
- added FIPS encryption to fast path input
- fixed FIPS key generation in server mode
- fixed stream length correction in FIPS mode
- added rdp encryption for licensing packets (apparently some clients,
specifically cetsc, require the license packets received from the
server to be encrypted under certain RDP encryption levels)
- replace errnous virtual extended mouse event in focus in event
Malloc can fail so it will, this patch adds some check in some places
where malloc/strdup results were not checked.
This patch also contains a server side fix for RDP security (credit to nfedera).
The signature len was badly set in the GCC packet. And some other RDP security
oriented fixes are also there.
