tty: support setting controlling session
This is... kinda backwards? But it works sufficiently for us. Every TTY has at most one controlling session - every session is supposed have at most one controlling terminal, too, but we don't implement that part yet.
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0d28bf0904
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@ -320,6 +320,24 @@ int pty_ioctl(pty_t * pty, unsigned long request, void * argp) {
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validate(argp);
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validate(argp);
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*(pid_t *)argp = pty->fg_proc;
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*(pid_t *)argp = pty->fg_proc;
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return 0;
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return 0;
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case TIOCSCTTY:
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/* If this is already the control session, quietly ignore. */
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if (this_core->current_process->session == this_core->current_process->id &&
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pty->ct_proc == this_core->current_process->session) {
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return 0;
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}
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/* If we aren't a session leader, we can't do this. */
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if (this_core->current_process->session != this_core->current_process->id) {
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return -EPERM;
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}
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/* If there's already a control session, only root can steal control, and only if *argp is 1
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* (on Linux, that's "if argp is 1", but we kinda messed this up by checking ioctl argp stuff
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* for bounds validity in the system call layer, so instead we use a pointer to 1... */
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if (pty->ct_proc && (!argp || (*(int*)argp != 1) || this_core->current_process->user != 0)) {
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return -EPERM;
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}
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pty->ct_proc = this_core->current_process->session;
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return 0;
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case TCSETS:
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case TCSETS:
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case TCSETSW:
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case TCSETSW:
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if (!argp) return -EINVAL;
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if (!argp) return -EINVAL;
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