haiku/docs/user/app/_app_keystore.dox
Andrew Lindesay 9295c1f645 HaikuDepot: Url -> Identifier
This change will rename the confusing "url" within
HaikuDepot to be "identifier" in line with
corresponding changes in pkg kit and HDS.  Also at
the same time support is introduced for HDS
repos' meta-data to artificially match against
multiple repos; as requested for the future R1B3
release process.  Some tidy-ups and extensions have
been made to the JSON schema-to-model and the
schema-to-parser scripts.

Change-Id: I402e7d610986039f58d72028bda7de977e9115e2
Reviewed-on: https://review.haiku-os.org/c/haiku/+/2986
Reviewed-by: Adrien Destugues <pulkomandy@gmail.com>
2020-07-05 09:41:54 +00:00

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/*
* Copyright 2020 Haiku, Inc. All rights reserved.
* Distributed under the terms of the MIT License.
*
* Authors:
* Niels Sascha Reedijk, niels.reedijk@gmail.com
*/
/*!
\page app_keystore Password and Key Storage API
Haiku R1 introduces the first version of a system-wide key store service,
allows you as developer to outsource some of the credential and certificate
management, as well as providing an infrastructure that enables sharing
these artifacts between applications.
\warning The implementation in Haiku R1 is limited and is a promise of more
to come. Functionality beyond storing and sharing passwords is for the
future. Also please read the security section of this document,
especially when you are working with artifacts that are more sensitive.
In many cases you will find that this system service will work just as
well as making your own implementation, but there are instances in
which you may chose not to use it.
\section app_keystore_overview 1. Highlevel Overview (components)
The implementation is based around the following concepts:
- The \b keystore is the centralized repository for your keys. It is
managed by the \b keystore_server and it contains one or more
\b keyrings.
- A \b keyring is a collection of keys. There is always a
\b master \b keyring, which cannot be removed. Access is organized
around keyrings. From a user's perspective, when an application wants
to access keys in a keyring, the user will have to grant permission to
that application to access the keyring. A keyring is identified by a
name, which needs to be unique on the user's system.
- A keyring contains \b keys. These are the smallest unit in the system.
A key can be anything that you want to safeguard in the keystore. Keys
are identified by the combination of an identifier and a secondary
identifier. These should be unique within a keyring.
- The final piece is the concept of \b permissions. In the current
implementation, an application needs to ask permission to access a
keyring. The \c keystore_server will validate the permissions, and if
necessary prompt the user to grant one-time or a permant access. If the
user only allows it once, access is granted until the application
terminates.
As a user of the API, you will mostly be working with \ref BKeyStore, as
the access point that queries and modifies keyrings and keys. An individual
key is represented by the \ref BKey object.
\section app_keystore_security 2. Security
The current implementation of this API should be considered low-security.
The most important thing to know is that there is \b no \b encryption
applied when storing the keys and keyrings to the drive. This means that
the data can be read by any malicious actor that can access the drive of
your machine.
This should also puts the current locking mechanism in perspective. While
the \c keystore_server will prompt the user to grant (or deny) access to
your application, when it wants to access a keyring, this again does not
prevent any malicious actor to bypass the \c keystore_server and directly
read from (and write to!) the file.
When considering on whether to use the current API, there are a few things
to think about:
- First, consider whether you should store the keys at all. Passwords to
services with extremely sensitive personal or financial information,
such as email passwords or credentials to financial institutions, should
not be stored at all. Prompt your user for the credentials when needed,
and don't keep them for later use.
- Secondly, if you are storing credentials for use with web services,
check if the service you are using supports using access tokens. Many
APIs have them, and often use it in combination with some form of
permission system or scoping, making it possible for you to keep access
as limited as possible. Furthermore, the user often has the ability to
revoke access to a token, in case they think it is compromised.
- When you assess that you really do need to store the credentials, make
a determination first about whether or not the credentials should have
some form of encryption. For now you should consider looking for another
solution to storing sensitive data, but contributions to improve this
API are very welcome. It is beyond the scope of this document to discuss
strategies around encryption.
- When you assess the risk is low enough not to employ encryption
strategies, you may consider using this API. It is particularly
recommended if you will be sharing the credentials with more than one
application.
\warning In the end, it is up to you as a developer to be conscious of any
choices you make when it comes to user data, and credentials are no
different. When you decide that the Password and Key API does not fit
your needs, choose a framework or library that does fit your purpose.
\section app_keystore_usage 3. Practical use of the API
Below are two distinct examples on how you may use the API.
\subsection app_keystore_usage_web The Langlaufer Web Browser
We are working on the infamous Langlaufer web browser, and we are adding
a feature where we autocomplete user names and passwords. It is decided to
use the Password and Key Storage API to do our key management. Whenever we
land on a web page with a login screen, we will try to see if we have
credentials for that web page. Part of the requirements is that we support
more than one set of credentials for a web page.
It is decided that the application will store the user credentials in it's
own keyring, as we do not want to interfere with any other keys in the
master key. Additionally, we will use both the primary and secondary
identifier fields. The primary will contain the hostname of the website,
and the secondary will contain the user name.
One final design note is that all the calls to the \c keystore_server are
synchronous, meaning they will block until there is a response back from
the keystore. In the case that a user needs to be prompted for a password,
the call will be blocked until they make a decision. That is why any calls
on \ref BKeyStore should be done on a separate worker thread, instead of
within the logic of a Window.
For clarity, the example below displays the interaction with the
\ref BKeyStore and \ref BKey classes through some utility functions. It is
up to the reader to put that in a separate working thread.
\code{.cpp}
#include <Key.h>
#include <KeyStore.h>
const char *kLanglauferKeyringName = "Langlaufer";
BObjectList<BPasswordKey>
GetKeysForWebsite(const char *baseUrl) {
// There may be more than one match, so we use the iteration methods.
BKeyStore keyStore;
uint32 cookie;
BPasswordKey currentKey;
BObjectList<BPasswordKey> list;
bool next = true;
while(next) {
status_t status = keyStore.GetNextKey(kLanglauferKeyringName,
B_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD, B_KEY_PURPOSE_WEB, cookie, currentKey);
switch(status) {
case B_OK:
// Try to see if the key matches the website
if (currentKey.Identifier() == baseUrl) {
// Add the item to the list.
list.AddItem(new BPasswordKey(currentKey));
}
break;
case B_BAD_VALUE:
// The keyring does not exist, create it, and end the
// search
CreateKeyring();
next = false;
break;
default:
// Something else went wrong, like the user did not give
// authorization, or we are at the end of the list.
// Bail out the search at this point.
next = false;
break;
}
}
}
return list;
}
void
CreateKeyring() {
BKeyStore keyStore;
// Ignore the return value in the next line, it may fail but that won't
// interrupt the flow of our program.
keyStore.AddKeyring(kLanglauferKeyringName);
}
void
AddOrReplaceKey(const char *baseUrl, const char *user, const char *password) {
BKeyStore keyStore;
BPasswordKey key;
// Fill out the key with existing data, or create new data
if (keyStore.GetKey(kLanglauferKeyringName, B_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD, baseUrl, user, &key) == B_OK) {
// Remove the existing key
keyStore.RemoveKey(kLanglauferKeyringName, key);
// Update the password
key.SetPassword(password);
} else {
key.SetTo(password, B_KEY_PURPOSE_WEB, user, password);
}
// Store the updated/new key in the keyring
keyStore.AddKey(kLanglauferKeyringName, key);
}
\endcode
\subsection app_keystore_usage_coolwebservice The CoolWebService Tool Suite
We are working on a set of tools that interface with a cool web service.
Instead of building one monolithic application, we make several small tools
with specific jobs for this cool web service. One of the tools does the
authentication, and stores the key in the master keyring on the system. The
other tools use this key to access the API.
Each tool requires the authentication token to be set up properly. That's
why in the \ref BApplication::ReadyToRun() hook we check for the
availability of the key. If it is not available, or it does not work, the
user will be redirected to the authentication tool. The key will be stored
as a password. It will be identified by the identifier "CoolWebService".
\code{.cpp}
void
CoolPushTool::ReadyToRun() {
BKeyStore keyStore;
BPasswordKey key;
if (keyStore.GetKey(B_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD, "CoolWebService", key) != B_OK) {
// Terminate the application and re-authenticate
...
}
// Extract the key
BString accessToken = key.Password();
// Validate the key, and if succesful, continue
...
}
\endcode
*/