413 lines
19 KiB
Groff
413 lines
19 KiB
Groff
.\" $NetBSD: openssl_verify.1,v 1.10 2003/07/24 14:16:53 itojun Exp $
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.\" ======================================================================
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.\"
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.IX Title "VERIFY 1"
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.TH VERIFY 1 "0.9.7b" "2001-10-08" "OpenSSL"
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.UC
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.SH "NAME"
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verify \- Utility to verify certificates.
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.SH "LIBRARY"
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libcrypto, -lcrypto
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.SH "SYNOPSIS"
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.IX Header "SYNOPSIS"
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\&\fBopenssl\fR \fBverify\fR
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[\fB\-CApath directory\fR]
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[\fB\-CAfile file\fR]
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[\fB\-purpose purpose\fR]
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[\fB\-untrusted file\fR]
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[\fB\-help\fR]
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[\fB\-issuer_checks\fR]
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[\fB\-verbose\fR]
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[\fB-\fR]
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[certificates]
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.SH "DESCRIPTION"
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.IX Header "DESCRIPTION"
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The \fBverify\fR command verifies certificate chains.
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.SH "COMMAND OPTIONS"
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.IX Header "COMMAND OPTIONS"
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.Ip "\fB\-CApath directory\fR" 4
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.IX Item "-CApath directory"
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A directory of trusted certificates. The certificates should have names
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of the form: hash.0 or have symbolic links to them of this
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form (\*(L"hash\*(R" is the hashed certificate subject name: see the \fB\-hash\fR option
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of the \fBx509\fR utility). Under Unix the \fBc_rehash\fR script will automatically
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create symbolic links to a directory of certificates.
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.Ip "\fB\-CAfile file\fR" 4
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.IX Item "-CAfile file"
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A file of trusted certificates. The file should contain multiple certificates
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in \s-1PEM\s0 format concatenated together.
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.Ip "\fB\-untrusted file\fR" 4
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.IX Item "-untrusted file"
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A file of untrusted certificates. The file should contain multiple certificates
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.Ip "\fB\-purpose purpose\fR" 4
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.IX Item "-purpose purpose"
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the intended use for the certificate. Without this option no chain verification
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will be done. Currently accepted uses are \fBsslclient\fR, \fBsslserver\fR,
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\&\fBnssslserver\fR, \fBsmimesign\fR, \fBsmimeencrypt\fR. See the \fB\s-1VERIFY\s0 \s-1OPERATION\s0\fR
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section for more information.
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.Ip "\fB\-help\fR" 4
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.IX Item "-help"
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prints out a usage message.
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.Ip "\fB\-verbose\fR" 4
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.IX Item "-verbose"
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print extra information about the operations being performed.
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.Ip "\fB\-issuer_checks\fR" 4
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.IX Item "-issuer_checks"
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print out diagnostics relating to searches for the issuer certificate
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of the current certificate. This shows why each candidate issuer
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certificate was rejected. However the presence of rejection messages
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does not itself imply that anything is wrong: during the normal
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verify process several rejections may take place.
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.Ip "\fB-\fR" 4
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.IX Item "-"
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marks the last option. All arguments following this are assumed to be
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certificate files. This is useful if the first certificate filename begins
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with a \fB-\fR.
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.Ip "\fBcertificates\fR" 4
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.IX Item "certificates"
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one or more certificates to verify. If no certificate filenames are included
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then an attempt is made to read a certificate from standard input. They should
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all be in \s-1PEM\s0 format.
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.SH "VERIFY OPERATION"
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.IX Header "VERIFY OPERATION"
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The \fBverify\fR program uses the same functions as the internal \s-1SSL\s0 and S/MIME
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verification, therefore this description applies to these verify operations
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too.
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.PP
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There is one crucial difference between the verify operations performed
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by the \fBverify\fR program: wherever possible an attempt is made to continue
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after an error whereas normally the verify operation would halt on the
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first error. This allows all the problems with a certificate chain to be
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determined.
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.PP
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The verify operation consists of a number of separate steps.
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.PP
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Firstly a certificate chain is built up starting from the supplied certificate
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and ending in the root \s-1CA\s0. It is an error if the whole chain cannot be built
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up. The chain is built up by looking up the issuers certificate of the current
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certificate. If a certificate is found which is its own issuer it is assumed
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to be the root \s-1CA\s0.
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.PP
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The process of 'looking up the issuers certificate' itself involves a number
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of steps. In versions of OpenSSL before 0.9.5a the first certificate whose
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subject name matched the issuer of the current certificate was assumed to be
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the issuers certificate. In OpenSSL 0.9.6 and later all certificates
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whose subject name matches the issuer name of the current certificate are
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subject to further tests. The relevant authority key identifier components
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of the current certificate (if present) must match the subject key identifier
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(if present) and issuer and serial number of the candidate issuer, in addition
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the keyUsage extension of the candidate issuer (if present) must permit
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certificate signing.
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.PP
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The lookup first looks in the list of untrusted certificates and if no match
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is found the remaining lookups are from the trusted certificates. The root \s-1CA\s0
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is always looked up in the trusted certificate list: if the certificate to
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verify is a root certificate then an exact match must be found in the trusted
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list.
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.PP
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The second operation is to check every untrusted certificate's extensions for
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consistency with the supplied purpose. If the \fB\-purpose\fR option is not included
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then no checks are done. The supplied or \*(L"leaf\*(R" certificate must have extensions
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compatible with the supplied purpose and all other certificates must also be valid
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\&\s-1CA\s0 certificates. The precise extensions required are described in more detail in
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the \fB\s-1CERTIFICATE\s0 \s-1EXTENSIONS\s0\fR section of the \fBx509\fR utility.
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.PP
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The third operation is to check the trust settings on the root \s-1CA\s0. The root
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\&\s-1CA\s0 should be trusted for the supplied purpose. For compatibility with previous
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versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL a certificate with no trust settings is considered
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to be valid for all purposes.
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.PP
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The final operation is to check the validity of the certificate chain. The validity
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period is checked against the current system time and the notBefore and notAfter
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dates in the certificate. The certificate signatures are also checked at this
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point.
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.PP
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If all operations complete successfully then certificate is considered valid. If
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any operation fails then the certificate is not valid.
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.SH "DIAGNOSTICS"
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.IX Header "DIAGNOSTICS"
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When a verify operation fails the output messages can be somewhat cryptic. The
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general form of the error message is:
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.PP
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.Vb 2
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\& server.pem: /C=AU/ST=Queensland/O=CryptSoft Pty Ltd/CN=Test CA (1024 bit)
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\& error 24 at 1 depth lookup:invalid CA certificate
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.Ve
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The first line contains the name of the certificate being verified followed by
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the subject name of the certificate. The second line contains the error number
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and the depth. The depth is number of the certificate being verified when a
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problem was detected starting with zero for the certificate being verified itself
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then 1 for the \s-1CA\s0 that signed the certificate and so on. Finally a text version
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of the error number is presented.
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.PP
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An exhaustive list of the error codes and messages is shown below, this also
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includes the name of the error code as defined in the header file x509_vfy.h
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Some of the error codes are defined but never returned: these are described
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as \*(L"unused\*(R".
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.Ip "\fB0 X509_V_OK: ok\fR" 4
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.IX Item "0 X509_V_OK: ok"
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the operation was successful.
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.Ip "\fB2 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: unable to get issuer certificate\fR" 4
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.IX Item "2 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: unable to get issuer certificate"
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the issuer certificate could not be found: this occurs if the issuer certificate
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of an untrusted certificate cannot be found.
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.Ip "\fB3 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL unable to get certificate \s-1CRL\s0\fR" 4
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.IX Item "3 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL unable to get certificate CRL"
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the \s-1CRL\s0 of a certificate could not be found. Unused.
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.Ip "\fB4 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: unable to decrypt certificate's signature\fR" 4
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.IX Item "4 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: unable to decrypt certificate's signature"
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the certificate signature could not be decrypted. This means that the actual signature value
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could not be determined rather than it not matching the expected value, this is only
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meaningful for \s-1RSA\s0 keys.
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.Ip "\fB5 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: unable to decrypt \s-1CRL\s0's signature\fR" 4
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.IX Item "5 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: unable to decrypt CRL's signature"
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the \s-1CRL\s0 signature could not be decrypted: this means that the actual signature value
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could not be determined rather than it not matching the expected value. Unused.
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.Ip "\fB6 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: unable to decode issuer public key\fR" 4
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.IX Item "6 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: unable to decode issuer public key"
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the public key in the certificate SubjectPublicKeyInfo could not be read.
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.Ip "\fB7 X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: certificate signature failure\fR" 4
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.IX Item "7 X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: certificate signature failure"
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the signature of the certificate is invalid.
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.Ip "\fB8 X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: \s-1CRL\s0 signature failure\fR" 4
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.IX Item "8 X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: CRL signature failure"
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the signature of the certificate is invalid. Unused.
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.Ip "\fB9 X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: certificate is not yet valid\fR" 4
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.IX Item "9 X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: certificate is not yet valid"
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the certificate is not yet valid: the notBefore date is after the current time.
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.Ip "\fB10 X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: certificate has expired\fR" 4
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.IX Item "10 X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: certificate has expired"
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the certificate has expired: that is the notAfter date is before the current time.
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.Ip "\fB11 X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: \s-1CRL\s0 is not yet valid\fR" 4
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.IX Item "11 X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: CRL is not yet valid"
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the \s-1CRL\s0 is not yet valid. Unused.
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.Ip "\fB12 X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: \s-1CRL\s0 has expired\fR" 4
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.IX Item "12 X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: CRL has expired"
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the \s-1CRL\s0 has expired. Unused.
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.Ip "\fB13 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: format error in certificate's notBefore field\fR" 4
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.IX Item "13 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: format error in certificate's notBefore field"
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the certificate notBefore field contains an invalid time.
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.Ip "\fB14 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: format error in certificate's notAfter field\fR" 4
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.IX Item "14 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: format error in certificate's notAfter field"
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the certificate notAfter field contains an invalid time.
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.Ip "\fB15 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: format error in \s-1CRL\s0's lastUpdate field\fR" 4
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.IX Item "15 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: format error in CRL's lastUpdate field"
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the \s-1CRL\s0 lastUpdate field contains an invalid time. Unused.
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.Ip "\fB16 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: format error in \s-1CRL\s0's nextUpdate field\fR" 4
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.IX Item "16 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: format error in CRL's nextUpdate field"
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the \s-1CRL\s0 nextUpdate field contains an invalid time. Unused.
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.Ip "\fB17 X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: out of memory\fR" 4
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.IX Item "17 X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: out of memory"
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an error occurred trying to allocate memory. This should never happen.
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.Ip "\fB18 X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: self signed certificate\fR" 4
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.IX Item "18 X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: self signed certificate"
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the passed certificate is self signed and the same certificate cannot be found in the list of
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trusted certificates.
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.Ip "\fB19 X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: self signed certificate in certificate chain\fR" 4
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.IX Item "19 X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: self signed certificate in certificate chain"
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the certificate chain could be built up using the untrusted certificates but the root could not
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be found locally.
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.Ip "\fB20 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: unable to get local issuer certificate\fR" 4
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.IX Item "20 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: unable to get local issuer certificate"
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the issuer certificate of a locally looked up certificate could not be found. This normally means
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the list of trusted certificates is not complete.
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.Ip "\fB21 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: unable to verify the first certificate\fR" 4
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.IX Item "21 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: unable to verify the first certificate"
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no signatures could be verified because the chain contains only one certificate and it is not
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self signed.
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.Ip "\fB22 X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: certificate chain too long\fR" 4
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.IX Item "22 X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: certificate chain too long"
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the certificate chain length is greater than the supplied maximum depth. Unused.
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.Ip "\fB23 X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: certificate revoked\fR" 4
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.IX Item "23 X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: certificate revoked"
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|
the certificate has been revoked. Unused.
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.Ip "\fB24 X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: invalid \s-1CA\s0 certificate\fR" 4
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.IX Item "24 X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: invalid CA certificate"
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|
a \s-1CA\s0 certificate is invalid. Either it is not a \s-1CA\s0 or its extensions are not consistent
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|
with the supplied purpose.
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.Ip "\fB25 X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: path length constraint exceeded\fR" 4
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.IX Item "25 X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: path length constraint exceeded"
|
|
the basicConstraints pathlength parameter has been exceeded.
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|
.Ip "\fB26 X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: unsupported certificate purpose\fR" 4
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|
.IX Item "26 X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: unsupported certificate purpose"
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|
the supplied certificate cannot be used for the specified purpose.
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|
.Ip "\fB27 X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: certificate not trusted\fR" 4
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|
.IX Item "27 X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: certificate not trusted"
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|
the root \s-1CA\s0 is not marked as trusted for the specified purpose.
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|
.Ip "\fB28 X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: certificate rejected\fR" 4
|
|
.IX Item "28 X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: certificate rejected"
|
|
the root \s-1CA\s0 is marked to reject the specified purpose.
|
|
.Ip "\fB29 X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH: subject issuer mismatch\fR" 4
|
|
.IX Item "29 X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH: subject issuer mismatch"
|
|
the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its subject name
|
|
did not match the issuer name of the current certificate. Only displayed when
|
|
the \fB\-issuer_checks\fR option is set.
|
|
.Ip "\fB30 X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH: authority and subject key identifier mismatch\fR" 4
|
|
.IX Item "30 X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH: authority and subject key identifier mismatch"
|
|
the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its subject key
|
|
identifier was present and did not match the authority key identifier current
|
|
certificate. Only displayed when the \fB\-issuer_checks\fR option is set.
|
|
.Ip "\fB31 X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH: authority and issuer serial number mismatch\fR" 4
|
|
.IX Item "31 X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH: authority and issuer serial number mismatch"
|
|
the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its issuer name
|
|
and serial number was present and did not match the authority key identifier
|
|
of the current certificate. Only displayed when the \fB\-issuer_checks\fR option is set.
|
|
.Ip "\fB32 X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN:key usage does not include certificate signing\fR" 4
|
|
.IX Item "32 X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN:key usage does not include certificate signing"
|
|
the current candidate issuer certificate was rejected because its keyUsage extension
|
|
does not permit certificate signing.
|
|
.Ip "\fB50 X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: application verification failure\fR" 4
|
|
.IX Item "50 X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: application verification failure"
|
|
an application specific error. Unused.
|
|
.SH "BUGS"
|
|
.IX Header "BUGS"
|
|
Although the issuer checks are a considerably improvement over the old technique they still
|
|
suffer from limitations in the underlying X509_LOOKUP \s-1API\s0. One consequence of this is that
|
|
trusted certificates with matching subject name must either appear in a file (as specified by the
|
|
\&\fB\-CAfile\fR option) or a directory (as specified by \fB\-CApath\fR. If they occur in both then only
|
|
the certificates in the file will be recognised.
|
|
.PP
|
|
Previous versions of OpenSSL assume certificates with matching subject name are identical and
|
|
mishandled them.
|
|
.SH "SEE ALSO"
|
|
.IX Header "SEE ALSO"
|
|
openssl_x509(1)
|