NetBSD/sys/dev/rndpool.c
dan 86d2054739 Account for 1 bit of entropy for each timestamp added during
initialisation. This is just as silly as the other entropy
estimations, but it at least allows us to see how many values have
been added.

spl protect rnd_get_entropy_counter call properly

Make rndpool start out doing rotations on the first pass - make the
LSFR's be less sensitive to stuck bits in poor initial inputs.

Add considerable comments regarding the mixing function.
2002-10-09 14:48:58 +00:00

329 lines
9.5 KiB
C

/* $NetBSD: rndpool.c,v 1.16 2002/10/09 14:48:58 dan Exp $ */
/*-
* Copyright (c) 1997 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
* This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation
* by Michael Graff <explorer@flame.org>. This code uses ideas and
* algorithms from the Linux driver written by Ted Ts'o.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* This product includes software developed by the NetBSD
* Foundation, Inc. and its contributors.
* 4. Neither the name of The NetBSD Foundation nor the names of its
* contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
* from this software without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS
* ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
* TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS
* BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: rndpool.c,v 1.16 2002/10/09 14:48:58 dan Exp $");
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/sha1.h>
#include <sys/rnd.h>
/*
* The random pool "taps"
*/
#define TAP1 99
#define TAP2 59
#define TAP3 31
#define TAP4 9
#define TAP5 7
static inline void rndpool_add_one_word(rndpool_t *, u_int32_t);
void
rndpool_init(rndpool_t *rp)
{
rp->cursor = 0;
rp->rotate = 1;
memset(&rp->stats, 0, sizeof(rp->stats));
rp->stats.curentropy = 0;
rp->stats.poolsize = RND_POOLWORDS;
rp->stats.threshold = RND_ENTROPY_THRESHOLD;
rp->stats.maxentropy = RND_POOLBITS;
KASSERT(RND_ENTROPY_THRESHOLD*2 <= 20); /* XXX sha knowledge */
}
u_int32_t
rndpool_get_entropy_count(rndpool_t *rp)
{
return (rp->stats.curentropy);
}
void rndpool_get_stats(rndpool_t *rp, void *rsp, int size)
{
memcpy(rsp, &rp->stats, size);
}
void
rndpool_increment_entropy_count(rndpool_t *rp, u_int32_t entropy)
{
rp->stats.curentropy += entropy;
rp->stats.added += entropy;
if (rp->stats.curentropy > RND_POOLBITS) {
rp->stats.discarded += (rp->stats.curentropy - RND_POOLBITS);
rp->stats.curentropy = RND_POOLBITS;
}
}
u_int32_t *
rndpool_get_pool(rndpool_t *rp)
{
return (rp->pool);
}
u_int32_t
rndpool_get_poolsize(void)
{
return (RND_POOLWORDS);
}
/*
* The input function treats the contents of the pool as an array of
* 32 LFSR's of length RND_POOLWORDS, one per bit-plane. The LFSR's
* are clocked once in parallel, using 32-bit xor operations, for each
* word to be added.
*
* Each word to be added is xor'd with the output word of the LFSR
* array (one tap at a time).
*
* In order to facilitate distribution of entropy between the
* bit-planes, a 32-bit rotate of this result is performed prior to
* feedback. The rotation distance is incremented every RND_POOLWORDS
* clocks, by a value that is relativly prime to the word size to try
* to spread the bits throughout the pool quickly when the pool is
* empty.
*
* Each LFSR thus takes its feedback from another LFSR, and is
* effectively re-keyed by both that LFSR and the new data. Feedback
* occurs with another XOR into the new LFSR, rather than assignment,
* to avoid destroying any entropy in the destination.
*
* Even with zeros as input, the LFSR output data are never visible;
* the contents of the pool are never divulged except via a hash of
* the entire pool, so there is no information for correlation
* attacks. With rotation-based rekeying, each LFSR runs at most a few
* cycles before being permuted. However, beware of initial
* conditions when no entropy has been added.
*
* The output function also stirs the generated hash back into the
* pool, further permuting the LFSRs and spreading entropy through the
* pool. Any unknown bits anywhere in the pool are thus reflected
* across all the LFSRs after output.
*
* (The final XOR assignment into the pool for feedback is equivalent
* to an additional LFSR tap of the MSB before shifting, in the case
* where no rotation is done, once every 32 cycles. This LFSR runs for
* at most one length.)
*/
static inline void
rndpool_add_one_word(rndpool_t *rp, u_int32_t val)
{
/*
* Shifting is implemented using a cursor and taps as offsets,
* added mod the size of the pool. For this reason,
* RND_POOLWORDS must be a power of two.
*/
val ^= rp->pool[(rp->cursor + TAP1) & (RND_POOLWORDS - 1)];
val ^= rp->pool[(rp->cursor + TAP2) & (RND_POOLWORDS - 1)];
val ^= rp->pool[(rp->cursor + TAP3) & (RND_POOLWORDS - 1)];
val ^= rp->pool[(rp->cursor + TAP4) & (RND_POOLWORDS - 1)];
val ^= rp->pool[(rp->cursor + TAP5) & (RND_POOLWORDS - 1)];
if (rp->rotate != 0)
val = ((val << rp->rotate) | (val >> (32 - rp->rotate)));
rp->pool[rp->cursor++] ^= val;
/*
* If we have looped around the pool, increment the rotate
* variable so the next value will get xored in rotated to
* a different position.
*/
if (rp->cursor == RND_POOLWORDS) {
rp->cursor = 0;
rp->rotate = (rp->rotate + 7) & 31;
}
}
#if 0
/*
* Stir a 32-bit value (with possibly less entropy than that) into the pool.
* Update entropy estimate.
*/
void
rndpool_add_uint32(rndpool_t *rp, u_int32_t val, u_int32_t entropy)
{
rndpool_add_one_word(rp, val);
rp->entropy += entropy;
rp->stats.added += entropy;
if (rp->entropy > RND_POOLBITS) {
rp->stats.discarded += (rp->entropy - RND_POOLBITS);
rp->entropy = RND_POOLBITS;
}
}
#endif
/*
* Add a buffer's worth of data to the pool.
*/
void
rndpool_add_data(rndpool_t *rp, void *p, u_int32_t len, u_int32_t entropy)
{
u_int32_t val;
u_int8_t *buf;
buf = p;
for (; len > 3; len -= 4) {
val = *((u_int32_t *)buf);
rndpool_add_one_word(rp, val);
buf += 4;
}
if (len != 0) {
val = 0;
switch (len) {
case 3:
val = *buf++;
case 2:
val = val << 8 | *buf++;
case 1:
val = val << 8 | *buf++;
}
rndpool_add_one_word(rp, val);
}
rp->stats.curentropy += entropy;
rp->stats.added += entropy;
if (rp->stats.curentropy > RND_POOLBITS) {
rp->stats.discarded += (rp->stats.curentropy - RND_POOLBITS);
rp->stats.curentropy = RND_POOLBITS;
}
}
/*
* Extract some number of bytes from the random pool, decreasing the
* estimate of randomness as each byte is extracted.
*
* Do this by hashing the pool and returning a part of the hash as
* randomness. Stir the hash back into the pool. Note that no
* secrets going back into the pool are given away here since parts of
* the hash are xored together before being returned.
*
* Honor the request from the caller to only return good data, any data,
* etc. Note that we must have at least 64 bits of entropy in the pool
* before we return anything in the high-quality modes.
*/
int
rndpool_extract_data(rndpool_t *rp, void *p, u_int32_t len, u_int32_t mode)
{
u_int i;
SHA1_CTX hash;
u_char digest[20]; /* XXX SHA knowledge */
u_int32_t remain, deltae, count;
u_int8_t *buf;
int good;
buf = p;
remain = len;
if (mode == RND_EXTRACT_ANY)
good = 1;
else
good = (rp->stats.curentropy >= (8 * RND_ENTROPY_THRESHOLD));
KASSERT(RND_ENTROPY_THRESHOLD*2 <= 20); /* XXX SHA knowledge */
while (good && (remain != 0)) {
/*
* While bytes are requested, compute the hash of the pool,
* and then "fold" the hash in half with XOR, keeping the
* exact hash value secret, as it will be stirred back into
* the pool.
*
* XXX this approach needs examination by competant
* cryptographers! It's rather expensive per bit but
* also involves every bit of the pool in the
* computation of every output bit..
*/
SHA1Init(&hash);
SHA1Update(&hash, (u_int8_t *)rp->pool, RND_POOLWORDS * 4);
SHA1Final(digest, &hash);
/*
* Stir the hash back into the pool. This guarantees
* that the next hash will generate a different value
* if no new values were added to the pool.
*/
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
u_int32_t word;
memcpy(&word, &digest[i * 4], 4);
rndpool_add_one_word(rp, word);
}
count = min(remain, RND_ENTROPY_THRESHOLD);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
buf[i] = digest[i] ^ digest[i + RND_ENTROPY_THRESHOLD];
buf += count;
deltae = count * 8;
remain -= count;
deltae = min(deltae, rp->stats.curentropy);
rp->stats.removed += deltae;
rp->stats.curentropy -= deltae;
if (rp->stats.curentropy == 0)
rp->stats.generated += (count * 8) - deltae;
if (mode == RND_EXTRACT_GOOD)
good = (rp->stats.curentropy >=
(8 * RND_ENTROPY_THRESHOLD));
}
memset(&hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
memset(digest, 0, sizeof(digest));
return (len - remain);
}