NetBSD/sys/netinet/ip_id.c
tls 3afd44cf08 First step of random number subsystem rework described in
<20111022023242.BA26F14A158@mail.netbsd.org>.  This change includes
the following:

	An initial cleanup and minor reorganization of the entropy pool
	code in sys/dev/rnd.c and sys/dev/rndpool.c.  Several bugs are
	fixed.  Some effort is made to accumulate entropy more quickly at
	boot time.

	A generic interface, "rndsink", is added, for stream generators to
	request that they be re-keyed with good quality entropy from the pool
	as soon as it is available.

	The arc4random()/arc4randbytes() implementation in libkern is
	adjusted to use the rndsink interface for rekeying, which helps
	address the problem of low-quality keys at boot time.

	An implementation of the FIPS 140-2 statistical tests for random
	number generator quality is provided (libkern/rngtest.c).  This
	is based on Greg Rose's implementation from Qualcomm.

	A new random stream generator, nist_ctr_drbg, is provided.  It is
	based on an implementation of the NIST SP800-90 CTR_DRBG by
	Henric Jungheim.  This generator users AES in a modified counter
	mode to generate a backtracking-resistant random stream.

	An abstraction layer, "cprng", is provided for in-kernel consumers
	of randomness.  The arc4random/arc4randbytes API is deprecated for
	in-kernel use.  It is replaced by "cprng_strong".  The current
	cprng_fast implementation wraps the existing arc4random
	implementation.  The current cprng_strong implementation wraps the
	new CTR_DRBG implementation.  Both interfaces are rekeyed from
	the entropy pool automatically at intervals justifiable from best
	current cryptographic practice.

	In some quick tests, cprng_fast() is about the same speed as
	the old arc4randbytes(), and cprng_strong() is about 20% faster
	than rnd_extract_data().  Performance is expected to improve.

	The AES code in src/crypto/rijndael is no longer an optional
	kernel component, as it is required by cprng_strong, which is
	not an optional kernel component.

	The entropy pool output is subjected to the rngtest tests at
	startup time; if it fails, the system will reboot.  There is
	approximately a 3/10000 chance of a false positive from these
	tests.  Entropy pool _input_ from hardware random numbers is
	subjected to the rngtest tests at attach time, as well as the
	FIPS continuous-output test, to detect bad or stuck hardware
	RNGs; if any are detected, they are detached, but the system
	continues to run.

	A problem with rndctl(8) is fixed -- datastructures with
	pointers in arrays are no longer passed to userspace (this
	was not a security problem, but rather a major issue for
	compat32).  A new kernel will require a new rndctl.

	The sysctl kern.arandom() and kern.urandom() nodes are hooked
	up to the new generators, but the /dev/*random pseudodevices
	are not, yet.

	Manual pages for the new kernel interfaces are forthcoming.
2011-11-19 22:51:18 +00:00

149 lines
4.3 KiB
C

/* $NetBSD: ip_id.c,v 1.15 2011/11/19 22:51:25 tls Exp $ */
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2008 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
* This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation
* by the 3am Software Foundry ("3am"). It was developed by Matt Thomas.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS
* ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
* TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS
* BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: ip_id.c,v 1.15 2011/11/19 22:51:25 tls Exp $");
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/kmem.h>
#include <sys/mutex.h>
#include <sys/cprng.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/in_var.h>
#include <lib/libkern/libkern.h>
#define IPID_MAXID 65535
#define IPID_NUMIDS 32768
struct ipid_state {
kmutex_t ids_lock;
uint16_t ids_start_slot;
uint16_t ids_slots[IPID_MAXID];
};
static inline uint32_t
ipid_random(void)
{
return cprng_fast32();
}
/*
* Initalizes the
* the msb flag. The msb flag is used to generate two distinct
* cycles of random numbers and thus avoiding reuse of ids.
*
* This function is called from id_randomid() when needed, an
* application does not have to worry about it.
*/
ipid_state_t *
ip_id_init(void)
{
ipid_state_t *ids;
size_t i;
ids = kmem_alloc(sizeof(ipid_state_t), KM_SLEEP);
mutex_init(&ids->ids_lock, MUTEX_DEFAULT, IPL_SOFTNET);
ids->ids_start_slot = ipid_random();
for (i = 0; i < __arraycount(ids->ids_slots); i++) {
ids->ids_slots[i] = i;
}
/*
* Shuffle the array.
*/
for (i = __arraycount(ids->ids_slots); --i > 0;) {
size_t k = ipid_random() % (i + 1);
uint16_t t = ids->ids_slots[i];
ids->ids_slots[i] = ids->ids_slots[k];
ids->ids_slots[k] = t;
}
return ids;
}
void
ip_id_fini(ipid_state_t *ids)
{
mutex_destroy(&ids->ids_lock);
kmem_free(ids, sizeof(ipid_state_t));
}
uint16_t
ip_randomid(ipid_state_t *ids, uint16_t salt)
{
uint32_t r, k, id;
/* A random number. */
r = ipid_random();
/*
* We do a modified Fisher-Yates shuffle but only one position at a
* time. Instead of the last entry, we swap with the first entry and
* then advance the start of the window by 1. The next time that
* swapped-out entry can be used is at least 32768 iterations in the
* future.
*
* The easiest way to visual this is to imagine a card deck with 52
* cards. First thing we do is split that into two sets, each with
* half of the cards; call them deck A and deck B. Pick a card
* randomly from deck A and remember it, then place it at the
* bottom of deck B. Then take the top card from deck B and add it
* to deck A. Pick another card randomly from deck A and ...
*/
mutex_enter(&ids->ids_lock);
k = (r & (IPID_NUMIDS - 1)) + ids->ids_start_slot;
if (k >= IPID_MAXID) {
k -= IPID_MAXID;
}
id = ids->ids_slots[k];
if (k != ids->ids_start_slot) {
ids->ids_slots[k] = ids->ids_slots[ids->ids_start_slot];
ids->ids_slots[ids->ids_start_slot] = id;
}
if (++ids->ids_start_slot == IPID_MAXID) {
ids->ids_start_slot = 0;
}
mutex_exit(&ids->ids_lock);
/*
* Add an optional salt to the id to further obscure it.
*/
id += salt;
if (id >= IPID_MAXID) {
id -= IPID_MAXID;
}
return (uint16_t)htons(id + 1);
}