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<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>
Notes on Configuring NTP and Setting up a NTP Subnet</H3>
</TITLE></HEAD><BODY><H3>
Notes on Configuring NTP and Setting up a NTP Subnet</H3>
</H3>
<H4>Introduction</H4>
This document is a collection of notes concerning the use of ntpd and
relatedprograms, and on coping with the Network Time Protocol (NTP) in
general. It is a major rewrite and update of an earlier document written
by Dennis Ferguson of the University of Toronto and includes many
changes and additions resulting from the NTP Version 3 specification and
new Version 4 implementation features. It supersedes earlier documents,
which should no longer be used
for new configurations.
<P><TT>ntpd</TT> includes a complete implementation of the NTP Version
3 specification, as defined in:
<ul>
<p><li>Mills, D.L. Network Time Protocol (Version 3) specification,
implementation and analysis. Network Working Group Report RFC-1305,
University of Delaware, March 1992, 113 pp. Abstract: <a
href=http://www.eecis.udel.edu/~mills/database/rfc/rfc1305/rfc1305a.ps>
PostScript</a> | <a
href=http://www.eecis.udel.edu/~mills/database/rfc/rfc1305/rfc1305a.pdf>
PDF</a>, Body: <a
href=http://www.eecis.udel.edu/~mills/database/rfc/rfc1305/rfc1305b.ps>
PostScript</a> | <a
href=http://www.eecis.udel.edu/~mills/database/rfc/rfc1305/rfc1305b.pdf>
PDF</a>, Appendices: <a
href=http://www.eecis.udel.edu/~mills/database/rfc/rfc1305/rfc1305c.ps>
PostScript</a> | <a
href=http://www.eecis.udel.edu/~mills/database/rfc/rfc1305/rfc1305c.pdf>
PDF</a>
</ul>
Additional features have are described for <A HREF="release.htm">NTP
Version 4</A>. It also retains compatibility with both NTP Version 2, as
defined in RFC-1119, and NTP Version 1, as defined in RFC-1059, although
this compatibility is sometimes strained and only semiautomatic. In
order to support in principle the ultimate precision of about 232
picoseconds in the NTP specification, <TT>ntpd</TT> uses NTP timestamp
format for external communication and double precision floating point
arithmetic internally. <TT>ntpd</TT> fully implements NTP Versions 2 and
3 authentication and in addition Version 4 autokey. It supports the NTP
mode-6 control message facility along with a private mode-7 control-
message facility used to remotely reconfigure the system and monitor a
considerable amount of internal detail. As extensions to the
specification, a flexible address-and-mask restriction facility has been
included.
<P>The code is biased towards the needs of a busy time server with
numerous, often hundreds, of clients and other servers. Tables are
hashed to allow efficient handling of many associations, though at the
expense of additional overhead when the number of associations is small.
Many fancy features have been included to permit efficient management
and monitoring of a busy primary server, features which are probably
excess baggage for a high stratum client. In such cases, a stripped-down
version of the protocol, the Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTP) can be
used. SNTP and NTP servers and clients can interwork in most situations,
as described in: Mills, D.L. Simple Network Time Protocol (SNTP).
Network Working Group Report RFC-2030, University of Delaware, October
1996, 14 pp. <A
HREF="http://www.eecis.udel.edu/~mills/database/rfc2030.txt">
(ASCII)</A>.
<P>The code was written with near demonic attention to details which can
affect precision and as a consequence should be able to make good use of
high performance, special purpose hardware such as precision oscillators
and radio clocks. The present code supports a number of radio clocks,
including those for the WWV, CHU, WWVB, MSF, DCF77, GOES and GPS radio
and satellite time services and USNO, ACTS and PTB modem time services.
It also supports the IRIG-B and IRIG-E signal format connected via an
audio codec. The server methodically avoids the use of Unix-specific
library routines where possible by implementing local versions, in order
to aid in porting the code to perverse Unix and non-Unix platforms.
<P>While this implementation conforms in most respects to the NTP
Version 3 specification RFC-1305, a number of improvements have been
made which are described in the conformance statement in the <A
HREF="biblio.htm">Further Information and Bibliography</A> page. It has
been specifically tuned to achieve the highest accuracy possible on
whatever hardware and operating-system platform is available. In
general, its precision and stability are limited only by the
characteristics of the onboard clock source used by the hardware
and operating system, usually an uncompensated crystal oscillator. On
modern RISC-based processors connected directly to radio clocks via
serial-asynchronous interfaces, the accuracy is usually limited by the
radio clock and interface to the order of a millisecond or less. The
code includes special features to support a pulse-per-second (PPS)
signal and/or an IRIG-B signal generated by some radio clocks. When used
in conjunction with a suitable hardware level converter, the accuracy
can be improved to a few tens of microseconds.
Further improvement is possible using an outboard, stabilized frequency
source, in which the accuracy and stability are limited only by the
characteristics
of that source.
<P>The NTP Version 4 distribution includes, in addition to the daemon
itself (<TT><A HREF="ntpd.htm">ntpd</A></TT>), several utility programs,
including two remote-monitoring programs (<A HREF="ntpq.htm">
<TT>ntpq</TT></A>, <TT><A HREF="ntpdc.htm">ntpdc</A></TT>), a remote
clock-setting program similar to the Unix rdate program
(<TT>ntpdate</TT>), a traceback utility u seful to discover suitable
synchronization sources (<TT>ntptrace</TT>), and various programs used
to configure the local platform and calibrate the intrinsic errors. NTP
has been ported to a large number of platforms, including most RISC and
CISC workstations and mainframes manufactured today. Example
configuration files for many models of these machines are included
in the distribution. While in most cases the standard version of the
implementation runs with no hardware or operating system modifications,
not all features of the distribution are available on all platforms. For
instance, a special feature allowing Sun workstations to achieve
accuracies in the order of 100 microseconds requires some minor changes
and additions to the kernel and input/output support.
<P>There are, however, several drawbacks to all of this. <TT>ntpd</TT>
is quite fat. This is rotten if your intended platform for the daemon is
memory limited. <TT>ntpd</TT> uses <TT>SIGIO</TT> for all input, a
facility which appears to not enjoy universal support and whose use
seems to exercise the parts of your vendors' kernels which are most
likely to have been done poorly. The code is unforgiving in the face of
kernel problems which affect performance, and generally requires that
you repair the problems in order to achieve acceptable performance. The
code has a distinctly experimental flavour and contains features which
could charitably be termed failed
experiments, but which have not been completely hacked out. Much was
learned from the addition of support for a variety of radio clocks,
with the result that some radio clock drivers could use some rewriting.
<H4>How NTP Works</H4>
The approach used by NTP to achieve reliable time synchronization from
a set of possibly unreliable remote time servers is somewhat different
than other protocols. In particular, NTP does not attempt to synchronize
clocks to each other. Rather, each server attempts to synchronize to
Universal
Coordinated Time (UTC) using the best available source and available
transmission
paths to that source. This is a fine point which is worth understanding.
A group of NTP-synchronized clocks may be close to each other in time,
but this is not a consequence of the clocks in the group having
synchronized
to each other, but rather because each clock has synchronized closely to
UTC via the best source it has access to. As such, trying to synchronize
a set of clocks to a set of servers whose time is not in mutual
agreement
may not result in any sort of useful synchronization of the clocks, even
if you don't care about UTC. However, in networks isolated from UTC
sources,
provisions can made to nominate one of them as a phantom UTC source.
<P>NTP operates on the premise that there is one true standard time, and
that if several servers which claim synchronization to standard time
disagree
about what that time is, then one or more of them must be broken. There
is no attempt to resolve differences more gracefully since the premise
is that substantial differences cannot exist. In essence, NTP expects
that
the time being distributed from the root of the synchronization subnet
will be derived from some external source of UTC (e.g., a radio clock).
This makes it somewhat inconvenient (though by no means impossible) to
synchronize hosts together without a reliable source of UTC to
synchronize
them to. If your network is isolated and you cannot access other
people's
servers across the Internet, a radio clock may make a good investment.
<P>Time is distributed through a hierarchy of NTP servers, with each
server
adopting a <I>stratum</I> which indicates how far away from an external
source of UTC it is operating at. Stratum-1 servers, which are at the
top
of the pile (or bottom, depending on your point of view), have access to
some external time source, usually a radio clock synchronized to time
signal
broadcasts from radio stations which explicitly provide a standard time
service. A stratum-2 server is one which is currently obtaining time
from
a stratum-1 server, a stratum-3 server gets its time from a stratum-2
server,
and so on. To avoid long lived synchronization loops the number of
strata
is limited to 15.
<P>Each client in the synchronization subnet (which may also be a server
for other, higher stratum clients) chooses exactly one of the available
servers to synchronize to, usually from among the lowest stratum servers
it has access to. This is, however, not always an optimal configuration,
for indeed NTP operates under another premise as well, that each
server's
time should be viewed with a certain amount of distrust. NTP really
prefers
to have access to several sources of lower stratum time (at least three)
since it can then apply an agreement algorithm to detect insanity on the
part of any one of these. Normally, when all servers are in agreement,
NTP will choose the best of these, where "best" is defined in terms of
lowest stratum, closest (in terms of network delay) and claimed
precision,
along with several other considerations. The implication is that, while
one should aim to provide each client with three or more sources of
lower
stratum time, several of these will only be providing backup service and
may be of lesser quality in terms of network delay and stratum (i.e., a
same-stratum peer which receives time from lower stratum sources the
local
server doesn't access directly can also provide good backup service).
<P>Finally, there is the issue of association modes. There are a number
of modes in which NTP servers can associate with each other, with the
mode
of each server in the pair indicating the behaviour the other server can
expect from it. In particular, when configuring a server to obtain time
from other servers, there is a choice of two modes which may be used.
Configuring
an association in symmetric-active mode (usually indicated by a
<TT>peer</TT>
declaration in the configuration file) indicates to the remote server
that
one wishes to obtain time from the remote server and that one is also
willing
to supply time to the remote server if need be. This mode is appropriate
in configurations involving a number of redundant time servers
interconnected
via diverse network paths, which is presently the case for most stratum-
1
and stratum-2 servers on the Internet today. Configuring an association
in client mode (usually indicated by a <TT>server</TT> declaration in
the
configuration file) indicates that one wishes to obtain time from the
remote
server, but that one is not willing to provide time to the remote
server.
This mode is appropriate for file-server and workstation clients that do
not provide synchronization to other local clients. Client mode is also
useful for boot-date-setting programs and the like, which really have no
time to provide and which don't retain state about associations over the
longer term.
<P>Where the requirements in accuracy and reliability are modest,
clients
can be configured to use broadcast and/or multicast modes. These modes
are not normally utilized by servers with dependent clients. The
advantage
of these modes is that clients do not need to be configured for a
specific
server, so that all clients operating can use the same configuration
file.
Broadcast mode requires a broadcast server on the same subnet, while
multicast
mode requires support for IP multicast on the client machine, as well as
connectivity via the MBONE to a multicast server. Since broadcast
messages
are not propagated by routers, only those broadcast servers on the same
subnet will be used. There is at present no way to select which of
possibly
many multicast servers will be used, since all operate on the same group
address.
<P>Where the maximum accuracy and reliability provided by NTP are
needed,
clients and servers operate in either client/server or symmetric modes.
Symmetric modes are most often used between two or more servers
operating
as a mutually redundant group. In these modes, the servers in the group
members arrange the synchronization paths for maximum performance,
depending
on network jitter and propagation delay. If one or more of the group
members
fail, the remaining members automatically reconfigure as required.
Dependent
clients and servers normally operate in client/server mode, in which a
client or dependent server can be synchronized to a group member, but no
group member can synchronize to the client or dependent server. This
provides
protection against malfunctions or protocol attacks.
<P>Servers that provide synchronization to a sizeable population of
clients
normally operate as a group of three or more mutually redundant servers,
each operating with three or more stratum-one or stratum-two servers in
client-server modes, as well as all other members of the group in
symmetric
modes. This provides protection against malfunctions in which one or
more
servers fail to operate or provide incorrect time. The NTP algorithms
have
been specifically engineered to resist attacks where some fraction of
the
configured synchronization sources accidently or purposely provide
incorrect
time. In these cases a special voting procedure is used to identify
spurious
sources and discard their data.
<H4>
Configuring Your Subnet</H4>
At startup time the <TT>ntpd</TT> daemon running on a host reads the
initial
configuration information from a file, usually <TT>/etc/ntp.conf</TT>,
unless a different name has been specified at compile time. Putting
something
in this file which will enable the host to obtain time from somewhere
else
is usually the first big hurdle after installation of the software
itself,
which is described in the <A HREF="build.htm">Building and Installing
the
Distribution</A> page. At its simplest, what you need to do in the
configuration
file is declare the servers that the daemon should poll for time
synchronization.
In principle, no such list is needed if some other time server operating
in broadcast/multicast mode is available, which requires the client to
operate in a broadcastclient mode.
<P>In the case of a workstation operating in an enterprise network for
a public or private organization, there is often an administrative
department
that coordinates network services, including NTP. Where available, the
addresses of appropriate servers can be provided by that department.
However,
if this infrastructure is not available, it is necessary to explore some
portion of the existing NTP subnet now running in the Internet. There
are
at present many thousands of time servers running NTP in the Internet,
a significant number of which are willing to provide a public time-
synchronization
service. Some of these are listed in the list of public time servers,
which
can be accessed via the <A HREF="http://www.eecis.udel.edu/~ntp">NTP web
page</A>. These data are updated on a regular basis using information
provided
voluntarily by various site administrators. There are other ways to
explore
the nearby subnet using the <TT><A HREF="ntptrace.htm">ntptrace</A></TT>
and <TT><A HREF="ntpdc.htm">ntpdc</A></TT> programs.
<P>It is vital to carefully consider the issues of robustness and
reliability
when selecting the sources of synchronization. Normally, not less than
three sources should be available, preferably selected to avoid common
points of failure. It is usually better to choose sources which are
likely
to be "close" to you in terms of network topology, though you shouldn't
worry overly about this if you are unable to determine who is close and
who isn't. Normally, it is much more serious when a server becomes
faulty
and delivers incorrect time than when it simply stops operating, since
an NTP-synchronized host normally can coast for hours or even days
without
its clock accumulating serious error approaching a second, for instance.
Selecting at least three sources from different operating
administrations,
where possible, is the minimum recommended, although a lesser number
could
provide acceptable service with a degraded degree of robustness.
<P>Normally, it is not considered good practice for a single workstation
to request synchronization from a primary (stratum-1) time server. At
present,
these servers provide synchronization for hundreds of clients in many
cases
and could, along with the network access paths, become seriously
overloaded
if large numbers of workstation clients requested synchronization
directly.
Therefore, workstations located in sparsely populated administrative
domains
with no local synchronization infrastructure should request
synchronization
from nearby stratum-2 servers instead. In most cases the keepers of
those
servers in the lists of public servers provide unrestricted access
without
prior permission; however, in all cases it is considered polite to
notify
the administrator listed in the file upon commencement of regular
service.
In all cases the access mode and notification requirements listed in the
file must be respected. Under no conditions should servers not in these
lists be used without prior permission, as to do so can create severe
problems
in the local infrastructure, especially in cases of dial-up access to
the
Internet.
<P>In the case of a gateway or file server providing service to a
significant
number of workstations or file servers in an enterprise network it is
even
more important to provide multiple, redundant sources of synchronization
and multiple, diversity-routed, network access paths. The preferred
configuration
is at least three administratively coordinated time servers providing
service
throughout the administrative domain including campus networks and
subnetworks.
Each of these should obtain service from at least two different outside
sources of synchronization, preferably via different gateways and access
paths. These sources should all operate at the same stratum level, which
is one less than the stratum level to be used by the local time servers
themselves. In addition, each of these time servers should peer with all
of the other time servers in the local administrative domain at the
stratum
level used by the local time servers, as well as at least one
(different)
outside source at this level. This configuration results in the use of
six outside sources at a lower stratum level (toward the primary source
of synchronization, usually a radio clock), plus three outside sources
at the same stratum level, for a total of nine outside sources of
synchronization.
While this may seem excessive, the actual load on network resources is
minimal, since the interval between polling messages exchanged between
peers usually ratchets back to no more than one message every 17
minutes.
<P>The stratum level to be used by the local time servers is an
engineering
choice. As a matter of policy, and in order to reduce the load on the
primary
servers, it is desirable to use the highest stratum consistent with
reliable,
accurate time synchronization throughout the administrative domain. In
the case of enterprise networks serving hundreds or thousands of client
file servers and workstations, conventional practice is to obtain
service
from stratum-1 primary servers listed for public access. When choosing
sources away from the primary sources, the particular synchronization
path
in use at any time can be verified using the <TT>ntptrace</TT> program
included in this distribution. It is important to avoid loops and
possible
common points of failure when selecting these sources. Note that, while
NTP detects and rejects loops involving neighboring servers, it does not
detect loops involving intervening servers. In the unlikely case that
all
primary sources of synchronization are lost throughout the subnet, the
remaining servers on that subnet can form temporary loops and, if the
loss
continues for an interval of many hours, the servers will drop off the
subnet and free-run with respect to their internal (disciplined) timing
sources. After some period with no outside timing source (currently one
day), a host will declare itself unsynchronized and provide this
information
to local application programs.
<P>In many cases the purchase of one or more radio clocks is justified,
in which cases good engineering practice is to use the configurations
described
above anyway and connect the radio clock to one of the local servers.
This
server is then encouraged to participate in a special primary-server
subnetwork
in which each radio-equipped server peers with several other similarly
equipped servers. In this way the radio-equipped server may provide
synchronization,
as well as receive synchronization, should the local or remote radio
clock(s)
fail or become faulty. <TT>ntpd</TT> treats attached radio clock(s) in
the same way as other servers and applies the same criteria and
algorithms
to the time indications, so can detect when the radio fails or becomes
faulty and switch to alternate sources of synchronization. It is
strongly
advised, and in practice for most primary servers today, to employ the
authentication or access-control features of the NTP specification in
order
to protect against hostile intruders and possible destabilization of the
time service. Using this or similar strategies, the remaining hosts in
the same administrative domain can be synchronized to the three (or
more)
selected time servers. Assuming these servers are synchronized directly
to stratum-1 sources and operate normally as stratum-2, the next level
away from the primary source of synchronization, for instance various
campus
file servers, will operate at stratum 3 and dependent workstations at
stratum
4. Engineered correctly, such a subnet will survive all but the most
exotic
failures or even hostile penetrations of the various, distributed
timekeeping
resources.
<P>The above arrangement should provide very good, robust time service
with a minimum of traffic to distant servers and with manageable loads
on the local servers. While it is theoretically possible to extend the
synchronization subnet to even higher strata, this is seldom justified
and can make the maintenance of configuration files unmanageable.
Serving
time to a higher stratum peer is very inexpensive in terms of the load
on the lower stratum server if the latter is located on the same
concatenated
LAN. When justified by the accuracy expectations, NTP can be operated in
broadcast and multicast modes, so that clients need only listen for
periodic
broadcasts and do not need to send anything.
<P>When planning your network you might, beyond this, keep in mind a few
generic don'ts, in particular:
<UL>
<LI>
Don't synchronize a local time server to another peer at the same
stratum,
unless the latter is receiving time from lower stratum sources the
former
doesn't talk to directly. This minimizes the occurrence of common points
of failure, but does not eliminate them in cases where the usual chain
of associations to the primary sources of synchronization are disrupted
due to failures.</LI>
<BR>&nbsp;
<LI>
Don't configure peer associations with higher stratum servers. Let the
higher strata configure lower stratum servers, but not the reverse. This
greatly simplifies configuration file maintenance, since there is
usually
much greater configuration churn in the high stratum clients such as
personal
workstations.</LI>
<BR>&nbsp;
<LI>
Don't synchronize more than one time server in a particular
administrative
domain to the same time server outside that domain. Such a practice
invites
common points of failure, as well as raises the possibility of massive
abuse, should the configuration file be automatically distributed do a
large number of clients.</LI>
</UL>
There are many useful exceptions to these rules. When in doubt, however,
follow them.
<H4>
Configuring Your Server or Client</H4>
As mentioned previously, the configuration file is usually called
/etc/ntp.conf.
This is an ASCII file conforming to the usual comment and whitespace
conventions.
A working configuration file might look like (in this and other
examples,
do not copy this directly):
<PRE>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; # peer configuration for host whimsy
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; # (expected to operate at stratum 2)
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; server rackety.udel.edu
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; server umd1.umd.edu
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; server lilben.tn.cornell.edu
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; driftfile /etc/ntp.drift</PRE>
(Note the use of host names, although host addresses in dotted-quad
notation
can also be used. It is always preferable to use names rather than
addresses,
since over time the addresses can change, while the names seldom
change.)
<P>This particular host is expected to operate as a client at stratum 2
by virtue of the <TT>server</TT> keyword and the fact that two of the
three
servers declared (the first two) have radio clocks and usually run at
stratum
1. The third server in the list has no radio clock, but is known to
maintain
associations with a number of stratum 1 peers and usually operates at
stratum
2. Of particular importance with the last host is that it maintains
associations
with peers besides the two stratum 1 peers mentioned. This can be
verified
using the <TT>ntpq</TT> program mentioned above. When configured using
the <TT>server</TT> keyword, this host can receive synchronization from
any of the listed servers, but can never provide synchronization to
them.
<P>Unless restricted using facilities described later, this host can
provide
synchronization to dependent clients, which do not have to be listed in
the configuration file. Associations maintained for these clients are
transitory
and result in no persistent state in the host. These clients are
normally
not visible using the <TT>ntpq</TT> program included in the
distribution;
however, <TT>ntpd</TT> includes a monitoring feature (described later)
which caches a minimal amount of client information useful for debugging
administrative purposes.
<P>A time server expected to both receive synchronization from another
server, as well as to provide synchronization to it, is declared using
the <TT>peer</TT> keyword instead of the <TT>server</TT> keyword. In all
other aspects the server operates the same in either mode and can
provide
synchronization to dependent clients or other peers. If a local source
of UTC time is available, it is considered good engineering practice to
declare time servers outside the administrative domain as <TT>peer</TT>
and those inside as <TT>server</TT> in order to provide redundancy in
the
global Internet, while minimizing the possibility of instability within
the domain itself. A time server in one domain can in principle heal
another
domain temporarily isolated from all other sources of synchronization.
However, it is probably unwise for a casual workstation to bridge
fragments
of the local domain which have become temporarily isolated.
<P>Note the inclusion of a <TT>driftfile</TT> declaration. One of the
things
the NTP daemon does when it is first started is to compute the error in
the intrinsic frequency of the clock on the computer it is running on.
It usually takes about a day or so after the daemon is started to
compute
a good estimate of this (and it needs a good estimate to synchronize
closely
to its server). Once the initial value is computed, it will change only
by relatively small amounts during the course of continued operation.
The
<TT>driftfile</TT> declaration indicates to the daemon the name of a
file
where it may store the current value of the frequency error so that, if
the daemon is stopped and restarted, it can reinitialize itself to the
previous estimate and avoid the day's worth of time it will take to
recompute
the frequency estimate. Since this is a desirable feature, a
<TT>driftfile</TT>
declaration should always be included in the configuration file.
<P>An implication in the above is that, should <TT>ntpd</TT> be stopped
for some reason, the local platform time will diverge from UTC by an
amount
that depends on the intrinsic error of the clock oscillator and the time
since last synchronized. In view of the length of time necessary to
refine
the frequency estimate, every effort should be made to operate the
daemon
on a continuous basis and minimize the intervals when for some reason it
is not running.
<H4>
Configuring NTP with NetInfo</H4>
If NetInfo support is compiled into NTP, you can opt to configure ntp
in your NetInfo domain. NTP will look int he NetInfo directory
<TT>/locations/ntp</TT> for property/value pairs which are equivalent
the the lines in the configuration file described above. Each
configuration keyword may have a coresponding property in NetInfo.
Each value for a given property is treated as arguments to that property,
similar to a line in the configuration file.
<P>For example, the configuration shown in the configuration file above
can be duplicated in NetInfo by adding a property "<TT>server</TT>" with
values "<TT>rackety.udel.edu</TT>", "<TT>umd1.umd.edu</TT>", and
"<TT>lilben.tn.cornell.edu</TT>"; and a property "<TT>driftfile</TT>"
with the single value "<TT>/etc/ntp.drift</TT>".
<P>Values may contain multiple tokens similar to the arguments available
in the configuration file. For example, to use <TT>mimsy.mil</TT> as an
NTP version 1 time server, you would add a value "<TT>mimsy.mil version
1</TT>" to the "<TT>server</TT>" property.
<H4>
Ntp4 Versus Previous Versions</H4>
There are several items of note when dealing with a mixture of
<TT>ntp4</TT>
and previous distributions of NTP Version 2 (<TT>ntpd</TT>) and NTP
Version
1 (<TT>ntp3.4</TT>). The <TT>ntp4</TT> implementation conforms to the
NTP
Version 3 specification RFC-1305 and, in addition, contains additional
feaures documented in the <A HREF="release.htm">Release Notes</A> page.
As such, by default when no additional information is available
concerning
the preferences of the peer, <TT>ntpd</TT> claims to be version 4 in the
packets that it sends from configured associations. The <TT>version
</TT>subcommand
of the <TT>server</TT>, <TT>peer</TT>, <TT>broadcast </TT>and
<TT>manycastclient
</TT>command can be used to change the default. In unconfigured
(ephemeral)
associaitons, the daemon always replies in the same version as the
request.
<P>An NTP implementation conforming to a previous version specification
ordinarily discards packets from a later version. However, in most
respects
documented in RFC-1305, The version 2 implementation is compatible with
the version 3 algorithms and protocol. The version 1 implementation
contains
most of the version 2 algorithms, but without important features for
clock
selection and robustness. Nevertheless, in most respects the NTP
versions
are backwards compatible. The sticky part here is that, when a previous
version implementation receives a packet claiming to be from a version
4 server, it discards it without further processing. Hence there is a
danger
that in some situations synchronization with previous versions will
fail.
<P>The trouble occurs when an previous version is to be included in an
<TT>ntpd</TT> configuration file. With no further indication,
<TT>ntpd</TT>
will send packets claiming to be version 4 when it polls. To get around
this, <TT>ntpd</TT> allows a qualifier to be added to configuration
entries
to indicate which version to use when polling. Hence the entries
<PRE>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; # specify NTP version 1
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; server mimsy.mil version
1&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; # server running ntpd version 1
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; server apple.com version
2&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; # server running ntpd version 2</PRE>
will cause version 1 packets to be sent to the host mimsy.mil and
version
2 packets to be sent to apple.com. If you are testing <TT>ntpd</TT>
against
previous version servers you will need to be careful about this. Note
that,
as indicated in the RFC-1305 specification, there is no longer support
for the original NTP specification, once called NTP Version 0.
<H4>
Traffic Monitoring</H4>
<TT>ntpd</TT> handles peers whose stratum is higher than the stratum of
the local server and pollers using client mode by a fast path which
minimizes
the work done in responding to their polls, and normally retains no
memory
of these pollers. Sometimes, however, it is interesting to be able to
determine
who is polling the server, and how often, as well as who has been
sending
other types of queries to the server.
<P>To allow this, <TT>ntpd</TT> implements a traffic monitoring facility
which records the source address and a minimal amount of other
information
from each packet which is received by the server. This feature is
normally
enabled, but can be disabled if desired using the configuration file
entry:
<PRE>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; # disable monitoring feature
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; disable monitor</PRE>
The recorded information can be displayed using the <TT>ntpdc</TT> query
program, described briefly below.
<H4>
Address-and-Mask Restrictions</H4>
The address-and-mask configuration facility supported by <TT>ntpd</TT>
is quite flexible and general, but is not an integral part of the NTP
Version
3 specification. The major drawback is that, while the internal
implementation
is very nice, the user interface is not. For this reason it is probably
worth doing an example here. Briefly, the facility works as follows.
There
is an internal list, each entry of which holds an address, a mask and a
set of flags. On receipt of a packet, the source address of the packet
is compared to each entry in the list, with a match being posted when
the
following is true:
<PRE>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; (source_addr &amp; mask) == (address &amp;
mask)</PRE>
A particular source address may match several list entries. In this case
the entry with the most one bits in the mask is chosen. The flags
associated
with this entry are used to control the access.
<P>In the current implementation the flags always add restrictions. In
effect, an entry with no flags set leaves matching hosts unrestricted.
An entry can be added to the internal list using a <TT>restrict</TT>
declaration.
The flags associated with the entry are specified textually. For
example,
the <TT>notrust</TT> flag indicates that hosts matching this entry,
while
treated normally in other respects, shouldn't be trusted to provide
synchronization
even if otherwise so enabled. The <TT>nomodify</TT> flag indicates that
hosts matching this entry should not be allowed to do run-time
configuration.
There are many more flags, see the <A HREF="ntpd.htm"><TT>ntpd</TT>
</A>page.
<P>Now the example. Suppose you are running the server on a host whose
address is 128.100.100.7. You would like to ensure that run time
reconfiguration
requests can only be made from the local host and that the server only
ever synchronizes to one of a pair of off-campus servers or, failing
that,
a time source on net 128.100. The following entries in the configuration
file would implement this policy:
<PRE>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; # by default, don't trust and don't allow
modifications
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; restrict default notrust nomodify
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; # these guys are trusted for time, but no
modifications allowed
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; restrict 128.100.0.0 mask 255.255.0.0 nomodify
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; restrict 128.8.10.1 nomodify
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; restrict 192.35.82.50 nomodify
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; # the local addresses are unrestricted
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; restrict 128.100.100.7
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; restrict 127.0.0.1</PRE>
The first entry is the default entry, which all hosts match and hence
which
provides the default set of flags. The next three entries indicate that
matching hosts will only have the <TT>nomodify</TT> flag set and hence
will be trusted for time. If the mask isn't specified in the
<TT>restrict</TT>
keyword, it defaults to 255.255.255.255. Note that the address
128.100.100.7
matches three entries in the table, the default entry (mask 0.0.0.0),
the
entry for net 128.100 (mask 255.255.0.0) and the entry for the host
itself
(mask 255.255.255.255). As expected, the flags for the host are derived
from the last entry since the mask has the most bits set.
<P>The only other thing worth mentioning is that the <TT>restrict</TT>
declarations apply to packets from all hosts, including those that are
configured elsewhere in the configuration file and even including your
clock pseudopeer(s), if any. Hence, if you specify a default set of
restrictions
which you don't wish to be applied to your configured peers, you must
remove
those restrictions for the configured peers with additional
<TT>restrict</TT>
declarations mentioning each peer separately.
<H4>
Authentication</H4>
<TT>ntpd</TT> supports the optional authentication procedure specified
in the NTP Version 2 and 3 specifications. Briefly, when an association
runs in authenticated mode, each packet transmitted has appended to it
a 32-bit key ID and a 64/128-bit cryptographic checksum of the packet
contents
computed using either the Data Encryption Standard (DES) or Message
Digest
(MD5) algorithms. Note that, while either of these algorithms provide
sufficient
protection from message- modification attacks, distribution of the
former
algorithm implementation is restricted to the U.S. and Canada, while the
latter presently is free from such restrictions. For this reason, the
DES
algorithm is not included in the current distribution. Directions for
obtaining
it in other countries is in the <A HREF="build.htm">Building and
Installing
the Distribution</A> page. With either algorithm the receiving peer
recomputes
the checksum and compares it with the one included in the packet. For
this
to work, the peers must share at least one encryption key and,
furthermore,
must associate the shared key with the same key ID.
<P>This facility requires some minor modifications to the basic packet
processing procedures, as required by the specification. These
modifications
are enabled by the <TT>enable auth</TT> configuration declaration, which
is currently the default. In authenticated mode, peers which send
unauthenticated
packets, peers which send authenticated packets which the local server
is unable to decrypt and peers which send authenticated packets
encrypted
using a key we don't trust are all marked untrustworthy and unsuitable
for synchronization. Note that, while the server may know many keys
(identified
by many key IDs), it is possible to declare only a subset of these as
trusted.
This allows the server to share keys with a client which requires
authenticated
time and which trusts the server, but which is not trusted by the
server.
Also, some additional configuration language is required to specify the
key ID to be used to authenticate each configured peer association.
Hence,
for a server running in authenticated mode, the configuration file might
look similar to the following:
<PRE>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; # peer configuration for 128.100.100.7
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; # (expected to operate at stratum 2)
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; # fully authenticated this time
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; peer 128.100.49.105 key 22 #
suzuki.ccie.utoronto.ca
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; peer 128.8.10.1 key 4&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; #
umd1.umd.edu
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; peer 192.35.82.50 key 6&nbsp; #
lilben.tn.cornell.edu
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; keys /usr/local/etc/ntp.keys&nbsp; # path for
key file
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; trustedkey 1 2 14 15&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; #
define trusted keys
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; requestkey
15&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; #
key (7) for accessing server variables
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; controlkey
15&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; #
key (6) for accessing server variables
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; authdelay
0.000094&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; # authentication delay
(Sun4c/50 IPX)</PRE>
There are a couple of previously unmentioned things in here. The
<TT>keys
</TT>line specifies the path to the keys file (see below and the
<TT>ntpd</TT>
document page for details of the file format). The <TT>trustedkey</TT>
declaration identifies those keys that are known to be uncompromised;
the
remainder presumably represent the expired or possibly compromised keys.
Both sets of keys must be declared by key identifier in the
<TT>ntp.keys</TT>
file described below. This provides a way to retire old keys while
minimizing
the frequency of delicate key-distribution procedures. The
<TT>requestkey</TT>
line establishes the key to be used for mode-6 control messages as
specified
in RFC-1305 and used by the <TT>ntpq</TT> utility program, while the
<TT>controlkey
</TT>line establishes the key to be used for mode-7 private control
messages
used by the <TT>ntpdc</TT> utility program. These keys are used to
prevent
unauthorized modification of daemon variables.
<P>Ordinarily, the authentication delay; that is, the processing time
taken
between the freezing of a transmit timestamp and the actual transmission
of the packet when authentication is enabled (i.e. more or less the time
it takes for the DES or MD5 routine to encrypt a single block) is
computed
automatically by the daemon. If necessary, the delay can be overriden by
the <TT>authdelay </TT>line, which is used as a correction for the
transmit
timestamp. This can be computed for your CPU by the <A
HREF="authspeed.htm"><TT>authspeed</TT>
</A>program included in the distribution. The usage is illustrated by
the
following:
<PRE>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; # for DES keys
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; authspeed -n 30000 auth.samplekeys
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; # for MD5 keys
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; authspeed -mn 30000 auth.samplekeys</PRE>
Additional utility programs included in the <TT>./authstuff</TT>
directory
can be used to generate random keys, certify implementation correctness
and display sample keys. As a general rule, keys should be chosen
randomly,
except possibly the request and control keys, which must be entered by
the user as a password.
<P>The <TT>ntp.keys</TT> file contains the list of keys and associated
key IDs the server knows about (for obvious reasons this file is better
left unreadable by anyone except root). The contents of this file might
look like:
<PRE>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; # ntp keys file (ntp.keys)
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 1&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; N&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
29233E0461ECD6AE&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; # des key in NTP format
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 2&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; M&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
RIrop8KPPvQvYotM&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; # md5 key as an ASCII random string
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 14&nbsp;&nbsp; M&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
sundial&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp
;&nbsp; # md5 key as an ASCII string
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 15&nbsp;&nbsp; A&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
sundial&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp
;&nbsp; # des key as an ASCII string
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; # the following 3 keys are identical
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 10&nbsp;&nbsp; A&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; SeCReT
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 10&nbsp;&nbsp; N&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
d3e54352e5548080
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 10&nbsp;&nbsp; S&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
a7cb86a4cba80101</PRE>
In the keys file the first token on each line indicates the key ID, the
second token the format of the key and the third the key itself. There
are four key formats. An <TT>A</TT> indicates a DES key written as a 1-
to-8
character string in 7-bit ASCII representation, with each character
standing
for a key octet (like a Unix password). An <TT>S</TT> indicates a DES
key
written as a hex number in the DES standard format, with the low order
bit (LSB) of each octet being the (odd) parity bit. An <TT>N</TT>
indicates
a DES key again written as a hex number, but in NTP standard format with
the high order bit of each octet being the (odd) parity bit (confusing
enough?). An <TT>M</TT> indicates an MD5 key written as a 1-to-31
character
ASCII string in the <TT>A</TT> format. Note that, because of the simple
tokenizing routine, the characters <TT>' ', '#', '\t', '\n'</TT> and
<TT>'\0'</TT>
can't be used in either a DES or MD5 ASCII key. Everything else is fair
game, though. Key 0 (zero) is used for special purposes and should not
appear in this file.
<P>The big trouble with the authentication facility is the keys file. It
is a maintenance headache and a security problem. This should be fixed
some day. Presumably, this whole bag of worms goes away if/when a
generic
security regime for the Internet is established. An alternative with NTP
Version 4 is the autokey feature, which uses random session keys and
public-key
cruptography and avoids the key file entirely. While this feature is not
completely finished yet, details can be found in the <A
HREF="release.htm">Release
Notes</A> page.
<H4>
Query Programs</H4>
Three utility query programs are included with the distribution,
<TT>ntpq</TT>,
<TT>ntptrace</TT> and <TT>ntpdc</TT>. <TT>ntpq</TT> is a handy program
which sends queries and receives responses using NTP standard mode-6
control
messages. Since it uses the standard control protocol specified in RFC-
1305,
it may be used with NTP Version 2 and Version 3 implementations for both
Unix and Fuzzball, but not Version 1 implementations. It is most useful
to query remote NTP implementations to assess timekeeping accuracy and
expose bugs in configuration or operation.
<P><TT>ntptrace</TT> can be used to display the current synchronization
path from a selected host through possibly intervening servers to the
primary
source of synchronization, usually a radio clock. It works with both
version
2 and version 3 servers, but not version 1.
<P><TT>ntpdc</TT> is a horrid program which uses NTP private mode-7
control
messages to query local or remote servers. The format and contents of
these
messages are specific to this version of <TT>ntpd</TT> and some older
versions.
The program does allow inspection of a wide variety of internal counters
and other state data, and hence does make a pretty good debugging tool,
even if it is frustrating to use. The other thing of note about
<TT>ntpdc</TT>
is that it provides a user interface to the run time reconfiguration
facility.
See the respective document pages for details on the use of these
programs.
<H4>
Run-Time Reconfiguration</H4>
<TT>ntpd</TT> was written specifically to allow its configuration to be
fully modifiable at run time. Indeed, the only way to configure the
server
is at run time. The configuration file is read only after the rest of
the
server has been initialized into a running default-configured state.
This
facility was included not so much for the benefit of Unix, where it is
handy but not strictly essential, but rather for dedicated platforms
where
the feature is more important for maintenance. Nevertheless, run time
configuration
works very nicely for Unix servers as well.
<P>Nearly all of the things it is possible to configure in the
configuration
file may be altered via NTP mode-7 messages using the <TT>ntpdc</TT>
program.
Mode-6 messages may also provide some limited configuration
functionality
(though the only thing you can currently do with mode-6 messages is set
the leap-second warning bits) and the <TT>ntpq</TT> program provides
generic
support for the latter. The leap bits that can be set in the
<TT>leap_warning</TT>
variable (up to one month ahead) and in the <TT>leap_indication</TT>
variable
have a slightly different encoding than the usual interpretation:
<PRE>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
Value&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Action
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
00&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs
p; The daemon passes the leap bits of its
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
synchronisation source (usual mode of operation)
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 01/10&nbsp;&nbsp; A leap
second is added/deleted
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
11&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbs
p; Leap information from the synchronization source
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; is
ignored (thus LEAP_NOWARNING is passed on)</PRE>
Mode-6 and mode-7 messages which would modify the configuration of the
server are required to be authenticated using standard NTP
authentication.
To enable the facilities one must, in addition to specifying the
location
of a keys file, indicate in the configuration file the key IDs to be
used
for authenticating reconfiguration commands. Hence the following
fragment
might be added to a configuration file to enable the mode-6 (ntpq) and
mode-7 (ntpdc) facilities in the daemon:
<PRE>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; # specify mode-6 and mode-7 trusted keys
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; requestkey 65535&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; # for mode-7
requests
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; controlkey 65534&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; # for mode-6
requests</PRE>
If the <TT>requestkey</TT> and/or the <TT>controlkey</TT> configuration
declarations are omitted from the configuration file, the corresponding
run-time reconfiguration facility is disabled.
<P>The query programs require the user to specify a key ID and a key to
use for authenticating requests to be sent. The key ID provided should
be the same as the one mentioned in the configuration file, while the
key
should match that corresponding to the key ID in the keys file. As the
query programs prompt for the key as a password, it is useful to make
the
request and control authentication keys typeable (in ASCII format) from
the keyboard.
<H4>
Name Resolution</H4>
<TT>ntpd</TT> includes the capability to specify host names requiring
resolution
in <TT>peer</TT> and <TT>server</TT> declarations in the configuration
file. However, in some outposts of the Internet, name resolution is
unreliable
and the interface to the Unix resolver routines is synchronous. The
hangups
and delays resulting from name-resolver clanking can be unacceptable
once
the NTP server is running (and remember it is up and running before the
configuration file is read). However, it is advantageous to resolve time
server names, since their addresses are occasionally changed.
<P>In order to prevent configuration delays due to the name resolver,
the
daemon runs the name resolution process in parallel with the main daemon
code. When the daemon comes across a <TT>peer</TT> or <TT>server</TT>
entry
with a non-numeric host address, it records the relevant information in
a temporary file and continues on. When the end of the configuration
file
has been reached and one or more entries requiring name resolution have
been found, the server runs the name resolver from the temporary file.
The server then continues on normally but with the offending
peers/servers
omitted from its configuration.
<P>As each name is resolved, it configures the associated entry into the
server using the same mode-7 run time reconfiguration facility that
<TT>ntpdc</TT>
uses. If temporary resolver failures occur, the resolver will
periodically
retry the requests until a definite response is received. The program
will
continue to run until all entries have been resolved.
<H4>
<A NAME="frequency_tolerance">Dealing with Frequency Tolerance
Violations</A>
(<TT>tickadj</TT> and Friends)</H4>
The NTP Version 3 specification RFC-1305 calls for a maximum oscillator
frequency tolerance of +-100 parts-per-million (PPM), which is
representative
of those components suitable for use in relatively inexpensive
workstation
platforms. For those platforms meeting this tolerance, NTP will
automatically
compensate for the frequency errors of the individual oscillator and no
further adjustments are required, either to the configuration file or to
various kernel variables. For the NTP Version 4 release, this tolerance
has been increased to +-500 PPM.
<P>However, in the case of certain notorious platforms, in particular
Sun
4.1.1 systems, the performance can be improved by adjusting the values
of certain kernel variables; in particular, <TT>tick</TT> and
<TT>tickadj</TT>.
The variable <TT>tick</TT> is the increment in microseconds added to the
system time on each interval- timer interrupt, while the variable
<TT>tickadj</TT>
is used by the time adjustment code as a slew rate, in microseconds per
tick. When the time is being adjusted via a call to the system routine
<TT>adjtime()</TT>, the kernel increases or reduces tick by
<TT>tickadj</TT>
microseconds per tick until the specified adjustment has been completed.
Unfortunately, in most Unix implementations the tick increment must be
either zero or plus/minus exactly <TT>tickadj</TT> microseconds, meaning
that adjustments are truncated to be an integral multiple of
<TT>tickadj</TT>
(this latter behaviour is a misfeature, and is the only reason the
<TT>tickadj</TT>
code needs to concern itself with the internal implementation of
<TT>tickadj</TT>
at all). In addition, the stock Unix implementation considers it an
error
to request another adjustment before a prior one has completed.
<P>Thus, to make very sure it avoids problems related to the roundoff,
the <TT>tickadj </TT>program can be used to adjust the values of
<TT>tick</TT>
and <TT>tickadj</TT>. This ensures that all adjustments given to
<TT>adjtime()</TT>
are an even multiple of <TT>tickadj</TT> microseconds and computes the
largest adjustment that can be completed in the adjustment interval
(using
both the value of <TT>tick</TT> and the value of <TT>tickadj</TT>) so it
can avoid exceeding this limit. It is important to note that not all
systems
will allow inspection or modification of kernel variables other than at
system build time. It is also important to know that, with the current
NTP tolerances, it is rarely necessary to make these changes, but in
many
cases they will substantially improve the general accurace of the time
service.
<P>Unfortunately, the value of <TT>tickadj</TT> set by default is almost
always too large for <TT>ntpd</TT>. NTP operates by continuously making
small adjustments to the clock, usually at one-second intervals. If
<TT>tickadj</TT>
is set too large, the adjustments will disappear in the roundoff; while,
if <TT>tickadj</TT> is too small, NTP will have difficulty if it needs
to make an occasional large adjustment. While the daemon itself will
read
the kernel's values of these variables, it will not change the values,
even if they are unsuitable. You must do this yourself before the daemon
is started using the <TT>tickadj</TT> program included in the
<TT>./util</TT>
directory of the distribution. Note that the latter program will also
compute
an optimal value of <TT>tickadj</TT> for NTP use based on the kernel's
value of <TT>tick</TT>.
<P>The <TT>tickadj</TT> program can reset several other kernel variables
if asked. It can change the value of <TT>tick</TT> if asked. This is
handy to compensate for kernel bugs which cause the clock to run with a
very large frequency error, as with SunOS 4.1.1 systems. It can also be
used to set the value of the kernel <TT>dosynctodr</TT> variable to
zero. This variable controls whether to synchronize the system clock to
the time-of-day clock, something you really don't want to be happen
when <TT>ntpd</TT> is trying to keep it under control. In some systems,
such as recent Sun Solaris kernels, the <TT>dosynctodr </TT>variable is
the only one that can be changed by the <TT>tickadj </TT>program. In
this and other modern kernels, it is not necessary to change the other
variables in any case.
<P>
We have a report that says starting with Solaris 2.6 we should
leave <I>dosynctodr</I> alone.
<A HREF="solaris-dosynctodr.html">Here is the report</A>.
<P>In order to maintain reasonable correctness bounds, as well as
reasonably
good accuracy with acceptable polling intervals, <TT>ntpd</TT> will
complain
if the frequency error is greater than 500 PPM. For machines with a
value
of <TT>tick</TT> in the 10-ms range, a change of one in the value of
<TT>tick</TT>
will change the frequency by about 100 PPM. In order to determine the
value
of <TT>tick</TT> for a particular CPU, disconnect the machine from all
sources of time (<TT>dosynctodr</TT> = 0) and record its actual time
compared
to an outside source (eyeball-and-wristwatch will do) over a day or
more.
Multiply the time change over the day by 0.116 and add or subtract the
result to tick, depending on whether the CPU is fast or slow. An example
call to <TT>tickadj</TT> useful on SunOS 4.1.1 is:
<PRE>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <TT>tickadj</TT> -t 9999 -a 5 -s</PRE>
which sets tick 100 PPM fast, <TT>tickadj</TT> to 5 microseconds and
turns
off the clock/calendar chip fiddle. This line can be added to the
<TT>rc.local</TT>
configuration file to automatically set the kernel variables at boot
time.
<P>All this stuff about diddling kernel variables so the NTP daemon will
work is really silly. If vendors would ship machines with clocks that
kept
reasonable time and would make their <TT>adjtime()</TT> system call
apply
the slew it is given exactly, independent of the value of
<TT>tickadj</TT>,
all this could go away. This is in fact the case on many current Unix
systems.
<H4>
Tuning Your Subnet</H4>
There are several parameters available for tuning the NTP subnet for
maximum
accuracy and minimum jitter. One of these is the <TT>prefer</TT>
configuration
declaration described in <A HREF="prefer.htm">Mitigation Rules and the
<TT>prefer</TT> Keyword </A>documentation page. When more than one
eligible
server exists, the NTP clock-selection and combining algorithms act to
winnow out all except the "best" set of servers using several criteria
based on differences between the readings of different servers and
between
successive readings of the same server. The result is usually a set of
surviving servers that are apparently statistically equivalent in
accuracy,
jitter and stability. The population of survivors remaining in this set
depends on the individual server characteristics measured during the
selection
process and may vary from time to time as the result of normal
statistical
variations. In LANs with high speed RISC-based time servers, the
population
can become somewhat unstable, with individual servers popping in and out
of the surviving population, generally resulting in a regime called
<I>clockhopping</I>.
<P>When only the smallest residual jitter can be tolerated, it may be
convenient
to elect one of the servers at each stratum level as the preferred one
using the keyword <TT>prefer</TT> on the configuration declaration for
the selected server:
<PRE>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; # preferred server declaration
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; peer rackety.udel.edu prefer&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;
# preferred server</PRE>
The preferred server will always be included in the surviving
population,
regardless of its characteristics and as long as it survives preliminary
sanity checks and validation procedures.
<P>The most useful application of the <TT>prefer</TT> keyword is in high
speed LANs equipped with precision radio clocks, such as a GPS receiver.
In order to insure robustness, the hosts need to include outside peers
as well as the GPS-equipped server; however, as long as that server is
running, the synchronization preference should be that server. The
keyword
should normally be used in all cases in order to prefer an attached
radio
clock. It is probably inadvisable to use this keyword for peers outside
the LAN, since it interferes with the carefully crafted judgement of the
selection and combining algorithms.
<H4>
Provisions for Leap Seconds and Accuracy Metrics</H4>
<TT>ntpd</TT> understands leap seconds and will attempt to take
appropriate
action when one occurs. In principle, every host running ntpd will
insert
a leap second in the local timescale in precise synchronization with
UTC.
This requires that the leap-warning bits be activated some time prior to
the occurrence of a leap second at the primary (stratum 1) servers.
Subsequently,
these bits are propagated throughout the subnet depending on these
servers
by the NTP protocol itself and automatically implemented by
<TT>ntpd</TT>
and the time- conversion routines of each host. The implementation is
independent
of the idiosyncrasies of the particular radio clock, which vary widely
among the various devices, as long as the idiosyncratic behavior does
not
last for more than about 20 minutes following the leap. Provisions are
included to modify the behavior in cases where this cannot be
guaranteed.
While provisions for leap seconds have been carefully crafted so that
correct
timekeeping immediately before, during and after the occurrence of a
leap
second is scrupulously correct, stock Unix systems are mostly inept in
responding to the available information. This caveat goes also for the
maximum-error and statistical-error bounds carefully calculated for all
clients and servers, which could be very useful for application programs
needing to calibrate the delays and offsets to achieve a near-
simultaneous
commit procedure, for example. While this information is maintained in
the <TT>ntpd</TT> data structures, there is at present no way for
application
programs to access it. This may be a topic for further development.
<H4>
Clock Support Overview</H4>
<TT>ntpd</TT> was designed to support radio (and other external) clocks
and does some parts of this function with utmost care. Clocks are
treated
by the protocol as ordinary NTP peers, even to the point of referring to
them with an (invalid) IP host address. Clock addresses are of the form
127.127.<I>t.u</I>, where <I>t</I> specifies the particular type of
clock
(i.e., refers to a particular clock driver) and <I>u</I> is a unit
number
whose interpretation is clock-driver dependent. This is analogous to the
use of major and minor device numbers by Unix and permits multiple
instantiations
of clocks of the same type on the same server, should such magnificent
redundancy be required.
<P>Because clocks look much like peers, both configuration file syntax
and run time reconfiguration commands can be used to control clocks in
the same way as ordinary peers. Clocks are configured via
<TT>server</TT>
declarations in the configuration file, can be started and stopped using
ntpdc and are subject to address-and-mask restrictions much like a
normal
peer, should this stretch of imagination ever be useful. As a concession
to the need to sometimes transmit additional information to clock
drivers,
an additional configuration file is available: the <TT>fudge</TT>
statement.
This enables one to specify the values of two time quantities, two
integral
values and two flags, the use of which is dependent on the particular
clock
driver. For example, to configure a PST radio clock which can be
accessed
through the serial device <TT>/dev/pst1</TT>, with propagation delays to
WWV and WWVH of 7.5 and 26.5 milliseconds, respectively, on a machine
with
an imprecise system clock and with the driver set to disbelieve the
radio
clock once it has gone 30 minutes without an update, one might use the
following configuration file entries:
<PRE>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; # radio clock fudge fiddles
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; server 127.127.3.1
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; fudge 127.127.3.1 time1 0.0075 time2 0.0265
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; fudge 127.127.3.1 value2 30 flag1 1</PRE>
Additional information on the interpretation of these data with respect
to various radio clock drivers is given in the <A
HREF="refclock.htm">Reference
Clock Drivers </A>document page and in the individual driver documents
accessible via that page.
<H4>
Towards the Ultimate Tick</H4>
This section considers issues in providing precision time
synchronization
in NTP subnets which need the highest quality time available in the
present
technology. These issues are important in subnets supporting real-time
services such as distributed multimedia conferencing and wide-area
experiment
control and monitoring.
<P>In the Internet of today synchronization paths often span continents
and oceans with moderate to high variations in delay due to traffic
spasms.
NTP is specifically designed to minimize timekeeping jitter due to delay
variations using intricately crafted filtering and selection algorithms;
however, in cases where these variations are as much as a second or
more,
the residual jitter following these algorithms may still be excessive.
Sometimes, as in the case of some isolated NTP subnets where a local
source
of precision time is available, such as a PPS signal produced by a
calibrated
cesium clock, it is possible to remove the jitter and retime the local
clock oscillator of the NTP server. This has turned out to be a useful
feature to improve the synchronization quality of time distributed in
remote
places where radio clocks are not available. In these cases special
features
of the distribution are used together with the PPS signal to provide a
jitter-free timing signal, while NTP itself is used to provide the
coarse
timing and resolve the seconds numbering.
<P>Most available radio clocks can provide time to an accuracy in the
order
of milliseconds, depending on propagation conditions, local noise levels
and so forth. However, as a practical matter, all clocks can
occasionally
display errors significantly exceeding nominal specifications. Usually,
the algorithms used by NTP for ordinary network peers, as well as radio
clock peers will detect and discard these errors as discrepancies
between
the disciplined local clock oscillator and the decoded time message
produced
by the radio clock. Some radio clocks can produce a special PPS signal
which can be interfaced to the server platform in a number of ways and
used to substantially improve the (disciplined) clock oscillator jitter
and wander characteristics by at least an order of magnitude. Using
these
features it is possible to achieve accuracies in the order of a few tens
of microseconds with a fast RISC- based platform.
<P>There are three ways to implement PPS support, depending on the radio
clock model, platform model and serial line interface. These are
described
in detail in the application notes mentioned in the <A
HREF="index.htm">The
Network Time Protocol (NTP) Distribution </A>document page. Each of
these
requires circuitry to convert the TTL signal produced by most clocks to
the EIA levels used by most serial interfaces. The <A
HREF="gadget.htm">Gadget
Box PPS Level Converter and CHU Modem </A>document page describes a
device
designed to do this. Besides being useful for this purpose, this device
includes an inexpensive modem designed for use with the Canadian CHU
time/frequency
radio station.
<P>In order to select the appropriate implementation, it is important to
understand the underlying PPS mechanism used by ntpd. The PPS support
depends
on a continuous source of PPS pulses used to calculate an offset within
+-500 milliseconds relative to the local clock. The serial timecode
produced
by the radio or the time determined by NTP in absence of the radio is
used
to adjust the local clock within +-128 milliseconds of the actual time.
As long as the local clock is within this interval the PPS support is
used
to discipline the local clock and the timecode used only to verify that
the local clock is in fact within the interval. Outside this interval
the
PPS support is disabled and the timecode used directly to control the
local
clock.
<H4>
Parting Shots</H4>
There are several undocumented programs which can be useful in unusual
cases. They can be found in the <TT>./clockstuff</TT> and
<TT>./authstuff</TT>
directories of the distribution. One of these is the <TT>propdelay</TT>
program, which can compute high frequency radio propagation delays
between
any two points whose latitude and longitude are known. The program
understands
something about the phenomena which allow high frequency radio
propagation
to occur, and will generally provide a better estimate than a
calculation
based on the great circle distance. Other programs of interest include
<TT>clktest</TT>, which allows one to exercise the generic clock line
discipline,
and <TT>chutest</TT>, which runs the basic reduction algorithms used by
the daemon on data received from a serial port.&nbsp;
<hr><a href=index.htm>Home</a><address><a
href=mailto:mills@udel.edu> David L. Mills &lt;mills@udel.edu&gt;</a>
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