1098c7bfb7
4.1.33 - Release 16 August 2009 2837931 wrong mode selected in ipf program for hash-entries 2826168 load_http can make ippool core dump 2825150 IPL_LOGMAX used to index some arrays 2825084 ipv6 fragments should not be allowed past 64k 2824713 ipfstat top output alternates between entries and nothing 2824712 ipfstat top output is shows negative ttl 2820965 a single bad ipv6 extension header should not impact others 2818197 ignored fragment bits defined as being reserved 2817667 IPv6 fragment header verification needs attention 2817098 fr_getrulen() finds the wrong rule 2817096 fr_rulen is unused 2741019 Lingering states (Established/Listen - 5/0) in state table 2702887 use of PBR/fastroute causes panic with ipv6 2671913 regression test in7 fails to execute 2598625 parsing empty config file results in an error 2698656 test parsing empty config files 2597956 not all pointers in a clone are reset 2543934 nat_t gets assigned ifp too early 2535795 No need to always bump fr_ref 2535778 Bad IPv6 packets droped by default 2031730 4.1.31 Nat drops fragmented packets after the first 2214661 ipf does not handle IPv6 fragments 2473273 NAT removed before RST/ICMP sent 2216500 fin_state serves no purpose 2424604 adding random MD5 data causes panic 2304435 Ineffecient lock usage in logging 2216491 fin_nat serves little purpose 2055619 duplicating a free-d packet will fail 2042949 Excessive locking when creating nat_t 2035610 nat_update does not need to get locks 2214658 ipf mostly ignores locking in NetBSD 1979427 Memory leak in user utilities - token never freed (rel br) * SunOS4 does not have a curproc, but it does have u. * The fix for 2020447 generated random port numbers but not within the range specified in the map rule. Add in a regression test to verify that the "random" part works. 2020447 NAT can undo name server random port selection 1988795 NetBSD does not build with kernel malloc stats 1988782 fr_movequeue can take a short cut 1988669 first nat creation failure prevents further success 1988668 hostmap searching does not work properly * on some 64bit architectures (such as alpha), the addrfamily_t is packed differently, throwing off the calculations for adf_len * one too many READ_ENTERs in ip_sync code. * clean up fr_fastroute a little by removing some #ifdefs and pushing the code around a bit to use the same variables (NetBSD) * more recent NetBSDs use VOP related macros differently
276 lines
5.2 KiB
C
276 lines
5.2 KiB
C
/* $NetBSD$ */
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#ifdef NEED_LOCAL_RAND
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/*-
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* THE BEER-WARE LICENSE
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*
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* <dan@FreeBSD.ORG> wrote this file. As long as you retain this notice you
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* can do whatever you want with this stuff. If we meet some day, and you
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* think this stuff is worth it, you can buy me a beer in return.
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*
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* Dan Moschuk
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*/
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#if !defined(SOLARIS2) && !defined(__osf__)
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# include <sys/cdefs.h>
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#endif
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#ifdef __FreeBSD__
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# include <sys/kernel.h>
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#endif
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#ifndef __osf__
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# include <sys/random.h>
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#endif
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#ifdef __FreeBSD__
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# include <sys/libkern.h>
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#endif
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#include <sys/lock.h>
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#ifndef __osf__
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# include <sys/mutex.h>
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#endif
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#include <sys/time.h>
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#if defined(SOLARIS2) && (SOLARIS2 < 9)
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# include <netinet/in_systm.h>
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#endif
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#include <sys/socket.h>
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#include <net/if.h>
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#ifdef __osf__
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# include <net/route.h>
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#endif
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#include <netinet/in.h>
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#include <netinet/ip.h>
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#include "netinet/ip_compat.h"
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#include "md5.h"
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#if !defined(__GNUC__)
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# define __inline
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#endif
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#define ARC4_RESEED_BYTES 65536
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#define ARC4_RESEED_SECONDS 300
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#define ARC4_KEYBYTES (256 / 8)
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static u_int8_t arc4_i, arc4_j;
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static int arc4_numruns = 0;
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static u_int8_t arc4_sbox[256];
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static time_t arc4_t_reseed;
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static ipfmutex_t arc4_mtx;
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static MD5_CTX md5ctx;
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static u_int8_t arc4_randbyte(void);
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static int ipf_read_random(void *dest, int length);
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static __inline void
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arc4_swap(u_int8_t *a, u_int8_t *b)
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{
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u_int8_t c;
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c = *a;
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*a = *b;
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*b = c;
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}
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/*
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* Stir our S-box.
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*/
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static void
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arc4_randomstir (void)
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{
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u_int8_t key[256];
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int r, n;
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struct timeval tv_now;
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/*
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* XXX read_random() returns unsafe numbers if the entropy
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* device is not loaded -- MarkM.
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*/
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r = ipf_read_random(key, ARC4_KEYBYTES);
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GETKTIME(&tv_now);
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MUTEX_ENTER(&arc4_mtx);
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/* If r == 0 || -1, just use what was on the stack. */
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if (r > 0) {
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for (n = r; n < sizeof(key); n++)
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key[n] = key[n % r];
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}
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for (n = 0; n < 256; n++) {
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arc4_j = (arc4_j + arc4_sbox[n] + key[n]) % 256;
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arc4_swap(&arc4_sbox[n], &arc4_sbox[arc4_j]);
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}
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/* Reset for next reseed cycle. */
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arc4_t_reseed = tv_now.tv_sec + ARC4_RESEED_SECONDS;
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arc4_numruns = 0;
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/*
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* Throw away the first N words of output, as suggested in the
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* paper "Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling Algorithm of RC4"
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* by Fluher, Mantin, and Shamir. (N = 256 in our case.)
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*/
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for (n = 0; n < 256*4; n++)
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arc4_randbyte();
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MUTEX_EXIT(&arc4_mtx);
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}
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/*
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* Initialize our S-box to its beginning defaults.
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*/
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static void
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arc4_init(void)
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{
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int n;
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MD5Init(&md5ctx);
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MUTEX_INIT(&arc4_mtx, "arc4_mtx");
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arc4_i = arc4_j = 0;
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for (n = 0; n < 256; n++)
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arc4_sbox[n] = (u_int8_t) n;
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arc4_t_reseed = 0;
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}
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/*
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* Generate a random byte.
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*/
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static u_int8_t
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arc4_randbyte(void)
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{
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u_int8_t arc4_t;
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arc4_i = (arc4_i + 1) % 256;
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arc4_j = (arc4_j + arc4_sbox[arc4_i]) % 256;
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arc4_swap(&arc4_sbox[arc4_i], &arc4_sbox[arc4_j]);
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arc4_t = (arc4_sbox[arc4_i] + arc4_sbox[arc4_j]) % 256;
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return arc4_sbox[arc4_t];
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}
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/*
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* MPSAFE
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*/
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void
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arc4rand(void *ptr, u_int len, int reseed)
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{
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u_int8_t *p;
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struct timeval tv;
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GETKTIME(&tv);
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if (reseed ||
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(arc4_numruns > ARC4_RESEED_BYTES) ||
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(tv.tv_sec > arc4_t_reseed))
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arc4_randomstir();
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MUTEX_ENTER(&arc4_mtx);
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arc4_numruns += len;
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p = ptr;
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while (len--)
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*p++ = arc4_randbyte();
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MUTEX_EXIT(&arc4_mtx);
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}
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uint32_t
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ipf_random(void)
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{
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uint32_t ret;
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arc4rand(&ret, sizeof ret, 0);
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return ret;
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}
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static u_char pot[ARC4_RESEED_BYTES];
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static u_char *pothead = pot, *pottail = pot;
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static int inpot = 0;
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/*
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* This is not very strong, and this is understood, but the aim isn't to
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* be cryptographically strong - it is just to make up something that is
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* pseudo random.
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*/
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void
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ipf_rand_push(void *src, int length)
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{
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static int arc4_inited = 0;
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u_char *nsrc;
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int mylen;
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if (arc4_inited == 0) {
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arc4_init();
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arc4_inited = 1;
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}
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if (length < 64) {
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MD5Update(&md5ctx, src, length);
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return;
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}
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nsrc = src;
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mylen = length;
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#if defined(_SYS_MD5_H) && defined(SOLARIS2)
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# define buf buf_un.buf8
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#endif
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MUTEX_ENTER(&arc4_mtx);
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while ((mylen > 64) && (sizeof(pot) - inpot > sizeof(md5ctx.buf))) {
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MD5Update(&md5ctx, nsrc, 64);
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mylen -= 64;
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nsrc += 64;
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if (pottail + sizeof(md5ctx.buf) > pot + sizeof(pot)) {
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int left, numbytes;
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numbytes = pot + sizeof(pot) - pottail;
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bcopy(md5ctx.buf, pottail, numbytes);
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left = sizeof(md5ctx.buf) - numbytes;
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pottail = pot;
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bcopy(md5ctx.buf + sizeof(md5ctx.buf) - left,
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pottail, left);
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pottail += left;
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} else {
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bcopy(md5ctx.buf, pottail, sizeof(md5ctx.buf));
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pottail += sizeof(md5ctx.buf);
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}
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inpot += 64;
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}
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MUTEX_EXIT(&arc4_mtx);
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#if defined(_SYS_MD5_H) && defined(SOLARIS2)
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# undef buf
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#endif
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}
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static int
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ipf_read_random(void *dest, int length)
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{
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if (length > inpot)
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return 0;
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MUTEX_ENTER(&arc4_mtx);
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if (pothead + length > pot + sizeof(pot)) {
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int left, numbytes;
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left = length;
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numbytes = pot + sizeof(pot) - pothead;
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bcopy(pothead, dest, numbytes);
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left -= numbytes;
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pothead = pot;
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bcopy(pothead, dest + length - left, left);
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pothead += left;
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} else {
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bcopy(pothead, dest, length);
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pothead += length;
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}
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inpot -= length;
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if (inpot == 0)
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pothead = pottail = pot;
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MUTEX_EXIT(&arc4_mtx);
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return length;
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}
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#endif /* NEED_LOCAL_RAND */
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