3afd44cf08
<20111022023242.BA26F14A158@mail.netbsd.org>. This change includes the following: An initial cleanup and minor reorganization of the entropy pool code in sys/dev/rnd.c and sys/dev/rndpool.c. Several bugs are fixed. Some effort is made to accumulate entropy more quickly at boot time. A generic interface, "rndsink", is added, for stream generators to request that they be re-keyed with good quality entropy from the pool as soon as it is available. The arc4random()/arc4randbytes() implementation in libkern is adjusted to use the rndsink interface for rekeying, which helps address the problem of low-quality keys at boot time. An implementation of the FIPS 140-2 statistical tests for random number generator quality is provided (libkern/rngtest.c). This is based on Greg Rose's implementation from Qualcomm. A new random stream generator, nist_ctr_drbg, is provided. It is based on an implementation of the NIST SP800-90 CTR_DRBG by Henric Jungheim. This generator users AES in a modified counter mode to generate a backtracking-resistant random stream. An abstraction layer, "cprng", is provided for in-kernel consumers of randomness. The arc4random/arc4randbytes API is deprecated for in-kernel use. It is replaced by "cprng_strong". The current cprng_fast implementation wraps the existing arc4random implementation. The current cprng_strong implementation wraps the new CTR_DRBG implementation. Both interfaces are rekeyed from the entropy pool automatically at intervals justifiable from best current cryptographic practice. In some quick tests, cprng_fast() is about the same speed as the old arc4randbytes(), and cprng_strong() is about 20% faster than rnd_extract_data(). Performance is expected to improve. The AES code in src/crypto/rijndael is no longer an optional kernel component, as it is required by cprng_strong, which is not an optional kernel component. The entropy pool output is subjected to the rngtest tests at startup time; if it fails, the system will reboot. There is approximately a 3/10000 chance of a false positive from these tests. Entropy pool _input_ from hardware random numbers is subjected to the rngtest tests at attach time, as well as the FIPS continuous-output test, to detect bad or stuck hardware RNGs; if any are detected, they are detached, but the system continues to run. A problem with rndctl(8) is fixed -- datastructures with pointers in arrays are no longer passed to userspace (this was not a security problem, but rather a major issue for compat32). A new kernel will require a new rndctl. The sysctl kern.arandom() and kern.urandom() nodes are hooked up to the new generators, but the /dev/*random pseudodevices are not, yet. Manual pages for the new kernel interfaces are forthcoming.
29 lines
1020 B
Plaintext
29 lines
1020 B
Plaintext
# $NetBSD: INSTALL,v 1.88 2011/11/19 22:51:19 tls Exp $
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#
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# INSTALL - Installation kernel.
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#
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# This kernel is derived from GENERIC with additional memory disk
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# options.
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include "arch/amd64/conf/GENERIC"
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options CONSDEVNAME="\"com\"",CONADDR=0x2f8,CONSPEED=115200
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#ident "INSTALL-$Revision: 1.88 $"
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no options MEMORY_DISK_DYNAMIC
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options MEMORY_DISK_IS_ROOT # force root on memory disk
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options MEMORY_DISK_SERVER=0 # no userspace memory disk support
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options MEMORY_DISK_ROOT_SIZE=10000 # size of memory disk, in blocks
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options MEMORY_DISK_RBFLAGS=RB_SINGLE # boot in single-user mode
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no options MTRR
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# DRI driver
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no i915drm* at drm? # Intel i915, i945 DRM driver
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no mach64drm* at drm? # mach64 (3D Rage Pro, Rage) DRM driver
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no mgadrm* at drm? # Matrox G[24]00, G[45]50 DRM driver
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no r128drm* at drm? # ATI Rage 128 DRM driver
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no radeondrm* at drm? # ATI Radeon DRM driver
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no savagedrm* at drm? # S3 Savage DRM driver
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no sisdrm* at drm? # SiS DRM driver
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no tdfxdrm* at drm? # 3dfx (voodoo) DRM driver
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