NetBSD/lib/libwrap/hosts_access.5

.TH HOSTS_ACCESS 5
.SH NAME
hosts_access,
hosts.allow,
hosts.deny \- format of host access control files
.SH DESCRIPTION
This manual page describes a simple access control language that is
based on client (host name/address, user name), and server (process
name, host name/address) patterns.  Examples are given at the end. The
impatient reader is encouraged to skip to the EXAMPLES section for a
quick introduction.
.PP
Note that in a `stock' installation of the tcp_wrappers package, a
program called \fItcpd\fR is called from \fI/etc/inetd.conf\fR, and
this program performs the wrapper checks and then executes the daemon.
In NetBSD \fIinetd\fR(8) has been modified to perform this check
internally, and so tcpd is neither used nor supplied.
.PP
Also note that libwrap under NetBSD uses the extensions to the access
control language as described in the \fIhosts_options\fR(5).
.PP
In the following text, \fIdaemon\fR is the process name of a
network daemon process, and \fIclient\fR is the name and/or address of
a host requesting service. Network daemon process names are specified
in the inetd configuration file.
.SH "ACCESS CONTROL FILES"
The access control software consults two files. The search stops
at the first match:
.IP \(bu
Access will be granted when a (daemon,client) pair matches an entry in
the \fI/etc/hosts.allow\fR file.
.IP \(bu
Otherwise, access will be denied when a (daemon,client) pair matches an
entry in the \fI/etc/hosts.deny\fR file.
.IP \(bu
Otherwise, access will be granted.
.PP
A non-existing access control file is treated as if it were an empty
file. Thus, access control can be turned off by providing no access
control files.
.SH "ACCESS CONTROL RULES"
Each access control file consists of zero or more lines of text.  These
lines are processed in order of appearance. The search terminates when a
match is found.
.IP \(bu
A newline character is ignored when it is preceded by a backslash
character.  This permits you to break up long lines so that they are
easier to edit.  \fBWARNING:\fP  The total length of an entry can be no
more than 2047 characters long including the final newline.
.IP \(bu
Blank lines or lines that begin with a `#\' character are ignored.
This permits you to insert comments and whitespace so that the tables
are easier to read.
.IP \(bu
All other lines should satisfy the following format, things between []
being optional:
.sp
.ti +3
daemon_list : client_list : option : option ...
.PP
\fIdaemon_list\fR is a list of one or more daemon process names
(argv[0] values) or wildcards (see below).  
.PP
\fIclient_list\fR is a list
of one or more host names, host addresses, patterns or wildcards (see
below) that will be matched against the client host name or address.
.PP
The more complex forms \fIdaemon@host\fR and \fIuser@host\fR are
explained in the sections on server endpoint patterns and on client
username lookups, respectively.
.PP
List elements should be separated by blanks and/or commas.  
.PP
With the exception of NIS (YP) netgroup lookups, all access control
checks are case insensitive.
.ne 4
.SH PATTERNS
The access control language implements the following patterns:
.IP \(bu
A string that begins with a `.\' character. A host name is matched if
the last components of its name match the specified pattern.  For
example, the pattern `.tue.nl\' matches the host name
`wzv.win.tue.nl\'.
.IP \(bu
A string that ends with a `.\' character. A host address is matched if
its first numeric fields match the given string.  For example, the
pattern `131.155.\' matches the address of (almost) every host on the
Eind\%hoven University network (131.155.x.x).
.IP \(bu
A string that begins with an `@\' character is treated as an NIS
(formerly YP) netgroup name. A host name is matched if it is a host
member of the specified netgroup. Netgroup matches are not supported
for daemon process names or for client user names.
.IP \(bu
An expression of the form `n.n.n.n/m.m.m.m\' is interpreted as a
`net/mask\' pair. A host address is matched if `net\' is equal to the
bitwise AND of the address and the `mask\'. For example, the net/mask
pattern `131.155.72.0/255.255.254.0\' matches every address in the
range `131.155.72.0\' through `131.155.73.255\'.
.SH WILDCARDS
The access control language supports explicit wildcards:
.IP ALL
The universal wildcard, always matches.
.IP LOCAL
Matches any host whose name does not contain a dot character.
.IP UNKNOWN
Matches any user whose name is unknown, and matches any host whose name
\fIor\fR address are unknown.  This pattern should be used with care:
host names may be unavailable due to temporary name server problems. A
network address will be unavailable when the software cannot figure out
what type of network it is talking to.
.IP KNOWN
Matches any user whose name is known, and matches any host whose name
\fIand\fR address are known. This pattern should be used with care:
host names may be unavailable due to temporary name server problems.  A
network address will be unavailable when the software cannot figure out
what type of network it is talking to.
.IP PARANOID
Matches any host whose name does not match its address.
Note that unlike the default mode of \fItcpd\fR, NetBSD \fIinetd\fR
does not automatically drop these requests; you must explicitly
drop them in your \fI/etc/hosts.allow\fR or \fI/etc/hosts.deny\fR 
file.
.IP "{RBL}.\fIdomain\fR"
Matches any host whose reversed address appears in the DNS under
\fIdomain\fR.  The primary such domain used for blocking unsolicited
commercial e-mail (spam) is `.rbl.maps.vix.com\'.
.ne 6
.SH OPERATORS
.IP EXCEPT
Intended use is of the form: `list_1 EXCEPT list_2\'; this construct
matches anything that matches \fIlist_1\fR unless it matches
\fIlist_2\fR.  The EXCEPT operator can be used in daemon_lists and in
client_lists. The EXCEPT operator can be nested: if the control
language would permit the use of parentheses, `a EXCEPT b EXCEPT c\'
would parse as `(a EXCEPT (b EXCEPT c))\'.
.br
.ne 6
.SH % EXPANSIONS
The following expansions are available within some options:
.IP "%a (%A)"
The client (server) host address.
.IP %c
Client information: user@host, user@address, a host name, or just an
address, depending on how much information is available.
.IP %d
The daemon process name (argv[0] value).
.IP "%h (%H)"
The client (server) host name or address, if the host name is
unavailable.
.IP "%n (%N)"
The client (server) host name (or "unknown" or "paranoid").
.IP %p
The daemon process id.
.IP %s
Server information: daemon@host, daemon@address, or just a daemon name,
depending on how much information is available.
.IP %u
The client user name (or "unknown").
.IP %%
Expands to a single `%\' character.
.PP
Characters in % expansions that may confuse the shell are replaced by
underscores.
.SH "SERVER ENDPOINT PATTERNS"
In order to distinguish clients by the network address that they
connect to, use patterns of the form:
.sp
.ti +3
process_name@host_pattern : client_list ...
.sp
Patterns like these can be used when the machine has different internet
addresses with different internet hostnames.  Service providers can use
this facility to offer FTP, GOPHER or WWW archives with internet names
that may even belong to different organizations. See also the `twist'
option in the hosts_options(5) document. Some systems (Solaris,
FreeBSD, NetBSD) can have more than one internet address on one physical
interface; with other systems you may have to resort to SLIP or PPP
pseudo interfaces that live in a dedicated network address space.
.sp
The host_pattern obeys the same syntax rules as host names and
addresses in client_list context. Usually, server endpoint information
is available only with connection-oriented services.
.SH "CLIENT USERNAME LOOKUP"
When the client host supports the RFC 931 protocol or one of its
descendants (TAP, IDENT, RFC 1413) the wrapper programs can retrieve
additional information about the owner of a connection. Client username
information, when available, is logged together with the client host
name, and can be used to match patterns like:
.PP
.ti +3
daemon_list : ... user_pattern@host_pattern ...
.PP
The daemon wrappers can be configured at compile time to perform
rule-driven username lookups (default) or to always interrogate the
client host.  In the case of rule-driven username lookups, the above
rule would cause username lookup only when both the \fIdaemon_list\fR
and the \fIhost_pattern\fR match. 
.PP
A user pattern has the same syntax as a daemon process pattern, so the
same wildcards apply (netgroup membership is not supported).  One
should not get carried away with username lookups, though.
.IP \(bu
The client username information cannot be trusted when it is needed
most, i.e. when the client system has been compromised.  In general,
ALL and (UN)KNOWN are the only user name patterns that make sense.
.IP \(bu
Username lookups are possible only with TCP-based services, and only
when the client host runs a suitable daemon; in all other cases the
result is "unknown".
.IP \(bu
A well-known UNIX kernel bug may cause loss of service when username
lookups are blocked by a firewall. The wrapper README document
describes a procedure to find out if your kernel has this bug.
.IP \(bu
Username lookups may cause noticeable delays for non-UNIX users.  The
default timeout for username lookups is 10 seconds: too short to cope
with slow networks, but long enough to irritate PC users.
.PP
Selective username lookups can alleviate the last problem. For example,
a rule like:
.PP
.ti +3
daemon_list : @pcnetgroup ALL@ALL
.PP
would match members of the pc netgroup without doing username lookups,
but would perform username lookups with all other systems.
.SH "DETECTING ADDRESS SPOOFING ATTACKS"
A flaw in the sequence number generator of many TCP/IP implementations
allows intruders to easily impersonate trusted hosts and to break in
via, for example, the remote shell service.  The IDENT (RFC931 etc.)
service can be used to detect such and other host address spoofing
attacks.
.PP
Before accepting a client request, the wrappers can use the IDENT
service to find out that the client did not send the request at all.
When the client host provides IDENT service, a negative IDENT lookup
result (the client matches `UNKNOWN@host') is strong evidence of a host
spoofing attack.
.PP
A positive IDENT lookup result (the client matches `KNOWN@host') is
less trustworthy. It is possible for an intruder to spoof both the
client connection and the IDENT lookup, although doing so is much
harder than spoofing just a client connection. It may also be that
the client\'s IDENT server is lying.
.PP
Note: IDENT lookups don\'t work with UDP services. 
.SH EXAMPLES
The language is flexible enough that different types of access control
policy can be expressed with a minimum of fuss. Although the language
uses two access control tables, the most common policies can be
implemented with one of the tables being trivial or even empty.
.PP
When reading the examples below it is important to realize that the
allow table is scanned before the deny table, that the search
terminates when a match is found, and that access is granted when no
match is found at all.
.PP
The examples use host and domain names. They can be improved by
including address and/or network/netmask information, to reduce the
impact of temporary name server lookup failures.
.SH "MOSTLY CLOSED"
In this case, access is denied by default. Only explicitly authorized
hosts are permitted access. 
.PP
The default policy (no access) is implemented with a trivial deny
file:
.PP
.ne 2
/etc/hosts.deny: 
.in +3
ALL: ALL
.PP
This denies all service to all hosts, unless they are permitted access
by entries in the allow file.
.PP
The explicitly authorized hosts are listed in the allow file.
For example:
.PP
.ne 2
/etc/hosts.allow: 
.in +3
ALL: LOCAL @some_netgroup
.br
ALL: .foobar.edu EXCEPT terminalserver.foobar.edu
.PP
The first rule permits access from hosts in the local domain (no `.\'
in the host name) and from members of the \fIsome_netgroup\fP
netgroup.  The second rule permits access from all hosts in the
\fIfoobar.edu\fP domain (notice the leading dot), with the exception of
\fIterminalserver.foobar.edu\fP.
.SH "MOSTLY OPEN"
Here, access is granted by default; only explicitly specified hosts are
refused service. 
.PP
The default policy (access granted) makes the allow file redundant so
that it can be omitted.  The explicitly non-authorized hosts are listed
in the deny file. For example:
.PP
/etc/hosts.deny:
.in +3
ALL: some.host.name, .some.domain
.br
ALL EXCEPT in.fingerd: other.host.name, .other.domain
.PP
The first rule denies some hosts and domains all services; the second
rule still permits finger requests from other hosts and domains.
.SH "BOOBY TRAPS"
The next example permits tftp requests from hosts in the local domain
(notice the leading dot).  Requests from any other hosts are denied.
Instead of the requested file, a finger probe is sent to the offending
host. The result is mailed to the superuser.
.PP
.ne 2
/etc/hosts.allow:
.in +3
.nf
in.tftpd: LOCAL, .my.domain
.PP
.ne 2
/etc/hosts.deny:
.in +3
.nf
in.tftpd: ALL: spawn (/some/where/safe_finger -l @%h | \\
	/usr/ucb/mail -s %d-%h root) &
.fi
.PP
(The safe_finger command can be gotten from the tcp_wrappers package and
installed in a suitable place. It limits possible damage from data sent
by the remote finger server.  It gives better protection than the
standard finger command.)
.PP
The expansion of the %h (client host) and %d (service name) sequences
is described in the section on shell commands.
.PP
Warning: do not booby-trap your finger daemon, unless you are prepared
for infinite finger loops.
.PP
On network firewall systems this trick can be carried even further.
The typical network firewall only provides a limited set of services to
the outer world. All other services can be "bugged" just like the above
tftp example. The result is an excellent early-warning system.
.br
.ne 4
.SH DIAGNOSTICS
An error is reported when a syntax error is found in a host access
control rule; when the length of an access control rule exceeds the
capacity of an internal buffer; when an access control rule is not
terminated by a newline character; when the result of %<letter>
expansion would overflow an internal buffer; when a system call fails
that shouldn\'t.  All problems are reported via the syslog daemon.
.SH FILES
.na
.nf
/etc/hosts.allow, (daemon,client) pairs that are granted access.
/etc/hosts.deny, (daemon,client) pairs that are denied access.
.ad
.fi
.SH "SEE ALSO"
.nf
hosts_options(5), hosts_access(3)
tcpdchk(8), tcpdmatch(8), test programs.
.SH BUGS
If a name server lookup times out, the host name will not be available
to the access control software, even though the host is registered.
.PP
Domain name server lookups are case insensitive; NIS (formerly YP)
netgroup lookups are case sensitive.
.PP
The total length of an entry can be no more than 2047 characters long,
including the final newline.
.SH AUTHOR
.na
.nf
Wietse Venema (wietse@wzv.win.tue.nl)
Department of Mathematics and Computing Science
Eindhoven University of Technology
Den Dolech 2, P.O. Box 513, 
5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands
\" @(#) hosts_access.5 1.20 95/01/30 19:51:46
\"	$NetBSD: hosts_access.5,v 1.9 1999/08/02 16:09:41 bouyer Exp $