1239c2bb08
Remove the double-underscore from the userland versions, and do the weak alias dance instead, now that these are public parts of libc. As discussed on tech-userlevel: https://mail-index.netbsd.org/tech-userlevel/2013/06/24/msg007843.html (option 3)
199 lines
6.3 KiB
C
199 lines
6.3 KiB
C
/* $NetBSD: crypt-sha1.c,v 1.8 2013/08/28 17:47:07 riastradh Exp $ */
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 2004, Juniper Networks, Inc.
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. Neither the name of the copyright holders nor the names of its
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* contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
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* from this software without specific prior written permission.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
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* "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
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* LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
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* A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
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* OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
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* LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
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* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
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* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
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* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
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* OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#include <sys/cdefs.h>
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#if !defined(lint)
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__RCSID("$NetBSD: crypt-sha1.c,v 1.8 2013/08/28 17:47:07 riastradh Exp $");
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#endif /* not lint */
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <time.h>
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#include <err.h>
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#include "crypt.h"
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/*
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* The default iterations - should take >0s on a fast CPU
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* but not be insane for a slow CPU.
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*/
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#ifndef CRYPT_SHA1_ITERATIONS
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# define CRYPT_SHA1_ITERATIONS 24680
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#endif
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/*
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* Support a reasonably? long salt.
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*/
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#ifndef CRYPT_SHA1_SALT_LENGTH
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# define CRYPT_SHA1_SALT_LENGTH 64
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#endif
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/*
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* This may be called from crypt_sha1 or gensalt.
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*
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* The value returned will be slightly less than <hint> which defaults
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* to 24680. The goals are that the number of iterations should take
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* non-zero amount of time on a fast cpu while not taking insanely
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* long on a slow cpu. The current default will take about 5 seconds
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* on a 100MHz sparc, and about 0.04 seconds on a 3GHz i386.
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* The number is varied to frustrate those attempting to generate a
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* dictionary of pre-computed hashes.
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*/
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unsigned int
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__crypt_sha1_iterations (unsigned int hint)
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{
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static int once = 1;
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/*
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* We treat CRYPT_SHA1_ITERATIONS as a hint.
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* Make it harder for someone to pre-compute hashes for a
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* dictionary attack by not using the same iteration count for
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* every entry.
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*/
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if (once) {
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int pid = getpid();
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srandom(time(NULL) ^ (pid * pid));
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once = 0;
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}
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if (hint == 0)
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hint = CRYPT_SHA1_ITERATIONS;
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return hint - (random() % (hint / 4));
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}
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/*
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* UNIX password using hmac_sha1
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* This is PBKDF1 from RFC 2898, but using hmac_sha1.
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*
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* The format of the encrypted password is:
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* $<tag>$<iterations>$<salt>$<digest>
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*
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* where:
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* <tag> is "sha1"
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* <iterations> is an unsigned int identifying how many rounds
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* have been applied to <digest>. The number
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* should vary slightly for each password to make
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* it harder to generate a dictionary of
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* pre-computed hashes. See crypt_sha1_iterations.
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* <salt> up to 64 bytes of random data, 8 bytes is
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* currently considered more than enough.
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* <digest> the hashed password.
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*
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* NOTE:
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* To be FIPS 140 compliant, the password which is used as a hmac key,
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* should be between 10 and 20 characters to provide at least 80bits
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* strength, and avoid the need to hash it before using as the
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* hmac key.
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*/
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char *
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__crypt_sha1 (const char *pw, const char *salt)
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{
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static const char *magic = SHA1_MAGIC;
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static unsigned char hmac_buf[SHA1_SIZE];
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static char passwd[(2 * sizeof(SHA1_MAGIC)) +
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CRYPT_SHA1_SALT_LENGTH + SHA1_SIZE];
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const char *sp;
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char *ep;
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unsigned long ul;
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int sl;
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int pl;
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int dl;
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unsigned int iterations;
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unsigned int i;
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/* XXX silence -Wpointer-sign (would be nice to fix this some other way) */
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const unsigned char *pwu = (const unsigned char *)pw;
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/*
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* Salt format is
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* $<tag>$<iterations>$salt[$]
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* If it does not start with $ we use our default iterations.
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*/
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/* If it starts with the magic string, then skip that */
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if (!strncmp(salt, magic, strlen(magic))) {
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salt += strlen(magic);
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/* and get the iteration count */
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iterations = strtoul(salt, &ep, 10);
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if (*ep != '$')
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return NULL; /* invalid input */
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salt = ep + 1; /* skip over the '$' */
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} else {
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iterations = __crypt_sha1_iterations(0);
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}
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/* It stops at the next '$', max CRYPT_SHA1_ITERATIONS chars */
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for (sp = salt; *sp && *sp != '$' && sp < (salt + CRYPT_SHA1_ITERATIONS); sp++)
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continue;
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/* Get the length of the actual salt */
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sl = sp - salt;
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pl = strlen(pw);
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/*
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* Now get to work...
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* Prime the pump with <salt><magic><iterations>
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*/
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dl = snprintf(passwd, sizeof (passwd), "%.*s%s%u",
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sl, salt, magic, iterations);
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/*
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* Then hmac using <pw> as key, and repeat...
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*/
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__hmac_sha1((unsigned char *)passwd, dl, pwu, pl, hmac_buf);
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for (i = 1; i < iterations; i++) {
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__hmac_sha1(hmac_buf, SHA1_SIZE, pwu, pl, hmac_buf);
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}
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/* Now output... */
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pl = snprintf(passwd, sizeof(passwd), "%s%u$%.*s$",
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magic, iterations, sl, salt);
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ep = passwd + pl;
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/* Every 3 bytes of hash gives 24 bits which is 4 base64 chars */
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for (i = 0; i < SHA1_SIZE - 3; i += 3) {
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ul = (hmac_buf[i+0] << 16) |
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(hmac_buf[i+1] << 8) |
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hmac_buf[i+2];
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__crypt_to64(ep, ul, 4); ep += 4;
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}
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/* Only 2 bytes left, so we pad with byte0 */
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ul = (hmac_buf[SHA1_SIZE - 2] << 16) |
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(hmac_buf[SHA1_SIZE - 1] << 8) |
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hmac_buf[0];
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__crypt_to64(ep, ul, 4); ep += 4;
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*ep = '\0';
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/* Don't leave anything around in vm they could use. */
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explicit_memset(hmac_buf, 0, sizeof hmac_buf);
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return passwd;
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}
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