6700cfccd6
Bug fixes: - Fix crash reported by Scott Ellis on current-users@. - Fix race conditions in enforcing the Veriexec rename and remove policies. These are NOT security issues. - Fix memory leak in rename handling when overwriting a monitored file. - Fix table deletion logic. - Don't prevent query requests if not in learning mode. KPI updates: - fileassoc_table_run() now takes a cookie to pass to the callback. - veriexec_table_add() was removed, it is now done internally. As a result, there's no longer a need for VERIEXEC_TABLESIZE. - veriexec_report() was removed, it is now internal. - Perform sanity checks on the entry type, and enforce default type in veriexec_file_add() rather than in veriexecctl. - Add veriexec_flush(), used to delete all Veriexec tables, and veriexec_dump(), used to fill an array with all Veriexec entries. New features: - Add a '-k' flag to veriexecctl, to keep the filenames in the kernel database. This allows Veriexec to produce slightly more accurate logs under certain circumstances. In the future, this can be either replaced by vnode->pathname translation, or combined with it. - Add a VERIEXEC_DUMP ioctl, to dump the entire Veriexec database. This can be used to recover a database if the file was lost. Example usage: # veriexecctl dump > /etc/signatures Note that only entries with the filename kept (that is, were loaded with the '-k' flag) will be dumped. Idea from Brett Lymn. - Add a VERIEXEC_FLUSH ioctl, to delete all Veriexec entries. Sample usage: # veriexecctl flush - Add a 'veriexec_flags' rc(8) variable, and make its default have the '-k' flag. On systems using the default signatures file (generaetd from running 'veriexecgen' with no arguments), this will use additional 32kb of kernel memory on average. - Add a '-e' flag to veriexecctl, to evaluate the fingerprint during load. This is done automatically for files marked as 'untrusted'. Misc. stuff: - The code for veriexecctl was massively simplified as a result of eliminating the need for VERIEXEC_TABLESIZE, and now uses a single pass of the signatures file, making the loading somewhat faster. - Lots of minor fixes found using the (still under development) Veriexec regression testsuite. - Some of the messages Veriexec prints were improved. - Various documentation fixes. All relevant man-pages were updated to reflect the above changes. Binary compatibility with existing veriexecctl binaries is maintained.
1422 lines
34 KiB
C
1422 lines
34 KiB
C
/* $NetBSD: kern_verifiedexec.c,v 1.99 2007/05/15 19:47:45 elad Exp $ */
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
* Copyright (c) 2005, 2006 Elad Efrat <elad@NetBSD.org>
|
|
* Copyright (c) 2005, 2006 Brett Lymn <blymn@NetBSD.org>
|
|
* All rights reserved.
|
|
*
|
|
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
|
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
|
* are met:
|
|
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
|
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
|
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
|
* 3. The name of the authors may not be used to endorse or promote products
|
|
* derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
|
|
*
|
|
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
|
|
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
|
|
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
|
|
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
|
|
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
|
|
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
|
|
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
|
|
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
|
|
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
|
|
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
|
|
__KERNEL_RCSID(0, "$NetBSD: kern_verifiedexec.c,v 1.99 2007/05/15 19:47:45 elad Exp $");
|
|
|
|
#include "opt_veriexec.h"
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/param.h>
|
|
#include <sys/mount.h>
|
|
#include <sys/malloc.h>
|
|
#include <sys/vnode.h>
|
|
#include <sys/namei.h>
|
|
#include <sys/exec.h>
|
|
#include <sys/once.h>
|
|
#include <sys/proc.h>
|
|
#include <sys/syslog.h>
|
|
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
|
|
#include <sys/inttypes.h>
|
|
#include <sys/verified_exec.h>
|
|
#if defined(__FreeBSD__)
|
|
# include <sys/systm.h>
|
|
# include <sys/imgact.h>
|
|
# include <crypto/sha1.h>
|
|
# include <crypto/sha2/sha2.h>
|
|
# include <crypto/ripemd160/rmd160.h>
|
|
#else
|
|
# include <sys/sha1.h>
|
|
# include <sys/sha2.h>
|
|
# include <sys/rmd160.h>
|
|
#endif
|
|
#include <sys/md5.h>
|
|
#include <uvm/uvm_extern.h>
|
|
#include <sys/fileassoc.h>
|
|
#include <sys/kauth.h>
|
|
#include <sys/conf.h>
|
|
#include <miscfs/specfs/specdev.h>
|
|
#include <prop/proplib.h>
|
|
#include <sys/fcntl.h>
|
|
|
|
MALLOC_DEFINE(M_VERIEXEC, "Veriexec", "Veriexec data-structures");
|
|
|
|
/* Readable values for veriexec_file_report(). */
|
|
#define REPORT_ALWAYS 0x01 /* Always print */
|
|
#define REPORT_VERBOSE 0x02 /* Print when verbose >= 1 */
|
|
#define REPORT_DEBUG 0x04 /* Print when verbose >= 2 (debug) */
|
|
#define REPORT_PANIC 0x08 /* Call panic() */
|
|
#define REPORT_ALARM 0x10 /* Alarm - also print pid/uid/.. */
|
|
#define REPORT_LOGMASK (REPORT_ALWAYS|REPORT_VERBOSE|REPORT_DEBUG)
|
|
|
|
struct veriexec_fpops {
|
|
const char *type;
|
|
size_t hash_len;
|
|
size_t context_size;
|
|
veriexec_fpop_init_t init;
|
|
veriexec_fpop_update_t update;
|
|
veriexec_fpop_final_t final;
|
|
LIST_ENTRY(veriexec_fpops) entries;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/* Veriexec per-file entry data. */
|
|
struct veriexec_file_entry {
|
|
u_char *filename; /* File name. */
|
|
u_char type; /* Entry type. */
|
|
u_char status; /* Evaluation status. */
|
|
u_char page_fp_status; /* Per-page FP status. */
|
|
u_char *fp; /* Fingerprint. */
|
|
void *page_fp; /* Per-page fingerprints */
|
|
size_t npages; /* Number of pages. */
|
|
size_t last_page_size; /* To support < PAGE_SIZE */
|
|
struct veriexec_fpops *ops; /* Fingerprint ops vector*/
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/* Veriexec per-table data. */
|
|
struct veriexec_table_entry {
|
|
uint64_t vte_count; /* Number of Veriexec entries. */
|
|
const struct sysctlnode *vte_node;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static int veriexec_verbose;
|
|
int veriexec_strict;
|
|
|
|
static char *veriexec_fp_names;
|
|
static size_t veriexec_name_max;
|
|
|
|
static const struct sysctlnode *veriexec_count_node;
|
|
|
|
static fileassoc_t veriexec_hook;
|
|
static specificdata_key_t veriexec_mountspecific_key;
|
|
|
|
static LIST_HEAD(, veriexec_fpops) veriexec_fpops_list;
|
|
|
|
static int veriexec_raw_cb(kauth_cred_t, kauth_action_t, void *,
|
|
void *, void *, void *, void *);
|
|
static struct veriexec_fpops *veriexec_fpops_lookup(const char *);
|
|
static void veriexec_file_free(struct veriexec_file_entry *);
|
|
|
|
static unsigned int veriexec_tablecount = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Sysctl helper routine for Veriexec.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
sysctl_kern_veriexec(SYSCTLFN_ARGS)
|
|
{
|
|
int newval, error;
|
|
int *var = NULL, raise_only = 0;
|
|
struct sysctlnode node;
|
|
|
|
node = *rnode;
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(rnode->sysctl_name, "strict") == 0) {
|
|
raise_only = 1;
|
|
var = &veriexec_strict;
|
|
} else if (strcmp(rnode->sysctl_name, "algorithms") == 0) {
|
|
node.sysctl_data = veriexec_fp_names;
|
|
node.sysctl_size = strlen(veriexec_fp_names) + 1;
|
|
return (sysctl_lookup(SYSCTLFN_CALL(&node)));
|
|
} else {
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
newval = *var;
|
|
|
|
node.sysctl_data = &newval;
|
|
error = sysctl_lookup(SYSCTLFN_CALL(&node));
|
|
if (error || newp == NULL) {
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (raise_only && (newval < *var))
|
|
return (EPERM);
|
|
|
|
*var = newval;
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_SETUP(sysctl_kern_veriexec_setup, "sysctl kern.veriexec setup")
|
|
{
|
|
const struct sysctlnode *rnode = NULL;
|
|
|
|
sysctl_createv(clog, 0, NULL, &rnode,
|
|
CTLFLAG_PERMANENT,
|
|
CTLTYPE_NODE, "kern", NULL,
|
|
NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
|
|
CTL_KERN, CTL_EOL);
|
|
|
|
sysctl_createv(clog, 0, &rnode, &rnode,
|
|
CTLFLAG_PERMANENT,
|
|
CTLTYPE_NODE, "veriexec",
|
|
SYSCTL_DESCR("Veriexec"),
|
|
NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
|
|
CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
|
|
|
|
sysctl_createv(clog, 0, &rnode, NULL,
|
|
CTLFLAG_PERMANENT|CTLFLAG_READWRITE,
|
|
CTLTYPE_INT, "verbose",
|
|
SYSCTL_DESCR("Veriexec verbose level"),
|
|
NULL, 0, &veriexec_verbose, 0,
|
|
CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
|
|
sysctl_createv(clog, 0, &rnode, NULL,
|
|
CTLFLAG_PERMANENT|CTLFLAG_READWRITE,
|
|
CTLTYPE_INT, "strict",
|
|
SYSCTL_DESCR("Veriexec strict level"),
|
|
sysctl_kern_veriexec, 0, NULL, 0,
|
|
CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
|
|
sysctl_createv(clog, 0, &rnode, NULL,
|
|
CTLFLAG_PERMANENT,
|
|
CTLTYPE_STRING, "algorithms",
|
|
SYSCTL_DESCR("Veriexec supported hashing "
|
|
"algorithms"),
|
|
sysctl_kern_veriexec, 0, NULL, 0,
|
|
CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
|
|
sysctl_createv(clog, 0, &rnode, &veriexec_count_node,
|
|
CTLFLAG_PERMANENT,
|
|
CTLTYPE_NODE, "count",
|
|
SYSCTL_DESCR("Number of fingerprints on mount(s)"),
|
|
NULL, 0, NULL, 0,
|
|
CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Add ops to the fignerprint ops vector list.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
veriexec_fpops_add(const char *fp_type, size_t hash_len, size_t ctx_size,
|
|
veriexec_fpop_init_t init, veriexec_fpop_update_t update,
|
|
veriexec_fpop_final_t final)
|
|
{
|
|
struct veriexec_fpops *ops;
|
|
char *newp;
|
|
unsigned int new_max;
|
|
|
|
/* Sanity check all parameters. */
|
|
if ((fp_type == NULL) || (hash_len == 0) || (ctx_size == 0) ||
|
|
(init == NULL) || (update == NULL) || (final == NULL))
|
|
return (EFAULT);
|
|
|
|
if (veriexec_fpops_lookup(fp_type) != NULL)
|
|
return (EEXIST);
|
|
|
|
ops = malloc(sizeof(*ops), M_VERIEXEC, M_WAITOK);
|
|
|
|
ops->type = fp_type;
|
|
ops->hash_len = hash_len;
|
|
ops->context_size = ctx_size;
|
|
ops->init = init;
|
|
ops->update = update;
|
|
ops->final = final;
|
|
|
|
LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&veriexec_fpops_list, ops, entries);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we don't have space for any names, allocate enough for six
|
|
* which should be sufficient. (it's also enough for all algorithms
|
|
* we can support at the moment)
|
|
*/
|
|
if (veriexec_fp_names == NULL) {
|
|
veriexec_name_max = 64;
|
|
veriexec_fp_names = malloc(veriexec_name_max, M_VERIEXEC,
|
|
M_WAITOK|M_ZERO);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we're running out of space for storing supported algorithms,
|
|
* extend the buffer with space for four names.
|
|
*/
|
|
while (veriexec_name_max - (strlen(veriexec_fp_names) + 1) <
|
|
strlen(fp_type)) {
|
|
/* Add space for four algorithm names. */
|
|
new_max = veriexec_name_max + 64;
|
|
newp = realloc(veriexec_fp_names, new_max, M_VERIEXEC,
|
|
M_WAITOK|M_ZERO);
|
|
veriexec_fp_names = newp;
|
|
veriexec_name_max = new_max;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (*veriexec_fp_names != '\0')
|
|
strlcat(veriexec_fp_names, " ", veriexec_name_max);
|
|
|
|
strlcat(veriexec_fp_names, fp_type, veriexec_name_max);
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
veriexec_mountspecific_dtor(void *v)
|
|
{
|
|
struct veriexec_table_entry *vte = v;
|
|
|
|
if (vte == NULL) {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
sysctl_free(__UNCONST(vte->vte_node));
|
|
veriexec_tablecount--;
|
|
free(vte, M_VERIEXEC);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Initialise Veriexec.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
veriexec_init(void)
|
|
{
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
/* Register a fileassoc for Veriexec. */
|
|
error = fileassoc_register("veriexec",
|
|
(fileassoc_cleanup_cb_t)veriexec_file_free, &veriexec_hook);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
panic("Veriexec: Can't register fileassoc: error=%d", error);
|
|
|
|
/* Register listener to handle raw disk access. */
|
|
if (kauth_listen_scope(KAUTH_SCOPE_DEVICE, veriexec_raw_cb, NULL) ==
|
|
NULL)
|
|
panic("Veriexec: Can't listen on device scope");
|
|
|
|
error = mount_specific_key_create(&veriexec_mountspecific_key,
|
|
veriexec_mountspecific_dtor);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
panic("Veriexec: Can't create mountspecific key");
|
|
|
|
LIST_INIT(&veriexec_fpops_list);
|
|
veriexec_fp_names = NULL;
|
|
veriexec_name_max = 0;
|
|
|
|
#define FPOPS_ADD(a, b, c, d, e, f) \
|
|
veriexec_fpops_add(a, b, c, (veriexec_fpop_init_t)d, \
|
|
(veriexec_fpop_update_t)e, (veriexec_fpop_final_t)f)
|
|
|
|
#ifdef VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_RMD160
|
|
FPOPS_ADD("RMD160", RMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(RMD160_CTX),
|
|
RMD160Init, RMD160Update, RMD160Final);
|
|
#endif /* VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_RMD160 */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA256
|
|
FPOPS_ADD("SHA256", SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(SHA256_CTX),
|
|
SHA256_Init, SHA256_Update, SHA256_Final);
|
|
#endif /* VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA256 */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA384
|
|
FPOPS_ADD("SHA384", SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(SHA384_CTX),
|
|
SHA384_Init, SHA384_Update, SHA384_Final);
|
|
#endif /* VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA384 */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA512
|
|
FPOPS_ADD("SHA512", SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(SHA512_CTX),
|
|
SHA512_Init, SHA512_Update, SHA512_Final);
|
|
#endif /* VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA512 */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA1
|
|
FPOPS_ADD("SHA1", SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(SHA1_CTX),
|
|
SHA1Init, SHA1Update, SHA1Final);
|
|
#endif /* VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_SHA1 */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_MD5
|
|
FPOPS_ADD("MD5", MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(MD5_CTX),
|
|
MD5Init, MD5Update, MD5Final);
|
|
#endif /* VERIFIED_EXEC_FP_MD5 */
|
|
|
|
#undef FPOPS_ADD
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct veriexec_fpops *
|
|
veriexec_fpops_lookup(const char *name)
|
|
{
|
|
struct veriexec_fpops *ops;
|
|
|
|
if (name == NULL)
|
|
return (NULL);
|
|
|
|
LIST_FOREACH(ops, &veriexec_fpops_list, entries) {
|
|
if (strcasecmp(name, ops->type) == 0)
|
|
return (ops);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Calculate fingerprint. Information on hash length and routines used is
|
|
* extracted from veriexec_hash_list according to the hash type.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
veriexec_fp_calc(struct lwp *l, struct vnode *vp,
|
|
struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe, u_char *fp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct vattr va;
|
|
void *ctx, *page_ctx;
|
|
u_char *buf, *page_fp;
|
|
off_t offset, len;
|
|
size_t resid, npages;
|
|
int error, do_perpage, pagen;
|
|
|
|
error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &va, l->l_cred, l);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef notyet /* XXX - for now */
|
|
if ((vfe->type & VERIEXEC_UNTRUSTED) &&
|
|
(vfe->page_fp_status == PAGE_FP_NONE))
|
|
do_perpage = 1;
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* notyet */
|
|
do_perpage = 0;
|
|
|
|
ctx = (void *) malloc(vfe->ops->context_size, M_VERIEXEC, M_WAITOK);
|
|
buf = (u_char *) malloc(PAGE_SIZE, M_VERIEXEC, M_WAITOK);
|
|
|
|
page_ctx = NULL;
|
|
page_fp = NULL;
|
|
npages = 0;
|
|
if (do_perpage) {
|
|
npages = (va.va_size >> PAGE_SHIFT) + 1;
|
|
page_fp = (u_char *) malloc(vfe->ops->hash_len * npages,
|
|
M_VERIEXEC, M_WAITOK|M_ZERO);
|
|
vfe->page_fp = page_fp;
|
|
page_ctx = (void *) malloc(vfe->ops->context_size, M_VERIEXEC,
|
|
M_WAITOK);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
(vfe->ops->init)(ctx);
|
|
|
|
len = 0;
|
|
error = 0;
|
|
pagen = 0;
|
|
for (offset = 0; offset < va.va_size; offset += PAGE_SIZE) {
|
|
len = ((va.va_size - offset) < PAGE_SIZE) ?
|
|
(va.va_size - offset) : PAGE_SIZE;
|
|
|
|
error = vn_rdwr(UIO_READ, vp, buf, len, offset,
|
|
UIO_SYSSPACE,
|
|
#ifdef __FreeBSD__
|
|
IO_NODELOCKED,
|
|
#else
|
|
0,
|
|
#endif
|
|
l->l_cred, &resid, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
if (do_perpage) {
|
|
free(vfe->page_fp, M_VERIEXEC);
|
|
vfe->page_fp = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
goto bad;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
(vfe->ops->update)(ctx, buf, (unsigned int) len);
|
|
|
|
if (do_perpage) {
|
|
(vfe->ops->init)(page_ctx);
|
|
(vfe->ops->update)(page_ctx, buf, (unsigned int)len);
|
|
(vfe->ops->final)(page_fp, page_ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (veriexec_verbose >= 2) {
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
printf("hash for page %d: ", pagen);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < vfe->ops->hash_len; i++)
|
|
printf("%02x", page_fp[i]);
|
|
printf("\n");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
page_fp += vfe->ops->hash_len;
|
|
pagen++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (len != PAGE_SIZE)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
(vfe->ops->final)(fp, ctx);
|
|
|
|
if (do_perpage) {
|
|
vfe->last_page_size = len;
|
|
vfe->page_fp_status = PAGE_FP_READY;
|
|
vfe->npages = npages;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bad:
|
|
if (do_perpage)
|
|
free(page_ctx, M_VERIEXEC);
|
|
free(ctx, M_VERIEXEC);
|
|
free(buf, M_VERIEXEC);
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Compare two fingerprints of the same type. */
|
|
static int
|
|
veriexec_fp_cmp(struct veriexec_fpops *ops, u_char *fp1, u_char *fp2)
|
|
{
|
|
if (veriexec_verbose >= 2) {
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
printf("comparing hashes...\n");
|
|
printf("fp1: ");
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ops->hash_len; i++) {
|
|
printf("%02x", fp1[i]);
|
|
}
|
|
printf("\nfp2: ");
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ops->hash_len; i++) {
|
|
printf("%02x", fp2[i]);
|
|
}
|
|
printf("\n");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (memcmp(fp1, fp2, ops->hash_len));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct veriexec_table_entry *
|
|
veriexec_table_lookup(struct mount *mp)
|
|
{
|
|
/* XXX: From raidframe init */
|
|
if (mp == NULL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
return mount_getspecific(mp, veriexec_mountspecific_key);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static struct veriexec_file_entry *
|
|
veriexec_get(struct vnode *vp)
|
|
{
|
|
return (fileassoc_lookup(vp, veriexec_hook));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool
|
|
veriexec_lookup(struct vnode *vp)
|
|
{
|
|
return (veriexec_get(vp) == NULL ? false : true);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Routine for maintaining mostly consistent message formats in Veriexec.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
veriexec_file_report(struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe, const u_char *msg,
|
|
const u_char *filename, struct lwp *l, int f)
|
|
{
|
|
if (msg == NULL)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (vfe != NULL && vfe->filename != NULL)
|
|
filename = vfe->filename;
|
|
|
|
if (filename == NULL)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (((f & REPORT_LOGMASK) >> 1) <= veriexec_verbose) {
|
|
if (!(f & REPORT_ALARM) || (l == NULL))
|
|
log(LOG_NOTICE, "Veriexec: %s [%s]\n", msg,
|
|
filename);
|
|
else
|
|
log(LOG_ALERT, "Veriexec: %s [%s, prog=%s pid=%u, "
|
|
"uid=%u, gid=%u]\n", msg, filename,
|
|
l->l_proc->p_comm, l->l_proc->p_pid,
|
|
kauth_cred_getuid(l->l_cred),
|
|
kauth_cred_getgid(l->l_cred));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (f & REPORT_PANIC)
|
|
panic("Veriexec: Unrecoverable error.");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Verify the fingerprint of the given file. If we're called directly from
|
|
* sys_execve(), 'flag' will be VERIEXEC_DIRECT. If we're called from
|
|
* exec_script(), 'flag' will be VERIEXEC_INDIRECT. If we are called from
|
|
* vn_open(), 'flag' will be VERIEXEC_FILE.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
veriexec_file_verify(struct lwp *l, struct vnode *vp, const u_char *name, int flag,
|
|
struct veriexec_file_entry **vfep)
|
|
{
|
|
struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
if (vp->v_type != VREG)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
/* Lookup veriexec table entry, save pointer if requested. */
|
|
vfe = veriexec_get(vp);
|
|
if (vfep != NULL)
|
|
*vfep = vfe;
|
|
if (vfe == NULL)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/* Evaluate fingerprint if needed. */
|
|
error = 0;
|
|
if ((vfe->status == FINGERPRINT_NOTEVAL) ||
|
|
(vfe->type & VERIEXEC_UNTRUSTED)) {
|
|
u_char *digest;
|
|
|
|
/* Calculate fingerprint for on-disk file. */
|
|
digest = malloc(vfe->ops->hash_len, M_VERIEXEC,
|
|
M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
|
|
|
|
error = veriexec_fp_calc(l, vp, vfe, digest);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
veriexec_file_report(vfe, "Fingerprint calculation error.",
|
|
name, NULL, REPORT_ALWAYS);
|
|
free(digest, M_VERIEXEC);
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Compare fingerprint with loaded data. */
|
|
if (veriexec_fp_cmp(vfe->ops, vfe->fp, digest) == 0)
|
|
vfe->status = FINGERPRINT_VALID;
|
|
else
|
|
vfe->status = FINGERPRINT_NOMATCH;
|
|
|
|
free(digest, M_VERIEXEC);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(vfe->type & flag)) {
|
|
veriexec_file_report(vfe, "Incorrect access type.", name, l,
|
|
REPORT_ALWAYS|REPORT_ALARM);
|
|
|
|
/* IPS mode: Enforce access type. */
|
|
if (veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_IPS)
|
|
return (EPERM);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
/* No entry in the veriexec tables. */
|
|
if (vfe == NULL) {
|
|
veriexec_file_report(NULL, "No entry.", name,
|
|
l, REPORT_VERBOSE);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Lockdown mode: Deny access to non-monitored files.
|
|
* IPS mode: Deny execution of non-monitored files.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_LOCKDOWN) ||
|
|
((veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_IPS) &&
|
|
(flag != VERIEXEC_FILE)))
|
|
return (EPERM);
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (vfe->status) {
|
|
case FINGERPRINT_NOTEVAL:
|
|
/* Should not happen. */
|
|
veriexec_file_report(vfe, "Not-evaluated status "
|
|
"post evaluation; inconsistency detected.", name,
|
|
NULL, REPORT_ALWAYS|REPORT_PANIC);
|
|
|
|
/*NOTREACHED*/
|
|
|
|
case FINGERPRINT_VALID:
|
|
/* Valid fingerprint. */
|
|
veriexec_file_report(vfe, "Match.", name, NULL,
|
|
REPORT_VERBOSE);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case FINGERPRINT_NOMATCH:
|
|
/* Fingerprint mismatch. */
|
|
veriexec_file_report(vfe, "Mismatch.", name,
|
|
NULL, REPORT_ALWAYS|REPORT_ALARM);
|
|
|
|
/* IDS mode: Deny access on fingerprint mismatch. */
|
|
if (veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_IDS)
|
|
error = EPERM;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
/* Should never happen. */
|
|
veriexec_file_report(vfe, "Invalid status "
|
|
"post evaluation.", name, NULL, REPORT_ALWAYS|REPORT_PANIC);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
veriexec_verify(struct lwp *l, struct vnode *vp, const u_char *name, int flag,
|
|
bool *found)
|
|
{
|
|
struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe;
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
r = veriexec_file_verify(l, vp, name, flag, &vfe);
|
|
|
|
if (found != NULL)
|
|
*found = (vfe != NULL) ? true : false;
|
|
|
|
return (r);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef notyet
|
|
/*
|
|
* Evaluate per-page fingerprints.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
veriexec_page_verify(struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe, struct vm_page *pg,
|
|
size_t idx, struct lwp *l)
|
|
{
|
|
void *ctx;
|
|
u_char *fp;
|
|
u_char *page_fp;
|
|
int error;
|
|
vaddr_t kva;
|
|
|
|
if (vfe->page_fp_status == PAGE_FP_NONE)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
if (vfe->page_fp_status == PAGE_FP_FAIL)
|
|
return (EPERM);
|
|
|
|
if (idx >= vfe->npages)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
ctx = malloc(vfe->ops->context_size, M_VERIEXEC, M_WAITOK);
|
|
fp = malloc(vfe->ops->hash_len, M_VERIEXEC, M_WAITOK);
|
|
kva = uvm_km_alloc(kernel_map, PAGE_SIZE, 0, UVM_KMF_VAONLY | UVM_KMF_WAITVA);
|
|
pmap_kenter_pa(kva, VM_PAGE_TO_PHYS(pg), VM_PROT_READ);
|
|
|
|
page_fp = (u_char *) vfe->page_fp + (vfe->ops->hash_len * idx);
|
|
(vfe->ops->init)(ctx);
|
|
(vfe->ops->update)(ctx, (void *) kva,
|
|
((vfe->npages - 1) == idx) ? vfe->last_page_size
|
|
: PAGE_SIZE);
|
|
(vfe->ops->final)(fp, ctx);
|
|
|
|
pmap_kremove(kva, PAGE_SIZE);
|
|
uvm_km_free(kernel_map, kva, PAGE_SIZE, UVM_KMF_VAONLY);
|
|
|
|
error = veriexec_fp_cmp(vfe->ops, page_fp, fp);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
const char *msg;
|
|
|
|
if (veriexec_strict > VERIEXEC_LEARNING) {
|
|
msg = "Pages modified: Killing process.";
|
|
} else {
|
|
msg = "Pages modified.";
|
|
error = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
veriexec_file_report(msg, "[page_in]", l,
|
|
REPORT_ALWAYS|REPORT_ALARM);
|
|
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
ksiginfo_t ksi;
|
|
|
|
KSI_INIT(&ksi);
|
|
ksi.ksi_signo = SIGKILL;
|
|
ksi.ksi_code = SI_NOINFO;
|
|
ksi.ksi_pid = l->l_proc->p_pid;
|
|
ksi.ksi_uid = 0;
|
|
|
|
kpsignal(l->l_proc, &ksi, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
free(ctx, M_VERIEXEC);
|
|
free(fp, M_VERIEXEC);
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* notyet */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Veriexec remove policy code.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
veriexec_removechk(struct vnode *vp, const char *pathbuf, struct lwp *l)
|
|
{
|
|
struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe;
|
|
|
|
vfe = veriexec_get(vp);
|
|
if (vfe == NULL) {
|
|
/* Lockdown mode: Deny access to non-monitored files. */
|
|
if (veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_LOCKDOWN)
|
|
return (EPERM);
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
veriexec_file_report(vfe, "Remove request.", pathbuf, l,
|
|
REPORT_ALWAYS|REPORT_ALARM);
|
|
|
|
/* IDS mode: Deny removal of monitored files. */
|
|
if (veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_IDS)
|
|
return (EPERM);
|
|
|
|
return (veriexec_file_delete(l, vp));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Veriexe rename policy.
|
|
*
|
|
* XXX: Once there's a way to hook after a successful rename, it would be
|
|
* XXX: nice to update vfe->filename to the new name if it's not NULL and
|
|
* XXX: the new name is absolute (ie., starts with a slash).
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
veriexec_renamechk(struct vnode *fromvp, const char *fromname,
|
|
struct vnode *tovp, const char *toname, struct lwp *l)
|
|
{
|
|
struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe, *tvfe;
|
|
|
|
if (veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_LOCKDOWN) {
|
|
log(LOG_ALERT, "Veriexec: Preventing rename of `%s' to "
|
|
"`%s', uid=%u, pid=%u: Lockdown mode.\n", fromname, toname,
|
|
kauth_cred_geteuid(l->l_cred), l->l_proc->p_pid);
|
|
|
|
return (EPERM);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vfe = veriexec_get(fromvp);
|
|
tvfe = NULL;
|
|
if (tovp != NULL)
|
|
tvfe = veriexec_get(tovp);
|
|
|
|
if ((vfe != NULL) || (tvfe != NULL)) {
|
|
if (veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_IPS) {
|
|
log(LOG_ALERT, "Veriexec: Preventing rename of `%s' "
|
|
"to `%s', uid=%u, pid=%u: IPS mode, %s "
|
|
"monitored.\n", fromname, toname,
|
|
kauth_cred_geteuid(l->l_cred),
|
|
l->l_proc->p_pid, (vfe != NULL && tvfe != NULL) ?
|
|
"files" : "file");
|
|
|
|
return (EPERM);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Monitored file is renamed; filename no longer relevant.
|
|
*
|
|
* XXX: We could keep the buffer, and when (and if) updating the
|
|
* XXX: filename post-rename, re-allocate it only if it's not
|
|
* XXX: big enough for the new filename.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (vfe != NULL) {
|
|
free(vfe->filename, M_VERIEXEC);
|
|
vfe->filename = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Monitored file is overwritten. Remove the entry.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (tvfe != NULL)
|
|
(void)veriexec_file_delete(l, tovp);
|
|
|
|
log(LOG_NOTICE, "Veriexec: %s file `%s' renamed to "
|
|
"%s file `%s', uid=%u, pid=%u.\n", (vfe != NULL) ?
|
|
"Monitored" : "Non-monitored", fromname, (tvfe != NULL) ?
|
|
"monitored" : "non-monitored", toname,
|
|
kauth_cred_geteuid(l->l_cred), l->l_proc->p_pid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
veriexec_file_free(struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe)
|
|
{
|
|
if (vfe != NULL) {
|
|
if (vfe->fp != NULL)
|
|
free(vfe->fp, M_VERIEXEC);
|
|
if (vfe->page_fp != NULL)
|
|
free(vfe->page_fp, M_VERIEXEC);
|
|
if (vfe->filename != NULL)
|
|
free(vfe->filename, M_VERIEXEC);
|
|
free(vfe, M_VERIEXEC);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
veriexec_file_purge(struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe)
|
|
{
|
|
if (vfe == NULL)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
vfe->status = FINGERPRINT_NOTEVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
veriexec_file_purge_cb(struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe, void *cookie)
|
|
{
|
|
veriexec_file_purge(vfe);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Invalidate a Veriexec file entry.
|
|
* XXX: This should be updated when per-page fingerprints are added.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
veriexec_purge(struct vnode *vp)
|
|
{
|
|
veriexec_file_purge(veriexec_get(vp));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Enforce raw disk access policy.
|
|
*
|
|
* IDS mode: Invalidate fingerprints on a mount if it's opened for writing.
|
|
* IPS mode: Don't allow raw writing to disks we monitor.
|
|
* Lockdown mode: Don't allow raw writing to all disks.
|
|
*
|
|
* XXX: This is bogus. There's an obvious race condition between the time
|
|
* XXX: the disk is open for writing, in which an attacker can access a
|
|
* XXX: monitored file to get its signature cached again, and when the raw
|
|
* XXX: file is overwritten on disk.
|
|
* XXX:
|
|
* XXX: To solve this, we need something like the following:
|
|
* XXX: open raw disk:
|
|
* XXX: - raise refcount,
|
|
* XXX: - invalidate fingerprints,
|
|
* XXX: - mark all entries for that disk with "no cache" flag
|
|
* XXX:
|
|
* XXX: veriexec_verify:
|
|
* XXX: - if "no cache", don't cache evaluation result
|
|
* XXX:
|
|
* XXX: close raw disk:
|
|
* XXX: - lower refcount,
|
|
* XXX: - if refcount == 0, remove "no cache" flag from all entries
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
veriexec_raw_cb(kauth_cred_t cred, kauth_action_t action, void *cookie,
|
|
void *arg0, void *arg1, void *arg2, void *arg3)
|
|
{
|
|
int result;
|
|
enum kauth_device_req req;
|
|
struct veriexec_table_entry *vte;
|
|
|
|
result = KAUTH_RESULT_DENY;
|
|
req = (enum kauth_device_req)arg0;
|
|
|
|
switch (action) {
|
|
case KAUTH_DEVICE_RAWIO_SPEC: {
|
|
struct vnode *vp, *bvp;
|
|
dev_t dev;
|
|
int d_type;
|
|
|
|
if (req == KAUTH_REQ_DEVICE_RAWIO_SPEC_READ) {
|
|
result = KAUTH_RESULT_DEFER;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vp = arg1;
|
|
KASSERT(vp != NULL);
|
|
|
|
dev = vp->v_un.vu_specinfo->si_rdev;
|
|
d_type = D_OTHER;
|
|
bvp = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Handle /dev/mem and /dev/kmem. */
|
|
if ((vp->v_type == VCHR) && iskmemdev(dev)) {
|
|
if (veriexec_strict < VERIEXEC_IPS)
|
|
result = KAUTH_RESULT_DEFER;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (vp->v_type) {
|
|
case VCHR: {
|
|
const struct cdevsw *cdev;
|
|
|
|
cdev = cdevsw_lookup(dev);
|
|
if (cdev != NULL) {
|
|
dev_t blkdev;
|
|
|
|
blkdev = devsw_chr2blk(dev);
|
|
if (blkdev != NODEV) {
|
|
vfinddev(blkdev, VBLK, &bvp);
|
|
if (bvp != NULL)
|
|
d_type = cdev->d_type;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
case VBLK: {
|
|
const struct bdevsw *bdev;
|
|
|
|
bdev = bdevsw_lookup(dev);
|
|
if (bdev != NULL)
|
|
d_type = bdev->d_type;
|
|
|
|
bvp = vp;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
default:
|
|
result = KAUTH_RESULT_DEFER;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (d_type != D_DISK) {
|
|
result = KAUTH_RESULT_DEFER;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* XXX: See vfs_mountedon() comment in secmodel/bsd44.
|
|
*/
|
|
vte = veriexec_table_lookup(bvp->v_mount);
|
|
if (vte == NULL) {
|
|
result = KAUTH_RESULT_DEFER;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch (veriexec_strict) {
|
|
case VERIEXEC_LEARNING:
|
|
case VERIEXEC_IDS:
|
|
result = KAUTH_RESULT_DEFER;
|
|
|
|
fileassoc_table_run(bvp->v_mount, veriexec_hook,
|
|
(fileassoc_cb_t)veriexec_file_purge_cb, NULL);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
case VERIEXEC_IPS:
|
|
result = KAUTH_RESULT_DENY;
|
|
break;
|
|
case VERIEXEC_LOCKDOWN:
|
|
result = KAUTH_RESULT_DENY;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case KAUTH_DEVICE_RAWIO_PASSTHRU:
|
|
/* XXX What can we do here? */
|
|
if (veriexec_strict < VERIEXEC_IPS)
|
|
result = KAUTH_RESULT_DEFER;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
result = KAUTH_RESULT_DEFER;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (result);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Create a new Veriexec table.
|
|
*/
|
|
static struct veriexec_table_entry *
|
|
veriexec_table_add(struct lwp *l, struct mount *mp)
|
|
{
|
|
struct veriexec_table_entry *vte;
|
|
u_char buf[16];
|
|
|
|
vte = malloc(sizeof(*vte), M_VERIEXEC, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
|
|
mount_setspecific(mp, veriexec_mountspecific_key, vte);
|
|
|
|
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "table%u", veriexec_tablecount++);
|
|
sysctl_createv(NULL, 0, &veriexec_count_node, &vte->vte_node,
|
|
0, CTLTYPE_NODE, buf, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL,
|
|
0, CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
|
|
|
|
sysctl_createv(NULL, 0, &vte->vte_node, NULL,
|
|
CTLFLAG_READONLY, CTLTYPE_STRING, "mntpt",
|
|
NULL, NULL, 0, mp->mnt_stat.f_mntonname,
|
|
0, CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
|
|
sysctl_createv(NULL, 0, &vte->vte_node, NULL,
|
|
CTLFLAG_READONLY, CTLTYPE_STRING, "fstype",
|
|
NULL, NULL, 0, mp->mnt_stat.f_fstypename,
|
|
0, CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
|
|
sysctl_createv(NULL, 0, &vte->vte_node, NULL,
|
|
CTLFLAG_READONLY, CTLTYPE_QUAD, "nentries",
|
|
NULL, NULL, 0, &vte->vte_count, 0, CTL_CREATE, CTL_EOL);
|
|
|
|
return (vte);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Add a file to be monitored by Veriexec.
|
|
*
|
|
* Expected elements in dict: file, fp, fp-type, entry-type.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
veriexec_file_add(struct lwp *l, prop_dictionary_t dict)
|
|
{
|
|
struct veriexec_table_entry *vte;
|
|
struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe = NULL, *hh;
|
|
struct nameidata nid;
|
|
const char *file, *fp_type;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
file = prop_string_cstring_nocopy(prop_dictionary_get(dict, "file"));
|
|
|
|
NDINIT(&nid, LOOKUP, FOLLOW, UIO_SYSSPACE, file, l);
|
|
error = namei(&nid);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
/* Add only regular files. */
|
|
if (nid.ni_vp->v_type != VREG) {
|
|
log(LOG_ERR, "Veriexec: Not adding `%s': Not a regular file.\n",
|
|
file);
|
|
|
|
error = EBADF;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vfe = malloc(sizeof(*vfe), M_VERIEXEC, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
|
|
|
|
/* Lookup fingerprint hashing algorithm. */
|
|
fp_type = prop_string_cstring_nocopy(prop_dictionary_get(dict,
|
|
"fp-type"));
|
|
if ((vfe->ops = veriexec_fpops_lookup(fp_type)) == NULL) {
|
|
log(LOG_ERR, "Veriexec: Invalid or unknown fingerprint type "
|
|
"`%s' for file `%s'.\n", fp_type, file);
|
|
|
|
error = EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (prop_data_size(prop_dictionary_get(dict, "fp")) !=
|
|
vfe->ops->hash_len) {
|
|
log(LOG_ERR, "Veriexec: Bad fingerprint length for `%s'.\n",
|
|
file);
|
|
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vfe->fp = malloc(vfe->ops->hash_len, M_VERIEXEC, M_WAITOK);
|
|
memcpy(vfe->fp, prop_data_data_nocopy(prop_dictionary_get(dict, "fp")),
|
|
vfe->ops->hash_len);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* See if we already have an entry for this file. If we do, then
|
|
* let the user know and silently pretend to succeed.
|
|
*/
|
|
hh = veriexec_get(nid.ni_vp);
|
|
if (hh != NULL) {
|
|
bool fp_mismatch;
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(vfe->ops->type, fp_type) ||
|
|
memcmp(hh->fp, vfe->fp, hh->ops->hash_len))
|
|
fp_mismatch = true;
|
|
else
|
|
fp_mismatch = false;
|
|
|
|
if ((veriexec_verbose >= 1) || fp_mismatch)
|
|
log(LOG_NOTICE, "Veriexec: Duplicate entry for `%s' "
|
|
"ignored. (%s fingerprint)\n", file,
|
|
fp_mismatch ? "different" : "same");
|
|
|
|
veriexec_file_free(vfe);
|
|
|
|
/* XXX Should this be EEXIST if fp_mismatch is true? */
|
|
error = 0;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Continue entry initialization. */
|
|
if (prop_dictionary_get_uint8(dict, "entry-type", &vfe->type) == FALSE)
|
|
vfe->type = 0;
|
|
else {
|
|
uint8_t extra_flags;
|
|
|
|
extra_flags = vfe->type & ~(VERIEXEC_DIRECT |
|
|
VERIEXEC_INDIRECT | VERIEXEC_FILE | VERIEXEC_UNTRUSTED);
|
|
if (extra_flags) {
|
|
log(LOG_NOTICE, "Veriexec: Contaminated flags `0x%x' "
|
|
"for `%s', skipping.\n", extra_flags, file);
|
|
|
|
error = EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!(vfe->type & (VERIEXEC_DIRECT | VERIEXEC_INDIRECT |
|
|
VERIEXEC_FILE)))
|
|
vfe->type |= VERIEXEC_DIRECT;
|
|
|
|
vfe->status = FINGERPRINT_NOTEVAL;
|
|
if (prop_bool_true(prop_dictionary_get(dict, "keep-filename"))) {
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
|
|
len = strlen(file) + 1;
|
|
vfe->filename = malloc(len, M_VERIEXEC, M_WAITOK);
|
|
strlcpy(vfe->filename, file, len);
|
|
} else
|
|
vfe->filename = NULL;
|
|
|
|
vfe->page_fp = NULL;
|
|
vfe->page_fp_status = PAGE_FP_NONE;
|
|
vfe->npages = 0;
|
|
vfe->last_page_size = 0;
|
|
|
|
vte = veriexec_table_lookup(nid.ni_vp->v_mount);
|
|
if (vte == NULL)
|
|
vte = veriexec_table_add(l, nid.ni_vp->v_mount);
|
|
|
|
/* XXX if we bail below this, we might want to gc newly created vtes. */
|
|
|
|
error = fileassoc_add(nid.ni_vp, veriexec_hook, vfe);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
vte->vte_count++;
|
|
|
|
if (prop_bool_true(prop_dictionary_get(dict, "eval-on-load")) ||
|
|
(vfe->type & VERIEXEC_UNTRUSTED)) {
|
|
u_char *digest;
|
|
|
|
digest = malloc(vfe->ops->hash_len, M_VERIEXEC,
|
|
M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
|
|
|
|
error = veriexec_fp_calc(l, nid.ni_vp, vfe, digest);
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
free(digest, M_VERIEXEC);
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (veriexec_fp_cmp(vfe->ops, vfe->fp, digest) == 0)
|
|
vfe->status = FINGERPRINT_VALID;
|
|
else
|
|
vfe->status = FINGERPRINT_NOMATCH;
|
|
|
|
free(digest, M_VERIEXEC);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
veriexec_file_report(NULL, "New entry.", file, NULL, REPORT_DEBUG);
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
vrele(nid.ni_vp);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
veriexec_file_free(vfe);
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
veriexec_table_delete(struct lwp *l, struct mount *mp) {
|
|
struct veriexec_table_entry *vte;
|
|
|
|
vte = veriexec_table_lookup(mp);
|
|
if (vte == NULL)
|
|
return (ENOENT);
|
|
|
|
veriexec_mountspecific_dtor(vte);
|
|
mount_setspecific(mp, veriexec_mountspecific_key, NULL);
|
|
|
|
return (fileassoc_table_clear(mp, veriexec_hook));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
veriexec_file_delete(struct lwp *l, struct vnode *vp) {
|
|
struct veriexec_table_entry *vte;
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
vte = veriexec_table_lookup(vp->v_mount);
|
|
if (vte == NULL)
|
|
return (ENOENT);
|
|
|
|
error = fileassoc_clear(vp, veriexec_hook);
|
|
if (!error)
|
|
vte->vte_count--;
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Convert Veriexec entry data to a dictionary readable by userland tools.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
veriexec_file_convert(struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe, prop_dictionary_t rdict)
|
|
{
|
|
if (vfe->filename)
|
|
prop_dictionary_set(rdict, "file",
|
|
prop_string_create_cstring(vfe->filename));
|
|
prop_dictionary_set_uint8(rdict, "entry-type", vfe->type);
|
|
prop_dictionary_set_uint8(rdict, "status", vfe->status);
|
|
prop_dictionary_set(rdict, "fp-type",
|
|
prop_string_create_cstring(vfe->ops->type));
|
|
prop_dictionary_set(rdict, "fp",
|
|
prop_data_create_data(vfe->fp, vfe->ops->hash_len));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
veriexec_convert(struct vnode *vp, prop_dictionary_t rdict)
|
|
{
|
|
struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe;
|
|
|
|
vfe = veriexec_get(vp);
|
|
if (vfe == NULL)
|
|
return (ENOENT);
|
|
|
|
veriexec_file_convert(vfe, rdict);
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
veriexec_unmountchk(struct mount *mp)
|
|
{
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
if (doing_shutdown)
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
switch (veriexec_strict) {
|
|
case VERIEXEC_LEARNING:
|
|
error = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VERIEXEC_IDS:
|
|
if (veriexec_table_lookup(mp) != NULL) {
|
|
log(LOG_INFO, "Veriexec: IDS mode, allowing unmount "
|
|
"of \"%s\".\n", mp->mnt_stat.f_mntonname);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
error = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VERIEXEC_IPS: {
|
|
struct veriexec_table_entry *vte;
|
|
|
|
vte = veriexec_table_lookup(mp);
|
|
if ((vte != NULL) && (vte->vte_count > 0)) {
|
|
log(LOG_ALERT, "Veriexec: IPS mode, preventing"
|
|
" unmount of \"%s\" with monitored files.\n",
|
|
mp->mnt_stat.f_mntonname);
|
|
|
|
error = EPERM;
|
|
} else
|
|
error = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case VERIEXEC_LOCKDOWN:
|
|
default:
|
|
log(LOG_ALERT, "Veriexec: Lockdown mode, preventing unmount "
|
|
"of \"%s\".\n", mp->mnt_stat.f_mntonname);
|
|
error = EPERM;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
veriexec_openchk(struct lwp *l, struct vnode *vp, const char *path, int fmode)
|
|
{
|
|
struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe = NULL;
|
|
int error = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (vp == NULL) {
|
|
/* If no creation requested, let this fail normally. */
|
|
if (!(fmode & O_CREAT))
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
/* Lockdown mode: Prevent creation of new files. */
|
|
if (veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_LOCKDOWN) {
|
|
log(LOG_ALERT, "Veriexec: Preventing new file "
|
|
"creation in `%s'.\n", path);
|
|
error = EPERM;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
error = veriexec_file_verify(l, vp, path, VERIEXEC_FILE, &vfe);
|
|
if (error)
|
|
goto out;
|
|
|
|
if ((vfe != NULL) && ((fmode & FWRITE) || (fmode & O_TRUNC))) {
|
|
veriexec_file_report(vfe, "Write access request.", path, l,
|
|
REPORT_ALWAYS | REPORT_ALARM);
|
|
|
|
/* IPS mode: Deny write access to monitored files. */
|
|
if (veriexec_strict >= VERIEXEC_IPS)
|
|
error = EPERM;
|
|
else
|
|
veriexec_file_purge(vfe);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
veriexec_file_dump(struct veriexec_file_entry *vfe, prop_array_t entries)
|
|
{
|
|
prop_dictionary_t entry;
|
|
|
|
/* If we don't have a filename, this is meaningless. */
|
|
if (vfe->filename == NULL)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
entry = prop_dictionary_create();
|
|
|
|
veriexec_file_convert(vfe, entry);
|
|
|
|
prop_array_add(entries, entry);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
veriexec_dump(struct lwp *l, prop_array_t rarray)
|
|
{
|
|
struct mount *mp;
|
|
|
|
CIRCLEQ_FOREACH(mp, &mountlist, mnt_list) {
|
|
fileassoc_table_run(mp, veriexec_hook,
|
|
(fileassoc_cb_t)veriexec_file_dump, rarray);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
veriexec_flush(struct lwp *l)
|
|
{
|
|
struct mount *mp;
|
|
int error = 0;
|
|
|
|
CIRCLEQ_FOREACH(mp, &mountlist, mnt_list) {
|
|
int lerror;
|
|
|
|
lerror = veriexec_table_delete(l, mp);
|
|
if (lerror && lerror != ENOENT)
|
|
error = lerror;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
}
|