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DNSEXT R. Arends
Internet-Draft Telematica Instituut
Expires: January 19, 2006 M. Kosters
D. Blacka
Verisign, Inc.
July 18, 2005
DNSSEC Opt-In
draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-opt-in-07
Status of this Memo
By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 19, 2006.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
Abstract
In the DNS security extensions (DNSSEC, defined in RFC 4033 [3], RFC
4034 [4], and RFC 4035 [5]), delegations to unsigned subzones are
cryptographically secured. Maintaining this cryptography is not
practical or necessary. This document describes an experimental
"Opt-In" model that allows administrators to omit this cryptography
and manage the cost of adopting DNSSEC with large zones.
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Table of Contents
1. Definitions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Experimental Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Protocol Additions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1 Server Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1.1 Delegations Only . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1.2 Insecure Delegation Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1.3 Wildcards and Opt-In . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1.4 Dynamic Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2 Client Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.1 Delegations Only . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.2 Validation Process Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.3 NSEC Record Caching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2.4 Use of the AD bit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. Transition Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
11.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
11.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A. Implementing Opt-In using "Views" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . 16
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1. Definitions and Terminology
Throughout this document, familiarity with the DNS system (RFC 1035
[1]), DNS security extensions ([3], [4], and [5], referred to in this
document as "standard DNSSEC"), and DNSSEC terminology (RFC 3090
[10]) is assumed.
The following abbreviations and terms are used in this document:
RR: is used to refer to a DNS resource record.
RRset: refers to a Resource Record Set, as defined by [8]. In this
document, the RRset is also defined to include the covering RRSIG
records, if any exist.
signed name: refers to a DNS name that has, at minimum, a (signed)
NSEC record.
unsigned name: refers to a DNS name that does not (at least) have a
NSEC record.
covering NSEC record/RRset: is the NSEC record used to prove
(non)existence of a particular name or RRset. This means that for
a RRset or name 'N', the covering NSEC record has the name 'N', or
has an owner name less than 'N' and "next" name greater than 'N'.
delegation: refers to a NS RRset with a name different from the
current zone apex (non-zone-apex), signifying a delegation to a
subzone.
secure delegation: refers to a signed name containing a delegation
(NS RRset), and a signed DS RRset, signifying a delegation to a
signed subzone.
insecure delegation: refers to a signed name containing a delegation
(NS RRset), but lacking a DS RRset, signifying a delegation to an
unsigned subzone.
Opt-In insecure delegation: refers to an unsigned name containing
only a delegation NS RRset. The covering NSEC record uses the
Opt-In methodology described in this document.
The key words "MUST, "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY, and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [7].
2. Overview
The cost to cryptographically secure delegations to unsigned zones is
high for large delegation-centric zones and zones where insecure
delegations will be updated rapidly. For these zones, the costs of
maintaining the NSEC record chain may be extremely high relative to
the gain of cryptographically authenticating existence of unsecured
zones.
This document describes an experimental method of eliminating the
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superfluous cryptography present in secure delegations to unsigned
zones. Using "Opt-In", a zone administrator can choose to remove
insecure delegations from the NSEC chain. This is accomplished by
extending the semantics of the NSEC record by using a redundant bit
in the type map.
3. Experimental Status
This document describes an EXPERIMENTAL extension to DNSSEC. It
interoperates with non-experimental DNSSEC using the technique
described in [6]. This experiment is identified with the following
private algorithms (using algorithm 253):
"3.optin.verisignlabs.com": is an alias for DNSSEC algorithm 3, DSA,
and
"5.optin.verisignlabs.com": is an alias for DNSSEC algorithm 5,
RSASHA1.
Servers wishing to sign and serve zones that utilize Opt-In MUST sign
the zone with only one or more of these private algorithms. This
requires the signing tools and servers to support private algorithms,
as well as Opt-In.
Resolvers wishing to validate Opt-In zones MUST only do so when the
zone is only signed using one or more of these private algorithms.
The remainder of this document assumes that the servers and resolvers
involved are aware of and are involved in this experiment.
4. Protocol Additions
In DNSSEC, delegation NS RRsets are not signed, but are instead
accompanied by a NSEC RRset of the same name and (possibly) a DS
record. The security status of the subzone is determined by the
presence or absence of the DS RRset, cryptographically proven by the
NSEC record. Opt-In expands this definition by allowing insecure
delegations to exist within an otherwise signed zone without the
corresponding NSEC record at the delegation's owner name. These
insecure delegations are proven insecure by using a covering NSEC
record.
Since this represents a change of the interpretation of NSEC records,
resolvers must be able to distinguish between RFC standard DNSSEC
NSEC records and Opt-In NSEC records. This is accomplished by
"tagging" the NSEC records that cover (or potentially cover) insecure
delegation nodes. This tag is indicated by the absence of the NSEC
bit in the type map. Since the NSEC bit in the type map merely
indicates the existence of the record itself, this bit is redundant
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and safe for use as a tag.
An Opt-In tagged NSEC record does not assert the (non)existence of
the delegations that it covers (except for a delegation with the same
name). This allows for the addition or removal of these delegations
without recalculating or resigning records in the NSEC chain.
However, Opt-In tagged NSEC records do assert the (non)existence of
other RRsets.
An Opt-In NSEC record MAY have the same name as an insecure
delegation. In this case, the delegation is proven insecure by the
lack of a DS bit in type map and the signed NSEC record does assert
the existence of the delegation.
Zones using Opt-In MAY contain a mixture of Opt-In tagged NSEC
records and standard DNSSEC NSEC records. If a NSEC record is not
Opt-In, there MUST NOT be any insecure delegations (or any other
records) between it and the RRsets indicated by the 'next domain
name' in the NSEC RDATA. If it is Opt-In, there MUST only be
insecure delegations between it and the next node indicated by the
'next domain name' in the NSEC RDATA.
In summary,
o An Opt-In NSEC type is identified by a zero-valued (or not-
specified) NSEC bit in the type bit map of the NSEC record.
o A RFC2535bis NSEC type is identified by a one-valued NSEC bit in
the type bit map of the NSEC record.
and,
o An Opt-In NSEC record does not assert the non-existence of a name
between its owner name and "next" name, although it does assert
that any name in this span MUST be an insecure delegation.
o An Opt-In NSEC record does assert the (non)existence of RRsets
with the same owner name.
4.1 Server Considerations
Opt-In imposes some new requirements on authoritative DNS servers.
4.1.1 Delegations Only
This specification dictates that only insecure delegations may exist
between the owner and "next" names of an Opt-In tagged NSEC record.
Signing tools SHOULD NOT generate signed zones that violate this
restriction. Servers SHOULD refuse to load and/or serve zones that
violate this restriction. Servers also SHOULD reject AXFR or IXFR
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responses that violate this restriction.
4.1.2 Insecure Delegation Responses
When returning an Opt-In insecure delegation, the server MUST return
the covering NSEC RRset in the Authority section.
In standard DNSSEC, NSEC records already must be returned along with
the insecure delegation. The primary difference that this proposal
introduces is that the Opt-In tagged NSEC record will have a
different owner name from the delegation RRset. This may require
implementations to search for the covering NSEC RRset.
4.1.3 Wildcards and Opt-In
Standard DNSSEC describes the practice of returning NSEC records to
prove the non-existence of an applicable wildcard in non-existent
name responses. This NSEC record can be described as a "negative
wildcard proof". The use of Opt-In NSEC records changes the
necessity for this practice. For non-existent name responses when
the query name (qname) is covered by an Opt-In tagged NSEC record,
servers MAY choose to omit the wildcard proof record, and clients
MUST NOT treat the absence of this NSEC record as a validation error.
The intent of the standard DNSSEC negative wildcard proof requirement
is to prevent malicious users from undetectably removing valid
wildcard responses. In order for this cryptographic proof to work,
the resolver must be able to prove:
1. The exact qname does not exist. This is done by the "normal"
NSEC record.
2. No applicable wildcard exists. This is done by returning a NSEC
record proving that the wildcard does not exist (this is the
negative wildcard proof).
However, if the NSEC record covering the exact qname is an Opt-In
NSEC record, the resolver will not be able to prove the first part of
this equation, as the qname might exist as an insecure delegation.
Thus, since the total proof cannot be completed, the negative
wildcard proof NSEC record is not useful.
The negative wildcard proof is also not useful when returned as part
of an Opt-In insecure delegation response for a similar reason: the
resolver cannot prove that the qname does or does not exist, and
therefore cannot prove that a wildcard expansion is valid.
The presence of an Opt-In tagged NSEC record does not change the
practice of returning a NSEC along with a wildcard expansion. Even
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though the Opt-In NSEC will not be able to prove that the wildcard
expansion is valid, it will prove that the wildcard expansion is not
masking any signed records.
4.1.4 Dynamic Update
Opt-In changes the semantics of Secure DNS Dynamic Update [9]. In
particular, it introduces the need for rules that describe when to
add or remove a delegation name from the NSEC chain. This document
does not attempt to define these rules. Until these rules are
defined, servers MUST NOT process DNS Dynamic Update requests against
zones that use Opt-In NSEC records. Servers SHOULD return responses
to update requests with RCODE=REFUSED.
4.2 Client Considerations
Opt-In imposes some new requirements on security-aware resolvers
(caching or otherwise).
4.2.1 Delegations Only
As stated in the "Server Considerations" section above, this
specification restricts the namespace covered by Opt-In tagged NSEC
records to insecure delegations only. Thus, resolvers MUST reject as
invalid any records that fall within an Opt-In NSEC record's span
that are not NS records or corresponding glue records.
4.2.2 Validation Process Changes
This specification does not change the resolver's resolution
algorithm. However, it does change the DNSSEC validation process.
Resolvers MUST be able to use Opt-In tagged NSEC records to
cryptographically prove the validity and security status (as
insecure) of a referral. Resolvers determine the security status of
the referred-to zone as follows:
o In standard DNSSEC, the security status is proven by the existence
or absence of a DS RRset at the same name as the delegation. The
existence of the DS RRset indicates that the referred-to zone is
signed. The absence of the DS RRset is proven using a verified
NSEC record of the same name that does not have the DS bit set in
the type map. This NSEC record MAY also be tagged as Opt-In.
o Using Opt-In, the security status is proven by the existence of a
DS record (for signed) or the presence of a verified Opt-In tagged
NSEC record that covers the delegation name. That is, the NSEC
record does not have the NSEC bit set in the type map, and the
delegation name falls between the NSEC's owner and "next" name.
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Using Opt-In does not substantially change the nature of following
referrals within DNSSEC. At every delegation point, the resolver
will have cryptographic proof that the referred-to subzone is signed
or unsigned.
When receiving either an Opt-In insecure delegation response or a
non-existent name response where that name is covered by an Opt-In
tagged NSEC record, the resolver MUST NOT require proof (in the form
of a NSEC record) that a wildcard did not exist.
4.2.3 NSEC Record Caching
Caching resolvers MUST be able to retrieve the appropriate covering
Opt-In NSEC record when returning referrals that need them. This
requirement differs from standard DNSSEC in that the covering NSEC
will not have the same owner name as the delegation. Some
implementations may have to use new methods for finding these NSEC
records.
4.2.4 Use of the AD bit
The AD bit, as defined by [2] and [5], MUST NOT be set when:
o sending a Name Error (RCODE=3) response where the covering NSEC is
tagged as Opt-In.
o sending an Opt-In insecure delegation response, unless the
covering (Opt-In) NSEC record's owner name equals the delegation
name.
This rule is based on what the Opt-In NSEC record actually proves:
for names that exist between the Opt-In NSEC record's owner and
"next" names, the Opt-In NSEC record cannot prove the non-existence
or existence of the name. As such, not all data in the response has
been cryptographically verified, so the AD bit cannot be set.
5. Benefits
Using Opt-In allows administrators of large and/or changing
delegation-centric zones to minimize the overhead involved in
maintaining the security of the zone.
Opt-In accomplishes this by eliminating the need for NSEC records for
insecure delegations. This, in a zone with a large number of
delegations to unsigned subzones, can lead to substantial space
savings (both in memory and on disk). Additionally, Opt-In allows
for the addition or removal of insecure delegations without modifying
the NSEC record chain. Zones that are frequently updating insecure
delegations (e.g., TLDs) can avoid the substantial overhead of
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modifying and resigning the affected NSEC records.
6. Example
Consider the zone EXAMPLE, shown below. This is a zone where all of
the NSEC records are tagged as Opt-In.
Example A: Fully Opt-In Zone.
EXAMPLE. SOA ...
EXAMPLE. RRSIG SOA ...
EXAMPLE. NS FIRST-SECURE.EXAMPLE.
EXAMPLE. RRSIG NS ...
EXAMPLE. DNSKEY ...
EXAMPLE. RRSIG DNSKEY ...
EXAMPLE. NSEC FIRST-SECURE.EXAMPLE. (
SOA NS RRSIG DNSKEY )
EXAMPLE. RRSIG NSEC ...
FIRST-SECURE.EXAMPLE. A ...
FIRST-SECURE.EXAMPLE. RRSIG A ...
FIRST-SECURE.EXAMPLE. NSEC NOT-SECURE-2.EXAMPLE. A RRSIG
FIRST-SECURE.EXAMPLE. RRSIG NSEC ...
NOT-SECURE.EXAMPLE. NS NS.NOT-SECURE.EXAMPLE.
NS.NOT-SECURE.EXAMPLE. A ...
NOT-SECURE-2.EXAMPLE. NS NS.NOT-SECURE.EXAMPLE.
NOT-SECURE-2.EXAMPLE NSEC SECOND-SECURE.EXAMPLE NS RRSIG
NOT-SECURE-2.EXAMPLE RRSIG NSEC ...
SECOND-SECURE.EXAMPLE. NS NS.ELSEWHERE.
SECOND-SECURE.EXAMPLE. DS ...
SECOND-SECURE.EXAMPLE. RRSIG DS ...
SECOND-SECURE.EXAMPLE. NSEC EXAMPLE. NS RRSIG DNSKEY
SECOND-SECURE.EXAMPLE. RRSIG NSEC ...
UNSIGNED.EXAMPLE. NS NS.UNSIGNED.EXAMPLE.
NS.UNSIGNED.EXAMPLE. A ...
In this example, a query for a signed RRset (e.g., "FIRST-
SECURE.EXAMPLE A"), or a secure delegation ("WWW.SECOND-
SECURE.EXAMPLE A") will result in a standard DNSSEC response.
A query for a nonexistent RRset will result in a response that
differs from standard DNSSEC by: the NSEC record will be tagged as
Opt-In, there may be no NSEC record proving the non-existence of a
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matching wildcard record, and the AD bit will not be set.
A query for an insecure delegation RRset (or a referral) will return
both the answer (in the Authority section) and the corresponding
Opt-In NSEC record to prove that it is not secure.
Example A.1: Response to query for WWW.UNSIGNED.EXAMPLE. A
RCODE=NOERROR, AD=0
Answer Section:
Authority Section:
UNSIGNED.EXAMPLE. NS NS.UNSIGNED.EXAMPLE
SECOND-SECURE.EXAMPLE. NSEC EXAMPLE. NS RRSIG DS
SECOND-SECURE.EXAMPLE. RRSIG NSEC ...
Additional Section:
NS.UNSIGNED.EXAMPLE. A ...
In the Example A.1 zone, the EXAMPLE. node MAY use either style of
NSEC record, because there are no insecure delegations that occur
between it and the next node, FIRST-SECURE.EXAMPLE. In other words,
Example A would still be a valid zone if the NSEC record for EXAMPLE.
was changed to the following RR:
EXAMPLE. NSEC FIRST-SECURE.EXAMPLE. (SOA NS
RRSIG DNSKEY NSEC )
However, the other NSEC records (FIRST-SECURE.EXAMPLE. and SECOND-
SECURE.EXAMPLE.) MUST be tagged as Opt-In because there are insecure
delegations in the range they define. (NOT-SECURE.EXAMPLE. and
UNSIGNED.EXAMPLE., respectively).
NOT-SECURE-2.EXAMPLE. is an example of an insecure delegation that is
part of the NSEC chain and also covered by an Opt-In tagged NSEC
record. Because NOT-SECURE-2.EXAMPLE. is a signed name, it cannot be
removed from the zone without modifying and resigning the prior NSEC
record. Delegations with names that fall between NOT-SECURE-
2.EXAMPLE. and SECOND-SECURE.EXAMPLE. may be added or removed without
resigning any NSEC records.
7. Transition Issues
Opt-In is not backwards compatible with standard DNSSEC and is
considered experimental. Standard DNSSEC compliant implementations
would not recognize Opt-In tagged NSEC records as different from
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standard NSEC records. Because of this, standard DNSSEC
implementations, if they were to validate Opt-In style responses,
would reject all Opt-In insecure delegations within a zone as
invalid. However, by only signing with private algorithms, standard
DNSSEC implementations will treat Opt-In responses as unsigned.
It should be noted that all elements in the resolution path between
(and including) the validator and the authoritative name server must
be aware of the Opt-In experiment and implement the Opt-In semantics
for successful validation to be possible. In particular, this
includes any caching middleboxes between the validator and
authoritative name server.
8. Security Considerations
Opt-In allows for unsigned names, in the form of delegations to
unsigned subzones, to exist within an otherwise signed zone. All
unsigned names are, by definition, insecure, and their validity or
existence cannot by cryptographically proven.
In general:
o Records with unsigned names (whether existing or not) suffer from
the same vulnerabilities as records in an unsigned zone. These
vulnerabilities are described in more detail in [12] (note in
particular sections 2.3, "Name Games" and 2.6, "Authenticated
Denial").
o Records with signed names have the same security whether or not
Opt-In is used.
Note that with or without Opt-In, an insecure delegation may have its
contents undetectably altered by an attacker. Because of this, the
primary difference in security that Opt-In introduces is the loss of
the ability to prove the existence or nonexistence of an insecure
delegation within the span of an Opt-In NSEC record.
In particular, this means that a malicious entity may be able to
insert or delete records with unsigned names. These records are
normally NS records, but this also includes signed wildcard
expansions (while the wildcard record itself is signed, its expanded
name is an unsigned name).
For example, if a resolver received the following response from the
example zone above:
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Example S.1: Response to query for WWW.DOES-NOT-EXIST.EXAMPLE. A
RCODE=NOERROR
Answer Section:
Authority Section:
DOES-NOT-EXIST.EXAMPLE. NS NS.FORGED.
EXAMPLE. NSEC FIRST-SECURE.EXAMPLE. SOA NS \
RRSIG DNSKEY
EXAMPLE. RRSIG NSEC ...
Additional Section:
The resolver would have no choice but to believe that the referral to
NS.FORGED. is valid. If a wildcard existed that would have been
expanded to cover "WWW.DOES-NOT-EXIST.EXAMPLE.", an attacker could
have undetectably removed it and replaced it with the forged
delegation.
Note that being able to add a delegation is functionally equivalent
to being able to add any record type: an attacker merely has to forge
a delegation to nameserver under his/her control and place whatever
records needed at the subzone apex.
While in particular cases, this issue may not present a significant
security problem, in general it should not be lightly dismissed.
Therefore, it is strongly RECOMMENDED that Opt-In be used sparingly.
In particular, zone signing tools SHOULD NOT default to Opt-In, and
MAY choose to not support Opt-In at all.
9. IANA Considerations
None.
10. Acknowledgments
The contributions, suggestions and remarks of the following persons
(in alphabetic order) to this draft are acknowledged:
Mats Dufberg, Miek Gieben, Olafur Gudmundsson, Bob Halley, Olaf
Kolkman, Edward Lewis, Ted Lindgreen, Rip Loomis, Bill Manning,
Dan Massey, Scott Rose, Mike Schiraldi, Jakob Schlyter, Brian
Wellington.
11. References
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11.1 Normative References
[1] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
[2] Wellington, B. and O. Gudmundsson, "Redefinition of DNS
Authenticated Data (AD) bit", RFC 3655, November 2003.
[3] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose,
"DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC 4033,
March 2005.
[4] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose,
"Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", RFC 4034,
March 2005.
[5] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose,
"Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions",
RFC 4035, March 2005.
[6] Blacka, D., "DNSSEC Experiments",
draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-experiments-01 (work in progress),
July 2005.
11.2 Informative References
[7] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[8] Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Clarifications to the DNS Specification",
RFC 2181, July 1997.
[9] Eastlake, D., "Secure Domain Name System Dynamic Update",
RFC 2137, April 1997.
[10] Lewis, E., "DNS Security Extension Clarification on Zone
Status", RFC 3090, March 2001.
[11] Conrad, D., "Indicating Resolver Support of DNSSEC", RFC 3225,
December 2001.
[12] Atkins, D. and R. Austein, "Threat Analysis of the Domain Name
System (DNS)", RFC 3833, August 2004.
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Authors' Addresses
Roy Arends
Telematica Instituut
Drienerlolaan 5
7522 NB Enschede
NL
Email: roy.arends@telin.nl
Mark Kosters
Verisign, Inc.
21355 Ridgetop Circle
Dulles, VA 20166
US
Phone: +1 703 948 3200
Email: markk@verisign.com
URI: http://www.verisignlabs.com
David Blacka
Verisign, Inc.
21355 Ridgetop Circle
Dulles, VA 20166
US
Phone: +1 703 948 3200
Email: davidb@verisign.com
URI: http://www.verisignlabs.com
Appendix A. Implementing Opt-In using "Views"
In many cases, it may be convenient to implement an Opt-In zone by
combining two separately maintained "views" of a zone at request
time. In this context, "view" refers to a particular version of a
zone, not to any specific DNS implementation feature.
In this scenario, one view is the secure view, the other is the
insecure (or legacy) view. The secure view consists of an entirely
signed zone using Opt-In tagged NSEC records. The insecure view
contains no DNSSEC information. It is helpful, although not
necessary, for the secure view to be a subset (minus DNSSEC records)
of the insecure view.
In addition, the only RRsets that may solely exist in the insecure
view are non-zone-apex NS RRsets. That is, all non-NS RRsets (and
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the zone apex NS RRset) MUST be signed and in the secure view.
These two views may be combined at request time to provide a virtual,
single Opt-In zone. The following algorithm is used when responding
to each query:
V_A is the secure view as described above.
V_B is the insecure view as described above.
R_A is a response generated from V_A, following RFC 2535bis.
R_B is a response generated from V_B, following DNS resolution as
per RFC 1035 [1].
R_C is the response generated by combining R_A with R_B, as
described below.
A query is DNSSEC-aware if it either has the DO bit [11] turned
on, or is for a DNSSEC-specific record type.
1. If V_A is a subset of V_B and the query is not DNSSEC-aware,
generate and return R_B, otherwise
2. Generate R_A.
3. If R_A's RCODE != NXDOMAIN, return R_A, otherwise
4. Generate R_B and combine it with R_A to form R_C:
For each section (ANSWER, AUTHORITY, ADDITIONAL), copy the
records from R_A into R_B, EXCEPT the AUTHORITY section SOA
record, if R_B's RCODE = NOERROR.
5. Return R_C.
Arends, et al. Expires January 19, 2006 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft DNSSEC Opt-In July 2005
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Arends, et al. Expires January 19, 2006 [Page 16]
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